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“The job of heli-ski guides [is] to always be observant for the unexpected, and to 
continually test conditions.  The decisions by heli-ski guides have a very low shelf 
life”. 
Madam Justice Koenigsberg (1996)  
Supreme Court of British Columbia, Case No. C922041 




High quality decision-making can be produced through a sophisticated 
analytical process in addition to an intuitive process.  A high quality intuitive process 
is dependent on an extensive repertoire of previous patterns generated by decision 
outcomes.  Intuition is frequently poorly understood and often dismissed as 
unreliable and irrelevant.  Yet there is a noteworthy sector within the literature that 
suggests otherwise (Glöckner, 2009; Smith, 2007).  Termed dual-process (Evans, 
2010), the combined strength of intuition and analysis forms the basis of how expert 
ski guides make decisions in avalanche terrain.  Typically, the quality of the decision 
process is described as being contingent on the evolved expertise of the decision 
maker.  Deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993) aimed at the 
development of context specific expertise provides the foundation.   
Ski guides are charged with the role of conducting guests through a 
constantly changing, hazardous environment with the goal of maximizing the guests’ 
rewards, within a risk envelope that does not eliminate the potential for a fatality.  
The challenge for ski guides is to formulate an operational context within a feedback 
environment that is plagued with inconsistencies and burdened with massive 
negative consequences.  The ski guide decision process is influenced by the depth 
and breadth of expertise, with rapid pattern recognition generating a sense of 
confidence.  However misleading environmental feedback can complicate the 
perception of decision quality.  When nothing bad happens, poor decisions can 
masquerade as good ones.  This may support the development of a faulty pattern 
recognition process.  
 Research that helps to describe the innovative practices and extant knowledge 
of mountain guiding will help to harmonise theory and practice.  There is 
considerable knowledge entrenched within the daily activities of the Canadian 
mechanized ski industry, as the average annual fatality rate is just under one and a 
half fatalities per 100,000 skier days.  However it is arguable that even this number 
of fatalities is too many and all efforts should be made to reduce the number of 
fatalities.  
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 Data were contributed over two seasons (2008/09 and 2009/10) by a self-
selected group of 35 heli-ski and snowcat-ski guides working in British Columbia.  
Mixed methods were used to analyse three sources of data.  An initial quantitative 
analysis of the participants’ background experience and 96 event reports (62 good 
day reports and 34 near-miss reports) was used to provoke qualitative questions of 
interview data.  
 The findings of this study address the issue of how and when intuition plays a 
role in ski guide decision-making.  Decision-making in avalanche terrain is a 
complex process and professional guides have well developed strategies to help them 
manage the challenges.  Years of training in analytical decision processes are 
supported by a wealth of available snowpack and weather information.  Guiding 
teams provide a valuable peer support network to further the sophistication of the 
decision process.  Yet despite the wealth of information available to support an 
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 Standing at the top of a pristine wilderness peak, the ski guide prepares a 
group of eleven guests for the rewards of a 1500 metre descent through deep, 
untracked powder.  Weather, snowpack and terrain usage data have been gathered 
throughout the winter, enabling the guide to carefully analyse the present hazard 
according to well-developed industry standards.  This has all come together, 
resulting in a decision to ski this slope.  As the guide slides over to the edge of the 
steep slope, a feeling emerges from somewhere within the guide.  It is a bad feeling.  
He cannot figure out the source of the feeling, only that something is not right.  
 In the morning meeting with the other guides, it had been decided that this 
run should be safe to ski.  But right here, right now, with eleven guests looking to 
him for a decision and eager to ski the slope, his gut, or his intuition told him 
something was wrong, something did not feel right.  What should he do? 
1.1	  Introduction	  
 The overall aim of this research project was to examine whether highly 
experienced heli-ski and snowcat-ski guides used intuition as a component of their 
decision process.  Decisions that resulted in near-miss events were examined, as 
were decisions that resulted in no negative consequences.  Canadian ski guides have 
been trained to use an analytical decision process, yet anecdotal evidence suggests 
that intuition also plays a role.   
 The first chapter introduces the reader to the layout of the thesis and 
establishes the research question.  The meanings of key words that are used 
throughout the document are established including: hazard, risk, consequence, near-
miss, good day, dual process, intuition, analysis and confidence.  A brief overview of 
each chapter provides the skeletal framework of the dissertation.  The introductory 
chapter concludes with a section on my role as the researcher. 
1.2	  Background	  Literature	  
 Decision-making in avalanche terrain is a complex process; so professional 
backcountry ski guides need well-developed strategies to help them navigate through 
the challenges.  Guides are charged with the role of conducting guests through a 
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constantly changing, hazardous, wilderness environment with the goal of 
maximizing the guests’ rewards (deep powder skiing) within a risk envelope that 
does not eliminate the potential for a fatality (Bruns, 1996; Canadian Mountain 
Holidays, 2007).  In many ways these challenges are exacerbated when mechanical 
means such as helicopters and snow cats are used to facilitate access to terrain.  Over 
the course of a day, a ski group that uses a four minute helicopter ride to get to the 
top of each ski run will travel through far more potential avalanche terrain than a ski 
touring group that takes three to four hours to get to the same place.  A typical day of 
heli-skiing may include over 7000 metres of downhill skiing, while a typical day of 
ski touring may involve 1500 metres of ascent and 1500 metres of descent.  The ski 
touring guide not only makes fewer avalanche hazard-related decisions, but he also 
has the opportunity to enter the terrain slowly and develop a feel for the nature of the 
environment. 
  The majority of decisions that a ski guide makes are related to hazard 
management, with the greatest challenge being the assessment of avalanche risk.  
There is a significant body of knowledge related to decision making in hazardous 
environments within the judgment and decision making literature.  However, much 
of this theoretical knowledge has not been applied to the practical field of ski 
guiding.  This study connects the praxis of ski guide decision-making with the 
theoretical underpinnings of the academic literature.  
 Locating this research question within the literature was not an easy task as it 
overlapped three distinct bodies of knowledge; judgment and decision-making 
(JDM), adventure leadership, and snow science.  Each of these bodies of knowledge 
brought a sequentially tighter focus to the research question.  The JDM literature 
anchored in cognitive psychology provided the theoretical basis of decision-making 
for the other two literatures.  Adventure leadership addressed the issues of a broad 
range of adventure activities and philosophies.  Snow science specifically targeted 
the issue of human interactions with snow dynamics.  The research question fits best 
within the realm of snow sciences, even if it was not an entirely comfortable fit.  
However the question borrowed theories from JDM and applied them to both snow 
science and adventure leadership. 
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 The judgment and decision-making literature has suggested that decision-
making has two components, analysis and intuition that contribute toward a final 
decision solution (Evans, 2008; Hogarth, 2005).  Analysis can be thought of as the 
product of careful thought and reflection, whereas intuition can be considered the 
product of our learned experiences or expertise (Evans, 2010).  Expertise is thought 
to range along a continuum and is generated through the depth and breadth of 
experiences (Hammond & Klein, 1993).  The ability to rapidly recognize previously 
experienced patterns and match them with the current situation comes from these 
many and varied experiences and can generate a sense of confidence (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996).  However misleading environmental feedback can complicate the 
perception of decision quality.  For example, when nothing bad happens, poor 
decisions can masquerade as good ones.  This notion of non-event feedback has the 
potential to support the development of a faulty pattern recognition process with a 
corresponding negative effect on the quality of future intuitive responses (Hogarth, 
1980).  Related questions that have been asked within the literature include: why can 
a deliberate analytical thought process be discarded at the last minute in favour of a 
sudden intuitive feeling, or how can a strong intuitive feeling, which promotes a 
sense of complete confidence be so radically wrong? 
 Snow science is the body of knowledge concerned with the theory and 
practice of snow avalanches.  There are two avenues of research within the snow 
science literature: the snow scientists who quantitatively study the physics and 
mechanics of the snow avalanche phenomenon and the social scientists that study 
human interaction with that phenomenon.  The snow scientists have conducted the 
majority of research within snow studies, with significantly less research from social 
scientists.  The results from the predominantly quantitative studies of avalanche 
mechanics contribute to new ways of testing and understanding the avalanche 
environment.  These are of great benefit to the end user, particularly the ski guide, 
however it is the results from the social scientists’ studies that can contribute to how 
these snowpack tests are used and how the results can be applied to the challenge of 
making decisions on the selection of safe skiing terrain for guests.  
 Decision-making within an avalanche context has been researched, but not 
extensively.  The majority of these social studies have been conducted on amateur or 
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recreational level decision makers (Hägeli, McCammon, Jamieson, Israelson, & 
Statham, 2006).  Most of these studies have taken a heuristics and bias approach, 
looking at the heuristics or ‘rules of thumb’ commonly employed and the frequent 
flaws, or heuristic biases that practitioners are susceptible to (McCammon, 2002).  
Expert decision-making in avalanche terrain is a relatively untouched area.   
 During the early development of heli-skiing, in the late 1960’s and early 
‘70’s, ski guides did not have a well defined analytical pathway to direct their 
decision strategy; instead they used their intuition (Cardon, 2004).  This has changed 
over the last twenty years as an analytical support structure has been built and 
decision support tools have been created.  It has reached the point that the use of 
intuitive strategies is frowned upon, likely because the role of intuition is poorly 
understood.  Current industry training and practices encourage practitioners to use 
scientific resources such as advanced snowpack tests to form the basis for their 
decisions (McClung & Schaerer, 2006).  There are many sophisticated tools, which 
can be integrated into an analytical decision process.  While there is great value in 
these tests, a reliance on the strength and weight of this evidence within the decision 
process, overshadows the role that intuition plays.  The significance of the intuitive 
response in avalanche decision-making has been downplayed, possibly due to an 
ignorance of the process, and is undervalued in the Canadian avalanche industry. 
1.2.1	  The	  Knowledge	  Gap	  
 The development and use of intuition by expert decision makers has been the 
focus of considerable research in other fields such as nursing (Benner, 1984) and fire 
fighting (Klein, 1998).  A more complete picture of how intuition plays a role in the 
decision process of ski guides and further, how it contributes to feelings of 
confidence has not been studied.  Previous snow science studies have recognized that 
intuition is a component of the decision process, but deeper questions such as how 
and when ski guides apply intuition in the decision process have not been addressed 
(Adams, 2005; Grímsdóttir, 2004; Hägeli, 2005).  Inferences can be drawn from 
previous research conclusions, but my contribution will be to look at an environment 
that has working sample of experts and is significantly different in numerous aspects.  
See Chapter 3 for a more elaborate discussion of the knowledge gap. 
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 The context that sets ski guiding apart from other complex and 
consequential decision environments has four distinct characteristics.  The first two 
are unique to ski guiding, while the second two are not unique, but when layered on 
top of the first two create additional complexities. 
• A unique physical environment 
o A winter mountain setting with localized microclimates can generate 
widely varying snowpack stability due to changing temperature, 
variations in wind speed and direction, and precipitation amounts 
and rates of accumulation.  The hazard to a skier presented by this 
environment will change temporally and spatially.  The hazard will 
be linked to how and where the skier is placed in the environment.   
• A unique feedback environment 
o Feedback from the physical environment can be absent or 
misleading.  A non-event, typically characterised by a slope not 
avalanching, could be misconstrued as a good decision. 
o The best feedback comes from a group of guides (rather than a 
single individual) who are working together.  Additional feedback 
comes from other guides working in the same region through the 
daily snowpack information exchange. 
• Professional Environment 
o Guest expectations and the guide’s desire to accommodate those 
needs can play a significant role in the decision process.   
• Corporate Environment 
o The goal of a successful heli-ski or cat-ski ski operator is ultimately 
to make money.  Opportunities for financial success hinge on guest 
satisfaction.  
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 New and useful insights will be generated through an analysis of whether 
the presence or absence of feedback has an impact on the development and use of 
intuition.  Ski guiding is a novel environment that may provide a greater 
understanding of the decision-making phenomenon. 
 Within an individual, the development of the potential to have and use 
intuition well has generally been thought to depend on a high level of expertise 
(Harteis, Koch, & Morgenthaler, 2008; Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  The 
development of expertise has typically been linked to the learning that is generated 
through a series of experiences.  These experiences need to fulfil the concept of 
deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993).  The final essential piece of the puzzle is 
feedback on decisions made, which is solicited and internalized from both internal 
and external sources.  This feedback shapes the learning and speeds the expertise-
building process (Hogarth, Gibbs, McKenzie, & Marquis, 1991). 
 The feedback loop potentially plays a critical role in the development of a 
sophisticated and nuanced decision-making process.  It has been argued that 
feedback is the key determinant in the development of intuition, particularly in light 
of potential, yet unrealized adverse consequences (Hogarth et al., 1991).  Ski guides 
are typically reluctant to test their hypotheses on slope stability when the 
consequence of being wrong is potentially deadly.  As a result, guides have learned 
to deliberately create avalanches, but only on small test slopes.  This is achieved by 
selecting the weakest part of a slope, typically a convex roll.  Convex rolls are found 
at the point where the slope angle begins to steepen.  The snowpack is under greater 
tension at this point and more easily triggered (McClung & Schaerer, 2006).  The 
guide will ski across the convexity to test the snowpack stability, recognizing that if 
he is successful, he may be caught in the resulting avalanche.  This is typically best 
done on slopes that do not have the potential to produce avalanches capable of fully 
burying and killing a skier.   
 Avalanche control teams have the luxury of using explosive control to test 
their theories without putting themselves at personal risk.  Ski guiding companies do 
not make extensive use of explosive avalanche control due to the vastness of the 
typical operation and the cost of explosives.  Unfortunately, the application of 
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explosives to a slope may still provide a non-result.  The implications of the non-
result may be harder to interpret and may lead to feelings of over-confidence. 
 Within the ski guiding industry, people have questioned research into 
intuition and mentioned the challenge of ‘measuring’ intuition.  Although it may be 
hard to do, it does not mean it should not be done.  Smith (2007) developed the 
Smith Intuition Instrument, but this was not a good fit with ski guiding as it included 
factors that were not applicable such as spiritual, sensing energy and reassuring 
feelings.  Other studies used decision times (Glöckner, 2009), eye-tracking 
(Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009) and Cognitive Style tests (Allinson & 
Hayes, 1996).  I looked for a simpler gauge that could measure, or assess intuition in 
a field setting based on whether feelings were present or not, strong or weak, good or 
bad.   
 There may be challenges to the measurement of intuition, but there are 
certainly strategies that will facilitate data collection and interpretation.  These 
strategies are addressed in future chapters.  The search for meaning within guides’ 
decision strategies is a considerable challenge, however it addresses a substantial 
need.  There are numerous implications of having this information.  The most 
dramatic is the potential for fewer avalanche accidents.  A reduction in injuries and 
fatalities for professionally guided groups will reflect well on the ski guiding 
industry.  Lessons learned by professionals will likely have a ‘trickle down effect’ to 
recreational users. 
 Based on my review of the literature, found in Chapter 3, gaps exist 
specifically in the snow science knowledge base, and more generally within the 
adventure leadership literature.  Previous research has failed to significantly integrate 
and apply the theories and models of expert decision-making within the JDM 
literature into the adventure leadership or the snow science literatures.  The works of 
Adams (2005) and Grímsdóttir (2004) laid the foundation upon which this current 
research is founded.  
 Dual process models of decision-making have been developed and used to 
evaluate the decision-making of other risk-based decision environments such as 
aviation and fire-fighting, but they have not been applied to wilderness ski guiding 
(Evans, 2011; Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  The intent of my research was to use a 
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testing out research strategy to explore the boundaries of these previous research 
generalizations and to apply JDM theories of heuristics and biases and naturalistic 
decision-making to ski guide decision-making (Phillips & Pugh, 2005). This strategy 
had the potential to generate new knowledge that could be applied to one or more of 
the three bodies of knowledge. 
1.2.2	  The	  Research	  Issues	  	  
 The research issues addressed by this study concern the degree to which 
intuition plays a role in the decision-making process of heli-ski and snowcat-ski 
guides in British Columbia, within a culture that supports and encourages analytical 
decision-making.  The decision culture of the Canadian professional ski guiding 
industry is described in Chapter Two.  The Association of Canadian Mountain 
Guides, the Canadian Ski Guide Association, the Canadian Avalanche Association 
and HeliCat Canada all teach and support a well-developed analytical decision 
structure.  
This research investigated whether decision strategies could be more 
successful if there was an increased emphasis on the intuitive response.  Inherent 
within an investigation of intuition is an assessment of the influence of expertise, as 
much of the literature suggests that more sophisticated intuitive responses are 
associated with increased expertise.  Connected to this theme is a discussion of 
whether good and bad feelings, known as somatic markers, can be reliable indicators 
for decision responses.  Two additional elements that are related to the intuitive 
decision-making issue are questions related to how feelings of confidence are 
generated and the impact that feedback has on the development of intuition. 
1.3	  Definitions	  
 The following terms, which are described briefly here, will be used 
extensively through the document.  They will be described in greater depth in the 








 Snow avalanches vary in size and destructive potential.  They are comprised 
mainly of snow, but may also contain ice and dirt (McClung & Schaerer, 2006).  
They can be triggered naturally, or by humans or animals.   
Hazard 
 The occupational health and safety definition suggests that hazards have the 
potential to cause harm or damage (Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and 
Safety, 2012).  
Avalanche Hazard  
 Avalanche hazard is based on the likelihood and degree of harm occurring.  
This can be measured through an estimation of the destructive potential of an 
avalanche overlaid by a likelihood or probability statement (Statham, 2008a). 
Avalanche Risk 
 An avalanche risk definition is based on the premise that specific avalanche-
related elements at risk are exposed and vulnerable to a hazard.  For the purpose of 
this study, the elements at risk are people and occasionally the helicopters and 
snowcats that transport them.   
Exposure 
 Exposure refers to the location within the terrain of the element at risk and 
the length of time that the element is there.  Ski guides have more control over their 
exposure to hazards than any other component of the risk management equation, as 
they can choose both the timing and the location of their travel.  Exposure can be 
estimated through an analysis of location and duration.  This is the only factor that 
the ski guide has complete control over, thus it plays a huge role in ski guide 
decision-making (Statham, 2008a). 
Vulnerability 
 Vulnerability is a measure of how easily the element at risk will be damaged 
by the magnitude of the avalanche.  It is related to the layers of protection that are 
available.  For example, a small avalanche might only bury a skier up to his waist, 
while the same size avalanche would be powerful enough to sweep a climber off a 
cliff.  It has been suggested that experienced ski guides are less vulnerable than the 
guests that they guide because they will have quicker reactions when they are caught 
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in an avalanche (Wylie, 2004, personal communication).  These quicker reactions 
may help them to escape the avalanche.   
Consequence 
 What is the worst that could happen?  Consequence is related to the location 
in the terrain, the degree of vulnerability and the destructive potential of the 
avalanche (Statham, 2008a).  
Near-miss and Incident 
 A near-miss is an incident with the potential for serious consequences, but 
without these consequences becoming reality (Kessels-Habraken, Van der Schaaf, 
De Jonge, & Rutte, 2010). In an adventure scenario this might mean that although 
there was potential for harm; none occurred, no first aid was required and no 
equipment was damaged or lost.  An accident is more severe and has been described 
as incident that progressed to the point where injury or damage occurred (Ritwik, 
2002).  For the ski guide this means that first aid was required, equipment was lost, 
or damaged, or the ski-programme was interrupted.  The concepts of incident and 
near-miss are related, as an incident can occur in which the consequences or outcome 
could have been far worse (Orasanu, 1998).  For example: A skier is caught in an 
avalanche, is dragged down the slope for 100 meters, loses his skis and is partially 
buried.  The avalanche was large enough to fully bury and kill the skier, so the worst-
case scenario did not become reality. 
Good Day 
 For the purpose of this study, participants were asked to describe challenging 
days that ended well.  These were not easy days.  The decision-making was complex, 
but at the end of the day, there had been no incidents or near-misses and the day’s 
objective had been achieved. 
Intuition 
 There are a variety of terms used interchangeably with intuition including: 
gut feeling, hunch, know-how, and tacit knowledge.  However intuition is different 
from insight and instinct.  Intuition is characterized by easily accessible thoughts that 
do not require much in the way of reflection.  Intuitive responses are: fast, effortless, 
can be impacted by emotions, governed by habit and can be difficult to control 
(Herbig, Bussing, & Ewert, 2001; Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  Whereas insight 
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involves an incubation period (Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008) 
and instincts are equated with innate abilities (Lieberman, 2000). 
Analysis 
 Analytical responses use reasoning and are: slow, require effort, are 
potentially rule-based, and are consciously controlled (Hogarth, 2005; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973). 
Dual Process Theory 
 Dual process theories provide an explanation of the interaction between two 
types of cognitive processing; intuition and analysis (Evans, 2008, 2010).  Type 1 
(intuition) and Type 2 (analysis) are activated independently in different parts of the 
brain and at different speeds (Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010; Sinclair, 2010). 
The default-interventionist theory suggests that intuition is the default process unless 
a need for analysis is detected (Evans, 2006).  
Mechanized Ski Guide 
 Mechanized ski guide is the term used to describe ski guides when they are 
working for a helicopter or snowcat ski-guiding operation. 
1.4	  Thesis	  Outline	  and	  Description	  
 Chapter Two describes the physical and professional setting of ski guide 
decision-making, and examines potential sources of the research questions.  An 
assessment of the unique elements of commercial ski guiding is used to clarify the 
challenges faced in the decision-making process.  This is a high-risk environment 
with potentially fatal consequences in the event of a bad decision.  The physical 
environment is constantly changing.  The weather is the primary contributor to this 
change, so a ski guide is constantly evaluating the effect of previous and current 
weather conditions and future weather predictions on the snowpack structure.  From 
this, a hazard and risk assessment must be completed.  The professional setting plays 
an important role, as the training and certification of guides is key to their success, 
but only one part of their development of expertise.  Tied in with the expertise of the 
guides are the expectations placed on them by the companies that they work for and 
the guests that are attracted to the $1000/day addiction known as heli-skiing or cat-
skiing. 
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 Chapter Three situates the research question within the literature.  This is 
complicated by the nature of the research area, as it straddles three bodies of 
literature.  As described earlier, avalanche decision-making is examined in this 
document within a context of snow science, even if the question of intuition is 
somewhat of an unconventional topic within a predominantly geosciences and 
engineering focus.  In addition, looking at the question from a broader context of 
adventure-based decision-making demanded an investigation of the literature of 
outdoor and adventure leadership.  However, the even broader and more complex 
field of judgment and decision-making within cognitive psychology provided the 
base of theories and models from which to evaluate ski-guiding decision-making.  
Throughout the chapter, the literature surrounding the research questions has been 
described and evaluated, clarifying the gap that existed prior to my research.  
 Chapter Four describes the philosophy of the research approach.  The 
methodology and methods are described and justified given the nature of this study.  
A research plan is laid out in detail describing the logical progression of data 
collection and analysis.  A discussion of the limitations of the methods concludes the 
section.  
 The research findings and associated discussion are presented in Chapters 
Five, Six, Seven and Eight.  Each of the chapters has been organized around a theme: 
Chapter Five – Expertise, Chapter Six – Decision filters as found in the event reports, 
Chapter Seven – Decision processes as found in the event reports, and Chapter Eight 
– An analysis of dual process as found in the final interviews.  The findings from the 
analysis of the questionnaire and interview data are revealed to the reader in these 
four chapters.   
 Analysis is initiated in Chapter Five through quantitative means and leads to 
intense qualitative analysis and discussion in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.  Using 
standard methods of qualitative data analysis (Seidel, 1998), I generated data codes 
and formed them into themes.  These themes are discussed and linked back to the 
foundation literature.  I have substantiated my explanation of the ski guide decision-
making process by linking an interpretation of the participants’ experiences with the 
theoretical discussions within the literature.  Chapter Eight uses qualitative data 
analysis on the data from Study 3. 
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 The final chapter unites the outcomes from the three studies and provides 
theoretical implications for future research, practical implications for the ski guiding 
industry and the conclusion.  The Appendices include copies of the two web-based 
questionnaires, the first set of interview questions, and the second set of interview 
questions.  
1.5	  Scope	  	  
1.5.1	  Sample	  Data	  
 This study was a qualitative analysis of a small number of ski guides, 
representing just fewer than 10% of the approximately 350 active ski guides who 
operated in British Columbia from 2008 to 2011.  Although the majority of the 
research participants self-selected some of the participants were solicited.  The initial 
invitation to participate in the study went out to the membership of the HeliCat 
Canada, which represents the majority of the Canadian heli-ski and snowcat-ski 
operators.  Seven companies responded to the invitation.  I attended their respective 
pre-season annual trainings and offered the opportunity to participate directly to the 
guides.  From an initial group of sixty guides who indicated interest in the project, 
thirty-five contributed reports, thirty-one of which were used in the analysis.  Four 
participants were not included in the data sets because their contributions were 
incomplete.  Limitations including the implications of a self-selection bias are 
discussed further in the methods chapter. 
 This study was not an analysis of all aspects of ski guide decision-making, 
nor was it limited to avalanche specific decisions.  It was focused on the role that 
intuition played within the realm of decision responses.  Although guest interactions 
factored into the ski guide’s decision process, this study did not analyse the guests’ 
motivations, only the impact those expressed, implied and anticipated expectations 
had on the guides.  
 Data were collected over two winters, 2008-2009 and 2009-2010.  The 
winters were described by avalanche professionals as being particularly challenging 
due to the persistent nature of numerous weak layers within the snowpack and the 
high consequence of potential avalanches (Klassen, 2010a).  It was an unforgiving 
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environment and the results of the study may have been different in more lenient 
years. 
1.5.2	  My	  Role	  as	  the	  Researcher	  	  
 This section describes how my beliefs about the nature of reality have 
developed and subsequently how my approach to this research question has been 
formed.  As an active mountain guide and a researcher, I brought a particular blend 
of knowledge and skills to this project.  I provided an opportunity for ski guides to 
contribute information about their successes and their near-misses, without concern 
for retrospective evaluation from their peer group or employers, as the reporting 
structure was designed to provide anonymity.  My concern for the protection of the 
integrity of the data and the confidentiality of the participants precluded me from 
publicly linking data with any participant.  This issue is further discussed in the 
ethics section. 
 Clearly the lens through which I engaged in this research was coloured by the 
proximity that I had with the study group, as I was native within the population that 
was studied (Palys, 1997).  I saw this as a benefit that I brought to the study as it 
made it much easier to build rapport and get the participants to open up and discuss 
their thoughts and actions.  Pitts and Miller-Day (2007) argue that building rapport in 
the process of developing a trusting relationship is essential in research that includes 
qualitative elements.  Although Palys (1997) did not necessarily support the notion 
that it was difficult to really understand a group of participants unless one was 
actually a member of that group, he acknowledged that being aware of one’s 
personal limitations as a researcher was essential.  
 I was able to blend the strengths of being both an insider and outsider with 
this group of research participants.  I have only worked part-time in the heli-ski 
industry and never worked as a cat ski guide.  This left me outside the personal 
knowledge of the effect of continuous involvement with an operational environment.  
However, I have worked as a heli-ski guide for over 100 days, which was sufficient 
to gain an appreciation of the challenges faced by heli-ski and snowcat-ski guides.  
In this way I was able to demonstrate an understanding of the environmental context, 
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yet still presented an outsider’s objectivity with the ability to ask seemingly 
obvious questions that an insider might miss due to over-familiarity.  
 The researcher has been described as a bricoleur who is able to utilize a 
combination of methodological, interpretive and narrative strategies (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003).  I fit that description, having developed a multi-faceted set of skills 
through my varied experiences as a mountain guide, educator and graduate student.  
My personal practical experience in outdoor leadership evolved over the last 30 
years, as I moved through various stages of development.  The foundation of my 
expertise was built during a ten-year period with Outward Bound Western Canada.  
It was concurrently refined through post-secondary schooling in outdoor leadership 
at the University of Calgary.  This blend of university during the winter and Outward 
Bound during the summer was an effective way of turning theory into practice.   
 The philosophical foundations of Outward Bound are anchored in personal 
growth and development through interactions with others in small group settings 
(Godfrey, 1980; Walsh & Golins, 1976).  As an instructor I was responsible for 
fostering the personal development of participants and facilitating group dynamics.  I 
became well versed in the skills of debriefing and facilitating interpersonal feedback.  
I began my leadership role with Outward Bound as a volunteer instructor, moved up 
through the ranks to senior instructor, and spent the last four years as a course 
director.  It was during those last four years that I also became certified as an 
assistant climbing and ski guide with the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides 
(ACMG).  This brought a transition to new opportunities in the guiding field and I 
became a full-time guide with Yamnuska Mountain School.  
 I followed an opportunity to pursue graduate studies in curriculum 
development for adventure studies, with Bill March at the University of Calgary the 
following year.  March, an internationally certified mountain guide (IFMGA) and 
former deputy director of Plas-y-Brenin National Outdoor Centre in Wales, was one 
of the founding members of the University of Calgary Outdoor Pursuits Program.  
March had been a key figure in the development of outdoor leadership training and 
certification in Britain during the 1970s.  He brought this expertise to the emerging 
Canadian outdoor leadership training industry in 1978 and enriched the lives of a 
generation of up-and-coming outdoor leaders.  
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 I continued to work as a guide during my graduate studies and for a year 
afterwards.  At that point a challenge presented itself in the form of a new adventure 
leadership program.  In 1992, I helped to develop the Adventure Guide Diploma at 
the University College of the Cariboo (now Thompson Rivers University (TRU).  
Since then, as part of my continued professional development as an instructor and 
assistant professor with TRU:  
• I completed my international guiding certification (IFMGA) in 1996, 
• Worked as a heli-ski guide for Canadian Mountain Holidays, Mike Wiegele 
Heli-skiing, Coast Range Heli-skiing and Northern Escape Heli-skiing;  
• Worked as a mountaineering guide for Yamnuska and the Alpine Club of 
Canada; and 
• Worked as an examiner on the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides on 
ski and alpine exams. 
 I became particularly interested in the decision-making process in 2002.  The 
desire to rigorously pursue a greater understanding of decision-making in the 
mountain environment was triggered by a discussion with Jean Paul Vion, the 
Director of Mountain Guide Training at Ecole National de Ski et Alpinisme (ENSA) 
in Chamonix, France.  He expressed frustration with the lack of tools in current 
practice to train new guides in decision-making.  That discussion sparked a four-
month research project in 2003; I visited guide-training programs in France, Canada, 
the UK and the USA.  I looked at ‘best practices’ in the training of apprentice guides.  
One of the outcomes from this project was the desire to pursue the topic of decision-
making in greater depth, in particular the impact of human factors and the role of 
expertise. 
 In a typical year, I have the opportunity to work with over twenty ACMG 
guides through TRU Adventure Programs and an additional ten guides in my 
professional development capacity.  Critical reflection on my performance over the 
years as a trained and certified mountain guide and as an outdoor educator has been 
an integral part of my professional practice.  I have compared my professional 
decision-making to other guides within the mountain guiding industry in Canada and 
I find myself on the conservative end of the risk acceptance spectrum.  Another 
difference between others in the guiding community and me is that my academic 
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background may lead to a more analytical and introspective orientation to my 
decision-making.  I acknowledge this bias as having a potential impact on the 
collection and interpretation of data and I have a heightened sense of situational 
awareness regarding this potential bias.  
 I have attempted to reduce the use of technical jargon and acronyms in this 
thesis.  Although technical writing in research publications can serve to connect the 
author with an elite group, it has the potential to complicate communication with 
other fields and the public.  Furthermore research which is externally focussed and 
seeks to merely justify its existence through the acquisition of research funds but 
with limited practical application serves limited purpose (Allison, 2006).  There was 
a need for research that had a foundation in the academic world, was grounded in 
practical applicability and helped to generate understanding of a phenomenon within 
both the research group and the broader population.  It is likely that this has been the 
case for research in the area of adventure leadership, particularly that of mountain 
guiding.  Research that helped to describe the innovative practices and extant 
knowledge of the field has helped theory and practice to be more in harmony.   
 So in light of my background as a guide, an educator and a researcher I felt 
equipped to undertake this research project.  With one foot anchored in the 
practicality of ski guiding in avalanche terrain and the other in the world of academia 
I felt uniquely placed to make a contribution to the on-going development of 
decision-making research. 
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Chapter	  2	  -­‐	  The	  Physical	  and	  Professional	  Setting	  
2.1	  Introduction	  
 HeliCat Canada, which represents 28 heli-ski and snowcat-ski operators, 
claim that 95% of the global market for commercial heli-skiing and snowcat-skiing is 
delivered in British Columbia (HeliCat-Canada, 2008).  The Canadian commercial 
ski guiding industry has capitalized on this opportunity by building a support 
network and training program for an estimated 350 active ski guides.  The 
requirements to become a Canadian ski guide are arguably the most rigorous in the 
world (Association of Canadian Mountain Guides, 1999; Canadian Ski Guide 
Association, 2007).  The rigours of the training are pitted against the inherent 
challenges of the environment.  Despite this, guests die every year (British Columbia 
Coroners Service, 2003a).  The commercial operators do not hide these facts from 
their guests and are actively engaged in risk optimization strategies, which balance 
safety, risk and reward (Canadian Mountain Holidays, 2007).  
2.2	  Physical	  Environment	  
 The mountainous geography of British Columbia provides the opportunity to 
engage in commercially guided, wilderness skiing.  Mountain terrain coupled with 
cold temperatures and regular flows of moisture from the Pacific create an excellent 
environment for deep powder skiing.  British Columbia covers an area of 944,735 
square kilometres, with 75% of the area considered mountainous including 20,300 
square kilometres considered alpine rock peaks and glaciers (Province of British 
Columbia, 2012; Shangaan Webservices Inc., 2012). 
 Most of British Columbia, 94%, is designated as public or Crown lands and is 
managed by the provincial government.  The Integrated Land Management Bureau 
of the Ministry of Natural Resource Operations is responsible for granting land 
tenures to commercial operators under the British Columbia Land Act (Ministry of 
Natural Resource Operations, 2012; Queen’s Printer, 2011).  These land tenures are 
exclusive for commercial recreation activities, but do not preclude the public or other 
commercial operations such as logging or mining from accessing the land. 
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 Collectively, the commercial heli-ski and snowcat-ski operators have 
secured land tenures that give them exclusive commercial rights to use the land 
during the winter for skiing operations.  These tenures cover 104,518 square 
kilometres, which is about the same size land area as Iceland.  The average heli-ski 
tenure is 4,300 square kilometres, while the average snowcat tenure is 82 square 
kilometres (Harley, 2002).  The altitude of the terrain that is used by operations 
ranges from 3,500 metres (11,500 feet) down to 600 metres (1,960 feet).  
2.2.1	  Winter	  Mountain	  Environment	  	  
 Three primary air masses are responsible for generating weather conditions in 
Western Canada: the Pacific, the Aleutian and the Continental (Canadian Avalanche 
Association, 2011).  The predominant weather pattern comes from the west, driven 
by the pattern of the jet stream.  Moist air off the Pacific rises as it crosses the BC 
coast and hits the Coast Range Mountains.  The temperate climate produces rain at 
sea level and vast amounts of moist snow in the mountains.  The air mass loses a 
large amount of its moisture, but not all of it.  When the moisture flow next hits the 
Interior Mountain Ranges, it is forced higher and the temperatures are generally 
cooler, producing copious amounts of dry light powder (McClung & Schaerer, 
2006).  This is where most of the heli-ski and snowcat-ski operators are located.  
Figure 1 (Google Earth, 2009) shows the concentration and extent of commercial 
ski-guiding tenures in the Columbia Mountains of British Columbia.  Little moisture 
is left in the air mass as it rises over the Rocky Mountains and collides with the cold 
air of the Continental Arctic air mass.   
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Figure	  1	  Interior	  British	  Columbia	  Commercial	  Ski-­‐guiding	  Operations	  
 
 Two primary weather patterns have been identified that influence the weather 
pattern in Western Canada and can cause dramatic changes from winter to winter.  
With the primary weather patterns originating in the Pacific, dramatically higher or 
lower water temperature significantly influences the winter storms that hit British 
Columbia.  The two primary patterns have been termed La Nina and El Nino.  La 
Nina results from cooler Pacific water temperatures, while El Nino results from 
warmer water temperatures (Wood, 1998). 
2.3	  Professional	  Environment	  
2.3.1	  The	  Canadian	  Heli-­‐ski	  and	  Snowcat-­‐ski	  Guiding	  Industry	  
 Mechanized skiing is defined as a commercial activity, which uses a 
helicopter or a snowcat to transport guests and guides uphill with the intent of 
accessing wilderness or high mountain skiing (HeliCat-Canada, 2008).  The industry 
began in April 1965 when Hans Gmoser used a small helicopter in the Bugaboo 
Mountains to ferry his ski touring guests back up the mountain for additional ski runs 
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(Donahue, 2008).  The company name was Canadian Mountain Holidays (CMH) 
and it has grown to become the largest heli-ski company in the world (Canadian 
Mountain Holidays, 2008).  Other pioneers were quick to seize the opportunity to 
build a new industry.  Canadian Mountain Holidays expanded to a second 
operational base in Valemount.  Mike Wiegele set up a competing operation in 
Valemount.  Both operations were based out of the only hotel in town and competed 
for ski terrain in the Cariboo Mountains (Donahue, 2008).  Shortly thereafter, Rudi 
Gertsch set up an operation in Golden BC and Peter Schlunneger chose Revelstoke 
as his base (Rossiter, 1980; Touche, 1980). 
 Canadian Mountain Holidays now has nine backcountry lodge operations and 
three front country hotel operations, utilizing over 15,000 square kilometres of 
terrain.  Their client base exceeds 7000 guests per year and accounts for close to 
50,000 user days.  Taking care of these guests is a team of over one hundred certified 
guides (Canadian Mountain Holidays, 2008).  
 The majority of the heli-ski and snowcat-ski operators have linked up to form 
an association to represent their needs called HeliCat Canada (HeliCat-Canada, 
2008).  There is no legal requirement to be a member of HeliCat Canada, so not all 
mechanized ski-guiding operations are members.  Between the HeliCat Canada 
membership and the additional eight or so non-members, the industry delivers close 
to 100,000 skier days per year.  
2.3.2	  Commercial	  Operational	  Context	  
 HeliCat Canada commissioned a socio-economic study in 2002 (Harley, 
2002).  On an annual basis, the commercial mechanized ski guiding industry serviced 
approximately 28,000 skiers for 95,000 skier-days.  Eighty-eight percent of the 
guests were from outside Canada.  Their direct spending was $92.6 million in 
1999/2000.  
 HeliCat Canada also commissioned a study of guest expectations, which was 
conducted by Tanner and Associates (2006).  Table 1 shows the guest profile.  





Table	  1	  Guest	  profiles	  for	  heli-­‐ski	  and	  snowcat-­‐ski	  operations	  
 In this study, nine out of ten heli-skiers rated having a competent guide as 
essential to a good heli-skiing experience; 7.4/10 rated personal safety as a concern, 
with 7.3/10 rating avalanches as their primary concern.  Similarly 8.6/10 cat-skiers 
rated having a competent guide as essential to a good skiing experience.   
 The industry began formally sharing weather and snowpack information in 
1991.  This became known as the InfoEx (Canadian Avalanche Association, 2012a).  
The concept of sharing of information was initiated by Canadian Mountain Holidays 
as a way of pooling valuable snowpack information amongst their numerous 
backcountry lodges.  Initially this was achieved through a complex series of radio 
links.  All the lodges, from the Cariboos in the north, to the Bugaboos in the south 
were able to have a daily discussion on snowpack concerns (Canadian Mountain 
Holidays, 2008).  The InfoEx has now evolved into an integral element of hazard 
forecasting to the point where it is an expectation of a professional, mechanized ski 
guiding operation (British Columbia Coroners Service, 2005).   
 In its current form, InfoEx users pay an annual subscription rate to access the 
information.  In discussion with the chair of the InfoEx Advisory Group, Brad 
Harrison (personal communication, December 2011), it was stated that there is now 
an expectation that all subscribers contribute avalanche, snowpack and weather 
observations on a daily basis.  There are 115 subscribers, most of who are in British 
Columbia and Alberta.  With over 10,000 data points per day this represents a wealth 
of information.  The forecasters at the Canadian Avalanche Centre use the 
information as the basis for the Public Avalanche Bulletins.  If they had to go out and 
collect the data themselves, it is estimated that it would cost in excess of $2 million 
annually (Canadian Avalanche Association, 2012a).   
 Heli-ski Cat-ski 
Expert skiers 81% 73% 
Median age 46.9 45.2 
Occupation – Professional 62% 55% 
Income Median CAN $124,000 CAN $111,000 
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2.3.2.1	  Number	  of	  Fatalities	  
 The Canadian Avalanche Centre has documented 79 fatalities in the heli-ski 
and snowcat-ski guiding industry since 1974 for an average of 2.1 fatalities per year 
(Canadian Avalanche Centre, 2012).  Over the last ten-year period (2003-2012) the 
average annual fatality rate has dropped to 1.3.  During the period of the study, in the 
Columbia Mountains, there were 1903 skier-triggered avalanches in 2008-2009 and 
3469 in 2009-2010.  Although the guides caused the majority of these skier-triggered 
avalanches deliberately, 23% were triggered accidentally and would include both 
near misses and involvements (Figure 2).  The observed triggers included: Skier – 
accidental (Sa), Skier – controlled (Sc), Skier – remote (Sr), Natural (Na), and Other. 
 
Figure	  2	  Avalanche	  Observations	  in	  the	  Columbia	  Mountains	  2006-­‐2010	  
 
2.3.3	  Training	  and	  Certification	  	  
2.3.3.1	  Avalanche	  Certification	  Process	  
 The Canadian Avalanche Association is responsible for representing 
avalanche professionals by setting technical standards and delivering training and 
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certification courses.  There are three levels of the professional training courses.  
The first level is a prerequisite for entry into the guide certification courses and 
assistant level exams.  The second level is a prerequisite for the full guide exams.  
The third level prepares upper level avalanche workers for employment in 
operational planning and risk management (Canadian Avalanche Association, 
2012b). The cost in Table 2 is for Levels One and Two.  
2.3.3.2	  The	  Guide	  Certification	  Process	  
 There are two certifying bodies for ski guiding in Canada, the Association of 
Canadian Mountain Guides (ACMG) and the Canadian Ski Guides Association 
(CSGA).  The ACMG also certifies climbing guiding activities, while the CSGA 
does not. 
Association of Canadian Mountain Guides 
 The ACMG was formed in 1963 and in 1972 was accepted into the 
International Federation of Mountain Guides Associations (IFMGA).  Training and 
certification is conducted through Thompson Rivers University - Adventure Studies 
Department.  To become a mountain guide requires a commitment to one hundred 
and fourteen days of training courses and examinations at a cost of $26,345.  This 
only reflects the course costs and does not include food, accommodation or travel.  
Table 2 also shows the cost for earning just the Ski Guide certification.  Also not 
included is the prerequisite training and experience needed to make an application 
for entry into the training and certification program and the skill maturation to 
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ACMG Ski Guide 20 18 38 9,375 
ACMG Mountain 
Guide 
36 46 82 21,145 
CAA Avalanche (1+2) 15 7 22 4,500 
First Aid 8 2 10 700 
Total for a Ski Guide 43 27 70 14,575 
Total for a  
Mountain Guide 
59 55 114 26,345 
 
 The Canadian Ski Guides Association (CSGA) is a mechanized ski guide 
certification program, which began running courses in 1990 and was incorporated in 
1996.  The British Columbia Helicopter Skiing and Snowcat Operators Association 
(BCHSSOA, now known as HeliCat Canada) recognized the CSGA Level 1 and 2 
courses as meeting the criteria for a Tail-guide and Assistant Guide.  The Level 3 
(Lead Guide) course was audited by BCHSSOA, but formal recognition was not 
completed until 2010.  In 2004 a rift developed between BCHSSOA and the CSGA, 
with the BCHSSOA only recognizing Level 1 and 2 CSGA guides certified prior to 
2004.  This rift within the guiding community was largely resolved in 2011.  Table 3 
shows the costs and the number of days required for all the courses and exams to 
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CSGA Level 1, 2 and 3 7 28 35 6,850 
Glacier Skills Course 7 0 7 1,200 
CAA Avalanche 15 7 22 4,500 
CSIA Level 1, 2 and 3 0 10 10 1,133 
First Aid 8 2 10 700 
Total for CSGA Level 3 37 47 84 14,383 
2.3.4	  Corporate	  and	  Guest	  Profile	  
2.3.4.1	  The	  Guiding	  Team	  
 A typical mechanized skiing operation utilizes a team of guides ranging from 
two to twenty-five guides at any one time.  The actual number of guides will depend 
on the size of the operation and the number of guests.  At the small end of the scale, 
utilizing one helicopter, two guides will work with a group of four guests.  At the 
other end of the scale, Mike Wiegele Helicopter Skiing, at maximum capacity uses 
twenty-five to thirty guides and nine helicopters of various sizes, to service over one 
hundred and thirty guests.   
 Guests are formed into ski groups based on the size of the helicopter.  Small 
helicopters carry 4-5 guests and large helicopters up to 11 guests.  Operators 
typically offer two styles of experience.  The standard offering maximizes the 
efficiency of the helicopter by servicing multiple groups with a single helicopter.  
The private package provides a single group with the services of a guide and a 
helicopter.  In a standard operation, each helicopter services from one to four ski 
groups each led by a guide.  One of the guides is the designated Lead Guide.  The 
Lead Guide is responsible for creating and implementing a plan for the day that 
balances the need to provide a safe, high quality skiing experience with the need to 
optimize the operational logistics, typically by carefully controlling helicopter flight 
time.   
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2.3.4.2	  Scales	  of	  Heli-­‐ski	  Operations	  
 Small or ‘Boutique’ heli-ski operations use one or two small helicopters (A-
Star or Bell 407).  Each helicopter fits 4-5 guests and will service one to three 
groups, or up to 15 guests.  Medium-sized heli-ski operations use one or two larger 
helicopters (Bell 205 or 212).  Each helicopter fits up to 11 guests and will service 
one to four groups, or up to 44 guests.  Large operations use various combinations of 
small and large helicopters to cater to 75-100+ guests.   
2.3.4.3	  Scales	  of	  Cat-­‐ski	  Operations	  
 Snowcat operators tend to have fewer guests as each snowcat can only 
service one group at a time compared to a helicopter, which can sequentially 
transport multiple groups.  Small operations utilize a single snowcat carrying up to 
14 guests, while medium sized operations use two snowcats, each carrying up to 14 
guests. 
2.3.5	  A	  Day	  in	  the	  Life	  of	  a	  Ski	  Guide	  
 Although there are numerous variations based on the operational context, a 
typical guiding day has a certain flow to it.  The decision process begins early with 
the development of a hazard forecast and a risk management plan for the day.  The 
active management of hazards during the day follows this.  The final step is a review 
of the day’s activities and a summary of observations in preparation for the following 
day. 
2.3.5.1	  In	  the	  Office	  
 The day begins early, usually at about 06:00.  The industry standard is to use 
a structured, well-defined analytical process to facilitate the flow of the morning 
guides’ meeting.  See Appendix 1 for the Canadian Avalanche Association A.M. 
Avalanche Hazard and Risk Analysis Worksheet.  This structured process begins 
with a reassessment of the conditions observed on the previous day.  The 
observations made by the nearest neighbouring operations are included in the 
analysis.  The overnight weather changes that might impact snowpack stability are 
factored into snowpack stability and hazard forecast for the day.  Finally, the initial 
terrain selection occurs.  
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 The first question to be addressed is: ‘What is happening with the 
weather?’  With the increased usage of remote weather telemetry and the Internet, a 
far greater quantity and quality of information is available.  It is easy to become 
absorbed by the computer and neglect the sage advice of the old European guides to 
“go out and sniff the air” (Kranabitter, personal communication, April 1988).  This 
may strengthen a connection between the intuitive, somatic response from smelling 
the air, feeling the air pressure and observing the sky, clouds and wind, with the 
cognitive process of analysing the weather report.  The second question is: “Did 
anything significant happen yesterday to other operators in the region?  Did they see 
similar conditions to what we observed yesterday?”   
 This information is accessed through the InfoEx.  The information reported 
includes: avalanche observations, snowpack structure and stability assessment, field 
summaries, and weather observations.  Avalanche observations are the most 
interesting component as both naturally occurring and human triggered are reported.  
This is critical event feedback as it demonstrates how easily avalanches can be 
triggered.  Of particular interest to the ski guide are the reports of avalanches 
triggered by humans, both deliberately and accidentally.  The skier-triggered 
accidental avalanche is arguably the most significant information to be added into the 
decision-making process, as it represents direct feedback.  This aids in accuracy 
calibration and hence confidence in decision-making.  
 Once the weather forecast and the InfoEx report have been assimilated by the 
guiding team, it is necessary to make a stability forecast for the operation.  This 
forecast is based on the stability assessment completed at the end of the previous 
day, supplemented by the InfoEx, and modified by the weather forecast.  The final 
step in daily risk management is to complete the ‘run list’ (Cardon, 2004).  This is a 
list of all the ski runs or lines available to the company within their land tenure as 
granted by the British Columbia Ministry of Natural Resource Operations.  The 
larger companies will have hundreds of potential runs on the list, so the guiding team 
must efficiently generate a plan for the day.  This will mean analysing a sufficient 
number of runs to meet the operational needs of the day.  Each run is coded as green, 
red, or yellow.  A green run is available for use and a red run is not.  Yellow is given 
to runs, for which there is insufficient or inconclusive information.  Once the guiding 
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team is in the field and able to gather more information, a face-to-face meeting is 
required to move a run from yellow to green.  The decision-making process of the 
run list is critical and can turn into a long, drawn out debate at a point in the day 
when there is not a great deal of extra time available.  In most if not all operations, 
each guide has the power of a veto when it comes to greening a run.  
2.3.5.2	  In	  the	  Field	  
 The lead guide will typically select one or two areas within the company’s 
operational land tenure for the day’s activities.  This will require the careful selection 
of a sequence of runs, which will be efficient and provide high quality skiing.  To 
achieve optimal use of the helicopter, the lead guide must select runs such that the 
helicopter is constantly ferrying groups up the mountain.  Efficiency is lost when the 
helicopter spends more time lifting a group or when it has to wait for a group to 
finish their run.   
 The cost of the helicopter is based on flight time and fuel consumption.  
Flight time is typically calculated by a Hobb’s meter, which measures the amount of 
time that sufficient power is being applied to the rotating blades such that it is 
capable of flight.  This would include the time that a machine is in a hover landing 
and when it is actually in the air.  Flight time costs between $2000 and $4000 per 
hour depending on the size of the helicopter.  Time spent on the ground with the 
engine idling is only charged at the rate of fuel consumption (200 – 300 litres per 
hour).  This makes for frequent time-critical decisions while in the air.  At $60 per 
minute, or $1 per second it is incumbent upon the guide in the helicopter to make 
rapid decisions as to where to go.   
 The helicopter is a useful tool for viewing and assessing the terrain about to 
be skied, however excessive flight times will quickly erode the day’s financial 
margin.  It typically takes three to five minutes to fly from the bottom of a run up to 
the next run.  During this time the lead guide must assess the hazards and select a 
line for descent on what might be over one thousand vertical metres of complex 
terrain.  The other guides within the helicopter group have an easier time, as they 
will have the lead guide’s tracks to follow.  Information about snowpack stability and 
other hazards will be shared within the guiding team by radio.   
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 The momentum of the helicopter and ski groups’ progress is significant. 
This can result in guides rushing their groups to the bottom of the run and the waiting 
helicopter, if anything slows their progress such as a lost ski.  This may create the 
impression that there is minimal time for hazard assessment.  Some operations will 
have an additional guide in the field, conducting snowpack stability assessments.   
 Lunch is typically served out in the field.  The helicopter lands and shuts 
down.  Once the guides have served the guests, there is time for a quick guides 
meeting.  Yellow runs can be discussed with regards to the conditions observed up to 
that point, and decisions can be made to change them to green or to red.  It is also be 
an opportunity to strategize the remainder of the day.  Some guests may want to ski 
longer than others.  It may be possible to reorganize the groups such that one or more 
helicopter loads fly back to the base early.   
 The lead guide must also keep track of the amount of fuel remaining in order 
to plan when the helicopter will have to fly back for fuel.  Typically, the helicopter 
will refuel two to three times during the day.  Optimal efficiency is acquired when 
the helicopter needs to refuel at the same time that a group is ready to fly back to the 
base. 
2.3.5.3	  End	  of	  the	  Day	  
 Once all the groups are back in at the end of the day, the guides will convene 
for another meeting.  Snowpack and avalanche observations will be recorded and an 
assessment of the snowpack stability will be generated.  This information will be 
shared with the rest of the industry through the InfoEx.  Depending on the culture of 
the guiding group, there may be the opportunity to reflect on issues or concerns that 
evolved during the day.  
2.4	  Summary	  
 The physical and professional settings of mechanized ski guiding operations 
in Western Canada are unique.  The guides who work in these settings are the front-
line decision makers charged with managing guest safety in a constantly changing 
and unforgiving environment.  The response to this challenging environment has 
been to develop what is arguably the most rigorous and sophisticated ski guide 
certification process in the world.  Supplementing this, the avalanche hazard 
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forecasting process has been continually improved through the joint efforts of the 
guiding associations and the avalanche association.  Unfortunately fatalities still 
occur.  The fatality rate can be considered a finite measure of decision success.  
Entrenched knowledge is equated to pattern recognition, which forms the basis for 
intuitive responses.  The quality of intuitive responses, based on pattern recognition 
has contributed to the decision success of ski guides.  However there is a gap 
between the advances made in the avalanche-related analytical decision process and 
the potential application of cognitive psychology theories.  
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Chapter	  3	  -­‐	  Literature	  Review	  -­‐	  The	  Decision	  Process	  of	  Ski	  Guides	  
3.1	  Introduction	  
 This programme of research was interdisciplinary in nature in that the 
literature upon which it was based came from three distinct bodies of knowledge.  
The largest and most developed body of knowledge was the Judgment and Decision 
Making (JDM) literature.  The adventure leadership literature provided a more 
focused discussion of decision making within an outdoor adventure skills context.  
The final body of knowledge was snow sciences, which although dominated by the 
hard sciences, has seen a growing number of contributions from the social sciences.  
Mountain guiding and more specifically ski guiding, as a subset of adventure 
leadership, is a practical field but has a growing body of theoretical underpinnings.  
The focus of this research was the point of convergence for these three bodies of 
knowledge - expert ski guide decision-making (Figure 3).  The relative sizes of the 
balloons in the figure are not drawn to scale as the size of the judgment and decision-
making literature vastly exceeds the other two bodies of knowledge.  A central theme 
running through these bodies of knowledge was the role that expertise played in the 
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Figure	  3	  Ski	  guiding	  within	  three	  bodies	  of	  knowledge	  
 
3.2	  Ski	  Guide	  Decision-­‐making	  
 The criteria individuals use and much of the decision-making related 
knowledge base in professional, ski guiding has remained poorly understood even to 
active practicing professionals.  Expert ski guides might have difficulty expressing 
how all the elements of their field-based, risk management decision process come 
together (Adams, 2005).  They might be able to articulate the procedure that they 
use, but not necessarily the source of some of their knowledge; some things they just 
know (Grímsdóttir, 2004).  Their ability to articulate most, but not all the factors that 
help them make good decisions can likely be attributed to the depth of their personal 
practical experience, or their expertise.  The ability of an expert to articulate the 
source of their knowledge is a hallmark of professionalism and generates credibility 
within the respective client groups (Benner, 1984). 
 Although mountain guiding has been taking place in Canada since 1897, the 
documented theory and practice was not formally structured into a training manual 
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until 1991 (ACMG, 1999).  The Technical Handbook for Professional Mountain 
Guides was rewritten in 1996 and 1999 and yet still only contained four pages on 
judgment and decision-making.  The Canadian Avalanche Association has taken a 
more proactive approach and developed a four day decision-making training module 
as part of the Level 2 professional training course (CAA, 2008).  This course rapidly 
gained respect from practicing professionals and has been acknowledged as a 
valuable professional development opportunity.  As evidence of the desire for greater 
understanding of the decision-making process, the course has been full since its 
inception in 2002.  
 A benefit of making this knowledge about how and why mountain guides 
make decisions, evident and understandable to the general public will allow guides to 
be judged less on the visual aesthetics of a demonstrated performance and more on 
their underlying knowledge base.  The safety record of the ski guiding industry is 
only one measure of professional competence.   
 The Canadian Avalanche Centre (CAC) is responsible for public safety.  An 
increasing number of recreational winter backcountry users have been educated in 
risk management strategies through the efforts of the CAC.  This has resulted in an 
increased level of awareness of acceptable travel practices, particularly during 
periods of high hazard.  However there can be conflict between public regional, 
hazard warnings issued by the Canadian Avalanche Centre and guiding operations 
that have generated a hazard forecast for their specific location.   
 An example of increased public scrutiny was triggered by two events.  The 
first occurred on January 20th 2003, when six guests and one employee died in an 
avalanche in the Columbia Mountains of British Columbia, while being led by an 
experienced mountain guide.  The public perception of this event was that the guide 
must have made an overt error, regardless of the underlying decision process that 
evolved leading up to the event (British Columbia Coroners Service, 2003b; 
Kerasote, 2003).  The second event occurred twelve days later.  Seven teenagers died 
in an avalanche while on a school trip in Glacier National Park, less than thirty 
kilometres away from the first accident (Cloutier, 2003).  These two events placed 
tremendous public scrutiny on wilderness ski guiding, adventure education in 
schools and the responsibilities of public land managers (Statham, 2004).   
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 More specifically, avalanche related decision-making, which is a sub-set or 
component of mountain guiding decision-making has been the subject of much 
debate and discussion with increasing intensity and frequency, beginning with the 
2002 International Snow Science Workshop (ISSW).  At the ISSW 2002, the topic of 
decision-making was split between the larger subject headings of Education and 
Forecasting and covered by only three authors.  However McCammon’s (2002) 
seminal work on the use of heuristics sparked great interest within the avalanche 
community and launched a new line of inquiry.  The ISSW 2004 included a much 
greater acknowledgement of the significance of decision-making.  It was included in 
the single subject heading of Risk Management, Decision-making and Information 
Delivery.  Within that heading there were numerous papers specifically on decision-
making.  The discussion of decision-making intensified with works from Adams 
(2004), Atkins and McCammon (2004), Grímsdóttir (2004) McCammon and Hägeli 
(2004), and Stewart-Patterson (2004). This trend continued at ISSW’s in 2006, 2008 
and 2010 with contributions from Digiacomo (2006), Sole and Emery (2008), Hägeli 
and Atkins (2010) and Stewart-Patterson (2010). 
 The increased interest in the study of decision-making is not unique to the 
avalanche industry, or even adventure leadership.  There is much to be learned from 
how other fields have approached the challenge of understanding the complexities of 
the decision-making process.  Extensive research has been conducted in fields such 
as nursing, in which the participants face many challenges similar to those 
experienced by ski guides.  Benner (1984) described how the increased 
sophistication of demonstrated decision processes within the practical field of 
nursing had occurred on an on-going basis without the benefit of research, however 
once research was conducted which articulated this expertise, it helped to develop a 
language that facilitated the description to the rest of the world.  The public 
perception of the decision process used by nurses was elevated from a status as a 
loosely described art form, to a well defined professional practice supported by 
research (Benner, 1984; Rew & Barrow, 2007; Rew, 1987; Smith, 2009). 
 With an annual average fatality rate in commercial heli-ski and snowcat-ski 
guiding over the last ten years, of just under one and a half fatalities per 100,000 
skier days, it is not unreasonable to suggest that there is considerable knowledge 
     
 
37 
entrenched within the daily activities of the practitioners (British Columbia 
Coroners Service, 2003a; Israelson, 2008).  However it is arguable that even this 
number of fatalities is too many and efforts should be made to reduce the number of 
fatalities in professionally guided groups while still maintaining the spirit of 
adventure inherent within this risk-based activity.  The results from my research will 
have direct application for practitioners and will have the potential to improve expert 
decision-making and thereby save lives. 
3.3	  Scope	  of	  the	  Review	  
 I started the literature review in 2006 with an analysis of the Proceedings of 
the International Snow Science Workshops from 1994 to 2006.  This provided a firm 
anchor as to the state of research in domain-specific, avalanche related decision-
making.  I used the database collections of peer-reviewed journals and periodicals 
available through the University of Edinburgh and Thompson Rivers University 
libraries to gather the majority of my references.  I accessed the Adventure-based 
leadership research through the ERIC database.  However, the PSYCArticles 
database became the prime search tool and was used extensively to access research 
within the larger field of cognitive psychology.  The PubMed database was used to 
access related material from the field of Nursing and Medicine.  Google Scholar was 
used as a generic search tool for areas such as Aviation, Military and Fire-fighting.  
Primary search terms included: decision-making, intuition, expertise, confidence, 
feedback and reflection.  The libraries of the University of Edinburgh and Thompson 
Rivers University provided access to considerable additional resources.  The search 
for additional material was on-going from 2006 to 2012 and included the 
proceedings of the ISSW 2008, 2009 and 2010 combined with continued searching 
of the databases. 
3.4	  Themes	  
 Two intertwined themes emerged within the literature in the context of how 
ski guides make decisions.  As I was studying expert ski guides, the literature on 
expertise formed the lens through which I examined the decision process.  This 
literature crossed multiple domains.  Entrenched within the decision-making 
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literature was an expert – novice distinction, with the recognition that these 
decision processes were different.  The degree or extent to which experts made 
decisions differently from novices was of some debate.  I distilled critical elements 
from the two themes and blended them together to form a solid rationale for the 
research I conducted.  By blending the expertise theme with the decision process 
theme I was able to extract the essence of expert decision-making and apply it to the 
research question.  
3.4.1	  Expertise	  
  Expertise was central to the analysis of the decision-making as experts make 
decisions differently from novices (Benner, 1984; Phillips, Klein, & Sieck, 2004; 
Starkes & Ericsson, 2003).  Expertise was examined as a discrete research area and 
then applied as a filter for the JDM, adventure leadership and snow science 
literatures. 
 The works of Ericsson benchmarked the study of expertise.  Ericsson, 
Krampe, and Tesch-Romer (1993) conducted a study on high level musicians and 
through an analysis of their diaries concluded that experts committed to roughly 
10,000 hours of deliberate practice, typically over a 10 year period.  This notion was 
supported by studies: on chess players (Charness, Krampe, & Mayr, 1996), in 
medicine (Patel, Kaufman, & Magder, 1996) and on athletes (wrestlers, skater and 
golfers) (Starkes et al., 1996).  It is notable that even extraordinarily talented 
individuals like chess master Bobby Fischer needed nine years of preparation before 
he was at an internationally acclaimed level (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 
1993).   
 However, it is important to recognize that ten years of experience does not 
make an expert.  Experiences can be empty or full, with full experiences maximizing 
the learning potential inherent within a given situation.  Weick (2001) describes the 
lack of learning associated with empty experiences as the repetition of similar events 
with little in the way of challenge or reflection.  Turning experience into expertise 
may be more difficult when the decision environment is dependent on human 
behaviour rather than physical stimuli.  For example, Costa and Porter (2003) found 
that mutual fund managers with ten years experience performed no better than their 
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less experienced peers.  Shanteau (1992) suggests that physical stimuli are more 
valid than human behaviour stimuli.  This would suggest that the heli-ski 
environment has some measure of validity.  The environment is highly dependent on 
the effects of the weather and thus more valid; however the interactions of humans 
with the terrain may reduce the validity, as the guide chooses where to place the 
group in the terrain. 
 Vick (2002) stressed the importance of going beyond routine, everyday 
practice in the pursuit of challenging problems; expertise is gained through the 
resolution of difficult challenges.  Vick (2002) also suggested that expertise was 
dependent on two integral elements: the size of the knowledge base and the speed at 
which it can be accessed. This equates to the definitions of pattern recognition and 
has been discussed further in this chapter (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Sloman, 1996).  
 Ericsson, et al. (1993) defined an eminent performance or achievement as 
going beyond full mastery of the current knowledge base and the top level of 
achievement to ultimately develop a unique and innovative contribution to their field.  
These top levels of performance were not attributed simply to years of experience, 
but more so to years of deliberate and intense practice aimed at continual 
improvement (Starkes et al., 1996).  
 Benner (1984) studied the development of expertise in clinical nursing 
practice and described four incremental levels of expertise, shown in Table 4.  A 
particularly salient point was how she described a “competent” person as reaching a 
stage where an understanding had developed as to the extent of one’s potential, and 
that as a competent practitioner, there was the capacity to develop further and 
become an expert.  She suggested that they become more sensitive to incompetence 
and may become anxious and or take on additional responsibilities to the point that 
they begin to fail.  They also may become so focused on identifying incompetence 
that they fail to recognize expertise.  The anxiousness or worry that is felt is an 
intelligent concern as it is indicative of the development of a more sophisticated 
understanding of the extent of their ignorance.  





Table	  4	  The	  four	  levels	  of	  expertise	  as	  described	  by	  Benner	  (1984)	  
3.4.1.1	  Experts	  Compared	  to	  Novices	  
 It is reasonable to expect experts to consistently demonstrate a more 
sophisticated decision process than novices, however there are a number of studies in 
which experts under-perform in relation to expectations.  In a study of 161 avalanche 
experts and novices, Atkins and McCammon (2004) found that experts routinely 
outperformed recreationists in their ability to choose safe skiing terrain. However the 
differences in performance were not due to differences in knowledge, but to an 
inability on the part of the recreationists to apply their knowledge.  They were 
lacking the domain specific experience needed to put their knowledge, facts, 
principles, rules and procedures into context (Atkins & McCammon, 2004). 
 However, experts do not always significantly outperform novices.  In a study 
of intuitive confidence using predictions of National Football League point spreads, 
Simmons and Nelson (2006) found that people predicted their favourites to play 
better than underdogs against a point spread that evenly matched the two teams. The 
point spread is a technique used by bookmakers to set up a scenario where the two 
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opposing teams are evenly matched.  Thus those who place bets are wagering 
whether or not they can predict the outcome more accurately than the expert 
bookmakers.  Rather than setting the odds as to which team will win the match, the 
point spread indicates the extent, or the number of points by which a particular team 
will win.  This is similar to the use of a handicap in a golf game or a sailing race.  
The results were not greatly different when a panel of eleven experts was matched up 
against thousands of fans who logged into Yahoo.com’s fantasy sports website.  
Although the experts predicted the favourites to win more often than the fans did, the 
study found that the experts only predicted the outcomes correctly in 50.1% of the 
games.  
 Surowiecki (2004) suggested that experts are not good at calibrating their 
judgments and are no better than normal people in avoiding an overconfidence trap.  
Camerer and Johnson (1997) argued that experts are no better predictors than less 
expert decision makers and that a simple linear regression model will likely make 
more accurate predictions than an expert.  In an analysis of 1,042 mutual funds from 
1986 to 1995, Costa and Porter (2003) found that managers with over ten years of 
experience did not perform significantly better than their less experienced peers.  
Rarely did a mutual fund manager consistently outperform an Index fund that has no 
active decision-making associated with it and is just linked to one of the major stock 
market indexes.  
 Although these are notable cases of expert decision makers under-performing 
in relation to expectations, they are the exceptions rather than the rules.  These cases 
seem to occur more frequently in invalid environments.  There is some evidence that 
expert predictions compared to novice predictions of human behaviour in areas such 
as sport performance (Simmons & Nelson, 2006a) and the stock market (Costa & 
Porter, 2003) have been found to be less accurate than expert predictions compared 
to novice predictions of natural events (weather).  The difficulty for expert 
predictions of human behaviour may lie in the high degree of variability within the 
human dynamic, whereas weather prediction or avalanche forecasting occurs in a 
more valid environment, as there is a reliance on natural phenomenon.  Flaws in the 
expert decision process can likely be overcome through a number of strategies 
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including a process of regular calibration of the decision maker’s confidence.  
Calibration can be attained through feedback from other experts. 
3.4.2	  Decision	  Process	  
3.4.2.1	  Introduction	  
 Much has been written about the risk management or risk control decision-
making process, largely coming from the field of psychology.  The most widely 
recognized term for this body of knowledge is judgment and decision-making 
(JDM).  However many different fields have a deep-seated interest in how decisions 
are made.  Although there is some debate within the JDM literature, it is generally 
accepted that decision-making includes two systems or processes, one analytical and 
one intuitive (Barrouillet, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Sloman, 1996). This is 
supported by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans, which have 
indicated that different parts of the brain are activated when participants respond 
analytically as opposed to intuitively (Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004).  
 The Dual Process literature gained a more predominant position around 2007-
2009 and became more widely accepted.  Evans (2010, 2011) clarifies the definition 
of Type 1 (intuitive) and Type 2 (analytical) processing.  He does not classify 
intuitive processing as unconscious and analytical processing as conscious.  He 
suggests that Type 1 outputs of feeling and emotion are accessible consciously and 
Type 2 processing can be dependent on controlled attention to subconscious cue 
identification. 
 Intuition and analysis are not mutually exclusive events or processes.  The 
interaction between these two processes has generated considerable interest.  The 
interaction between intuitive and analytical processes has been described as one of 
the key elements of decision-making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Kahneman, 
2011).  The dynamic tension between intuitive thinking and rational thought has 
been the subject of numerous books in the public press (Brafman & Brafman, 2008; 
Gladwell, 2005; LeGault, 2006; Mlodinow, 2008).  These publications often offer a 
sensationalized view into the decision process, thinly veiled by the illusion of 
empirical research.  The cornerstone of these publications is Gladwell’s ‘Blink – The 
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Power of Thinking Without Thinking’ (2005).  Gladwell uses emotive, singular 
events to lend strength to his argument, but overall the argument lacks weight.  To 
his credit, his concept of “thin slicing” is anchored in situational awareness and 
pattern recognition.  These topics have been discussed with much more detail and 
analysis in the academic journals, particularly within the realm of Naturalistic 
Decision-Making (NDM) and Recognition-Primed Decision-Making (RPD).   
 The interaction has also been proposed as a continuum, with decisions that 
are fully analytical, fully intuitive or a mix somewhere in between (Hammond, 1993; 
Hogarth, 1980).  Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996, p. 651) described a variation on 
this theme with what they termed, “fast and frugal heuristics”.  They suggested that 
in environments with high levels of uncertainty, the analysis of too much information 
might lead to less accurate predictions than a fast and frugal heuristic termed Take 
the Best (TTB).  This approach focused on two or three key indicators compared to 
the more complex and analytical Lens Model proposed by Brunswik (1955), which 
relied on the weighting of multiple cues.  Small errors in multiple cues had the 
potential to generate an inflated error in the final decision.  Small levels of 
uncertainty in only two or three cues might be more accurate.  Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein’s (1996) fast and frugal decision tree is really just a simple rule-based 
decision using the two or three most important cues.  It is different from intuition.  
However, once a fast and frugal heuristic (decision tree) is learned, it can become a 
pattern to be recognized and subsequently integrated into an intuitive response.  
 It has been generally accepted that there is a link between decision-making 
and expertise (Ericsson, 1996).  The concept of expertise and how its development 
affects the interplay between intuition and analysis can be applied to the context of 
avalanche risk management.  A key element within the definition of expertise is the 
role that feedback plays in improving decision accuracy.  This leads to the 
development of domain specific expertise as demonstrated through improvements in 
intuition accuracy and expressions of confidence (Hogarth et al., 2008).  However a 
counter to the validity of the intuitive argument is the overuse of heuristics and 
biases (Hall, 2002).  The development of avalanche risk management expertise is 
contingent on the existence and use of a feedback pathway and the avoidance of a 
dependency on heuristics. 
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3.4.2.2	  Naturalistic	  Decision-­‐making	  
 Research on the decision processes used by mountain guides in a wilderness 
skiing environment likely falls within the broad realm of Naturalistic Decision-
Making (NDM) (Kahneman, 2003; Weick, 2001; Zsambok & Klein, 1997).  Klein 
(1998, p. 1) defined Naturalistic Decision-Making as “the study of how people use 
their experience to make decisions in field settings”.  A subset of this area of 
research has been further developed by Klein (1993) and termed Recognition-Primed 
Decision-Making (RPD).  The Recognition-primed model proposed by Klein hinges 
on the concept that expert decision makers use a singular evaluation approach rather 
than a comparative evaluation.  In this singular approach, the decision maker selects 
the first option that works, rather than generating two or more options and then 
comparing them.  Also termed satisficing, Simon (1997) describes the singular 
approach as the formulation of a decision that exceeds the minimum performance 
and outcome criteria established by the decision maker.  Satisficing may not 
necessarily produce the best result, but it will be good enough (Schwartz et al., 
2002).  Experts seem to be able to generate this single useable option without having 
to compare it to others, whereas novices tend to rely on the generation of multiple 
options and subsequent comparison.  Klein (1998) describes two key elements within 
the RPD concept, recognition and action.  Recognition of key elements during the 
initial scene assessment builds a foundation for action.  This potential action is then 
evaluated through a story building process with the intent of imagining possible 
outcomes. 
 The RPD Model is based on the assumption that recognition is the initial step 
in the decision process (Klein, 1998).  There are two components to recognition.  
The need for a decision must be recognized first.  This primes the second component, 
which is recognition of the decision environment.  This central theme of recognition 
in RPD is based on the concept of situational awareness (SA), which has been 
described as the ability to maintain the big picture (Endsley, Farley, Jones, Midkiff, 
& Hansman, 1998; Endsley & Robertson, 2000; Endsley, 1997, 2006; Matthews, 
Strater, & Endsley, 2004).  SA is a state of being and is considered important for all 
levels of mastery from novice to expert (Endsley, 2006).  The correct identification 
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of the situational context and decision clues can lead to effective decision-making.  
This is different from a decision error that results from a poorly understood decision 
context.  Experts can typically make rapid decisions based on situational awareness 
and pattern recognition (Klein, 2011). 
 Situational awareness can also be described as who is doing what, and what is 
happening around the event that will impact the process (Endsley, 1997).  Situational 
awareness is the basis for pattern recognition.  Pattern matching is dependent on the 
ability to identify critical cues.  Not all features will be represented in similar 
patterns, so it is essential to identify the key elements of the pattern. 
 A diminished situational awareness reduces the number of possible beneficial 
solutions, as the potential patterns will be less well defined.  Endsley (1997)  
describes three levels of situational awareness: perception of the critical 
environmental factors, comprehension of the significance of those key factors in the 
formation of a holistic picture of the decision environment, and the ability to project 
or forecast what could change within the decision environment.  In novel situations, 
situational awareness may be restricted by the decision maker’s working memory 
and the limits of his, or her attention span.  Information overload can become an 
issue as decision complexity rises.  According to Endsley experienced decision 
makers will develop mental models that represent previous patterns and 
corresponding levels of all three levels of SA.  Well-developed models are able to 
account for dynamic situations and adapt previous schemata to new situations.  
Pattern matching is dependent on the ability to identify critical cues.  Not all features 
will be represented in similar patterns, so it is essential to identify the key elements 
of the pattern. 
 As the decision maker experiences increased saturation in a particular 
environment through repeated exposure, there may be an expectation of more rapid 
recognition of patterns.  Although Klein (1998) suggests that the expert has actions 
that are triggered in a single step for rapid ‘automatic’ decision responses, the speed 
of the response may compromise accuracy.  Automaticity may result in things being 
missed through a lowering of situational awareness.  When expectations of events do 
not match up with reality, it indicates the need to adapt goal selection to the decision 
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environment.  For example, avalanches on low angle terrain would indicate the 
need to re-evaluate the hazard forecast. 
 There are features of the environment that will impact how well participants 
are able to maintain situational awareness (Endsley, 2006):  
• The capacity of the system to produce high quality raw data. 
• The design of the interface between the user and the access point to 
the data. 
• The system complexity. 
• The number of steps that are automated.  Greater automation may 
decrease the user’s awareness of the steps. 
• Stress 
 There are also a number of human factors that effect the development and use 
of situational awareness including: attention span, working memory, goal orientation, 
expectations and pattern matching (Endsley, 2006).  Of these, pattern matching is 
perhaps the most significant for the ski guide.  SA is not considered transferable, as 
knowing what to look for and the meaning of what is perceived is context specific 
and dependent upon tacit knowledge and expertise.  Experts are normally able to 
develop sophisticated mental models that incorporate an interconnected, systems-
based interpretation of the environment. 
 For the ski guide, this would typically include an interpretation of the impact 
of a group of skiers on the snowpack and their location in the terrain.  It would also 
include the implications of multiple groups in the same terrain, the logistics of the 
helicopter or snowcat and the transitions from one geographic feature to the next as 
the day progressed.  Mental models facilitate the integration of individual elements 
of critical information into the decision process that may be filled with many pieces 
of apparently important information.  This is important in the development of 
forecasts and the possible ramifications of a decision.  A high quality mental model 
becomes the bridge that allows an expert to match the current situation with a 
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previously experienced pattern.  Recognition of the critical cues allows for more 
rapid pattern matching.   
 Automaticity often develops with increased learning and practice (Endsley, 
2006).  The reduction in effort directed at simple tasks allows the decision maker to 
focus on more demanding tasks.  For example a new heli-ski guide may become 
absorbed by the demands of terrain hazard assessment and not be able to direct 
attention at the challenge of managing the group.  With increased skills and 
automaticity in terrain selection, the guide can focus more attention on group 
management.  However there is a downside to automaticity.  An expert may be able 
to adequately manage ‘normal’ situations with a diminished level of SA, but may not 
be prepared when an abnormal situation arises.  The drift into complacency and 
automaticity is dangerous ground (Klein, 2011).  Checklists have been used 
successfully as a way to avoid automaticity.  It is important even for experts, to 
recognize when a situation is completely novel as previous patterns will likely be 
inadequate.  In trying to make a pattern fit a current situation, the decision maker 
may be guilty of stretching a pattern beyond recognition in the search for a possible 
solution.   
 Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu and Salas (2001) describe how a story building 
process can be used to seek solutions.  It is typically used in three incremental 
approaches based on the complexities of the decision challenge.  In the simplest 
form, immediate recognition of a problem and its solution is the simplest and most 
rapid response providing a quick ‘if ...then’ reaction.  When confronted with a 
relatively simple scenario the decision maker’s previous experience provides a 
template from which to solve the problem.  The complexity increases with higher 
levels of uncertainty prompting slower recognition of the problem.  This puts a 
question mark after the ‘if’.  Once the problem is recognized a solution can be 
quickly selected.  In this situation, the decision maker uses a story-building process 
with the intent of imagining possible outcomes to generate a satisfactory solution.   
 At the highest level of complexity the decision maker must not only develop 
recognition of the problem, but then also must contemplate the possible outcome.  
This variation is typically used when a dynamic, shifting environment is 
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encountered.  A single course of action can be generated and evaluated without the 
need to compare it to alternate strategies.  Expertise has been described as the key 
factor that allows these strategies to be effective and will be explored later in this 
chapter.  
 Klein (1998) conducted studies on fire fighters, naval ship commanders, tank 
platoon leaders, infantry officers, and commercial pilots and suggested that RPD 
strategies were used in 80-95% of the cases.  Experienced decision makers were able 
to recognize patterns within complex environments and rapidly develop solutions, 
which were adequate for the task.  These rapidly produced solutions may not have 
been the most elegant, or best solutions, but they created results that were ‘good 
enough.’  Klein argues that RPD strategies are most likely to be used when the 
decision maker is reasonably experienced relative to the challenge and is faced by a 
high level of uncertainty, exacerbated by time pressure.   
 Lipshitz and Klein (1993, pp. 110-111) describe six components of RPD that 
are typically present in real world settings and acknowledge that RPD does not 
address all the concerns of NDM, particularly the issues of team and organizational 
constraints.  These six components form the basis for the decision challenge.  All six 
are well represented within the challenges faced by ski-guides. 
1. Ill structured problems 
Although the challenge, or the decision problem, for ski guides 
can be stated as the need to safely conduct the guests through 
potentially hazardous wilderness terrain, there is a large degree of 
spatial variability.  The hazard associated with the snowpack 
stability varies considerably from place to place. 
2. Uncertain dynamic environments 
Winter weather conditions in the mountains change rapidly.  Poor 
visibility poses a particular challenge for the guide by 
complicating the selection of a safe ski line.  It is also an issue for 
the helicopter pilot while flying. 
3. Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 
Guest expectations may clash with safety parameters.  
Particularly during times of poor snowpack stability and high 
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avalanche hazard, guest desires to ski the steep and deep lines 
may conflict with the guide’s desire to keep everyone alive. 
4. Action / feedback loops 
Near-miss events and accidents provide more obvious feedback 
and might typically be reviewed extensively for lessons to be 
learned.  However there may be minimal feedback and reflection 
on good decisions.  It is unremarkable when nothing goes wrong. 
5. Time pressure  
Helicopter time is expensive.  Efficient use of helicopter time is 
paramount particularly when decisions involve the sequential 
movement of multiple groups. 
6. High stakes 
There are two components to the high stakes: guests are paying 
$1000/day or more and, guests may die because of poor 
decisions. 
 Klein (1998) suggests that analysis is not one of the strategies used by experts 
in these high stakes, time critical natural settings.  Based on his research on fire-
fighters, he suggests that the use of intuition and mental simulation, the development 
of metaphors and the telling of stories are much more appropriate strategies and 
claims that these areas have not been extensively studied in real-world JDM 
contexts.  
 When placed within the context of Naturalistic Decision-making (NDM) the 
question arises as to whether wilderness ski guiding is any different from other 
environments that pose risk-based challenges such as wilderness first aid.  Although 
there are certainly many similarities between the decision environments of the 
wilderness first aid responder and the ski guide, there are also significant differences.  
The key element that stands out is the questionable reliability, or even existence of a 
feedback loop.  For example, first aid for a traumatic injury benefits from a feedback 
loop.  If the direct pressure on a wound is sufficient, the bleeding will stop.  If it is 
insufficient, the bleeding will continue (Isaac & Goth, 1991).  This provides the 
opportunity to react to the feedback and modify the strategy.  
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 This is not the case for the ski guide where feedback may be entirely 
absent.  There is certainly the potential for a poor decision to result in a fatality, but it 
is perhaps equally likely that nothing bad will happen at all.  Poor decisions 
occasionally result in feedback in the form of near-misses or accidents, yet there will 
also be times when poor decisions do not result in any overt feedback.   
 At the other end of the ski-guiding decision spectrum, a good outcome is not 
necessarily attributable to a good decision.  Explicit feedback rarely occurs on good 
guiding decisions.  The most challenging scenario is that good decisions in ski 
guiding rarely result in direct feedback other than nothing bad happening.  Although 
this could be considered a good outcome, if the decision process were flawed, it 
might create a template for future flawed decisions, perhaps with outcomes not as 
favourable.  Inferences can be made as to the quality of the decision based on this 
non-result by those involved, such as other guides.  The question as to whether this 
was a good or bad decision hinges on the perception of whether the actual outcome 
(nothing bad happened) was representative of existing conditions.  If other guides 
within the operation considered the decision quality low, there is considerable 
opportunity for feedback and reflection. 
 The concept of spatial variability (Campbell & Jamieson, 2004) within the 
snow pack and the existence of ‘super weak zones’ plays a key role in understanding 
a likelihood statement regarding whether or not a slope is safe to ski.  Spatial 
variability refers to the changes within the snowpack structure over the terrain.  For 
example, a slope that is generally stable may have one or more localized areas of 
weakness where an avalanche can be triggered.  These areas of weakness or super 
weak zones may be due to variations within snowpack distribution or underlying 
surface roughness (McClung & Schaerer, 2006).  As it is difficult to specifically 
identify super weak zones, a slope may be categorized as being safe enough to 
commit a ski group to even though there may be isolated locations of triggerability.  
If the group skis the slope without anyone hitting a weak spot and triggering the 
slope, it can be described as non-event feedback.  This is particularly relevant with 
regard to Hogarth et al.’s (2008) work on the complexity of the environment in 
which intuition is developed or learned, as described later in this chapter. 
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 NDM researchers consider experts to have highly developed domain 
specific decision-making skills (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001; Lipshitz & 
Klein, 1993; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  The primary consideration is that the 
expertise is situated in a context.  The RPD model is based on the principle that 
rational choice and expected utility do not form the basis of decisions (Glöckner & 
Witteman, 2010; Klein, 1997).  Instead previous experience that has evolved into 
expertise supports the decision process.  Situational awareness allows for pattern 
recognition and the identification of whether the situation is typical or atypical.  A 
typical situation can be matched with a previous response and an adequate course of 
action can be selected.  Ross, Shafer and Klein (2006) suggest that NDM research 
can be used to generate decision training that contributes to cognitive authenticity.  
This term refers to domain specific perceptual skills that an expert would use to solve 
a problem.   
3.4.2.3	  A	  Two	  System	  Process	  
3.4.2.3.1	  Dual	  Process	  
3.4.2.3.1.1	  The	  Role	  of	  Intuition	  
Not only is there a lack of clarity within the literature as to exactly what intuition is, 
there are a variety of terms used interchangeably with intuition.  Betsch (2008, p. 4) 
described intuition as “a process of thinking”, with inputs coming from memory and 
outputs surfacing as feelings.  Myers (2002) equated intuition with common sense 
and argued that common sense is not so common, hence much of our naïve intuition 
is tied up in misconceptions such as the relative dangers of flying in a post 9/11 
world versus commuting by car to work.   
 The role of intuition has been the subject of much debate generally along the 
line of whether it is a rational or irrational process (King, 2002).  Easen and 
Wilcockson (1996, p. 672) described intuition as “an irrational process but with a 
rational basis”.  There is however, consensus that as expertise develops, intuition 
becomes a more refined tool and is used more extensively; the challenge being to not 
become overly reliant on it (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  In this section I will clarify 
a definition of intuition and more specifically a definition of pattern recognition that I 
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will use for the purpose of my studies.  These definitions clarify the context that I 
have used to craft the connection between intuition and expertise within the study.  
3.4.2.3.1.1.1	  Definition	  of	  Intuition	  
 In a study of emergency room nurses, Cioffi (1997) argues that intuition 
plays a vital role in the decision-making process, as it is a subconscious way of 
knowing, based on experience.  King (2002) investigated the use of intuition in non-
expert nurses and found that intuition is used more by experienced (expert) decision 
makers than inexperienced (novice) ones.  Easen and Wilcockson (1996) argue that a 
knowledge base built on experience provided the basis for pattern recognition.  This 
in turn supported intuitive responses.    
 An intuitive response will likely generate a feeling or emotion that is 
identifiable at a conscious level.  However the origin of the feeling cannot be 
identified (Evans, 2011).  The conscious analysis of an intuitive response does not 
change its sub-conscious origins.  The Default-interventionist theory would suggest 
that we would act on these rapid intuitions unless the intuitive solution does not 
saticfice the decision challenge (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). 
 Not all authors supported the use of intuition, citing various concerns.  
Ruggiero (1997) voiced a concern that intuition should not be used in isolation or as 
a replacement for analytical thinking, as was not part of the conscious thought 
process.  Whereas Herbig, Bussing, and Ewert (2001) equated intuition with tacit 
knowledge and described it as something which was acquired implicitly as part of 
work, and not necessarily something which was reflected upon.  As a result it might 
contain erroneous or problematic content.   
 Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1999) described the use of two systems 
within the decision-making process.  System 1 used perception and intuition.  It was 
driven by easily accessible thoughts that did not require much in the way of 
reflection.  Operations conducted under System 1 were: fast, effortless, implicit, 
could be emotionally charged, governed by habit and were difficult to control.  
System 2 used reasoning.  Operations conducted under System 2 were: slower, serial, 
effortful, potentially rule-based, and were consciously controlled.   
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 Dreyfus (2004) expanded on the definition by identifying six key aspects: 
pattern recognition, similarity recognition, common-sense understanding, skilled 
know-how, a sense of salience and deliberate rationality.  Of these six aspects pattern 
recognition has been recognized as the most important (Benner, 1984; Klein, 1993; 
Simon, 1987). 
 Baylor (2001) described two qualitatively different types of intuition that 
were available for use, in relation to the development of expertise.  She suggested 
that immature intuition was readily available at a novice level and mature intuition 
available at an expert level (Figure 4).  As expertise was built and the ability to 
critically analyse and to develop controlled cognitive processes evolved, the use of 
intuition was potentially inhibited.   
Figure	  4	  U-­‐shaped	  progression	  of	  intuition	  (Baylor	  2001)	  
 
 Baylor used the term ‘availability’ when perhaps a more descriptive term is 
accessibility.  A more convincing argument would be that not only is intuition still 
available, but it continues to mature as cognitive analytical skills develop.  However, 
the newfound cognitive process may mask the significance of the intuitive input 
(Figure 5).  According to the Default-Interventionist theory the strength of the 
intuitive response would be low and there would be a strong drive to find an answer 
analytically (Alter et al., 2007). 
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The significance of ‘immature intuition’ is questionable.  It may be present 
and identifiable in the novice decision maker, however it should not be relied on as 
the majority of the research has recognised the domain-specificity of the intuitive 
process.  Thus a novice decision maker would be unlikely to have domain specific 
experiences on which suitable intuitive responses could be based.  Any intuition 
available at this novice stage will have to be generic and transferred from other 
perhaps closely related experiences.  
Figure	  5	  A	  more	  complete	  picture	  integrates	  the	  use	  of	  cognitive	  processes	  with	  the	  accessibility	  of	  
intuition	  (adapted	  from	  Baylor,	  2001)	  
 
3.4.2.3.1.1.2	  Arguments	  against	  the	  use	  of	  intuition	  
 Easen and Wilcockson (1996) raised the question as to whether an intuitive 
decision could be considered ‘unprofessional’ as the decision would not have been 
the result of a rational process and might have been difficult to explain.  They argued 
that the inability of the decision maker to explain this intuitive leap might have been 
due to a complete bypassing of the linear reasoning process.   
 When confronted with the reality of professional decisions being scrutinized 
by the courts in regards to legal liability, a ski guide or an outdoor leader might feel 
exposed when the only explanation they have in defence of their actions is ‘It felt like 
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the right thing to do at the time’.  Easen and Wilcockson (1996) argued that 
compared to a yardstick of scientific and rational thought, intuitive thinking might be 
considered to be of lower quality and hence unprofessional.  They argued that there 
were significant benefits to professionals when decisions based on intuition could be 
explained and accepted as valid, both internally to the decision maker and externally 
to other members of the profession, the public and the courts.  The internal validation 
was an essential part of the intuitive process and was based on the decision maker’s 
knowledge and experience.  
3.4.2.3.2	  Intuitive	  –	  Analytical	  Continuum	  
 Hammond and Klein (1993) proposed a Cognitive Continuum Theory in 
which intuition and analysis were placed on a continuum.  The decision process was 
described as a pendulum, swinging back and forth along the continuum.  When a 
decision based on intuition was unsuccessful, the tendency was to move to a more 
analytical process.  The reverse was also true when analysis failed intuition gained a 
greater role.  An additional issue was that some tasks were more apt to be solved 
through an intuitive process while others were best solved through an analytical 
process.  The cognitive continuum was dependent on the context of the environment 
and needed to match the demands of the task (Dunwoody, Haarbauer, Mahan, 
Marino, & Tang, 2000). 
3.4.2.3.3	  Somatic	  Markers	  
 Damasio (1996) proposed the somatic marker hypothesis suggesting that 
people experience both positive and negative feelings that influenced the decision 
process.  These feelings were triggered through pattern recognition and previous 
emotional states.  Punishments or rewards earned through previous decisions 
established somatic markers which formed the basis for future decisions (Glöckner & 
Witteman, 2010).  These somatic markers were immediate and experienced prior to 
the activation of a reasoning process.  For example, a strong negative somatic 
response could be interpreted as a warning system, alerting the decision maker 
possible danger.  I have a bad feeling about this so I am not even going to think 
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about going there.  For the participants in my research, strong feelings - mostly 
negative, influenced their decision process.  
3.4.2.3.4	  Feedback	  	  
 Hogarth et al. (2008) argued that the critical element in the development of 
intuition was the quality and quantity of feedback.  He described feedback as being 
relevant or irrelevant, in relation to the seriousness of the consequences, which could 
be described as lenient or exacting.  Intuition does not need to be very precise when 
consequences are lenient.  A general direction can be sufficient.  However, when 
consequences are exacting, there are significant consequences for minor errors.  This 
produces an environment that can be described at its extremes as either ‘kind’ or 
‘wicked’ (Hogarth et al., 1991).  A ‘kind’ environment has relevant feedback and 
lenient consequences, compared to a ‘wicked’ environment, which has irrelevant 
feedback and exacting consequences.   
 This has particular significance to the decision-maker in avalanche terrain.  
The experience gained by expert ski guides might have been acquired in range of 
wicked and kind environments.  Many decisions could be made when there is the 
potential for catastrophic consequences and minimal, or irrelevant feedback is 
generated.  The “cultural capital or the inventory of intuitions that guide behaviour” 
(Hogarth et al., 2008, p. 91) has the potential to be tainted by this lack of relevant 
feedback, necessitating regular calibration.  
 Surowiecki (2004) suggested that although judgment calibration is important, 
both experts and non-experts have trouble maintaining an accurate estimation of the 
likelihood that judgments are correct.  One of the challenges in decision calibration is 
the interpretation of feedback from a previous decision.  Feedback can be of low 
quality or missing completely.  For example: if a slope does not avalanche when I ski 
down it, the decision to ski the slope must have been a good one.  This line of 
thinking may be flawed due to over-reliance on the feedback inherent within the 
activity, rather than incorporating a reflective component (Jamieson, 2006; Schön, 
1990).  Hogarth et al. (2008) argued that due to the ‘mere-exposure effect’, repeated 
exposure to an event without negative consequence can result in the context of the 
event being perceived positively.  
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 Good decision-making should have a reflective component and be 
anchored by the notion of mindfulness (Weick, 2001).  This pre-occupation with the 
anticipation of the unexpected rather than a satisfaction with previous performance is 
perhaps what separates good decision-makers from lucky ones and will help to 
address the issue of variable quality feedback (Hogarth et al., 2008; Wiseman, 2003). 
3.4.2.3.5	  Summary	  
 There is no argument over whether intuition plays a role in the decision 
process.  It is clearly acknowledged that if a decision maker’s knowledge and 
experience is lacking, a decision based on intuition can be flawed and no better than 
a misguided guess (Dreyfus, 2004).  One of the questions that must be addressed is 
whether or not, or to what degree, validation of intuitive responses can occur 
accurately through an internal or introspective process.  The discussion revolves 
around the extent to which we can identify and subsequently trust our intuitive 
responses.  Intuition has a nebulous distinction within the realm of decision-making 
and will benefit from further study that clarifies its development and use.  
3.5	  The	  Link	  Between	  Intuition	  and	  Expertise	  
3.5.1	  Introduction	  
 This section explores the link between the development of intuition and the 
development of expertise.  There is consistent agreement within the JDM literature 
that as expertise develops, decision makers are rewarded with more refined intuitive 
responses.  A key element within the definitions of expertise is the role that feedback 
plays in improving decision accuracy.  This leads to the development of domain 
specific intuition and expertise, which clarifies some of the differences between 
experts and novices. 
 Schön used the term technical rationality to describe expertise.  He 
considered “professional competence as the application of privileged knowledge to 
instrumental problems of practice” (1990, p. xi).  Various authors (Benner, 1984; 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Dreyfus, 2004; Ericsson & Charness, 1994) identified 
stages of mastery, or levels of expertise which played a role in how efficiently a 
complex situation might be resolved.  In studies ranging from nurses to chess 
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players, it has been identified and generally accepted that experts make decisions 
very differently from beginners (Atkins & McCammon, 2004; Benner, 1984; 
Galloway, 2002; Morrow et al., 2003; Starkes & Ericsson, 2003).  Typically, experts, 
compared to beginners, put more time into the analysis of the problem and 
consequently need less time to solve it.  They can also quickly absorb more 
information and remember it in both the short and long-term (Wagner & Sternberg, 
2002). 
 The trend in adventure leadership has been to develop a ‘rule-based process’ 
for novice decision makers and a ‘principle-based process’ for expert decision 
makers (Grímsdóttir, 2004; Hägeli et al., 2006; Wagner & Sternberg, 2002).  This 
has led to a series of incremental questions including: who is an expert, how do you 
know when you have become an expert, and how do you make the transition from 
novice, rule-based decisions to expert, principle-based ones?  Paley (1996) suggested 
that experts can be identified two ways, either through a peer assessment, or through 
the accomplishment of established performance criterion.  
 My research explored the challenges of the first question: who is an expert 
and how do they make decisions?  I chose this to address the research gap 
illuminated by a large scale research project completed in Western Canada on how 
novice winter recreational backcountry users, including both skiers and 
snowmobilers make decisions (Hägeli et al., 2006) and the research conducted by 
Adams (2005) on avalanche professionals.  The transition from novice to expert is 
likely topic for future research.  
 Ericsson (1996) described three important criteria in the empirical study of 
expert performance: reliability, reproducibility and predictability.  The most 
important condition was that the expert performance occurred reliably in a specific 
set of circumstances.  Ericsson argued that decision-making was best studied in a 
controlled laboratory setting, as it was more difficult to study expert performance in 
field settings in domains such as medicine, which posed a multitude of diverse 
challenges.  Ski guiding in avalanche terrain might also fall in this category of being 
more difficult to study as it contains numerous variables.   
 Ericsson (1996) suggested that it was preferable to measure expert 
performance in an absolute manner with a constant set of challenges rather than in a 
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relative measure with fluctuating challenges.  It would be easier to monitor 
changes over time with a constant set of challenges.  This argument does not 
adequately address the challenges faced by ski guides as the environment is 
constantly evolving, so to study ski guide decision-making in a controlled lab setting 
would be contrived.  To develop a more complete understanding of the role of 
intuition in the expert decision process of ski guides will require a study of their 
performance in a professional arena such as the complex winter mountain 
environment of Western Canada.  The value of studying decision-making in this 
unique environment is rooted in the complexity of the problem, exacerbated by an 
unreliable environmental feedback mechanism and extrapolated over the immensity 
of the terrain.  On an average winter day in British Columbia, 150 guides make high 
consequence decisions, with significant implications for the safety of their guests, on 
the use of an area twice the size of Switzerland.  Heli-ski groups rapidly move 
through this terrain, requiring numerous high consequence decisions in the 
completion of upwards of 8000 metres of vertical descent in a single day.  Although 
the InfoEx helps to pool knowledge about the snowpack structure, snow stability and 
the ease of triggering an avalanche, the potential for large degrees of variability from 
one area to its nearest neighbour adds a layer of complexity. 
3.5.2	  The	  Development	  of	  Expertise	  and	  Intuition	   	  
 A number of conditions have been cited as being characteristic of events that 
foster the development of expertise and the subsequent impact on intuition.  These 
included: a desire and motivation to improve, a well designed task that 
accommodated the learner’s starting point, and timely access to high quality 
feedback (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993).  The greatest potential for 
development occurred when tasks that met these criteria were repeated often.  Of 
these characteristics, feedback whether generated externally or internally through a 
reflective process, was generally considered the most important (Balzer, Doherty, & 
O’Connor, 1989; Brown, 2006; Hogarth et al., 1991).  A well-designed task 
performed by a highly motivated person can meet with limited success in the absence 
of high quality feedback (Balzer et al., 1989).  For the ski guide, this can be the case 
all too often.  Low-probability – high-consequence scenarios do not provide 
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consistent high-quality feedback (Klassen, 2010a).  Ski guides cannot be 
dependent solely on environmental feedback as it can lack qualities that are truly 
representative of the decision complexity.  Feedback that addresses not only what the 
correct answer was, but also includes elements of why the answer was correct can be 
much more effective in the development of decision-making skills (Hammond & 
Summers, 1972). 
3.5.2.1	  Pattern	  Recognition	  
 Pattern recognition may be a crucial element in the decision-making process 
of ski guides as it can occur when previous experiences encompass a high degree of 
similarity or representativeness with a new situation.  In this situation, intuition could 
be particularly accurate.  This would allow experts to more rapidly access a greater 
amount of information and to come up with a better decision faster.   
 In a study of chess masters, Chase and Simon (1973) found that experts, 
compared to novices, had an increased ability to chunk information (identify 
patterned clusters), store it in long term memory and recall it later.  In further studies, 
Gobet and Simon (1998) identified the template theory which predicted that experts 
would be able to develop far more elaborate chunking abilities, using both larger 
chunks and more of them. 
 Galloway (2002) suggested that building an extensive pattern recognition 
repertoire was an important part of becoming an expert outdoor leader.  This would 
help leaders identify a greater complexity of response possibilities.  Information 
could be retrieved from the experience-generated knowledge base through the 
visualization of mental images.   
 Pattern recognition is an integral part of how intuitive inferences help the 
decision maker.  However, there is disagreement within the literature as to whether 
experts are more adept at using pattern recognition to forecast future events, or to 
look backward in the analysis of past events.  Looking forward in time is a prediction 
(e.g. What is going to happen?).  Whereas, looking backwards in time is a diagnostic 
inference (e.g. What has been going on that has led us to where we are now?).  
Hogarth et al. (2008) argued that experts seem to be more adroit at using backward 
inferences or diagnosis, as they are more able to absorb the details and to recognize 
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patterns quickly.  This pattern recognition seems to be based in a greater 
understanding of what is normal versus what is abnormal.  This contrasts with Vick’s 
(2002) suggestion that experts use a forward reasoning process to more rapidly 
diagnose a situation, rather than a backward reasoning process.  Vick’s argument is 
supported by the findings of Patel et al. (1996) in their study of medical expertise.  
The forward reasoning process allowed for the identification of key factors and then 
a rapid selection of a seemingly obvious solution (Weick, 2001).  Certainly, there is 
evidence that experts can use both processes; the argument is perhaps over which 
one is preferred or used first.  For example, a backward reasoning process can be 
used to further check a solution derived by a forward reasoning process, and vice 
versa.  This is how Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1999) described what they call, 
the intuitive – analytical interaction. 
 In a study of avalanche professionals, Adams (2005) reported that 88% of her 
participants used some level of pattern recognition in their decision-making process.  
The sample group, generally described as experts, included 37 Canadian avalanche 
professionals: heli-ski guides, ski patrollers, highways avalanche control technicians 
and park wardens.  Years of professional experience were used as the measure for 
expertise, with 80% exceeding 10 years.  These years of professional experience of 
the avalanche experts had contributed to the accumulation of an extensive inventory 
of patterns.  This helped them quickly make sense of new situations.  
 Pattern recognition is not necessarily the panacea for all decision problems.  
Bad patterns can also be formed.  Hogarth et al. (1991) suggested that this could 
occur when decision feedback was absent or misleading.  Ewert, Shellman and Glenn 
(2006) equated pattern matching with a possible instructor trap, the heuristic bias of 
familiarity.  They suggested that a seemingly familiar pattern might provide an easy 
solution to a slightly different decision problem.  A failure to recognize the subtleties 
of the differences could result in a poor decision. 
3.5.2.2	  Feedback	  	  
 Of the elements of effective learning described by Ericsson and his co-
authors (Ericsson, 1996; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993); defined task, 
appropriate difficulty, feedback, and error correction; feedback has been considered 
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the critical element.  The type, quality and quantity of feedback would be 
dependent on the characteristics of the operational environment.  Other factors, 
which have been explored in this section, include the impact of near-misses, the 
timing of feedback and the significance of experiencing multiple environments in the 
development of intuition. 
 In environments with inconsistent or unreliable feedback such as ski guiding, 
the opportunity for improvement in decision accuracy may be minimal.  Given the 
importance of decision accuracy in the avoidance of fatalities, it would seem crucial 
to develop strategies to overcome this lack of implicit feedback.  There need to be 
ways to generate feedback beyond that which is implicit.   
 The ski guide faces the challenge of interpreting numerous, possibly 
conflicting environmental feedback clues, such as a lack of recent skier-triggered 
avalanche activity despite a known weakness within the snowpack.  High quality 
feedback on the decision maker’s interpretation of the environmental feedback could 
come from other experts.  Teams of guides such as those used by most mechanized 
ski operations could likely benefit from some form of decision analysis during the 
traditional evening guides meeting.  As intuitive responses based in pattern matching 
possibly play a critical role in the interpretation of environmental feedback, knowing 
if and how intuition is developed would be of great benefit to the guiding community 
and the greater community that hires guides to conduct them safely through 
hazardous terrain.  
 Hogarth et al. (2008) argued that the critical element in the development of 
intuition was the quality and quantity of feedback.  Figure 6 shows how feedback can 
be relevant or irrelevant, in relation to the seriousness of the consequences, which 
can be described as lenient or exacting.  Intuition does not need to be very precise 
when consequences are lenient.  A general direction can be sufficient.  However, 
when consequences are exacting, there are significant consequences for minor errors.  
This produced an environment that could be described at its extremes as either ‘kind’ 
or ‘wicked’.  A kind environment has relevant feedback and lenient consequences, 
compared to a wicked environment, which has irrelevant feedback and exacting 
consequences.   
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Figure	  6	  Learning	  environments	  for	  the	  development	  of	  intuition	  (Hogarth	  et	  al.,	  2008)
	  
 This has particular significance to the decision maker in avalanche terrain.  
The experience gained by expert ski guides might have been acquired in range of 
wicked and kind environments.  Many decisions are made when there is the potential 
for catastrophic consequences and minimal, or irrelevant feedback is generated.  The 
“cultural capital or the inventory of intuitions that guide behaviour” (Hogarth, 2008, 
p. 91) has the potential to be tainted by this lack of relevant feedback.  
 An analysis of the winters of 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 in British Columbia 
might provide an example of the role that the environment plays in the feedback 
process.  Deep weak layers within the snowpack, which are notoriously difficult to 
assess in regards to the hazard they pose, plagued the winter of 2007-2008.  The 
number of recreational avalanche fatalities in British Columbia was above average at 
eleven, yet there was not a single fatality in professional, guided groups (Klassen, 
2008; Marshall, 2008).  In contrast, the winter of 2006-2007 was characterized by 
frequent, regular storms and few, if any, persistent weak layers lingered in the 
snowpack.  The total number of fatalities (5) in British Columbia was well below the 
five-year moving average, but 60% were commercial fatalities.   
 This conflicted with previous research, which indicated that avalanche 
experts typically had greater difficulty forecasting deep slab instabilities (Jamieson & 
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occurred immediately prior to my two winters of data collection.  Reports from 
guides suggested that the professional avalanche community was able to identify the 
different nature of the weather conditions and resultant snowpack instabilities.  
Patterns did not match previous experiences and doubt was a constant decision factor 
(Piché, 2008).  Many near-miss events were reported, but they occurred sporadically 
and no consistent pattern of feedback.  Numerous anomalous events were catalogued 
in the 2007-2008 InfoEx reports, which fell outside the pattern recognition of the 
reporting professionals.  
 The winter of 2007-2008 had many of the hallmarks of a wicked 
environment, with massive negative consequences and variable feedback (Hogarth et 
al., 1991), yet no guiding fatalities occurred.  One can speculate that the guiding 
safety record was the result of conservative decision-making with an element of good 
luck.  An avalanche event occurred relatively early in the season on January 6th, 2008 
at the Big White ski area that punctuated the decision challenges.  An avalanche 
released on a persistent weak layer deep within the snowpack on a slope inside the 
ski area boundary that was open to the public.  Six people were buried resulting in 
one fatality.  This avalanche prompted the professional community to be more 
prudent in their decision-making in the face of variable quality feedback and massive 
consequences (Brown, 2006).  
 The ‘hard – easy’ effect is another possible explanation of these outcomes 
(Suantak, Bolger, & Ferrell, 1996).  Guides may have become over confident when 
the conditions were easy in 2006-2007, whereas they were less confident and hence 
more conservative in the wicked conditions of 2008-2009. 
 Unfortunately, these conditions may have laid the foundation for potentially 
dysfunctional patterns or bad intuitions.  Intuitions formed in 2007-2008 could be 
considered highly suspect, as it might be overly presumptuous to assume that more 
good decisions were made that year and were the cause of the zero fatality rate. 
 Feedback received through the commitment of errors and the recognition that 
these errors had occurred provided a possible answer to the above questions.  Weick 
(2001) suggested that when the number of perceived errors was low, there was 
minimal opportunity to learn.  It was only once the errors were detected that 
feedback could be elicited.  Errors, which were not perceived or recognized as such, 
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could be considered a false positive.  For example, the decision to ski a particular 
slope will likely be considered valid when the result does not include a negative 
result such as an avalanche (Gonzales, 2008). Adjustment to detected errors 
increased the quality of the decision-making.   
 Lipshitz et al. (2001) suggested that making errors was not necessarily a 
problem.  The focus needed to be on the identification of errors and the possible 
learning outcomes generated by them.  Working towards an error-free performance 
in a highly complex unstable environment may in the end be detrimental to the 
learning process.  
 It is also necessary to consider the impact of exposure to multiple locations or 
environments on the development of intuition.  It is possible that intuition developed 
differently for guides who moved from one operational area to another to develop 
their expertise.  Being challenged to make difficult decisions on a more regular basis, 
compared to a guide who continues to work in the same location and subsequently 
has developed a greater depth of local knowledge, may in the end foster a more 
sophisticated inventory of intuitions (Tozer, Fazey, & Fazey, 2007). 
 Soman (2003) suggested that the evaluation of an experience and subsequent 
learning, could vary depending on the timing of when the feedback was elicited.  
This evaluation could occur through a reflective process or through the solicitation of 
feedback from others.  A prospective evaluation is an anticipation of what will 
happen and occurs prior to the implementation of a decision.  Whereas a 
retrospective evaluation is comprised of thinking back on what actually happened.  
The timing of the retrospective analysis was critical.  Soman (2003) argued that a 
temporally proximal evaluation of an event was preferred and would carry more 
weight.  He went on to suggest that adaptations occurred to the perception of 
previous events, with the memories of negative events, such as poor decisions that 
led to painful outcomes, diminishing over time.  These painful memories were 
strongest immediately after the event and weaker as time went by.  In this sense, 
multiple retrospective evaluations of the same event, conducted at different times, 
might lead to differing interpretations.   
 One of the challenges is the interpretation of feedback from a previous 
decision, particularly when the feedback was a non-event. Feedback can be of low 
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quality or missing completely.  For example: if a slope does not avalanche when I 
ski down it, the decision to ski the slope must have been a good one.  This line of 
thinking may be flawed due to over-reliance on the feedback inherent within the 
activity, rather than incorporating a reflective component (Jamieson, 2006; Schön, 
1990).  Hogarth et al. (2008) argued that due to the ‘mere-exposure effect’, repeated 
exposure to an event without negative consequence can result in the context of the 
event being perceived positively.  
 Feedback is an integral component of the improvement of decision accuracy.  
The issue of variable quality feedback can be addressed through a pre-occupation 
with the anticipation of the unexpected rather than a satisfaction with previous 
performance is perhaps what separates good decision-makers from lucky ones 
(Hogarth et al., 2008; Wiseman, 2003).  Although errors provide an obvious trigger 
for the evaluation of feedback, further analysis of feedback can be stimulated by a 
reflective component.  
3.5.2.3	  Reflection	  
 Reflection has the potential to become self-generated feedback.  Certainly 
there is the need for reflection to be calibrated to avoid becoming overly critical or 
blind to seemingly obvious negative clues, but it does provide an avenue for 
improvement in decision accuracy. 
 Jensen, Gwyer, Shepard, and Hack (2000) suggested that the on-going 
development of expertise can be fostered through the process of continual reflection-
in-action as demonstrated by a ‘thinking out loud’ process.  Experts who challenged 
themselves with difficult cases could continue to expand the depth and breadth of 
their knowledge base through a reflective process.  This self-monitoring, thinking 
process could be used to examine incoming data through the lens of their previous 
experience (Jensen, Gwyer, Shepard, & Hack, 2000).  
 Schön (1990) described how the element of surprise illuminates a hole in our 
previously held expectations. This gap can be swept aside or further examined 
through a reflective process for clues.  Adams (2005), in a study of avalanche 
professionals, suggested that critical reflection was an essential component of 
deliberate practice and played a key role in the development of expertise.   
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 Good decision-making should have a reflective component and be 
anchored by the notion of mindfulness (Weick, 2001).  This pre-occupation with the 
anticipation of the unexpected rather than a satisfaction with previous performance is 
perhaps what separates good decision-makers from lucky ones and will help to 
address the issue of variable quality feedback (Hogarth et al., 2008; Wiseman, 2003) 
3.5.2.4	  Domain	  Specific	  Development	  
 Wagner and Sternberg (2002) suggested that expertise should be considered 
domain-specific due to the extent of dedicated practice required.  These domain 
specific activities could be divided into three categories: work, play and deliberate 
practice.  Deliberate play at an early age was found likely to promote engagement in 
the activity and a willingness to engage in deliberate practice as the participant’s skill 
set matured (Ward, Hodges, Starkes, & Williams, 2007).  Intrinsic motivation was 
the greatest predictor of dedication to deliberate practice, with a lack of the deliberate 
intention to improve as barrier to expert performance. 
 Campitelli and Gobet (2011) argue that deliberate practice is a necessary 
component of expertise development, but question whether it alone is sufficient to 
acquire expertise.  In their study of chess players, they found that there are highly 
talented people who can achieve mastery with less than the 10,000-hour benchmark 
of practice.  They suggest that 10,000 hours is an average not a minimum.  The 
achievement of expert levels of performance may be aided by above average 
cognitive abilities and starting at an early age.  Assertions of handedness and season 
of birth were also predictors for expertise, but likely have less influence on ski 
guides than on chess masters.  Gladwell (2008) argues that the opportunity to excel 
plays a very important roll in the acceleration of expertise development.  For 
example, hockey players born in January gain access to better coaching sooner than 
their peers born in December. 
 Fadde and Klein (2010) suggest that deliberate performance is a way to 
accelerate the development of expertise.  It intensifies the tenets of deliberate 
practice through four specific exercises: estimation, experimentation, extrapolation 
and explanation.  Deliberate performance is conducted during routine work time and 
is aimed at improving domain expertise.  
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 Mountain guiding has followed the lead of many professions and adopted a 
continued professional development (CPD) programme to ensure the on-going 
development of its members (Association of Canadian Mountain Guides, 2006; 
Canadian Avalanche Association, 2006).  Within this domain specific development, 
there is the recognition that there are a number of levels or increments in the 
transition from novice to expert.  For an aspiring apprentice mountain guide field 
days could easily fall into the three categories of: work, play and deliberate practice. 
 Reflecting on my twenty years of experience in student recruitment and 
selection into the Adventure Studies Department (over 500 students), play has 
typically been what inspired the pursuit of certification as a mountain professional.  
Extensive deliberate practice has been a required element in the preparation for 
mountain guiding exams.  Work becomes an option once the first exam is passed.   
 For fully certified guides, deliberate practice might fall lower on the agenda 
due to increased work opportunities.  Ericsson et al. (1993) suggested that work 
pressures might discourage the acquisition and development of new skills even 
though they could provide improved and more efficient strategies.  The dilemma of 
how to spend limited time resources might be further complicated by extrinsic 
rewards associated with work such as money and social recognition.  In contrast to 
this, deliberate practice not only generates no income, it usually incurs a financial 
burden, either through lost wages or direct financial costs.  The motivation to 
continue with deliberate practice at this point would need to be based in an 
appreciation for the long-term benefits associated with becoming an expert.  An 
increased emphasis on Fadde and Klein’s (2010) four components of deliberate 
performance could potentially counteract the loss of deliberate practice time.  
 As may be the case in many professions, but perhaps more so in Adventure 
Leadership, the maturation process of becoming recognized within the peer group as 
an expert requires more time to be channelled into dedicated practice or work and 
less into play.  This is particularly true for guides who hold full-time jobs within the 
field, but may be less of an issue for the guides who maintain an itinerant lifestyle 
with significant gaps in their annual employment during the ‘off-seasons’ of 
October-November and May-June.  
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 Professional development programmes and courses can provide an 
opportunity for experienced practitioners to further develop their expertise.  Both the 
Association of Canadian Mountain Guides (ACMG) and the Canadian Avalanche 
Association (CAA) require Continued Professional Development (CPD) as a 
component of active professional membership (ACMG, 2006; CAA, 2006).  The 
CAA requirements are much more stringent than the ACMG requirements 
(Appendix 10).  The CAA employs a points based system that requires members to 
demonstrate the continued development of their expertise in a minimum of three of 
the six available categories.  Theses categories are: professional practice, formal 
learning activities, informal learning activities, participation in service activities, 
presentations, and contributions to knowledge.  
 It is no longer considered good enough to merely maintain a standard of 
competency.  The professional mountain community in Canada, through the efforts 
of the Canadian Avalanche Association and the Association of Canadian Mountain 
Guides has modelled the requirement for continued professional development after 
the Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of British Columbia.  
There are similarities with the CPD systems used by the medical and legal 
professions.  The ACMG (2006, p. 1) has defined CPD as “the systematic 
maintenance, improvement and broadening of knowledge and skill, and the 
development of personal qualities necessary for the execution of professional and 
technical duties throughout the practitioner’s working life”.  The emphasis is on 
improvement and broadening of knowledge, with the recognition that simply 
maintaining the guiding skill set at the level of certification is inadequate.  New 
knowledge and continual learning are acknowledged as essential parts of the 
profession.    
 The Canadian Avalanche Association requirement for professional members 
to engage in Continued Professional Development (CPD) provides the clearest 
example of how continued professional development contributes to dedicated 
practice and the development of expertise.  Professional members are required to 
“continuously upgrade their knowledge, training, qualifications and credentials”.  
The CAA CPD requirements are included as an appendix and are summarized here.  
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The requirements will be described and evaluated in regards to the how they 
influence the development of expertise in ski guides.  
 Professional Members must generate 240 CPD points over a three-year 
period, with a minimum of 80 points per year.  Points must be accumulated in at least 
three of the six categories.  They must maintain a three-year rolling average of 80 
points.  The categories are: professional practice, formal learning activities, informal 
learning activities, participation (service), presentations and contribution to 
knowledge.  Members cannot earn their CPD points from just their professional 
practice.  A minimum of three of the six categories must be used to generate points 
over a three-year period and there are maximums for each category.   
 Although professional practice can be up to 62.5% of the annual CPD points 
total, formal and informal learning activities combined can contribute up to the same 
amount.  These learning activities are an integral part of the ski guide’s pursuit of 
expertise.  Three key events form the cornerstone of most ski guides’ professional 
development: annual company pre-season training, the CAA Annual General 
Meeting CPD event, and the biannual International Snow Science Workshop (ISSW) 
conference.  Every heli-ski and cat-ski company conducts a mandatory pre-season 
training session.  These sessions typically involve presentations and workshops from 
leading researchers and industry experts such as Dr Bruce Jameison (University of 
Calgary Applied Snow and Avalanche Research Group), Dr Pascal Hägeli, and 
Manuel Genswein.  The Annual CAA CPD event is well attended and each year is 
directed toward a theme.  In 2012 the theme was the integration of new technology 
into standard common practice.  The ISSW is the pivotal point in the transition of 
new research into practice.  The theme of the conference is the ‘Blending of Theory 
and Practice’.  Although the event is the stage for the distribution of new research 
and knowledge, many practitioners not only attend the conference, but also make 
practice-based presentations generated through action research.  Contributions to 
knowledge can comprise up to 37.7% of the annual total, and not only play an 
important role in the development of the individual practitioner, but also the 
profession of ski guiding.  The CAA Membership Committee is required to annually 
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conduct a random audit of the membership.  If a member is unable to demonstrate 
compliance with the CPD requirement a change in membership status is required.   
 A caveat to the benefit of participation in CPD events is that there may be a 
tendency to engage in ‘safe’ situations that demonstrate superior abilities, rather than 
risking new situations that might expose weaknesses.  Dweck (2002) cautioned that a 
lack of willingness to engage in challenging learning opportunities can result in 
stagnation relative to peers who are inclined to push themselves into new situations.  
She goes on to suggest that self-handicapping may occur when people care more 
about looking good or smart than they do about doing something right or 
accomplishing something great. 
 As the above discussion demonstrates, development of expertise is based on 
motivation to succeed and practice, not innate abilities.  ‘Gifted’ children will not 
become talented adults without hard work and the willingness to engage in 
intellectual and creative risks.  The development of expertise comes at a cost 
however, as it is not easy or inexpensive to acquire and demands a high level of 
motivation and effort over a sustained period of time (Sternberg & Ericsson, 1996; 
Wagner & Sternberg, 2002).  In an analysis of twenty members of the Canadian 
National Figure Skating Team, Starkes et al. (1996) found that both the skaters and 
their coaches rated ‘desire’ as the number one element in the likelihood of success.  
Good coaching and practice came second and third, while the coaches rated natural 
ability 6th and the athletes rated it 10th. 
 As decision makers move upward through the levels of expertise, there can 
be an increasing willingness to recognize the importance of and to act on intuitive 
feelings.  The ability to use intuition can develop much more effectively.  
Inexperienced decision makers can develop their intuitive senses by talking with 
more experienced decision makers.  This sharing of thoughts should help the less 
experienced to hone their skills.  The domain specific nature of expertise and 
intuition requires that considerable time and effort is put into professional 
development activities.  The willingness to engage in challenging CPD events and 
risk failure in front of a peer group will likely payoff in significant long-term 
benefits. 
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 The expertise of the heli and snowcat guiding industry is exemplified 
through the relatively low number of fatalities, particularly for what many consider 
an extreme sport.  The safety record of commercial heli and snowcat skiing is 
generally very good, but it does have some variability (Figure 7).  In 1991, nine 
guests died in the worst avalanche accident in Canadian mechanized skiing history.  
For the following two seasons there were no commercial mechanized skiing 
avalanche fatalities.  During the 1996/1997 season there were four fatal mechanized 
skiing avalanches resulting in nine fatalities.  In the following two seasons there were 
no commercial guiding fatalities.  Over the ten-year span from 2000/2001 to 
2009/2010 there were 11 avalanche accidents resulting in 14 fatalities.  This must be 
put into the context of the number of skiers and the volume of terrain covered during 
that time.  
• 100,000 skier days per year 
• 5000-8000 vertical metres of skiing per guest per day 
• 8-14 runs per guided group per day 
• 350 guides working per season 
• 150 guides working each day 
• The season is 5 months, or 150 days 
 This means that a guide typically makes about 1200 run decisions per year 
and that there are over 180,000 run decisions made industry-wide over the same time 
period.  HeliCat Canada considers safety as the number one priority for the 
association members.  Thousands of hours are dedicated to learning from the very 
few accidents that occur.  Training events help to fulfil the roll of on-going dedicated 
practice (HeliCat-Canada, 2013). 
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Figure	  7	  Canadian	  guiding	  avalanche	  fatalities	  1973-­‐2010	  
 
3.5.3	  Use	  of	  Intuitive	  Options	  
 In this section a number of issues within the role of intuition has been 
explored including: the notion of subjective probability, the importance of pattern 
recognition, and a description of the challenge of choosing between non-intuitive and 
intuitive options. 
 Simmons and Nelson (2006) suggested that people tend to choose intuitive 
options rather than non-intuitive ones. They called this an intuitive bias.  Intuitive 
options come to mind easily and because of this they promote confidence.  When 
other information becomes known that counters the immediate intuitive response, 
there is less likelihood that it will be considered as valuable as the intuitive option.  
There are a number of possible explanations.  Intuitive biases come from the 
integration of the two mental systems described by Kahneman (2003). Since the first 
system is based on intuition, it can provide a quick answer to a decision problem.  
There is potential for error to be introduced if a quick intuitive answer to an easy (but 
slightly different) question is used to answer a more complex question.  The second 
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system, analysis, requires a much greater level of reflection and is therefore 
slower, but has the benefit of adding information that was initially neglected.  Doubt 
is a phenomenon that can develop during this reflective period and could be 
considered “a meta-cognitive appreciation of one’s ability to think incompatible 
thoughts about the same thing” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 702).   
 In a study of avalanche professionals, Adams (2005) found that expert 
forecasters regularly used the non-primary option as a method for quality control, 
that is when the intuitive option was chosen, the non-intuitive option was used as a 
filter to check for biases and when the non-intuitive option was chosen, intuition was 
used as a final check.  ‘Does this feel right?’  If both intuition and analysis run 
concurrently as two independent processes, they can be used as a series of checks 
and balances (Evans, 2010). 
 The intuitive response may win out due to a number of possible factors.  
Chaiken (1980) proposed a heuristic systemic model, which suggested that people 
are either unmotivated or unable due to overload, to update their initial intuitive 
response, whereas Kahnemann (2003) suggested that the second system was actually 
unable to sufficiently correct the initial assessment.  This initial intuitive response 
became the ‘anchor’.  As new information was processed, adjustments were made, 
but rarely did these adjustments go far enough.  The key concept was accessibility.  
How easily did these intuitive thoughts come to mind?  Was it hard work, or was it 
effortless? 
 Although there is general agreement as to the link between the development 
of expertise and the development of intuition; there is a lack of consensus within the 
literature as to the degree to which intuition should be trusted and used.  Davidson 
(2005) argued that greater effort should be put into the use of the non-intuitive option 
and that the intuitive option had its place in the response to emergency situations, but 
was generally overused.  Kahneman suggests that intuition was overused because it 
was easy.  “People are not accustomed to thinking hard and are often content to trust 
a plausible judgment that quickly comes to mind” (2003, p. 699).  Ruggiero (1997) 
included the caveat that novices were rarely blessed with accurate intuition as it 
could often be both uncontrollable and unreliable.  He argued that the inclusion of 
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intuition in the decision-making process was a welcome addition, but should not 
be used in isolation.  
3.5.3.1	  Subjective	  Probability	  
3.5.3.1.1	  Uncertainty	  
 Dealing with uncertainty is an occupational hazard for ski guides (Statham, 
2008a, 2008b).  They are compelled to make life or death decisions on a daily basis 
with varying degrees of uncertainty.  Likelihood judgments, or subjective probability 
assessments are qualitative expressions used to communicate the probability of an 
occurrence (Reagan, Mosteller, & Youtz, 1989) and are used in highly complex 
environments when decisions are required in the face of uncertainty (Vick, 2002).  
Clearly within the ski-guiding environment, there would be tremendous benefit to 
having a greater understanding of how intuition plays a role in the development of 
likelihood statements.  
 Lipshitz et al. defined uncertainty as “a sense of doubt that blocks or delays 
action” (2001, p. 337).  Their definition was further broken down to identify three 
forms of uncertainty and described as: inadequate understanding or insufficiently 
situational awareness, incomplete, ambiguous, or unreliable information, and 
conflicting alternatives.  Kahneman et al. (1999) argued that heuristic strategies were 
commonly used in these environments and allowed decision makers to estimate the 
probable outcome of an event by interpreting subjective information through a filter 
of personal experience.  This was useful when there was a high level of uncertainty 
and no immediately obvious answer.  However, there was disagreement within the 
literature.  Betsch (2008) argued that intuition should not be equated with the 
shortcut strategies known as heuristic processes as suggested by Kahneman et al. 
(1999) and by Gilovich (1991), because these heuristics were contingent upon 
deliberation rather than intuition.  
3.5.4	  Intuition	  Leading	  to	  Confidence	  
 In this section the connection is made between the use of intuition and 
feelings of confidence.  Statham described ski guiding and avalanche forecasting as 
operating in an “untidy world of uncertainty” (2008, p. 4).  The degree of uncertainty 
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experienced by a decision maker will likely be reflected in his or her level of 
confidence.  High levels of uncertainty might be expected to produce low levels of 
confidence.  Hogarth et al. (2008) suggested that this may not always be the case.  In 
situations when high quality feedback on decision accuracy was not available, other 
measures could be used to measure the quality of the decision.  The primary measure 
would be confidence.  If there was a strong intuitive response, it could feel like ‘the 
right thing to do’, and expressions of confidence in this intuitive response would be 
used to validate the decision.  
 Simmons and Nelson (2006) argued that the primary task of a decision maker 
was to evaluate the need to switch from the intuitive choice to the non-intuitive 
option.  Key information included the constraints that opposed or limited the initial 
intuitive response and the intuitive confidence, which supported the intuitive 
response.  Generally the easier the intuitive response came to mind, the more likely it 
was to inspire confidence.  In an investigation of predictions against point spreads in 
National Football League games, which included a series of fourteen quantitative 
studies, four hypotheses were proposed (Simmons & Nelson, 2006b):  
1. Intuitive bias – people choose intuitive responses over equally credible 
non-intuitive responses. 
2. Constraint magnitude – people choose the non-intuitive response when 
constraint information was strong. 
3. Intuitive confidence – people choose intuitively when they were confident 
in their intuition. 
4. Intuitive betrayal – people who choose non-intuitive responses were less 
confident. 
 Intuitive uncertainty was introduced through seemingly irrelevant sources.  
Simmons and Nelson (2006) used an uncertain start time for football games.  These 
irrelevant sources that produced uncertainty, decreased intuitive confidence.  On 
questionnaires, poor or difficult to read fonts also decreased intuitive confidence.  
Shappell and Wiegmann (2001) suggested that uncertainty was exacerbated when 
sensory input was outside the normal range.  For the ski guide, sensory input could 
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be distorted by environmental factors such as: poor lighting, clouds obscuring 
vision, and noise from wind, or helicopters. 
3.5.4.1	  Confidence	  
 Confidence, and in particular over-confidence, may be responsible for 
leading decision-makers astray in attempts to convince themselves of the accuracy of 
their decisions (Dobbins, Kroll, & Liu, 1998; Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 
1990).  As there is likely a link between confidence and accuracy, it would be 
important to know how well confidence is calibrated relative to accuracy.  In a two-
alternative choice situation there is a 50/50 chance of getting it right.  If you know 
the answer then you will have 100% confidence and accuracy.  If you have no idea 
then, you have a 50% chance of getting it right and therefore a 50% confidence 
rating (Merkle & Van Zandt, 2006).   
 Although the ski guiding environment is much more complex, it still comes 
down to the question ‘Can I safely bring my guests down this run?’  The answer 
must be a confident yes or a definitive no.  Maybe, or perhaps would not good 
enough.  There would be a decision point in the helicopter on the selection of a 
landing to drop the skiers off, and a commitment point as the skiers were poised at 
the top of the slope.  If the slope is deemed unsafe after the group has committed it, 
an extraction could be difficult. 
 Simmons and Nelson (2006) suggested that although complete certainty was 
difficult to achieve, when intuitive confidence approached 100%, disconfirming 
information could become irrelevant.  It would likely be difficult to convince 
someone to change their mind once they have high confidence in an intuitive 
response (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977).  However, feelings of regret have 
been reported to become more prevalent when the initial intuitive choice was 
abandoned in favour of a non-intuitive choice that later proved to be wrong 
(Simmons & Nelson, 2006b).  
 A major issue for confidence statements is the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy.  A number of researchers have (2006) described how a 
hard-easy effect (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Merkle & Van Zandt, 
2006), or difficulty effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992) could occur, when a greater 
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overconfidence was exhibited on hard questions and slight under-confidence on 
very easy tasks. In a study of expert decision-making, Wright, Rowe and Bolger 
(1994) found that issues of calibration needed to be addressed when decision-making 
was perceived to be more difficult.   
 These confidence judgements were affected by both random error and 
cognitive biases.  Cognitive bias was defined as a mental process that allowed people 
to feel that they knew more than they actually did (Merkle & Van Zandt, 2006).  This 
promoted an inability to properly digest stimulus information, which negatively 
impacted the accuracy of confidence judgements.  Overconfidence often resulted 
from an inability or unwillingness to adjust one’s confidence far enough, as task 
difficulty changed (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 
1980; Suantak et al., 1996).  Adams (2005) described how ski guides could 
potentially fall into this trap in their perception of a sufficiently large margin of 
safety.  One of her participants emphasised the importance of maintaining a margin 
that was “just a hair bigger than what I think I need”.  
 Baranski and Petrusic (1995) argued that the calibration of decision 
confidence and accuracy were important elements and required consistent effort.  
Surowiecki (2004) suggested that although judgement calibration was important, 
both experts and non-experts had trouble maintaining an accurate estimation of the 
likelihood that judgements are correct.  One of the challenges in decision calibration 
is the interpretation of feedback from a previous decision.  
 In a study investigating the connection between a systematic approach and 
overall efficiency in avalanche rescue, Genswein (2008) tested 120 mountain and ski 
guides.  The participants were asked to make a confidence prediction as to how well 
they expected to perform in a timed avalanche rescue scenario.  Four avalanche 
transceivers were buried at various depths and distances apart.  The guides were 
evaluated based on their time to successfully locate the four buried transceiver and 
the overall efficiency of their search methods.  The 35-year-old guides had a low pre-
confidence level, yet achieved the best performances.  The 50-55 year-old guides had 
a similar, low level of pre-confidence, however they also had the worst 
performances.  Strikingly, the middle ground from an age and expertise perspective, 
the 40-45 year-old participants had the highest level of pre-confidence, but only a 
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mediocre level of performance.  Mitigating factors on the participants’ speed and 
efficiency scores included familiarity with the supplied avalanche transceiver, recent 
rescue practice and fitness.  Figure 8 shows the variation in rescue performance time 
in relation to age.  
 Relating these results to levels of expertise within the guiding community, the 
average age of completion for the full mountain guide certification in Canada is 35.  
These guides are at the peak of their dedicated practice in preparation for the final 
exam.  The middle group is at the peak of their professional performance, and 
generally recognized as experts by their peer group.  An explanation for their 
decreased performance in the avalanche rescue scenario might be that they are in a 
position of increased work demands and have less time available for dedicated 
practice and continued professional development.  
Figure	  8	  Confidence	  and	  rescue	  performance	  time	  in	  relation	  to	  age	  (Genswein,	  2008)	  
 
 A question raised by this study was how widespread the “overestimation of 
one’s ability” was within the 40-45 year-old group (Genswein, 2008, p. 23).  Did 
overconfidence apply just to technical rescue skills, which were typically practiced, 
but not used on a regular basis, or did it also apply more broadly to decision-making 
skills?  Genswein (2008) also compared the degree to which guides were systematic 
in their approach to avalanche rescue, with their linguistic origin, which he also 
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termed mentality.  He found Germanophones to be highly systematic and 
Francophones to be least systematic, with Anglophones in the middle.  A systematic 
approach could be equated with a high level of cognitive, analytical processing and 
less intuitive input.  There may be a connection between cultural origin and the use 
of decision processes that is worthy of further study.  Perhaps Germanophones are 
more likely to use a cognitive decision process, and Francophones an intuitive 
process. 
3.6	  Summary	  of	  the	  Literature	  
3.6.1	  Judgement	  and	  Decision-­‐making	  Literature	  
 There are many discussions within the judgement and decision-making 
literature and a variety of arguments.  The discussion at the core of the literature 
centres on the decision process.  The classic argument of the modern discussion was 
proposed by Brunswik (1955).  He suggested that decision challenges should be 
viewed through an analytical lens.  His model provided a method to break the 
decision challenge down into manageable pieces.  
 The next stage after Brunswik’s analytical model was the recognition that a 
second decision process also contributed to decision-making.  This second process 
was based in tacit knowledge and was more difficult to define.  Intuition was thought 
to be a separate process from the better-defined analytical Brunswikian model.  
However there seemed to be an assumption that analytical thought was superior to 
intuition (Koriat et al., 1980).   
 The decision-making discussion has progressed well beyond the classic 
analytical decision model to incorporate an acceptance of the role that heuristics and 
intuition play.  A discussion of dual process emerged and was centred on how the 
two processes interacted.  Although most researchers acknowledged that both these 
processes occurred there was still considerable debate as to the nature of the 
interaction.  The debate centred on whether the intuitive-analytical interaction 
occurred on a continuum (Hammond, 2010), or as two independent variables (Evans, 
2011).   
 Stanovich, West and Toplak (2011) discussed how some researchers had 
equated heuristics with System 1 or intuitive processes.  However, Gigerenzer (2007) 
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one of the foremost heuristics researchers preferred to describe heuristics as a 
process distinct from the System 1 and 2 terminology.  Kruglanski  and Gigerenzer 
(2011) argued that System 1 and System 2 shared some characteristics in that they 
were both essentially rule-based.  They suggested that the relative accuracy of one 
system compared to the other system would be dependent on how well the selected 
decision rule matched the decision environment.  
 The discussion of the intuitive – analytical interaction is fragmented within 
the judgement and decision-making literature, as little has been done to blend the 
various theories together.  The opposite appears to be the trend, as the various 
schools of thought have carved out their terrain and dug their arguments deeper.  
Kahneman and Klein (2009) have been the lone voices that have attempted to unite 
the arguments together.   
3.6.2	  Adventure	  Leadership	  Literature	  
 Progress within the JDM literature has slowly made its way into the 
adventure literature.  Recent research has recognized that theories generated by the 
JDM field have the potential to contribute to a greater understanding of decision-
making by adventure leaders.  However there is still much to be done to connect 
these two fields together.   
Shooter, Sibthorp and Paisley (2009) discarded the long standing category of 
meta skills proposed by Priest (1986), suggesting instead that decision-making skills 
are tied to technical skills.  They argued that the enactment of a decision was based 
on environmental considerations as they pertained to a technical skill and existed 
within an interpersonal context.  My research goes beyond this argument with the 
integration and application of dual process theories (Evans, 2010).    
3.6.3	  Snow	  Science	  Literature	  
 The discussion within the snow science literature is less well entrenched and 
there appears to be a greater acceptance of a variety of viewpoints.  Specifically 
within the snow science literature the majority of research has been aimed at the 
heuristics and bias discussion (Furman et al., 2010; McCammon, 2002).  This has 
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left a gap, as there has been little discussion of the application of dual process 
theories to avalanche related risk management decisions.   
 Adams (2004, 2005) and Stewart-Patterson (2004) initiated a human factors 
discussion in avalanche related expert decision-making, which complimented the 
research conducted by Grímsdóttir (2004) on expert ski guide’s use of terrain 
knowledge.  Adams touched on the role that intuition could play in the decision 
process, as her research focused on how experts could use a systems-based thought 
process.  My current research follows the line of reasoning initiated by Adams’ 
research, but goes much deeper, significantly adding to the depth of the discussion, 
with particular emphasis on the intuitive-analytical discourse.  
 Amateur, novice, or recreational decision-making has been examined by 
numerous authors (Furman et al., 2010; McCammon & Hägeli, 2004).  There has 
been a move towards consensus within the snow science literature supporting the 
notion that amateurs need decision support tools and should be using a rule-based 
protocol in their selection of safe skiing terrain.  McCammon and Hägeli (Hägeli et 
al., 2006; McCammon & Hägeli, 2004, 2005, 2006) argue that rule-based decision 
support tools have the potential to work well for amateur or recreational avalanche 
decision makers.  Numerous decision support tools for amateurs have been generated 
for the European avalanche phenomenon including: Munter’s Reduction Method, 
Larcher’s Stop-or-go Method, and Bolognesi’s NivoTest.  Recognizing the 
shortcomings of applying a model based on European data to North American 
avalanche terrain usage, McCammon and Hägeli (2006) developed the Avaluator for 
North America.  
 Galloway (2005) acknowledges that there are major differences between 
experts and novices in their ability to be aware of the intricacies of the situation, 
which in turn modifies how and what they recognize in the situation.  The more 
sophisticated mental models of experts allow them to not only pay greater attention 
to the finer details, but also to place those details in perspective within the big 
picture. 
 There has been little support for the use of rule-based decision support tools 
amongst avalanche professionals.  McCammon and Hägeli (2005) suggested that 
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although rule-based strategies had been widely adopted by recreational 
backcountry users in Europe, they had not been widely used by professionals.  
Canadian avalanche experts have also argued against suggestions that rule-based 
decision support tools should supplant their more sophisticated principle-based 
decision process.   
 The suggestion that decision support tools designed for the recreational 
decision maker should also be used by expert, professional decision makers has met 
with considerable resistance.  The primary concern has been that a rule-based system 
designed for a recreationist simplifies the decision scenario by reducing the number 
of variables.  Avalanche experts have argued that they can manage and interpret 
greater amounts of raw data (Hägeli & Atkins, 2010).  The conflict between the 
application of amateur decision support tools and expert principle-based decision-
making has been exacerbated under certain snowpack conditions.  The decision 
support tools may indicate a stop situation, while the expert decision process 
indicates the need for high levels of caution, but not a stop condition.  Experts have 
argued that they are able to make more refined decisions in their selection of safe 
skiing terrain (Association of Canadian Mountain Guides, 1999).  However, the 
strength and weight of this argument is diminished every time a professional has an 
accident during times of high hazard (British Columbia Coroners Service, 2005).  
 The use of the currently available decision aids by ski guides was rejected 
early in the thesis based on the premise that an expert would not use a tool made for 
an amateur.  Outside of the ski-guiding context, there is also little support for rule-
based strategies designed for amateurs to be used by expert decision makers 
(Metzger & Parasuraman, 2005) 
 Klein (2011) argues that procedures, or rules do not work for experts.  He 
suggests that rules are training wheels and memory aids.  They make routine 
operations easier.  The downside is that the use of procedure erodes expertise, as the 
decision process drifts into automatic processing.  Experts need to remain engaged, 
particularly in complex situations; experts need to know when to break the rules.  
They can do this by making their tacit knowledge more visible (Klein, 2011).  
Unfortunately, feedback on tacit knowledge tends to be procedure based rather than 
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about the use of tacit knowledge, the ‘what’ instead of the ‘why’.  It is easier to 
give feedback on explicit procedural errors, such as which subtle cues and patterns 
were missed. 
 A tool that has been developed by the Canadian Avalanche Association for 
the expert avalanche decision maker is the AM and PM Hazard and Risk Worksheets 
(Appendix 1).  In addition, HeliCat Canada provides guidelines on run selection.  A 
run coding process is widely used in the industry.  Runs coded Green are available 
for use that day by the guiding team.  Runs coded Red are not available.  Yellow 
runs require more information and a team decision.  The protocol to make the 
decision to change a yellow run to a green run requires a face-to-face discussion 
within the guiding team.  
 In a broader context such as nursing, expert decision-making has been 
recognized as being different from novice decision-making (Benner, 1984).  
However the discussion as to whether avalanche experts should use decision support 
tools remains contentious.  The argument has been made that ski guides can process 
larger amounts of raw data in their analytical decision process.  However, no studies 
support this position.  Expert avalanche decision makers have a successful history of 
good decisions, with relatively few fatalities in relation to the volume of terrain used.  
Whether ski guides are so successful because of their ability to analyse large 
amounts of raw data, or their intuitive processing through pattern recognition has not 
been researched.  My research addresses a void in the discussion, adding to the 
discussion of how intuition plays a role in expert ski guide decision-making.  
3.7	  Gaps	  in	  the	  Literature	  
 My research emerged from the literature in three areas and identified gaps in 
all three areas.  The focus of the work has been to investigate ski guide decision-
making, with the intent of addressing specific gaps within the snow science 
literature.  In a broader context, it also addresses gaps in the adventure leadership 
literature and contributes to the discussion of the role of intuition within the JDM 
literature. 
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3.7.1	  Snow	  Science	  
 McCammon’s (2002) benchmark study of recreational decision makers 
clearly established heuristic biases as a source of avalanche related decision errors.  
He found that simple rules of thumb, or heuristics were used to simplify the decision 
process used by recreational skiers in avalanche terrain.  He found that a decision 
process based on the use of heuristics was susceptible to heuristic traps.  Four 
heuristic traps were found to occur: familiarity, social proof, commitment and 
scarcity.  He suggested that there was a positive correlation between the 
susceptibility of decision makers to fall into heuristic traps and the occurrence of 
avalanche accidents.  However he concluded that simply knowing that heuristic traps 
could occur was insufficient.  He suggested that finding a way to educate 
practitioners in methods of recognition and avoidance were needed.  As his study 
investigated recreational avalanche accidents, it begged the question of whether 
expert avalanche practitioners could also fall prey to heuristic biases.  
 A follow-up study by McCammon and Hägeli (2004) that investigated 
decision support frameworks for recreational backcountry users solidified this line of 
thinking.  They evaluated whether four decision support tools designed for European 
recreational skiers could work in North America.  They suggested that the decision 
support tools had been embraced by recreational backcountry users, but had met with 
resistance from the professional guiding community.  They found that the European 
tools had a number of deficiencies when they were applied in the North American 
context, based on U.S. accident data.  Instead they suggested that a simpler checklist, 
focussed on seven specific clues, had the potential to help recreational users generate 
better decisions.  
 A subsequent study of winter backcountry recreation (Furman et al., 2010) 
used McCammon’s work as a basis for an investigation of recreational heuristic-
based decision-making that included risk-taking propensity and avalanche forecast 
variables.  They found support for McCammon’s heuristic traps, but that risk-taking 
propensity also played a role in the decision to ski a slope.  They remarked that risk 
tolerance has not been investigated as to how it modifies a heuristics-based decision 
process. 
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 Although the need for some form of avalanche decision support tool for 
amateur recreational decision makers, to aid in the avoidance of heuristic related 
decision errors was clearly established (Hägeli et al., 2006), it has yet to be 
determined whether decision support tools can facilitate expert decision-making. 
 Expert decision-making in avalanche terrain has been studied.  Grímsdóttir’s 
(2004) study of heli-ski guides focussed primarily on terrain selection and group 
management.  She did not investigate the ski guide’s decision process.  Adams’ 
(2005) study of avalanche professionals took a systems approach in her investigation 
of the human factors in expert decision-making.  This study was the foundation upon 
which I constructed my research plan.  The role of intuition was but one of the many 
human factors that she explored.  There was room for further research that 
investigated the decision process used by ski guides and in particular the role that 
intuition played.   
 Hägeli and Atkins’ (2010) study of expert ski guide decision-making looked 
to bridge the gap between expert decision-making and amateur decision-making.  
Their goal was to study how experts made decisions in avalanche terrain; with the 
aim of using expert decision filters to develop a decision support tool for amateurs.  
 These studies clearly left a gap in the snow science literature.  Expert 
decision-making in avalanche terrain had not been studied in relation to recent 
advances made in the JDM literature, particularly in the area of dual process theories. 
3.7.2	  Adventure	  
 The topic of instructor decision-making has been investigated in the 
adventure leadership literature, however the context has often been dependent on the 
hypothetical application of JDM models and theories and not on empirical studies 
(Cook, 1996; Guthrie, 1996; Watters, 2005).  Galloway has been the notable 
exception to this with studies on medical decision-making in outdoor leadership 
(2007) and the development of useful tools to measure leader expertise (2003).  
Numerous ways to measure expertise have been utilised in the literature, but 
Galloway’s (2003) Outdoor Leader Experience Use History (OLEUH) provided an 
excellent template.  Galloway (2007) used both personal and professional measures 
of outdoor experience.  Eight subscales were used: Professional Environment, 
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Professional Population, Professional Leadership, Professional Activity, 
Demographic, Personal Experience, Personal Environment, and Personal Activity, 
based on the assumption that accurate personal and professional trip logs were 
maintained over what could be a 30+ year career.  The OLEUH would have provided 
a very accurate calculation of expertise for my research, if my research participants 
had accurately logged the eight subscales developed and tested by Galloway,  
 In my research, I used elements from the OLEUH.  I used a more frugal 
process and combined it with the Canadian Avalanche Association’s guidelines for 
Continued Professional Development (CPD).  I used a less sophisticated measure of 
experience, preferring instead to focus on areas that would provide a high degree of 
accuracy and omitting possible inaccurate information based on selective memories.  
An empirical investigation of ski guide decision-making, anchored by the adventure 
leadership expertise literature and the JDM literature, may have the potential to 
generate a greater understanding of the adventure leadership decision process and fill 
a gap in the adventure literature. 
3.7.3	  Judgement	  and	  Decision-­‐making	  
 Within the JDM literature there are areas or gaps that my research might be 
able to address.  There is considerable debate as to whether the intuitive and 
analytical processes run in parallel (Barrouillet, 2011b; Evans, 2010) or on a 
continuum (Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hammond & Summers, 1972; Hammond, 2010).   
 Hogarth (1980) described how the environmental context would impact the 
development of intuition.  A low-feedback, high-consequence environment, such as 
that frequently experienced by ski guides would be termed “wicked” and have 
potential long-term negative effects on the quality of intuitive responses.  More 
research is needed on the application of intuition in wicked environments.  
3.8	  The	  Research	  Questions	  
 Generalizations made in the adventure leadership and judgement and 
decision-making literature have been used to form research questions that can be 
applied to the snow science literature.  These questions centre on how intuition is 
used in the decision-making process.  Two judgement and decision-making 
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perspectives have been used to create the framework of the research questions.  
The heuristics and biases perspective supported a line of questioning based on 
generating an understanding of why experienced ski guides made seemingly foolish 
mistakes.  Whereas, a naturalistic decision-making perspective supported a line of 
questions that investigated why so few ski-guiding fatalities occurred in relation to 
the amount of terrain covered.   
 The context that framed the research questions was based in the fatality rates 
recorded by the ski-guiding industry over the two seasons prior to the collection of 
data.  Ski guides were successful in their decision-making in 2007-08 with no 
fatalities, but not in 2006-07 when five fatalities were recorded.  What was different?  
Did something change in the ski guide decision-making process? 
 The primary research question addresses why ski guides have varying 
degrees of success in their decision-making.  What factors contribute to good 
decision-making?  As ski guides have been taught to use an analytical decision 
process through their training and certification, to what extent do they actually use 
analysis in their decision-making?  Based on the dual-process models of decision-
making, how did ski guides blend their use of intuition and analysis?  A number of 
elements were considered as to their impact on the decision process.  This included 
the influence of expertise, and the role of both professional and environmental 
feedback.  These influences were potentially different on good days when nothing 
bad happened and on days when near-miss events occurred.  The impact of the use of 
intuition and, or analysis on decision confidence also warrants investigation.  The 
subsidiary questions include an examination of how confidence was affected by an 
intuitive response and how feedback could impact confidence and the future use of 
intuition. 
3.9	  Summary	  
 The development and use of intuition by expert decision makers has been the 
focus of considerable research in other fields such as nursing (Benner, 1984) and fire 
fighting (Klein, 1998).  A more complete picture of how intuition plays a role in the 
decision process of ski guides and further, how it contributes to feelings of 
confidence has not been studied.  Inferences can be drawn from previous research 
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conclusions, but my contribution will be to look at a unique environment that is 
significantly different in numerous aspects.  The analysis of decision-making with 
regards to the impact of the feedback process or lack thereof, on the development 
expertise and the subsequent use of intuition in this novel environment may provide 
new and useful insights into give a greater understanding of this phenomenon.  
 Within in the field of Naturalistic Decision-making and more specifically 
Recognition Primed Decision-making much has been said about the role of intuition, 
however there are gaps that demand further exploration.  There is disagreement as to 
the role of the use of heuristics.  Some authors equate heuristics with intuition, while 
others suggest that intuition is a separate process.  The role of the ski-guiding 
environment is of particular interest, as it allows poor decisions to masquerade as 
good ones, thus it is critically important to understand the role that intuition plays in 
this decision process.   
 The use of intuition could be characterized by either good feelings or bad 
feelings, yet there is little in the literature that explains their relative significance.  
This research examines the gap between the application of intuitive somatic markers 
and the development of intuition within the decision process. 
 If there is an unrecognized flaw in the intuitive response, then the decision 
process can be compromised.  This has been particularly acute when an instability 
within the snowpack has been deeply buried and has not been recently reactive to 
slope tests, creating a low probability, high consequence decision challenge.  Termed 
a persistent weak layer, it has been the cause of many of the guiding related fatalities 
in Western Canada (Klassen, 2008; McClung & Schaerer, 2006).   
 A shortcoming in the intuitive process may have been due to the nature of the 
environment in which those intuitions were formed.  Hogarth et al. (2008) described 
how the characteristics of the environment affected how intuitions were formed or 
learned.  These environmental influences determined whether the intuitions were 
functional (good intuitions) or potentially dysfunctional (bad intuitions).  If we knew 
that our intuitions had been formed under ‘wicked’ conditions, it would be possible 
to be more questioning or less trusting of them.  For example a ski guide would 
likely have received immediate relevant feedback when dealing with an easily 
triggered storm snow instability (a kind environment), however feedback might have 
     
 
90 
been entirely absent when dealing with a deeply buried persistent weak layer (a 
wicked environment).  
 The nature of the environment has potential implications both for the 
development of intuition as described by Hogarth et al. (2008) and the use or value 
of intuition in a current decision-making process.  Recognising the characteristics of 
the environment will help to contextualise the value of intuitions formed at that time 
and may also help to clarify whether or not additional emphasis should be placed on 
the intuitive response to a current challenge.  The role of the environment in the 
evolution of intuition within the guiding decision process needs more study.  
 Research needs to be conducted, that accounts for the role of intuition within 
a culture that values hard facts and reasoning (Adams, 2005; McClung & Schaerer, 
2006).  The avalanche industry in Canada has developed a rigorous analytical 
process for snowpack stability assessment and forecasting.  The intuitive process, or 
Kahneman et al.’s (1999) System 1 has not been well understood in a field 
dominated by excellence in hard science research.  A complicating factor is the 
element of luck or chance, be it good or bad and the ability to separate out true 
quality decisions from just lucky ones.   
 Hogarth et al. (2008) suggested that self-insight might be difficult for experts 
with highly developed skills and that the perspective of an external coach could help 
to improve intuitive skills.  They argued that it would be possible to replace 
misleading intuitions with correct ones and suggested that people can be trained to 
reduce their tendency to abandon good decision-making principles.  
 Ski guiding likely represents the height of decision complexity within the 
field of adventure leadership, perhaps equivalent to guiding Himalayan peaks above 
8000 meters.  The research question that I propose has not been extensively studied.  
My research centres on how guides make decisions to manage risk in an environment 
that is constantly evolving and provides little feedback when good decisions are 
made.  I argue that there are factors within the challenges of the wilderness ski 
guiding decision process, which are in need of further study.  
     
 
91 
Chapter	  4	  –	  Research	  Methodology	  	  
4.1	  Introduction	  
 This chapter explains the methodological framework that I used to address 
the research question.  I applied the three elements of inquiry as described by 
Creswell (2003): knowledge claims, methodology which described the underlying 
principles, and the specific methods, which were used to gather data.  The human 
element of how the researcher sees the world created the lens through which all of 
these parts were viewed and was addressed first chapter.  Allison and Pomeroy 
(2000) suggested that recognizing the researcher’s lens and his or her underlying 
knowledge base helps to contextualize and generate greater understanding of the 
research. 
 The question of whether human actions can be described as a series of 
patterns that are recognizable and consistent in nature, or whether our universe is 
ruled by random unconnected behaviours and events is central to the essence of 
research into human behaviour.  If we subscribe to the notion of a chaotic world, 
then any attempt to generate an understanding of human behaviour is destined to fail 
(Palys, 1997; Ponterotto, 2005).  My research is based on the assumption that an 
individual’s pattern of behaviour can be interpreted and analysed.  It may be an 
inductive fallacy to assume that the observed decision processes of ski guides will 
follow similar patterns in the future, however to assume otherwise throws into 
question the rationale for trying to generate understanding of the phenomenon. 
4.2	  Philosophy	  of	  Approach	  -­‐	  Theoretical	  Perspectives	  
4.2.1	  Introduction	  
 The ‘philosophy of science’ has been defined as the conceptual 
underpinnings of a systemic quest for knowledge (Ponterotto, 2005).  Within this 
quest are a number of key assumptions about the ontology, epistemology, axiology 
and methodology.  These assumptions are based on our beliefs about reality and how 
we construct knowledge within that reality (Allison, 2000).  This section describes 
the theoretical perspectives of research, in particular the concept of the research 
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paradigm, which formed the basis for the philosophical and conceptual context of 
the study.  
4.2.2	  Qualitative	  and	  Quantitative	  
 It is arguable that the paradigm wars of years past are over and have been 
replaced by a more open attitude of acceptance (Cherryholmes, 1992; Creswell, 
2003).  Creswell  (2003) suggested that researchers should not feel forced to declared 
their allegiance to a single paradigm and be restricted in their selection of methods.  
Tashakkori (1998) advocated the use of a pluralistic approach in the selection of 
mixed methods, drawing from both quantitative and qualitative strategies of inquiry.  
Miles and Huberman (1994) summarized this approach with the suggestion that both 
words and numbers could be used together to generate a more complete 
understanding of the world.   
 Palys (1997) struggled with the division of research perspectives into the two 
distinct camps of quantitative and qualitative traditions, but felt that it was still an 
adequate description of what was actually happening.  He argued that linking the 
terms positivism and quantitative might not do justice to the current state of research.  
Ponterotto (2005) described how both quantitative and qualitative methods could be 
empirical in nature as data were collected, analysed and interpreted in both cases.  
Table 5 provides a comparison between quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies.  In this table goals, research design, sample selection, data collection 
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Table	  5	  Characteristics	  of	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  research	  (Merriam,	  1998,	  p.	  9)	  
 Qualitative Quantitative 






Fieldwork, ethnographic, naturalistic, 
grounded, constructivist 
Experimental, empirical, statistical 
Goals Understanding, description, 
discovery, meaning, hypothesis 
generating 
Prediction, control, description, 
confirmation, hypothesis testing 
Design Flexible, evolving, emergent Predetermined, structured 
Sample Small, non-random, purposeful Large, random, representative 
Data Collection Researcher as primary instrument, 
interviews, observations, documents 
Inanimate instruments (scales, tests, 
surveys, questionnaires, computers) 
Mode of 
analysis 
Inductive (by researcher) Deductive (by statistical methods) 




Denzin and Lincoln described the differences between qualitative and 
quantitative research. 
Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the 
intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the 
situational constraints that shape inquiry…In contrast quantitative studies 
emphasize the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between 
variables, not processes.  (2003a, p. 13) 
 
 My research used mixed methods; it blended results from a quantitative study 
into the development of a qualitative line of inquiry through two further studies.  The 
combination of qualitative and quantitative strategies allowed me to conduct a more 
in-depth qualitative analysis of possible correlational links that had been indicated by 
the suggestions of causal relationships in the quantitative analysis. 
4.2.3	  Elements	  of	  a	  Paradigm	  
 Denzin and Lincoln (2003b) listed four elements which help to describe a 
paradigm: axiology, epistemology, ontology and methodology.  These elements have 
been described in terms of their application to the predominantly qualitative 
implications of this research.   
 Ponterotto (2005) described axiology as being concerned with the 
researcher’s values and how they formed an integral component of the paradigm. 
These values, or biases had to be described and accommodated both in the 
acquisition of data and its interpretation.  Although these biases needed to be 
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bracketed, they also provided an opportunity to enhance the level of engagement 
and interaction between the participant and the researcher. 
 Denzin and Lincoln (2003b) equated epistemology with the concern for the 
relationship between what is known and the researcher.  This could also be described 
as the interaction between the nature of knowledge and the researcher’s underlying 
assumptions and values.  Epistemology refers to the interaction between the 
researcher and the participant.  In a qualitative study “…reality is socially 
constructed and, therefore, the dynamic interaction between researcher and 
participant is central to capturing and describing the ‘lived experience’ (Erlebnis) of 
the participant” (Ponterotto, 2005, p. 131). 
 Ontology refers to the nature of reality as it is interpreted (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2003a).  The positivist view is that there is a singular reality which must be identified 
and measured (Ponterotto, 2005).  Whereas the constructivist position takes the view 
that reality is subjectively interpreted through the lens of an individual’s lived 
experiences (Ponterotto, 2005)  
4.2.3.1	  Comparing	  Paradigms	  
 In the postpositive paradigm a probable cause is linked to an effect or 
outcome.  The scientific method has been described as starting with a theory 
followed by the collection of data, which when analysed either reinforces the original 
theory or suggests that changes to the theory are necessary (Creswell, 2003).  
 This is significantly different from the socially constructed knowledge claim, 
in which individuals create subjective meaning to what they see and do.  As 
perspectives vary from person to person, the understanding of a phenomenon can 
increase in its complexity.  Thus one of the goals of the constructivist view has been 
to examine a phenomenon from the participants’ vantage points and to obtain and 
retain as much as possible of their perspectives (Creswell, 2003).  Table 6 illustrates 
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Table	  6	  Contrasting	  interpretive	  paradigms	  (Denzin	  &	  Lincoln,	  2003a,	  p.	  34)	  










Substantive-formal Interpretive case 
studies, ethnographic 
fiction 
 Palys (1997) described how qualitative methods could be used to focus on 
this unique contextual setting, from the perspective of the individuals fully engaged 
within that setting.  The participants’ own words were frequently used to describe the 
phenomenon.  This method was empirical in nature, in that data were collected, 
analysed and ultimately interpreted.  Palys (1997) further argued that when studying 
human behaviour, an analysis would be incomplete if it did not account for the 
perceptions of the participants. 
 A pragmatic approach to research has recognized that the central theme of a 
problem was more important than the methods by which it was investigated 
(Bottofff, 1997; Cherryholmes, 1992; Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori, 1998).  All 
manners of methods were considered in the quest for understanding thus giving rise 
to what has been termed a ‘mixed methods’ approach.  Tashakkori (1998) described 
‘mixed methods’ as the combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods 
within a single study, drawing on the strengths and potentially offsetting the 
weaknesses of each. 
There is subtlety in the blending of quantitative and qualitative methods and a need 
to recognize the strong statements made for and against each paradigm.  Ponterotto 
(2005, p. 127) argued strongly against the ‘postpositivizing’ of qualitative studies, 
describing it as driving the proverbial round peg into the square hole.  The examples 
he gave included: literature driven semi-structured interviews and the establishment 
of theme categories before the study.   
 However Guba and Lincoln (1989) disputed the pragmatic argument stating 
that there was no need to choose between the positivist and the constructivist 
paradigms. They argued that the significant differences were at the ontological and 
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epistemological levels, in that they “…do not matter in the day to day conduct of 
inquiry because methods and paradigms are independent”, and that it will likely 
work well to blend the two (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 157, italics in original).  They 
contended that although the method may just be a tool, the user of the tool must be 
able to articulate the paradigmatic implications for the way in which the method was 
used.  I recognized the need to address this study of human behaviour from the 
perspective of the practitioners, yet I felt that the addition of a positivist perspective 
would contribute to a greater understanding of the issue.  
 Charmaz (2003) proposed the term ‘grounded theory’ to describe a 
constructivist perspective that assumed the existence of multiple realities.  Ponterotto 
(2005) expanded on this with idea that these multiple realities were equally valid.  In 
grounded theory, reality was understood through meaning created in the mind of the 
individual.  The meaning was explored through a reflective process initiated by the 
researcher and based on engagement with the participant.  This co-constructed reality 
was interpreted through interaction.  The essence of grounded theory was that it had 
to be functional and offer possible solutions to real problems (Charmaz, 2003).  He 
suggested that this could be achieved by generating data, which were of high quality 
and great depth.  He termed this: thick, rich data.  The data were collected through a 
variety of methods including direct observations, formal and informal interviews, 
and reflective journaling.  Thick, rich data were highly descriptive and helped to 
paint an elaborate picture of the phenomenon. 
 The literature review included the search terms: decision-making, intuition, 
expertise, confidence, feedback and reflection.  In my examination of the literature 
on empirical research into decision-making from 1975 to the present, the majority of 
studies were quantitative in nature (Dobbins, Kroll, & Liu, 1998; Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1978; Merkle & Van Zandt, 2006; Morrow et al., 2003; Wierzbicki, 1997; 
Woolhouse & Bayne, 2000). There were far fewer qualitative studies (Herbig, 
Bussing, & Ewert, 2001; Jensen, Gwyer, Shepard, & Hack, 2000; King, 2002). 
Haverkamp, Morrow, & Ponterotto (2005) argued that qualitative and mixed 
methods had been under utilized in psychology research.  In addition, Klein (1993) 
argued that research on experts had rarely been conducted in a dynamic real 
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environment with changing information, and conditions.  More typically it had 
been conducted in static decision environments. 
4.3	  Research	  Plan	  	  
4.3.1	  Research	  Strategies	  
Quantitative research, like photography, excels at producing images 
characterized by precision.  Qualitative research, like portraiture, can 
offer a glimpse of “what resides beneath.”  Both photography and 
painting require great skill, and both qualify as art; the analogy can be 
extended to quantitative and qualitative research in that both require 
skill, and both qualify as science (Haverkamp, Morrow, & Ponterotto, 
2005, p. 124). 
4.3.1.1	  Introduction	  
 Creswell (2003) suggested that there were three criteria for selecting an 
approach to research: the creation of a good match between the problem and the 
methodology, the personal experiences of the researcher and the audience that the 
research is directed towards, with the first criterion being primary.  Thorne (199) 
described the match between the problem and the methodology as the 
epistemological integrity. Assumptions about the nature of knowledge must be 
consistent with the methodology of the research process.  There needs to be a 
defensible continuity to the research argument, from the question through to the 
interpretation of the data.  Representative credibility is important in that the 
discussion of results is consistent with the method in which the phenomenon was 
studied.   
 The use of a variety of research methods, also termed triangulation, can 
generate increased credibility.  The basic principle of triangulation is to generate 
greater understanding through multiple views of the same event or object.  However 
disagreement between findings can lead to confusion in the determination of which 
finding is the correct one.  One solution is to further investigate anomalous views to 
determine whether they should be given greater or lesser weight.  It can also help to 
generate an audit trail, which would allow other researchers the opportunity to follow 
the logic of the research.  The essence of thick descriptions is to provide sufficient 
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evidence for the reader to come to the same conclusions as the author (Thorne, 
1997). 
 A pragmatic approach to the methodology and the use of mixed methods 
allowed me to take advantage of elements of both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches.  The nature of the study of intuition demanded a methodology that 
encompassed a variety of data sources.  This research was predominantly qualitative 
in nature, however quantitative strategies were added to generate a more complete 
description-based analysis.  The intent was to generate a greater understanding of 
how experts actually made decisions, not how they should make them.  To achieve 
this goal, the research was both idiographic, in that it focussed on the nature of an 
individual’s response and emic, it used terms that were meaningful to those research 
participants (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001).  The idiographic research 
perspective helped to create a depth of understanding of the complexity of ski 
guiding and the emic considerations were oriented around the unique behaviours of 
these individuals (Ponterotto, 2005).  It was necessary to generate an understanding 
of the participants’ personal practical knowledge, which Connelly and Clandinin 
(1988) defined as a person’s knowledge base that had been generated through direct 
practical applications.  Vick (2002) suggested that there was merit in the 
development of research that connected the study of expertise based in personal 
practical knowledge, with the study of heuristics and biases, which would reduce the 
current state of speculation.  
 One of the challenges in presenting a concise description of qualitative 
research findings is to retain the meaning as described by the participants (Morse, 
1997).  Phenomenological research has been used to generate an understanding of an 
experience as perceived by those experiencing it (Cohen, Kahn, & Steeves, 2000).  
An understanding of the extent to which ski guides are dependent on their expertise 
to maximize the efficient use of intuition and subsequent feelings of confidence in 
their decision process has not been generated through mere descriptions of the people 
involved.  It has come through intricate and detailed descriptions and analysis of the 
attributes of these people (Palys, 1997).  
 Ponterotto (2005) described the relativist position on the nature of reality, or 
ontology as being based on the subjective interpretation of a situation.  As such there 
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were multiple possible interpretations based on the participant’s perception.  
Factors such as previous experience, the social context and the degree of engagement 
between the researcher and the participant, all affected the interpretation of reality.  
Thick descriptions of the phenomenon could be used to create an interpretation.  As 
there was no single truth to be discovered, other researchers interacting with different 
participants may not construct the same reality. 
 This section explores a variety of research strategies in light of the research 
methods employed in previous related studies.  This has created a reference point on 
which to base the appropriate research methods used in this study. 
4.3.1.2	  Research	  methodology	  in	  adventure-­‐based	  decision-­‐making	  
 As described in the literature review, I found four works in human factor 
snow science related decision-making that were significant to my research.  Three 
were from Western Canada and one from New Zealand.  Each of the four researchers 
used distinctly different methods of collecting and analysing data.  
 Adams’ thesis ‘A Systems Approach to Human Factors and Expert Decision-
Making within Canadian Avalanche Phenomena’ (2005) was the most closely 
aligned with my research.  Adams used an inductive grounded theory approach.  
Grounded theory methods are based on a systematic collection and analysis of data 
and use an inductive process to generate theory (Charmaz, 2003).  This approach was 
needed as little empirical research had been conducted that addressed the issue of 
expert decision-making in the avalanche field.  The phenomenon had not been well 
explored or explained by the existing research base.   
 A qualitative, semi-structured survey was used to initially invite and pre-
screen participants.  Two focus groups of nine avalanche experts were then formed.  
Each group met for a three-hour session.  From a methodological perspective the two 
focus groups provided the richest data.  This direct interaction with avalanche 
professionals allowed researchers to gain access to the knowledge and expertise of 
their participants at a more personal level.  The participants were willing to actively 
engage in the research process.  Adam’s participants reflected on their many years of 
experience to provide answers to the focus group questions.  My intent is to conduct 
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interviews much sooner after a significant event, ideally within thirty days of any 
significant event.    
 Adams provided a number of recommendations for future research, including 
the development of an approach that focussed on the good decisions that participants 
had made.  She suggested that this strength-based approach to the examination of 
avalanche decision-making would provide greater understanding of the phenomenon.  
She also suggested that there would be benefit to an analysis of human factors 
influences in accidents and narrow escapes.  These recommendations formed the 
basis for my research. 
 Davidson (2005) developed a process for the analysis of factors which 
contributed to accidents.  His causal factor analysis results contributed to our 
understanding of how accidents occur are and helped to form many of the questions 
in my near-miss survey.  Davidson used a quantitative analysis of existing historical 
data to generate a sample of eighteen incidents.  These incidents were further 
analysed qualitatively using a ‘Delphi panel’ of outdoor adventure experts.   
 The Delphi technique was developed during the cold war era as a tool for 
anticipating future US defence requirements and forecasting the implications of new 
technology.  It is now widely used as a research technique when multiple expert 
opinions are desirable, but gathering a group of experts is logistically not possible 
(Pollard & Pollard, 2004).  The Delphi process incorporated feedback from the 
involved instructor after the first round analysis from the group of experts.  In 
Davidson’s study, the feedback from the instructor was in many cases defensive in 
nature.  The Delphi panel of experts learned and changed through the successive 
iterations, with more emphasis placed on instructor error in early incidents and not as 
much on management system error.  Each expert member of the panel analysed six 
incidents, which was enough to learn the process and yet not be too overwhelming.   
 The Delphi process is a powerful tool and is particularly well suited to the 
analysis of negative outcome incidents.  However it is also somewhat cumbersome 
and had limited potential for my study due to the need to assimilate data from 
decisions generated over numerous field days.   
 According to Grímsdóttir(Grímsdóttir & McClung, 2006) (2004), expert ski 
guides had difficulty describing how they make high quality decisions on a 
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consistent basis.  Grímsdóttir’s mixed methods study began with a quantitative 
risk-based analysis of skier triggered avalanches using reports compiled by the CMH 
software program – Snowbase, focussing on the terrain selected and the associated 
snowpack stability rating for that day.  Recognizing that a statistical study alone 
would not provide a complete picture of avalanche terrain risk management, the 
second part of her study used a structured questionnaire and interviews with guides 
to generate further understanding of the decision process.  The questionnaire and 
interview focussed on the role of terrain selection and group management as tools to 
mitigate risk.  The interview was conducted using photographs of heli-ski runs to 
generate a hypothetical situation.  Some of the pictures were of runs that had been 
skied that day, while others were runs that had not been used but were still within the 
operation and familiar to the guides.  The guides were asked to discuss their terrain 
selection choices based either on the actual stability of the day or on a hypothetical 
stability rating.   
 The final component of triangulation in her study was direct observation with 
the intent of creating context for her as a researcher.  In the analysis of interview and 
direct observation data, she identified lack of feedback as being a critical impediment 
in the development of ski guiding expertise.  One of the participants suggested 
asking the question “How many times have I been somewhere I shouldn’t have been, 
but I didn’t get the evidence to tell me I shouldn’t have been there?” (Grímsdóttir, 
2004, p. 134).  She also suggested that getting the guides to tell stories about their 
toughest decisions was a potential avenue for research into the perspective of the 
guide.  The mixed methods used in this study created a somewhat complete picture 
of how observed and expressed terrain selection compared with the recorded 
avalanche incidents database.  
 Hägeli et al (2006) have developed an Advanced Decision Framework for 
Amateur Recreationists (ADFAR).  The initial outcome from this work was a 
decision tool named the ‘Avaluator’, which is now into its second iteration.  In a 
study of existing decision tools, McCammon and Hägeli (2005) evaluated the 
applicability of European rule-based models to North American conditions.  They 
found that a simple checklist was a promising area for future development. 
Longland, Haider, Hägeli and Breadmore (2006) argued that a rule-based decision 
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system was preferable for recreationists as they generally did not have the 
expertise to use a knowledge-based method.  Although aimed at the amateur user, a 
component of their study focussed on the strategies employed by professionals.  This 
helped to clarify the significant differences in the decision processes of amateur and 
professional avalanche terrain users, in particular the role that intuition potentially 
plays. 
 In a somewhat less related, non-adventure based study, Regehr, Goldberg, & 
Hughes (2002) used mixed methods for their data collection of post-event stress in 
paramedics.  To collect quantitative data, they used a number of Likert-type scales 
including the ‘Impact of Events’ scale developed by Zilberg, Weiss, and Horowitz 
(1982).  For the qualitative data collection, they used a convenience sample selected 
from volunteers that came from the quantitative participant group.  These 
participants were offered the opportunity to explore their experiences more fully 
through a semi-structured interview process.  Purposeful sampling was used to select 
a wide range of participants with varying levels of experiences and length of service.   
 Post-event, paramedics reported that they reviewed their performance with 
their peer group to ensure that all actions had been performed correctly.  This 
cognitive strategy focused on the technical aspects of the performance.  Thus, each 
event had the potential to be reframed as a positive learning experience.  Even 
though respondents recognized the importance of sharing their experiences, the 
‘macho attitude’ that prevailed, limited discussion of the underlying fears and 
concerns.  
 A mixed methods approach was employed successfully in three of these 
studies.  A quantitative analysis was used in the initial stage to either select 
promising cases or to frame the context for which a more in depth qualitative 
analysis could be conducted.  This approach seems to have worked well for the 
challenge of generating greater understanding of the decision process in adventure 
leadership. 
4.3.2	  Research	  Methods	  
Merriam suggests that “rigor in a qualitative research derives from the 
researcher’s presence, the nature of the interaction between researcher and 
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participants, the triangulation of data, the interpretation of perceptions, and 
rich, thick description” (1998, p. 151). 
4.3.2.1	  Introduction	  
 I used mixed methods in my research as it allowed me to use of a variety of 
methods to generate greater understanding of the phenomenon by looking at it from a 
variety of angles and using a variety of tools (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003a).  I examined 
two distinct perspectives of the decision – outcome interaction.  Both perspectives 
focused on good outcomes, as participants were more open and forthcoming when it 
came to discussing the details of such events.   
 I analysed days when nothing bad happened, termed good days, and days 
when near misses occurred.  The analysis of good days was based on the assumption 
that as nothing bad had happened, the decision process could be considered good.  
The intent of this analysis was to extract the good qualities of the decision process.  
The analysis of near miss events was based on the premise that there was a flaw or 
shortcoming in the decision process, which could have led to a disastrous outcome.  
The intent of this analysis was to learn from mistakes.  The criteria that I used to 
denote a near-miss occurrence was indicated either through environmental feedback, 
for example an accidentally skier triggered avalanche with no involvement, or 
through retrospective analysis by the guide, guests or fellow guides.  
 There were both opportunities and limitations inherent within the 
environment that I studied.  I attempted to capitalize on the opportunities and 
minimize the impact of the limitations.  Recognizing that one of the prime limitations 
was the time constraint that ski guides experienced, data collection was optimized to 
create a balance of maximum research gain and minimum impact on the guides and 
guiding operations.  
4.3.2.2	  Study	  Population	  
 In 2008, the entire population of active, certified, mountain and ski guides in 
Canada was approximately 350.  This included members from both the Association 
of Canadian Mountain Guides (ACMG) and the Canadian Ski Guides Association 
(CSGA).  There were 216 Association of Canadian Mountain Guides (ACMG) 
certified guides, 128 of them were mountain guides and the other 88 were ski guides 
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(ACMG, 2007).  An analysis of the 2010 ACMG membership indicated that 65% 
had earned their assistant guide certification prior to 2000.  According to Ericsson’s 
definition they could potentially qualify to be considered experts (1996).  The gender 
mix may or may not have been relevant to this research, however 11% of the ski 
guides and 6.5% of the mountain guides were female.  The primary goal of this study 
was not to investigate gender differences in decision strategies.  There were roughly 
another 130 active members of the Canadian Ski Guides Association (CSGA), 
twenty-three of whom were Level 3 Guides (CSGA, 2007). This is the highest level 
within the CSGA certification process and most would qualify as ten-year plus 
veterans.  
4.3.2.2.1	  Sample	  Selection	  
 Merriam (1998) described several ways of choosing a sample population. 
Termed purposeful sampling, I used three of the suggested methods: maximum 
variation, convenience, and network.  The main criterion was to achieve maximum 
variation; however in addition there was a certain amount of convenience and 
networking in the sample selection.  To realize this goal, I selected participants from 
a wide variety of work environments, including both large and small heli-ski 
operations and two cat-ski operations.  The participants came from both Canadian 
guide certification schemes.  
 Patton (2002) argued that there were no rules for sample size in qualitative 
research.  My intent was to recruit fifty participants, from the combined 
memberships of the ACMG and the CSGA for the following reasons (Long, 2007).  
1. Logistics – This was the maximum number of participants that I could 
accommodate in the research design.  I needed to be able to review their 
survey contributions and then conduct interviews. 
a. The participants worked in small groups.  Thus more that one 
participant was interviewed in a single onsite visit. 
b. I was able to visit the seven participating operations multiple times 
over the two seasons of data collection. 
2. Richness of data 
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a. The number of participants was small enough to ensure high 
quality engagement and the collection of rich data.  Given a finite 
amount of researcher time, I could spend more time with fewer 
participants thus generating greater rapport with the participants.  
 It was very difficult to select a random probability sample for this study.  The 
purposeful sampling that I used facilitated the exploration of the relationship 
between the participant and the phenomenon.  Although I cared about the greater 
implications of the study, the intent of the research was to study a specific group of 
guides in Western Canada.  The two threads of guiding and avalanche terrain 
provided some degree of generalizability to the global population of 6000 IFMGA 
certified guides in 23 countries.  
 I used the following attributes or criteria to help identify information-rich 
participants (Merriam, 1998):  
1. Certified guide (ACMG, CSGA, IFMGA) 
2. Worked in the mechanized ski industry for at least 3 years 
3. Ten years experience as a ski guide 
4. Engaged in deliberate practice as per ACMG and CAA CPD 
requirements 
 I ended up with potentially thirty participants with which to conduct more in-
depth interviews.  This fit with Kvale’s (1996) suggestion that a good number of 
interview participants was fifteen, plus or minus ten, with the emphasis placed on the 
importance of quality rather than quantity.  Ponterotto (2005) supported this notion 
of thick, high quality description rather than a larger number of lower quality 
descriptions.  I aimed on the slightly on the high side as I anticipated there might be 
an element of attrition (Shadish, 2002).  I worked hard to maintain high quality 
interactions with all participants in the hope of reducing or eliminating attrition.  The 
prime consideration was to sample to the point of saturation, when no significant 
new information was coming in (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Merriam, 1998) 
 During the period from September 2007 to May 2008, I actively recruited 
participants at the corporate and individual levels within the guiding community.  
The results of this recruitment were that seven companies indicated they would 
participate in the study.  I was invited to present at annual pre-season training 
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sessions and to solicit individual guides.  The participating companies were: 
Canadian Mountain Holidays, Coast Range Heli-skiing, Mike Wiegele Heli-skiing, 
Selkirk Tangiers Heli-skiing, Eagle Pass Heli-skiing, White Grizzly Snowcat Skiing 
and Selkirk Wilderness Skiing.  Guides from two operational nodes of Canadian 
Mountain Holidays participated.  To achieve my target of thirty participants, I 
needed an average of four participants from each company.  
4.3.2.2.1.1	  Sample	  Population	  Demographics	  
 The 30 participants all worked for heli-ski or snowcat-ski operations in 
British Columbia during the period of November 2008 to March 2011.  There was a 
range of length and intensity of employment.  Some worked long, full-time seasons 
(20+ weeks), while others worked part-time and, or shorter seasons.  The sample 
population statistics are reported in Chapter 5. 
 The average age was 40 (SD = 7.8), with a range of 26 to 58.  There were 
twenty-six male participants and four female participants, which was similar to the 
ratio observed in the guiding community more generally.  
4.3.2.2.1.2	  Operations	  
 Although the participants primarily worked at seven different companies 
(five heli-ski, two snowcat), some of the participants worked at multiple operations.  
The seven primary locations included: two small, one medium and two large heli-ski 
operations, and two medium sized cat operations.  The profile of the sample selection 
was similar to the profile of the heli and snowcat industry.  The participants came 
from all sectors (Heli and Cat; large and small).  They represented a cross section of 
the British Columbia mechanized ski industry (HeliCat-Canada, 2008). 
4.3.2.2.1.3	  The	  Training	  and	  Certification	  of	  Expertise	  
 Participating guides were trained and certified by one or both of the Canadian 
guiding associations, the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides (ACMG) and 
the Canadian Ski Guides Association (CSGA).  These two certification programs 
were described in detail in Chapter 2.  As each certifying process was linked to a 
specific experience building process, there was a variety of expertise generated.  
Guides from the two associations worked together at many, but certainly not all of 
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the mechanized ski operators.  Within my participant group, there were six 
IFMGA guides, nine ACMG Ski guides and six CSGA Level 3 guides.  Twenty-
three participants had completed the CAA Level 2 certification.  Additionally there 
were seven ACMG assistant ski guides and two CSGA level 2 guides.  During the 
period of this study some of those assistant guides and level 2 guides completed the 
next levels of certification.  
4.3.2.3	  Strategies	  for	  Data	  Collection	  
4.3.2.3.1	  Introduction	  
 Palys (1997) described the person-to-person exchange of information as a 
fundamental process of social science research.  There are numerous, commonly 
used, interactive data collection methods; the two most frequently used are surveys 
and interviews.  These methods are versatile and provide direct responses from the 
participants.  Palys described three components of these methods of data collection.  
The researcher needed to begin by establishing an ethical context that promoted 
honest and comprehensive responses.  The questions needed to be designed carefully 
so that they provoked a reflective response.  Finally, the greatest challenge for the 
researcher was to generate understanding of the participants’ responses.  This section 
describes the data collection methods that were used.  
4.3.2.3.2	  Self-­‐Reporting	  
 Self-reporting, or introspective self-evaluations have been widely used in 
social science research however there are a number of recognized limitations (Bray, 
Huffman, & Fletcher, 1999).  Nisbett and Wilson (1977) went as far as to discredit 
the process of introspection as a valid data collection method.  They supported the 
notion that although verbal self-reports might provide interesting information, they 
should not be used as the sole or core data on which analysis was based.  They 
suggested that people have difficulty accurately reporting the existence of certain 
stimuli and, or their responses to those stimuli.  A number of authors have countered 
Nisbett and Wilson’s argument, and suggested that verbal reports can be used and 
that strategies can be employed to produce valid data (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; 
Smith & Miller, 1978; White, 1980).  Data legitimacy would depend on the 
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perceptions of the participants and the self-reporting strategies employed (Bray, 
Huffman, & Fletcher, 1999).  Wright, Rowe and Bolger (1994) found that a self-
assessment of expertise corrolated positively with forecasting performance.  
 Self-reporting or verbalization has been reported to occur either concurrently 
or retrospectively (Ericsson & Simon, 1980).  A concurrent ‘think aloud’ strategy 
was good for verbalizing thought processes that were occurring in short term 
memory.  This can be useful during direct observation.  However, verbalizing of the 
task may cause considerable overload on the participants during some complex 
tasks.  Although verbalizing the degree to which intuition was used in the decision 
process was subordinate to the actual task of safely conducting a ski group through 
avalanche terrain, it would seem to be a simple description of what actually 
happened.  However verbalization of expert intuition may be difficult, as it may not 
be occurring at a conscious level (Ericsson & Simon, 1980).  Asking expert ski 
guides to verbalize their intuitive thought processes during stressful ski descents 
could potentially slow down the decision-making process and endanger lives.  
 A retrospective verbalization is the description of a task that occurred earlier.  
Retrospective verbalizations held promise for this research as the context could be 
specified within the questions to help the respondent focus and retrieve more in-
depth information from memory (Ericsson & Simon, 1980).  The question style 
could either provide a list of potential answers or be open to all available 
information.  The challenge when a fixed set of potential answers was provided was 
that they needed to reflect the possible answer range from the participant’s 
perspective.  If the list of potential answers did not include a participant’s preferred 
choice, a second best answer could be used.  Typically the researcher might not even 
know that the answer was the participant’s second choice.  Open questions provided 
more opportunity for participants to accurately describe their answers.  
 Ericsson and Simon (1980) suggested that there were a number of criteria 
which would increase the extent to which a retrospective self-report corresponded to 
actual events.  
1. The self-report was generated relatively soon after the event had occurred. 
2. The recording procedure was user friendly and was not time consuming. 
3. The information to be recorded was accessible at a conscious level. 
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 Smith and Miller (1978) suggested that the issue was less about whether 
participants had retrospective access to their decision processes, and more about the 
conditions under which they were best retrieved.  Although there might have been 
an element of reactivity, in that the process of generating a self-report actually 
influenced the content of the report (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), strategies were 
employed to reduce the level of reactivity by choosing a time for reporting that did 
not conflict with other cognitive processing tasks (White, 1980). 
 Participants were asked to provide retrospective reports of both good days 
and near-miss events.  Good days were to be selected based on the outcome and the 
overall challenge of the day.  The preference was to gather reports from days that 
provided difficult decision-making and had good outcomes.  The near-miss events 
were more obvious to report on.  Participants were asked to complete the reports as 
soon as possible after the completion of the day to avoid the degradation of the 
perceptions of events over time.  Memories of negative or painful events resulting 
from poor decisions are likely to diminish with the passage of time (Soman, 2003).  
4.3.2.3.3	  Questionnaires	  
 The goal of this research was to capture reflective information as soon after 
an event as possible (Soman, 2003), however I could not be with every participant at 
the end of every day.  This necessitated the use of a self-administered questionnaire 
to prompt the participants to reflect on critical areas of interest to the study.  Palys 
(1997) suggested that direct contact between the researcher and the participant would 
positively affect response rates on questionnaires.  The pre-season meeting with the 
participants allowed me to brief them on the process and collect feedback from them.  
The questionnaire facilitated the collection of information much like a diary, and 
formed the basis for an interview.  Participants generated an entry at the end of each  
‘interesting’ day, the criteria for which were: a challenging environment, with 
minimal or misleading feedback, and the potential for major consequences.  These 
descriptions were given to the participants with the freedom to interpret them and 
choose the reporting days.  As the predictability of the avalanche hazard was 
constantly changing, there were periods when few questionnaires were completed 
and periods when questionnaires were completed every day.  
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 I maximized the advantages as described by Palys (Table 7) by providing 
a reporting structure that allowed the participants an element of privacy.  I was the 
only person who was able to link a participant with a completed questionnaire, which 
was the basis for the interview process.  This also helped to overcome some of the 
limitations by clarifying ambiguities and ensuring that questions were interpreted 
correctly. 
Table	  7	  Advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  questionnaires	  (Palys,	  1997,	  p.148)	  
All Types of Questionnaires Self-Administered 
Questionnaires 
Advantages / Strengths Advantages / Strengths 
Good way to amass a lot of data quickly If researcher is there, can respond to questions 
and clarify ambiguities 
Relatively inexpensive Respondent can answer in privacy 
Structured questions make for easier data 
coding 
Good for sensitive issues where anonymity is 
provided 
Disadvantages / Limitations Disadvantages / Limitations 
Researcher’s data are limited to what is on the 
paper 
Researcher, if not present, cannot clarify 
ambiguities 
Vocabulary must be appropriate Misinterpreted questions and non-responses not 
caught until too late 
 
 The questionnaires were administered through the web-based survey tool 
SurveyMonkey.  This tool allowed participants direct access to the survey instrument 
whenever they had web access.  I was able to view the surveys as they were 
completed.  
4.3.2.3.4	  Interviews	  
 Kvale described the interview process as a “construction site of knowledge” 
(1996, p. 2).  He used the metaphor of the interviewer as a miner of information and 
knowledge and as a traveller through the experiences of the participants.  He 
suggested that the research interview should be characterized by a methodological 
awareness of the formation of the questions, a focus on the dynamic interaction 
between the researcher and the participant, and detail-oriented, critical attention to 
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not only the words used, but also the message contained within the words.  
Through the use of open-ended questions the researcher could adapt to the responses 
of the participants and elicit more in-depth answers while retaining control over the 
process (Creswell, 2003).  However interviewers must be wary of the influence they 
exert, as there could be the potential to alter both the content and the context of the 
participant’s input (Reed, Patton, & Gold, 1993).  Although interviews can range 
from a highly structured series of questions, much like a verbal questionnaire, to a 
completely unstructured chat, it behoves the researcher to have a thread which binds 
the process together and creates a connection between what the participant says and 
what the researcher wants to learn (Long, 2007).  
 In my extensive experience conducting interviews and debriefing sessions 
initially as an Outward Bound Instructor and more recently as an examiner for the 
Association of Canadian Mountain Guides, capturing the subtlety of the message 
required intense concentration on the part of the interviewer.  A recording of the 
interview, either video or audio, allowed the interviewer to review the interaction 
multiple times to ensure that nothing was missed.  
 Kvale (1996) described seven important stages in the design and 
implementation of the interview process.  The first stage was the creation of a theme 
that the interview will follow.  The rest of the process is hung on this framework.  
The second component was the design and was dependent on the intended 
knowledge gain.  The amount of detail may vary, but some sort of schedule of key 
topics or issues was desirable (Long, 2007).  The actual interview itself required the 
researcher to create an environment that encouraged the participant to become fully 
engaged.  Formulations that describe the impact of the dialogue on either the 
participant or the researcher can be used to clarify statements that are cryptic or 
misunderstood (Patton, 1984). Once the interview was completed it needed to be 
transcribed, analysed, verified and reported.  These steps have been discussed later in 
a larger context.  
 Kvale (1996) and Long (2007) suggested a number of strategies and 
examples for the types of questions to use at various points through an interview.  
1. Introduce the topic and get started  - “Can you tell me about…?” 
2. Begin with description and build into reflection, introspection and analysis 
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3. Elicit a follow-up to a question – “Is there anything more…?” 
4. Specify or probe – What did you think then?  Why? 
5. Lead from one question to the next – “OK let’s move on”.   
6. The importance of silence – Give the participant sufficient wait time. 
7. Interpret and reflect an understanding – “So you mean…  What I hear you 
say…?” 
 While the self-report questionnaires formed the basis for the interview, it was 
the interview itself, which formed the mainstay of my research methods.  It allowed 
me to clarify information from the questionnaires and brought together information 
from a number of daily reports.  The synthesis of individual reports helped to 
generate a more complete understanding of how intuition was used.  
4.3.2.3.5	  Direct	  Observation	  
 Observation is methods by which researchers can watch phenomena unfold.  
The researcher either acts as a participant within the study group, or as an outsider 
not fully engaged in the activity (Drew, Hardman, & Hosp, 2008).  
 The advantages of observation included:  
1. Full immersion in the process increased the depth of understanding. 
2. There was increased access to the cultural patterns that explained the 
participants’ sense of their own behaviours.  
3. The observer also interviewed the participants. 
4. Less time was needed to distinguish common events from unusual events. 
The disadvantages of observation included: 
1. There could have been a tendency to focus on frequently occurring events. 
2. There was the potential for sampling bias. 
3. There could have been some loss of objectivity. 
4. There could have been a temptation to accept others’ explanations too 
readily. 
 (Drew, Hardman, & Hosp, 2008, p. 197) 
 Direct observation was one of the strategies that I used to overcome the 
limitations of self-reporting.  This allowed me to actually be present as decisions 
unfolded and not be completely dependent on the participants’ interpretation of 
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events (Long, 2007).  As mentioned in the self-reporting section, a participant’s 
report could be coloured by their needs and wants, and when in doubt, could be used 
to portray them in a more favourable light.  It was entirely possible that a participant 
was oblivious to the subtleties of their decision process.  Although I was a participant 
observer my presence alone could have caused the participants to change their 
behaviour in some way (Veal, 2006).  However, the participants were all somewhat 
familiar with having someone watching them.  They had all completed multiple 
guiding exams in which an examiner was not only observing their behaviour, but 
also grading them on it.  My presence was much less intrusive and intimidating.  In 
the larger ski groups of twelve skiers, I could blend into the background and become 
just another guest.  I had the benefit of not having to make the actual decision, but 
retained the luxury of second guessing it.  It provided me with the opportunity to ask 
questions about the process of how the participant got there.  I was more interested in 
the process than the actual decision.  In the end however, direct observation was not 
extensively used due to time constraints. 
4.3.2.3.6	  Cognitive	  Task	  Analysis	  
 Task analysis is defined as a study of what a person is meant to do 
(Schraagen, 2006).  The follow-on question is how do they achieve the task they are 
meant to do.  From a research perspective, task analysis is an applied strategy where 
real job tasks are investigated.  With the advent of computer technology and a 
developing interest in expert systems, the focus became more on the cognitive aspect 
of task analysis.  As such it can be used to help generate a more complete 
understanding of expert decision-making.  
 Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) is an extension of task analysis, primarily 
focussed on the decision process that forms the basis for observable actions 
(Schraagen, Chipman, & Shalin, 2009).  CTA attempts to capture how decisions are 
made in NDM settings (Gordon & Gill, 1997).  The analysis is focussed on the 
knowledge and ways of processing that are used by experts.  CTA goes beyond 
simple task analysis and is useful when complex problems push the decision maker.   
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 Although CTA is not well defined (Gordon & Gill, 1997), many elements 
can be examined including: pattern recognition, mental models, challenges in the 
development of domain specific knowledge, and instructional methods in the 
transition from novice to expert.  The intent is to use enough of the above strategies 
to form a theory or model of expert decision-making in a specific domain. 
 CTA takes a great deal of time and effort and is therefore expensive.  It is 
most appropriate when the task is complex and not easy to learn, is dynamic with 
high levels of uncertainty, and requires the decision maker to multi-task.  CTA 
includes a broad range of different techniques including: direct observation, 
interviews and reports.  CTA is a cognitive analysis tool.  The primary applications 
of CTA are as an instructional design tool, or in the design of an expert system.  
There are three key stages to CTA: extract the knowledge, analyse the knowledge for 
meaning, and finally communicate that meaning (Yates & Feldon, 2011).  
 Militello (Militello, Hutton, Pliske, Knight, & Klein, 1997; Militello & 
Hutton, 1998) suggested that CTA had become too sophisticated and consequently 
required tremendous resources, time in particular, so they developed a user-friendlier 
version of CTA.  Termed Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA), it was designed 
as part of a US Navy project.  There are three components to ACTA: the task 
diagram, a knowledge audit, and a simulation interview.  The task diagram interview 
provides an overview of the task and illuminates the key cognitive challenges.  The 
task is broken down into three to six smaller chunks or sections.  The knowledge 
audit investigates the nature of the expertise need to solve the task, particularly 
diagnosis, situational awareness, improvisation, and recognition of anomalies.  The 
simulation interview investigates the cognitive process of the expert.  The primary 
focus is the identification of how to deal with high consequence environments. 
1. Present a scenario (vignette).  This can be picture, video, or diagram. 
 It may require a CTA to design a challenging scenario 
2. Semi-structured interview questions.  How would you think and act in this 
situation?  Situation assessment, key indicators, actions, possible pitfalls. 
3. Develop a cognitive demands table  
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No metric has been developed to assess the validity and reliability of ACTA 
 There are many different forms or methods of CTA, with over 100 variations 
identified in the literature (Yates & Feldon, 2011).  There is little structure in the 
selection of any particular CTA method other than attempting to craft a good match 
between the method and the specific research environment.  The top five most 
commonly used CTA elicitation techniques were: Think Aloud, Semi-structured 
Interview, Document Analysis, Structured Interview, and Critical Decision.  
 Klein et al. (1989) described the Critical Decision Method (CDM) as a way to 
model expert decision-making under conditions of high variability, time pressure and 
large volumes of information.  The context of the CDM was from within 
Recognition-Primed decision-making (RPD).  CDM operates under the assumption 
that a greater level of expertise is needed to solve non-routine challenges.  The intent 
of the strategy was to extract information from the decision maker, particularly when 
the decision maker is cognitively unaware of all the elements that contributed to a 
decision.  Klein et al. (1989) applied this strategy in an attempt to generate greater 
understanding of the content knowledge of experts and how that contributed to 
decisions.  There are three key stages: extract the knowledge, analyse the knowledge 
for meaning, and finally communicate that meaning.  
 In the CDM, experts are asked to think of a critical event and how they 
managed it (Klein et al., 1989).  The researcher facilitates the process by supplying 
probing questions that help the expert to explore the critical elements.  The CDM is 
based on a retrospective interview of an expert on a specific incident.  The expert is 
probed for retrospective thoughts on how the situation was addressed.  Typically the 
incident involves non-routine events.  Incidents are selected on the basis that the 
environment is challenging and the decisions are not simple.  Near-misses provide 
fertile ground for CDM interviews.  Semi-structured probing pushes the decision 
maker to reflect on the event while still allowing the participant to be engaged in a 
stimulating dialogue.  The probing centres on the development of the decision point, 
specifically the elements of prior knowledge, situational awareness and pattern 
recognition.  CDM has often been used as a way of extracting and analysing expert 
decision strategies with the intent of developing a way to train less skilled decision 
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makers.  Although one of the limitations of this method is that with self-reports, 
participants can misrepresent their actions, CDM is one of the CTA techniques that 
has the greatest level of formal and specific methodology (Yates & Feldon, 2011).  
4.3.2.4	  Components	  of	  Data	  Collection	  
 There were both concurrent and sequential elements to the data collection 
(Creswell, 2003).  A quantitative analysis of the formation of intuition due to 
environmental factors as described by Hogarth (2008) ran concurrently with the 
largely qualitative analysis of the use of intuition (Figure 9).  Each participant’s 
expertise profile was established through a questionnaire at the beginning of the 
season when they committed to the contribution of field data. 
There were four components to the qualitative data collection:  
1. A good decision questionnaire 
2. A near-miss questionnaire 
3. An interview process, which allowed for the collation and summarization of 
the accumulated good decision questionnaires and near-miss questionnaires. 
4. Direct observation 
 Weightings were allocated foremost to the interview data, as they were a 
summary of the questionnaire data.  When the four components led in the same 
direction, the relative weightings were less critical.  However anomalous indicators 
had great weight as they promoted further inquiry and were addressed in the final 
round of interviews. 
Methods Summary 
1) Expertise – Background experience profile 
 Web-based 
 Quantitative analysis 
2) Decision-making – Event reports 
 Web-based 
 Good days and near miss 
 Quantitative and qualitative analysis 
3) Decision-making event report interview 
 Face-to-face or phone 
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 Semi-structured interview questions 
4) Decision-making interview (post season) 
 Face-to-face  
 Vignette – based on Cognitive Task Analysis 
  A variation of Critical Decision Method 
 Moved to semi-structured interview questions 
 I adapted the interview (to CDM) 
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4.3.2.4.1	  Formation	  of	  intuition	  data	  
 The development of intuition has been characterized as a long term process 
dependent on accumulated individual days and seasons (Hogarth et al., 2008).  The 
InfoEx database, as described in Chapter 2, was sufficiently well developed that I 
could extract the characteristics of the environment for any combination of time 
frame and geographic region.  The data could also be linked over numerous seasons.  
This information was used to develop a picture of the nature of the environment in 
which the participants had developed their intuition (Appendix 2).  The consequence 
and feedback received while operating in an immediate dynamic environment form 
the basis for the development of patterns (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Hogarth et al., 
1991, 2008; Hogarth, 2001).  Patterns formed under wicked environments may 
produce suspect patterns.  It is only when these patterns are recognized and acted 
upon in the future that the possible negative implications may play out.  The decision 
process will be flawed due to the recognition of a flawed pattern formed under 
wicked conditions. 
 For the last 10 years, the InfoEx has recorded sufficient breadth and depth of 
data to generate a categorization of the nature of the environment.  This included 
both the frequency and quality of the environmental feedback, and the consequences 
of potential errors.  This was done for the two seasons of data collection and the 
preceding year. 
 Avalanche observations provided the greatest insight into the characteristics 
of the complexity of the decision environment.  Both the quality of feedback and the 
consequence of errors were mined from this data.  The quality of feedback data came 
from the frequency of avalanches observed, combined with the ease and type of 
triggering.  The consequences of errors were detectable through the depth of the 
fracture plane and the size of the avalanche.  The indication of the percentage of 
terrain observed contributed to a level of reliability.  The comments section provided 
insight into the decision process.  All of the above data was then linked to the 
Stability Assessment section, which provided a general assessment of the snowpack 
stability for three elevation bands (Alpine, Treeline, Below Treeline) using the terms: 
Very Good, Good, Fair, Poor, and Very Poor. 
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4.3.2.4.2	  Expertise	  data	  
 The data collection process for the establishment of expertise accommodated 
a description of the depth and breadth of the participants’ experience and how that 
experience has led to the development of expertise.  This was achieved initially 
through a questionnaire with follow-up questions in an interview.  The data 
collection process was explained to the participants and base line information 
relating to expertise was collected.  The questionnaires were piloted twice prior to 
implementation.  The first pilot study was conducted in 2006-2007 with some of the 
instructional staff at Glenmore Lodge.  The second pilot study was conducted in 
2007-2008 with a small group of heli-ski guides. 
 Previous research studies have generated a variety of criteria to calculate or 
estimate expertise, with no definitive method gaining wide acceptance (Ericsson & 
Charness, 1994; Ericsson, 1996; Galloway, 2005a, 2007; Patel, Kaufman, Magder, & 
Ericsson, 1996; Starkes & Ericsson, 2003).  The challenge has been to extract 
enough high quality parameters to generate a good picture of expertise.  Most 
researchers of deliberate practice have depended on self-reported retrospective 
accounts of the frequency, type and duration of practice sessions.  Even diaries have 
not proved to be accurate reflections of how practices have been structured.  
 A balance between simple and complex methods might provide a practical, 
yet relatively accurate solution.  Adams (2007) used a simple measure of years of 
professional experience as her determinant of expertise.  However, a simple 
inference from the years of experience might lead to a flaw assumption of expertise, 
as the years may be lacking in learning opportunities.  An overly complex index may 
suffer from the introduction of more numerous small errors due to inadequate record 
keeping and flawed memories.  In response to this challenge, I chose a relatively 
small number of factors, each of which had an increased likelihood of accuracy.   
 I employed both objective and subjective criteria to assess each participant’s 
level of expertise.  The key criteria were: certification level, years of work 
experience, breadth of work experience, time spent engaging in continued 
professional development (CPD), and a self-rating of expertise.  The participants had 
recorded information on certification, years of work experience and participation in 
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CPD as a requirement of professional membership in the Canadian Avalanche 
Association.  In contrast to Galloway’s (2005) sample population of Outward Bound 
instructors, the sample population of ski guides was generally highly experienced 
with only two participants with less than ten years of experience in avalanche terrain.  
Galloway’s group included the full range of experience levels from interns to course 
directors.  
 The number of different operations that the participant had worked at was 
easily calculated and gave an indication of the breadth of work experience.  The 
questions, which asked the participants to rate themselves as to expertise, required an 
introspective analysis by the participants.  These subjective measures of expertise 
provided additional insight into how and why expertise might influence decision-
making.  Although these factors were not all the factors that could and have been 
used to determine expertise, e.g. populations worked with and levels of education, 
they represented a grouping that provided a broad picture of the participants’ levels 
of expertise.  
4.3.2.4.3	  Decision	  data	  
 The collection of good decision and near-miss data was initiated with a 
questionnaire and followed by interviews.  During the season, guides had access to a 
short questionnaire, which focused on generating a reflective analysis of the day’s 
good decisions.  The questionnaire was available on the web and in paper form.  A 
sample has been included in Appendix 3.  Participants were asked to fill out this 
form on the days when the decision-making was particularly challenging and yet the 
outcome was still good.  The completion of the questionnaire on a particular day was 
like a diary entry.    
 Once per season, I visited each operation to collect and discuss completed 
questionnaires (diary entries).  Some of the interviews were conducted by phone due 
to the logistical complexity of meeting face-to-face.  I conducted interviews in an 
iterative process, each interview building on the last and the intervening events, as 
learning likely occurred for both the participant and the researcher as the season(s) 
progressed (Palys, 1997).  Thus there was an opportunity to explore issues to a 
     
 
122 
greater depth later in the season and in the second season.  I was able to expand 
upon the questions as a cycle of successive interviews took place.  
 The first interview (in Study 2) was based on CDM strategies, but was 
expanded to use both near-miss and good day reports as both were challenging 
decision environments.  Sosniak (2006) describes this as tough, or challenging case 
analysis.  Adams (2007) used the principles of CTA and CDM as the basis of her 
analysis of the 47 critical incident decision-making summaries (CIDS) described by 
her participants.  
 The web-based incident reports provided the starting point for the interviews.  
Participants were asked to describe the events in detail.  The semi-structured 
questions provided a standardized set of probes and thus an increase in reliability.  
The probing focussed on how the participant’s decision process evolved, with 
particular emphasis on situational awareness and pattern recognition. 
The key questions that provided insight into the participants’ decision processes 
were: 
1. The Type of Decision Response 
a. Did you go with your initial intuitive response or were you more 
analytical? 
b. If there was an element of intuition in the decision, rate the intuition 
in terms of strength and whether it promoted feelings to do something 
(Positive or good feeling), or to avoid doing something (Negative or 
bad feeling). 
2. Confidence 
a. Describe how confident you were in your decision(s) prior to 
committing to a course of action and at the end of the day. 
3. Feedback 
a. Reflect on the quality and quantity of feedback you received about 
your decisions.  Feedback could be from the environment, fellow 
guides, or guests. 
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 The questions were tested in two pilot studies, during the winter of 2006-
2007 with Glenmore Lodge staff and the winter of 2007-2008 with Canadian ski 
guides.  
The web-based near-miss reporting questionnaire had similar questions to the good 
day questionnaire, relating to the use of intuition in the decision process.  This 
questionnaire was of particular significance when guides had a near-miss that offered 
a good learning opportunity for other guides.  The structure of the web-based 
reporting offered an opportunity to contribute while remaining anonymous.  
 The second interview (Study 3) was initiated with a decision vignette due to 
the time interval separation from the decision environment.  The vignette proved to 
be unnecessary as participants were still cognitively engaged with the previous 
season’s challenges.  This is supported by Klein et al.’s (1989) suggestion that 
artificial vignettes take too long to prepare and do not provide a sufficiently 
sophisticated and rich description of the context.  
 Although the second round of interviews was designed using a CDM 
framework, the structured confines of the decision vignette limited the range of 
possible answers.  The CDM framework was opened up to allow for a broader 
exploration of the participants’ perceptions of events.   
 CTA and CDM help to capture the essence of the expert’s knowledge.  This 
can be difficult, as the expert often cannot articulate what is known.  Methods 
include ‘talk aloud’ exercises that facilitate the expert’s articulation of what is going 
on in his head.  The reality of a true task environment can help the expert to 
articulate what is happening (Gordon & Gill, 1997).  CTA may work to determine 
what is the expert’s knowledge.  Does it also help to describe how the expert is able 
to use previous knowledge in the solving of a new task?   
Second Interview Scenarios 
Rationale:  
 The intent of the second round of interviews was to clarify my understanding 
of the participants’ use of the terms intuitive and analytical.  Specifically, when they 
said that a decision response was a mix of intuitive and analytical, what did that 
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really mean?  Were they using both strategies?  If so were they using them 
sequentially or in parallel?   
 Horstmann, Hausmann and Ryf (2010) suggest that it is possible to elicit an 
intuitive or analytical response by manipulating the context of the scenario.  A 
familiar setting, with minimal objective information, framed by directions to respond 
intuitively, might induce an intuitive process, while an unfamiliar setting, with 
significant amounts of objective information, framed by directions to respond 
analytically, might induce an analytical process. 
 The intent of the decision vignette was not to discover whether they decided 
to ski the slope, but rather to challenge them with a scenario and then query them on 
the process that they used to get there.  The decision scenarios were used to initiate a 
discussion and investigate the use of intuitive and analytical strategies.  The 
participants described what an intuitive response or an analytical response meant to 
them.  Participants were given one of two possible scenarios; one had factors that 
might promote an intuitive response, while the other had factors that might promote 
an analytical response. 
• The Intuitive scenario used a photo of familiar terrain supplemented by 
limited snowpack and weather data, with the intent of inducing some 
level of pattern recognition and thus an intuitive decision response. 
• The Analytical scenario used a photo of unfamiliar terrain supplemented 
by extensive snowpack and weather data, with the intent of inducing an 
analytical decision response. 
• The environmental conditions in both scenarios promoted a high degree 
of uncertainty, with neither an obvious ‘go’ response or ‘no go’ response. 
• The key questions were at the end. 
Questions 
1. What is your initial impression?  
2. What are the conditions under which you would ski it? 
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3. Talk aloud your decision process. Would you ski it?   Yes / 
No 
4. If yes, where would you go and how confident would you be? 
a. Would there be any stop conditions? 
5. If no, what additional information would you want? 
6. Would it change if you knew 
a. The HST interface produced a CTM on facets size 1 Yes / No 
7. Would it change if you knew 
a. There was a persistent weak layer down 120cm, facets on top of a 
crust, which produced an RB 5    Yes / No 
8. Describe an intuitive response  
a. What does it mean to you? 
9. Describe an analytical response 
a. What does it mean to you? 
10. What caused you to be more or less confident in your decision? 
4.3.2.4.4	  Observation	  data	  
 There were limited opportunities for field observation.  Observation of ski 
guiding decision-making required participation in the enactment of the day’s ski 
plan, as the logistical considerations required me to travel with a guided group.  As a 
researcher, I travelled with a guide and a group of guests, but did not participate in 
the decision process as a guide, and only participated in the activity as a guest.  It 
was clearly recognized that space availability for this field observation was 
dependent on guest registrations and operational logistics.  I did not displace guests 
in the helicopter or snowcat, as any fiscally responsible operation would prefer to 
have a paying guest rather than a researcher occupying a $1000/day seat.  However 
there were occasional circumstances when seats were unoccupied and provided me 
with the opportunity to conduct direct observations.  The benefit of direct 
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observation was to immerse the researcher in the complexities of the 
environment beyond what was expected because of discussions within the morning 
guide’s meeting.  As a fellow ski guide, it helped me gain a greater understanding of 
the specific challenges faced by the participant on that particular day and helped me 
to focus the interview questions.  Due to the logistical considerations, I was only able 
to conduct one day of direct observation.  I applied the lens of what I would do as a 




 Clancey (2006) suggests that the use of statistics to analyse data collected in 
an NDM setting may develop into an over-reliance on data that could be misleading. 
This could evolve into a tendency to quantify data merely for the sake of generating 
a statistical argument (Forsythe, 1999).  Wright (2003) supports the use of 
descriptive statistics as the most useful tool for communicating to the reader.  He 
supports the argument that null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) can be 
overused and that the reporting of p values may, at times be of limited worth.  
Hopkins (2001) adds to this by stressing the importance of considering the practical 
rather than the statistical significance of the outcomes of data analysis.   He suggests 
that p-values should not be used to generalize from a sample to the general 
population within an NDM setting.  
 
 Merriam (1998) describes qualitative research data as being collected and 
analysed in a synchronic fashion, as insights which developed in one phase of the 
research would typically merge into the next phase of the investigation.  “But the 
researcher does not know what will be discovered, what or whom to concentrate on, 
or what the final analysis will be” (Merriam, 1998, p. 162).  Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) argue that the data has to undergo a microanalysis which involves a dynamic, 
semi-structured  process, freely flowing between the raw data and the interpretations 
generated by the researcher and the participants.  Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10) 
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stressed the importance of “maintaining three concurrent flows of activity: data 
reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing / verification”. 
4.3.2.5.2	  Quantitative	  Analysis	  
4.3.2.5.2.1	  Rating	  the	  Expertise	  
 As described in the Literature Review, a mere calculation of hours of 
engagement was a crude and largely inadequate measure of expertise.  The concept 
of dedicated practice as previously described in Chapter 3, gave additional credibility 
to the argument.  The primary determinants that were gathered in the Background 
Experience Profile included: certification, work experience, continued professional 
development activities and self-rated expertise (Appendix 5).  Certification was easy 
to measure, but represented only a few of the benchmarks in a guide’s career.  It did 
not measure higher levels of expertise once the top level of certification had been 
achieved, or once a participant no longer trained toward a higher level of 
certification.  
 The specific participant variables within the reported experience category 
included:  
• Total years of work experience (broken down into weeks of work) 
• The number of different locations worked at (breadth of experience) 
• The number of years at the current location (depth of experience) 
• Engagement in Continued Profession Development (CPD) activities 
(dedicated practice) 
 The final measure was the self-reporting of expertise through three questions.  
These three questions asked the participants to rate themselves.  The first two asked 
them to rate themselves relative to their peers, while the third used a more abstract 
arbitrary scale.   
1. Compared to other guides or instructors in your primary activity, how do you 
rate your overall abilities as a decision maker?  Note: This does not refer to 
your technical skill expertise. 
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2. Compared to other guides or instructors in your primary activity, how 
refined are your abilities to balance risk with reward (i.e. your risk 
optimization skills)? 
3. Categorize your guiding skill set in each of the following areas as to your 
level of expertise.  (Expert, Proficient, Competent, Advanced Beginner, N/A) 
 Heli or Snowcat Skiing  
 Ski Touring  
 Avalanche Control  
 Waterfall Ice Climbing 
 Alpine Climbing  
 Rock Climbing  
  Other  
4.3.2.5.3	  Qualitative	  Analysis	  
 Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that qualitative data analysis was an 
interactive process, involving data collection, data display, data reduction and finally 
conclusions (Figure 10).  Data reduction consisted of the continual process of 
extracting the essence of the contact.  Strauss and Corbin (1998) recommended doing 
this through a line by line microscopic analysis.  Described as ‘mining the data’ this 
detailed focus on every word was aided by the process of coding key data chunks 
and summarizing patterns, and has been described later.  Data display involved the 
organizing of the reduced data into easily digestible texts, graphs or charts.  
Conclusion drawing was the process of distilling the meaning from the data (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).  
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Figure	  10	  Components	  of	  data	  analysis:	  Interactive	  model	  (Miles	  &	  Huberman,	  1994,	  p.	  12)	  
 
 Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that the writing up of field contact 
data should be summarized in a contact summary sheet a day or two after the contact.  
This summary should include questions like: who was involved, what were the main 
themes, what aspect of the research question was addressed, did anything new come 
out of the contact and what are the implications for the next contact?  This was to be 
followed by a process that looked for patterns in the data.  From these patterns, 
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Table	  8	  Common	  process	  of	  qualitative	  analysis	  (Miles	  &	  Huberman,	  1994,	  p.	  9)	  
1. Code field notes 
2. Note personal reflections in the field notes 
3. Sort materials with regards to similar phrases, relationships, patterns, themes and sequences 
4. Isolate the patterns, commonalities and differences to integrate into the next iteration of field 
data collection 
5. Begin to generate a set of generalizations from the patterns 
6. Integrate the generalizations with the formal body of knowledge 
4.3.2.5.3.1	  Coding	  
 The next step was the coding of information.  Miles and Huberman (1994) 
stressed the importance of avoiding data overload and being able to access and 
retrieve the key components.  The coding process involved the generation of 
descriptive labels, which were then attached to chunks of data.  This helped to 
generate meaning for the researcher as segments were clustered together around the 
central research themes.  Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 103) described the process of 
coding as beginning with the “abstract representation of an event”, or 
conceptualization.  Concepts were grouped together to form categories, with each 
categories then further developed through the description of its’ properties and 
dimensions.  Miles and Huberman (1994) described the use of three types of codes: 
descriptive, interpretive and pattern.  These codes were incremental in their 
complexity.  Codes were created prior to the start of fieldwork based on the research 
question, and as a more inductive approach was also warranted, codes were 
generated after the first round of data collection.  There was room in the middle for 
an approach that created codes for general themes and allowed for the addition of 
more specific codes as the data emerged.  The themes listed below became apparent 
through relating my personal expertise in decision-making to my interpretation of the 
decision-making literature. 
I took this middle ground using these central themes to generate the initial codes: 
1. Expertise (Ericsson, 1996) 
a. Depth 
b. Breadth 
c. Dedicated practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993) 






c. Characteristics – Wicked or kind?  (Hogarth, 2008) 
d. Snow stability / hazard forecast 
3. Decision Process 
a. Familiarity with the terrain 
b. Feedback (Hogarth, 1980; Soman, 2003) 
c. Intuitive – analytical (Kahneman, 2003) 
d. Intuitive confidence (Simmons & Nelson, 2006) 
 This qualitative data analysis process has been described as noticing, 
collecting and thinking about the data (Seidel, 1998).  Although the context of data 
flow might imply the idea that these codes were sequential, this was just one way to 
construct meaning.  Some of these themes and coded components described events 
or processes, which happened simultaneously.  The decision process has been 
described as a cyclical and iterative process (Klein, 1998) and this analysis followed 
that model.  
 My first step was to allocate data codes to the subjective data from the 
questionnaires and the interviews, and then the data codes were formed into themes.  
The thematic grouping process was based on relationships amongst the codes and 
followed the iterative process typically used in qualitative data analysis (Seidel, 
1998).  
 I used the meanings to generate a logical flow and pattern, which I formed 
into central themes.  The frequency of occurrence of the codes was only one 
indicator of their significance to the participants.  However it was likely a reasonable 
measure of the strength and weight attributed to these factors within the decision 
process, by the participants.  
4.3.2.5.3.1.1	  Inter-­‐rater	  
 An inter-rater, also termed a co-coder to aid in the reliable and consistent 
interpretation and analysis of the data, assisted me.  Palys (1997, p. 416) described 
inter-rater reliability or inter-observer agreement as “the degree to which two or 
     
 
132 
more people, using the same coding scheme and observing the same people, 
produce essentially the same results”.  Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that 
the initial set of field notes should be coded by both the researcher and the inter-
coder. Using the formula:  
Reliability = # of agreements / total # of agreements + disagreements,  
 Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that it was rare to get better than 70% 
inter-rater reliability on the first round, and that it should increase to over 90% by the 
end of the process.  I achieved an 80% level of reliability on the first round.  
Drew, Hardman, and Hosp (2008) advised to re-check the coding a few days later to 
ensure a high level of code – recode reliability.  This data audit was a way to assess 
the logical process of the analysis.  It was also suggested to check-coding, both for 
internal consistency, code-recode reliability, and inter-coder reliability (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
 Pelham and Blanton (2007) suggested that the inter-rater needed to be 
independent from the project and yet trained in the coding method specific to the 
analysis.  I used an inter-rater with those qualities.  Dwayne Congdon, who had great 
interest in the research topic, agreed to assist in the project.  Congdon brought an 
extensive knowledge and experience base in mountain guiding to the project, which 
he used to interpret, analyse and code the participant’s responses.  His personal 
practical experience included numerous first ascents of alpine routes in Canada and 
culminated with an ascent of Everest via a new route on the west ridge in 1986.  He 
has worked extensively in the mechanized-ski industry and is currently the director 
of the Canadian Mountain and Ski Guide Program at Thompson Rivers University, 
which is responsible for the training and certification of mountain guides in Canada 
to the international standard, as set by the International Federation of Mountain 
Guides Associations (IFMGA).  
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4.4	  Validity	  	  
4.4.1	  Introduction	  
 It was essential that this research be conducted in an ethical manner, which 
produced valid results that the researcher, participants, the guiding community and 
the general population beyond, considered credible, authentic and trustworthy.  
Reliability in terms of the consistency of responses and generalizability in terms of 
its applicability to new environments played much less of a role (Creswell, 2003).  
Odom and Morrow (2006, p. 138) defined reliability as the “consistency of 
measurements”.  An example of a reliability coefficient based on Pearson’s r is the 
objectivity coefficient, measuring the consistency between the interrater scores 
(Interrater reliability).  They defined validity as the truthfulness of the measurements.  
Criterion-related validity was generated using the Pearson r to evaluate the 
relationship between the objective calculation of expertise and the subjective 
estimation of expertise.  However, neither objective, nor subjective scores can be 
considered absolute, or completely ‘truthful’. 
 This research has the potential to impact professional practice in the 
Canadian mountain guiding environment and beyond.  Greater accuracy in the 
decision-making process will result in a decrease in the number of injuries and 
fatalities.  There was a need for practical, action-oriented results that had been 
developed in a manner that inspired confidence.  The key was to develop an 
understanding of the decision-making phenomenon from the perspective of the 
decision-maker and to interpret it within the context of the operational environment.  
4.4.2	  Issues	  concerning	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  research	  
 As previously mentioned, I used a small, non-random sample.  The invitation 
to participate initially went out to all companies that were members of HeliCat 
Canada.  Seven companies responded positively to the proposal.  I visited the 
participating companies during their pre-season training weeks in November and 
December 2007 and revisited the training weeks in 2008 and 2009.  I solicited 
individuals to participate in the study and was open to the inclusion of more 
participants for the primary data collection period of November 2008 to April 2009 
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and November 2009 to April 2010.  Inclusion in the study was based on 
voluntary participation.  
 This was a self-selecting sample and presented the challenge of 
accommodating an inherent level of selection bias.  Titus (2007, p. 489) described 
self-selection bias occurring “when predictors of an out-come are themselves 
associated with other unobserved or observed variables”.  The variable to address in 
this research was ‘why participate?’, which then produced the question of whether 
participation was in anyway related to the use of intuition within the decision-making 
process.  Two principles had been suggested to alleviate selection bias concerns 
(Shadish, 2002).  More data could be collected and, or more assumptions could be 
made about the data that were absent.  Participation in this study should have 
appealed both to those who had a high level of expertise and considered themselves 
good decision makers, and to those who had a lower level of expertise with an 
interest in becoming better decision makers.  This helped to differentiate the decision 
process based on levels of expertise.  I was pleasantly surprised by how many of the 
long time guides became actively engaged in the discussions that I held at the various 
training sessions. 
 I was the primary investigator.  I needed to account for my personal biases, 
values and interests in an open and honest manner that gave credibility to the process 
(Creswell, 2003).  Strauss and Corbin (1998) argue strongly that the elimination of 
bias is impossible, but that there are strategies which can help to reduce its effects.  
Biases can creep into the data set from either the researcher or the participants.  The 
terms ‘always’ and ‘never’ were potential red flags indicating the acceptance of 
statements at face value rather than being scrutinized by a deeper analytical process 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  I have been very clear about my tendency to be 
conservative in my risk management decisions.  My presence might have caused 
participants to be on their ‘best behaviour’, or to modify their decisions in some way, 
perhaps to reflect more closely how they thought their employers would like them to 
act.  They might also have modified their decisions based on participation in the 
study as they became more reflective of their practices.  This increased sensitivity to 
the decision process was a potential follow-on benefit for participants. 
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4.4.3	  Strategies	  to	  enhance	  validity	  
4.4.3.1	  Triangulation	  	  
 Bottorff (1997) described methodological triangulation as the integration of 
findings produced by using both qualitative and quantitative methods. This could be 
achieved through either simultaneous or sequential methodological triangulation.  
Creswell (2003) identified triangulation as an essential element of pragmatic research 
which built on the strength of this methodology. 
 I examined the decision-making phenomenon from two distinct perspectives 
of the decision – outcome interaction.  The primary focus concentrated on good 
decision-making resulting in good outcomes and the secondary focus was on near-
miss events, when a flawed decision process resulted in a good outcome.  Studying 
both good and bad decisions is supported by Galloway’s (2002) suggestion that a 
goal of leadership development programs should be to free learners from the cycle of 
only learning from bad experiences and poor decisions.  Certainly the argument can 
be made that connections can be drawn between negative outcomes and the poor 
decisions that likely caused them.  The reverse is not necessarily true.  A good 
outcome can be considered likely to have evolved out of a good decision process, but 
there may be minimal direct evidence.  However peer feedback and review is a 
potential source of validation.  To achieve this result, in the questionnaire I asked the 
participants to comment on the quantity and quality of peer feedback they received 
on their decisions.  This allowed me to integrate a quantitative analysis of the 
operational environment with a qualitative analysis of the decisions that took place 
within that environment.  The importance of feedback to the determination of 
whether a good outcome can be attributed to good decision-making is discussed in 
Section 7.2.3 and Section 8.3.3.2.  Once decisions have been identified as being of 
high quality, they can be used as the basis for learning.  This has the potential to 
build high quality patterns for future intuitive recognition.   
4.4.3.2	  Member	  Checks	  
 As knowledge was generated through the subjective interpretation of data, 
this information was fed back to the participants for validation.  Termed interpretive 
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authority it is easier to trust the interpretations of the researcher when my 
tentative interpretations were relayed back to the participants and their responses 
were incorporated into the analysis (Thorne, 1997).  These member checks occurred 
at each subsequent repeated observation.  
4.4.3.3	  Repeated	  Observations	  
 I had participants from eight different operational areas and was able to 
gather data from them numerous times.  I visited each operation once per season to 
conduct interviews with the participants. 
4.4.3.4	  Peer	  Examinations	  
 I have a peer group within the Adventure Studies Department at Thompson 
Rivers University that represented a concentrated pool of expertise in the field of risk 
management.  They were used as a sounding board.  This was somewhat like the 
Delphi Panel as used by Davidson (2005).  My analysis of the raw data was 
circulated, with the intent of tapping into their collective expertise and creating a 
broader interpretation.  I was able to retain a broader perspective on the research 
problem. 
4.4.3.5	  Validity	  Check	  
 A six-point validity check was completed to determine two key points.  The 
first question was whether I was justified in combining the seasons.  The second 
question was how I needed to accommodate for the range in the number of reported 
days as some participants reported only a single day, while the most prolific 
participant reported 19 events.  This avoided a heavy reliance on a single 
participant’s responses.  Participant 103’s responses were not leptokurtic.  His 
responses were wide ranging.  The quantitative data were averaged for all 
participants to avoid over-reliance on a single contributor. 
 
1. All the reports from the 2008/2009 season were compared to the Individuals’ 
averaged reports from that season.  There were 33 good day reports from 14 
individuals and 23 near-miss reports from 16 people. 
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2. All the reports the 2009/2010 season (29 good day reports from 17 people 
and nine near-miss reports from eight people) were compared to the 
Individuals’ averaged reports from the 2008/2009 season. 
3. Participant 103 contributed 21.3% of the total number of reports so it was 
necessary to assess whether this high level of participation would skew the 
data set.  
a. For the 2009/2010 season, a comparison was made between: 
Participant 103 alone, the group including Participant 103, and the 
group without Participant 103. 
b. A further comparison was made using all the reports for both seasons.  
Participant 103 alone was compared to the group including Participant 
103. 
c. A final comparison was completed using Participant 103’s average 
over both seasons compared to Averaged Individuals (without 
Participant 103) over both seasons 08/09 and 09/10. 
4. The individuals’ averaged reports from the 2008/2009 season were compared 
to the individuals’ averaged reports from the 2009/2010 season. 
5. The final comparison was to look at an average of all the reports from both 
seasons as compared to an average of all the reports using averaged 
individuals. 
a. This final comparison also allows for a comparison between averaged 
good day reports with averaged near-miss reports.  
4.4.3.5.1	  Validity	  Check	  Results	  
1. The questions ‘Sources of Challenge’ and ‘Sources of Uncertainty’ had the 
greatest degree of variability in all five of the above comparisons.  
a. Within the ‘Sources of Challenge’ answers the ranking of the top 
three were consistent, however the percent weightings varied.  The 
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answers ranked fourth and fifth varied in many of the above five 
comparisons.   
b. Within the ‘Sources of Uncertainty’ answers both the rankings and 
percent weightings varied. 
2. Participant 103 was the most prolific contributor with 19 reports over the two 
seasons (14 good days, 5 near-misses). 
a. Compared to the Averaged individuals, with the exception of the two 
above-mentioned questions, all good day parameters were within one 
standard deviation.  As there were no extreme values, or outliers, in 
the data set, standard deviation was used to classify variance. 
b. Compared to the Averaged individuals, in addition to the two above-
mentioned questions, the near-miss parameters were within one 
standard deviation with the exception of The Intuitive-Analytical Mix 
and the Most Likely Consequence.  
i. On the Intuitive-Analytical parameter, Participant 103 was 
within two standard deviations.  
ii. On the Most Likely Consequence parameter, Participant 103 
was within two standard deviations. 
c. Compared to the Group without 103 (09/10) 
i. Near-misses – The intuitive response was toward a positive 
action for both P103 and the Group without P103. 
1. The Group without P103 had a stronger positive 
response with a smaller standard deviation.  P103 had a 
stronger intuitive response, but it was split between 
strong positive and strong negative responses, while 
the rest of the group tended toward moderate positives. 




 This study adhered to The University of Edinburgh and Thompson Rivers 
University - Research on Human Subjects Ethics Policies, which identified several 
key issues for consideration.  The primary issue was the confidentiality of participant 
contributions. 
See Appendix 4 for the Informed Consent document. 
4.5.1	  Confidentiality	  
 All potential participants were informed of the ethical principles of research 
on human subjects.  As there was the potential for reputations to be impacted through 
contributions to the study, it was essential for the researcher to ensure complete 
confidentiality for all participants.  To ensure the integrity of the data and to maintain 
confidentiality for the participants, the questionnaire webpage was password 
protected and required a user ID. 
 The names of the participants and the companies that they worked for have 
not been used in the document to protect the confidential nature of near-miss 
reporting.  Individuals or companies that wished to be credited for their contributions 
to the research have been identified as such.  No individuals or companies have been 
linked with any specific incidents in the published results.  Identifying information 
such as locations, run names and group size were not included in the results.  
Information was stored in a password protected electronic file.  Raw physical data 
(questionnaires) were kept in a locked file box, until they were incorporated into the 
analysis at which time they were shredded.  Only the research team had access to the 
data. 
 Participation in this study was by invitation and was in no way linked to 
professional performance, conduct, or employment reviews.  This study was 
completely independent of all job related formative feedback and summative 
evaluation. 
4.6	  Summary	  
 This chapter described both the theoretical origins of the research 
methodology and placed the research problem within an appropriate research 
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paradigm.  It has linked the problem with specific methods and justified those 
methods within the operational context of mechanized ski guiding.  The importance 
of recognizing the role of the researcher within the research has also been addressed. 
 As described in the literature review, the characteristics of the decision-
making environment played a key role both in the long-term development of 
intuition and the significance attributed to intuition in the solution of a current 
challenge.  It was the intent of this research to generate greater understanding of this 
phenomenon.  This was a pragmatic question, with not only the need to address the 
significant logistical complexities in the mechanized ski industry, but also the 
potential for lives to be saved.  The specific mixed methods described in this chapter 
generated understanding through triangulation.  This chapter set the foundation upon 
which the next chapters on analysis and discussion of results were based. 
 A testing out research strategy was used to find the limits of previous 
generalizations made in other fields.  The Judgement and Decision-making literature, 
particularly the theories generated by the heuristics and biases researchers and the 
naturalistic decision-making researchers, was used to analyse whether the ski guiding 
environment was any different from other risk-based decision environments. 
 Mixed methods were used to analyse three data sources:  
  1. A web-based questionnaire on background experience, was  
  completed by each participant, 
  2. A web-based questionnaire, which allowed for multiple event  
  reports of both good days and near-miss days, and  
  3. Interviews and focus groups.  
 The data were contributed over two seasons, 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 by a 
self-selected group of 32 heli-ski and snowcat-ski guides working in British 
Columbia.  A quantitative analysis of the participants’ background experience and 89 
event reports (57 good day reports and 32 near-miss reports) was used to provoke 
questions of the qualitative data from the interviews and the descriptive prose within 
the event reports.  Some participants were more prolific in their event reporting than 
others.  The highest number of reports from a single individual was nineteen and the 
lowest was one.  The average of each individual’s event report(s) created a single set 
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of data points.  These averaged individuals were then combined to generate 
group averages and annual averages. 
 Although the quantitative data was generated from arguably a statistically 
marginal number of research participants and reports, its analysis provided cues from 
which to query the qualitative data.  The intent of the experience profile was not to 
compare a range of expertise to decision responses.  The intent of the study was to 
examine expert responses, thus the intent of the experience profile was to show that 
the participants were, by and large, experts.  Valuable insight was gained through 
this two-stage analysis.  A number of trends were evident within the quantitative 
data, which although not in themselves statistically significant, prompted further 
questions of the interview responses and descriptive questionnaire responses. 
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Chapter	  5	  Results:	  Expertise	  and	  the	  Link	  to	  Intuition	  
5.1	  Introduction	  
 As described in the methods chapter, the empirical basis of this thesis 
comprised three studies.  However, rather than presenting findings and discussion of 
each study in its own chapter, the results of my data analysis are presented in a 
theme-based approach.  By utilizing this approach to the presentation and subsequent 
analysis of the data, I illustrate the connections between the various data sources 
generated through mixed methods data collection.  In this first results chapter, I 
describe the results of a quantitative analysis of the two questionnaires, with the 
analysis focusing primarily on the role of expertise in ski-guides’ decision-making.  
In particular, I begin by evaluating and rating the participants’ expertise based on 
responses to the Background Experience Questionnaire.  After this I present the 
results from the good day and near-miss event reports.  I conclude with an 
examination of if and how these reports differed as a function of expertise.  
 Although it might be intuitively gratifying to believe in the strength of an 
argument based on a small sample size, it would be no more than wishful thinking to 
believe that the power of the study would be sufficient to produce publishable results 
based on the quantitative results alone (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971).  As my sample 
size was small, I generated a stronger argument by using descriptive statistics as a 
launching pad for the qualitative investigation.  As the inherently low statistical 
power of my study would have needed to be compensated by a large effect size, 
basing my argument solely on the results of my statistical analysis lacked both 
strength and weight (Maxwell, Kelley, & Rausch, 2008).  
5.2	  Background	  Experience	  Questionnaire	  	  
5.2.1	  Introduction	  
 Thirty participants completed the Background Experience profile (Appendix 
5).  As described in the methodology chapter, the intent of the background 
experience questionnaire was to elicit information that could be used to generate an 
expression of each participant’s degree of expertise.  The elements considered in the 
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estimation of participant expertise included: level of certification, depth and 
breadth of professional practice, dedicated deliberate practice in the form of 
continued professional development, and subjective self-evaluations. 
5.2.2	  Objective	  Depth	  of	  Expertise	  	  
 The certification process to become a ski guide is very rigorous.  Extensive 
personal experience in the form of deliberate practice is needed to apply for entry 
into the guide training process.  Success at both the aspirant and full guide exams 
demands considerable expertise and on-going deliberate practice.  The Canadian 
Mountain and Ski Guide Program requirements for entry into the Ski Guide Training 
courses suggest that a minimum of five years of personal experience is needed prior 
to application.  Applicants must provide evidence of experience through a ski 
resume.  As entry to the program is competitive, the actual level of experience often 
far exceeds the listed criteria.   
• 15 backcountry tours of 1-2 days in high alpine or glaciated terrain 
• 2 backcountry tours of five-days or longer in remote, glaciated terrain (non-
hut based) 
• 5 backcountry tours of three to five-days or longer in remote glaciated terrain 
(may be hut based) 
• 5 peaks requiring mountaineering skills, climbed during ski tours 
• Notable backcountry descents 
• Relevant summer mountaineering experience 
• A total of 3 or more years of experience in a variety of snow climates 
• References that can vouch for your backcountry experience resume  
  
 Participants were asked to estimate the number of weeks of work that they 
had completed over their guiding career.  Three different areas of work were 
distinguished: heli-ski and snowcat guiding, ski tour guiding, and avalanche control.  
A ‘week’ of work is the standard unit of measurement for the commercial ski guiding 
industry, and it may range from five to seven days of actual guiding time with guests.  
The participants also listed the average number of days that they had participated in 
continued professional development (CPD) activities over each of the previous three 
each years.  
 In order to derive the final variables, I had to make certain assumptions; 
assumptions designed to generate a conservative estimation of the actual hours of 
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experience.  This conservatism would serve to counteract potential self-
enhancement biases in self-reported measures of expertise (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 
2004). 
 In particular, the assumption regarding work hours was that a guide would 
have worked eight hours per day and six days per week.  Although it could be argued 
that a guide’s work day begins at 0600 hours (e.g., weather observations) and 
extends past 2300 hours (e.g., guest socialization), the amount of time dedicated to 
guiding decisions could be considered to be eight to ten hours, based a 0700 morning 
guide’s meeting and a 1630 evening guide’s meeting.  Workplace regulations in 
British Columbia state that workers cannot commit to excessive hours to the point 
that their health is compromised.  Excessive, however, is not defined (Workrights.ca, 
2011).  So long guiding days are the norm in the industry. 
 The CPD hours were calculated based on the number of CPD days per season 
multiplied by the number of seasons.  The assumption was that a CPD day would 
have been eight hours.  The final number of CPD hours was less well defined as the 
calculation was based on an average number of reported CPD days per season, over 
the previous three years.  
I based the final ‘Depth of Expertise’ variable on the sum of “work hours” 
and “CPD hours” where:  
Work Hours = (Number of Seasons) x (Number of Weeks) x (6 Days) x (8 
hours/day)  
CPD Hours = (Number of Seasons) x (Number of Days) x (8 hours/day) 
 As discussed in the literature review, one of the underlying principles in the 
determination of expertise was the concept of deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 
1993).  Although this may be easy to determine when evaluating musicians’ 
expertise (e.g. the number of hours of preparation), it may be harder to do with 
guides.  A recreational day of skiing in avalanche terrain may generate increased 
expertise in relation to terrain use and, as such, it might be considered deliberate 
practice; however it would not be a professional guiding day, with all of the 
additional considerations linked to conducting guests through the terrain.   
The calculation of expertise did not include recreational hours spent in 
avalanche terrain.  Participants were not asked to supply their number of recreational 
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days as typically these days may not be recorded and would be more difficult to 
document.  However, it should be acknowledged that recreational ski days likely 
contribute to the generation of some elements of ski guiding expertise.  As such, the 
‘objective’ measure of expertise used in this study can only be used as a general 
guideline.  
 There were twenty-five profiles with sufficient information to generate the 
depth-of-experience calculation.  The observed depth of expertise ranged from a low 
of 584 to a high of 23,600.  The average was 8,956 hours (SD = 5244).  Table 9 
shows the calculation for a sample participant.  
Table	  9	  Example	  of	  the	  depth	  of	  expertise	  calculation	  for	  Participant	  714	  
 For 12 of his 20 years, the participant worked 20 weeks of heli-skiing and 
two weeks of ski touring.  For three years he worked 18 weeks of heli-skiing and 
four weeks of ski touring, and for five years he worked 15 weeks of heli-skiing.  This 
participant did not work in avalanche control separate from his work as a ski guide.  
The full spread sheet with the calculations for all participants is Appendix 7.  
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5.2.3	  Objective	  Breadth	  of	  Expertise	  
 Breadth of expertise comprised two criteria: the physical location and the 
operational context, the latter of which was a function of the dynamics of the ski 
program (e.g. physical scale of the operation) and the expertise of the guiding team.  
Of the two, the physical location was theoretically perhaps, the greater contributor to 
the development of expertise breadth, as all heli-ski and snowcat-ski companies have 
defined areas of operation or tenures.  The operational context was discussed in 
Chapter Two.  Given the spatial variation of snowpack characteristics, I am 
suggesting that each area of operation is unique.  There are degrees of variation 
within this premise, however, as two neighbouring areas will be more alike than two 
distant operations (Hägeli, 2005). 
5.2.4	  Objective	  Integration	  of	  Breadth	  and	  Depth	  of	  Expertise	  
 The intersection of the participants’ depth and breadth of experience can be 
seen in a simple scatter chart (Figure 11).  Although they were all certified guides 
and ‘experts’, this figure illustrates the variation in depth and breadth of experiences.  
For example, within the 16-20 years of experience group, the number of locations 
varied from one to ten.  One might surmise that the participant with 18 years of 
experience in a single area would know that area very well.  In contrast, the 
participant with 18 years of experience in ten different locations would likely not 
know any one area as richly, but may have developed decision expertise that was 
able to adapt to new challenges more easily (Tozer et al., 2007). 
     
 
148 
Figure	  11	  Experience	  -­‐	  depth	  and	  breadth	  
 
5.2.5	  Correlation	  between	  Depth	  and	  Breadth	  of	  Experience	  with	  Hours	  of	  
Experience	  
 Galloway (2007) used the interaction between depth and breadth as a sub-
scale within his Outdoor Leader Experience Use History instrument in the 
determination of expertise.  Multiplying years of experience by the number of 
locations generated an indication of depth and breadth.  This was termed the 
Professional Environment.  I used Pearson’s correlation to see if there was a measure 
of association between this measure of expertise and the hours of experience 
calculation (Figure 12).  As the Hours of Experience calculation used the number of 
years of experience as a primary factor, a positive correlation was expected.  When 
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Figure	  12	  Breadth	  and	  depth	  of	  experience	  correlated	  to	  hours	  of	  experience	  -­‐	  All	  participants	  
 
5.2.6	  Subjective	  Expertise	  
 The subjective measure of expertise gave an additional perspective on the 
participants’ level of expertise.  In the first self-rated question (i.e. “Compared to 
other guides, rate your overall abilities as a decision maker”, where 1= very low and 
9 = very high) the average rating of the participants was 6.61 (SD = 1.16).  Nine 
participants rated themselves as Average-to-High (6) and thirteen rated themselves as 
High (7).  The participants perceived themselves to be highly expert, even in 
comparison to other experts. 
 A similar pattern was seen in the Risk Optimization question: participants 
perceived themselves as being very adept at balancing risk with reward.  Using the 
same scale of Very Low (1) to Very High (9), the average rating was 6.5 (SD = 1.2), 
with 15 participants rating themselves as High (7).  
 The third subjective-expertise question asked participants to rate themselves 
using four of Dreyfus’s (2004) five-stage Expertise Scale (Novice, Advanced 
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an option, as none of my participants would have fit this descriptor.  Most of the 
participants believed themselves to be either Expert (47%) or Proficient (37%).  
 There were two potential explanations for the finding that participants, on 
average, rated themselves as having higher abilities than an average guide.  The first 
was that this group of participants was not a random sample of the larger ski guide 
population and, given their positions within the industry and levels of expertise as 
described above, they indeed may have been better at decision-making and risk 
optimization.  This explanation, however, was unlikely, as there was no evidence to 
suggest that the participants in the sample group were not typical of ski guides in the 
larger population.  The more likely possibility was supported by research in other 
areas.   Studies have demonstrated that people overestimate their skills in relation to 
others, such that more than 50% of a sample will report themselves as being ‘above 
average’ (Hoorens 1995).  This of course is a statistical impossibility.  It has been 
argued that this ‘above-average effect’ is largely due to a lack of information about 
how others perform, a lack of personal feedback and an element of motivational bias 
as the results consistently trend toward an overestimation of skills (Dunning et al., 
2004). 
5.2.7	  Relationship	  between	  Objective	  and	  Subjective	  Measures	  of	  Expertise	  
 To assess the degree to which the subjective measures revealed anything 
objective about participants’ levels of expertise, I performed several bivariate 
(simple) correlations between the two classes of measures.  With a sample size of 25 
and using 0.05 alpha level, results for a one-tailed test were considered significant 
when |r| > 0.337 (Price, 2000). 
 Field and Gillett (2010) list the Pearson correlation coefficient, r as one of the 
most common measures of effect size.  It can be used to express both the strength 
and direction of the relationship between two variables, as well as the strength of an 
experimental effect.  Cohen (1992) suggests the following interpretation of effect 
sizes: a small effect is when r=0.10; a medium effect is when r=0.30; and a large 
effect is when r=0.50.  Field and Gillett (2010) recommend using the Pearson 
correlation coefficient as it is generally well understood.  My research was based on 
a small non-random sample.  Similar to a case study, the effect size should only be 
     
 
151 
considered as an estimation when extrapolated to the larger population of ski 
guides (Field, 2005a, 2005b). 
5.2.7.1	  Relationship	  between	  Hours	  of	  Expertise	  and	  Self-­‐reported	  Expertise	  
 All three subjective measures of expertise (self-reported abilities as a decision 
maker, self-rated risk optimization skills and self-rated level of expertise) showed a 
significant, positive correlation with hours of expertise (Table 10).  With increasing 
hours of expertise, participants perceived themselves to have enhanced decision-
making abilities, better risk-optimization skills, and a higher level of expertise. 
Table	  10	  Hours	  of	  expertise	  correlations	  with	  self-­‐reported	  expertise	  
r Hours of 
Expertise 
Self-reported Decision-making 0.502 
Self-reported Risk Optimization 0.456 
Self-reported Proficiency 0.514 
5.2.7.2	  Relationship	  between	  Self-­‐reported	  Expertise	  and	  CPD	  	  
 The correlation between subjective expertise and participation in Continued 
Professional Development activities across the last three years was negative (Table 
11).  With increased self-perceived expertise, CPD went down.  Once guides 
complete the certification process, there may be a reduced drive to engage in 
deliberate practice.  Another possible explanation for this finding is that more 
experienced guides rate themselves higher in their decision-making and risk 
management abilities and feel less of a need to have recently engaged in professional 
development.  Evidence in support of this interpretation is the finding that hours of 
expertise and CPD activities were also negatively correlated (r = -0.393); that is, the 
greater the number of hours, and the fewer the CPD activities. 
Table	  11	  Continued	  Professional	  Development	  correlations	  with	  self-­‐reported	  expertise	  
r CPD 
Self-reported Decision-making -0.449 
Self-reported Risk Optimization -0.207 
Self-reported Proficiency -0.396 




 As noted earlier a common benchmark for defining an expert is 10,000 hours 
of deliberate practice (Ericsson, 1996).  The 30 participants who contributed to this 
research had an average of 8,956 hours experience (work and CPD combined), which 
approached the 10,000-hour benchmark of practicing the profession of ski guiding.  
This would include avalanche hazard forecasting, risk assessment, terrain selection, 
guest management and emergency management.  Again, the data set did not include 
the number of recreational hours spent in avalanche terrain.  This would have added 
significantly to the participants’ totals. 
 It is important to recognize, however, that 10,000 hours of experience by 
itself does not make an expert.  When put on a continuum, experiences could be 
considered relatively empty to relatively full, with full experiences maximizing the 
learning potential inherent within a given situation.  Top levels of performance have 
not been attributed only to years of experience, but also to years of deliberate and 
intense practice aimed at continual improvement (Ericsson et al., 1993; Starkes et al., 
1996).  That is, the number of days or hours engaged in an activity cannot be used as 
the sole measure of expertise as many people will simply repeat the same mistakes 
with little effort towards improvement (Weick, 2001).   
 Similarly, Vick (2002) argued that expertise was dependent on two integral 
elements: the size of the knowledge base and the speed at which it can be accessed.  
These two elements have also been called pattern recognition (Kass, Herschler, & 
Companion, 1991).  In the next section the participants’ good day and near-miss 
decisions were recorded and analysed.  The focus of this analysis was to link 
expertise with the use of intuition primarily through an examination of the role that 
pattern recognition played.  Klein’s (1998) research on fire-fighters supported the 
notion that the recognition of patterns would prime a decision response and form the 
basis for action.   
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5.3	  Expertise	  and	  the	  Decision	  Process	  in	  Daily	  Event	  Reports	  
5.3.1	  Introduction	  
 Participants contributed event reports for both good days and near-misses 
over the 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 winter seasons.  During this time, the 30 
participants completed 89 useable reports, 57 of which were good day reports and 32 
were near-miss reports.  There were seven reports (all from the first season) excluded 
from data analysis, as these participants merely indicated whether it was a good day 
or near-miss report, but did not answer any of the subsequent questions about the 
event.  I attribute these reports to a lack of participant familiarization with the web-
based questionnaire format of SurveyMonkey, as they learned how to use the tool.   
 Twenty-two people contributed 32 near-miss reports and 21 people 
contributed 57 good day reports.  The number of reports completed by a single 
participant varied from a high of 19 (14 good days and five near-misses), to a low of 
one (either a good day or a near-miss).  To ensure that the results represent 
‘participants in general’, rather than the perceptions of a single, frequently-reporting 
participant, all the reports from each participant were averaged within each of the 
good day and near-miss categories separately.  This produced a singular set of values 
for each individual.  For example, to reduce the reliance on the most prolific 
participant’s contributions, the results from his 14 good day reports were averaged, 
as were the results from his five near-miss reports.  If there was a tendency for him to 
be more or less intuitive in his decision responses, the weight of his responses 
counted as only one response.  This was done for all participants who contributed 
more than one good day or near-miss response.  
5.3.2	  Comparison	  between	  Near-­‐miss	  and	  Good	  day	  Reports	  -­‐	  Combined	  Seasons	  
 I compared the near-miss data and the good day data, to see if there was a 
difference in how the decisions were enacted; in particular, the extent to which the 
decision process was influenced by intuition and analysis.  
5.3.2.1	  Challenge	  and	  Uncertainty	  
 According to the participants, the greatest challenge for both good day and 
near-miss events was the forecasting of snowpack stability.  This may have been due 
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to the uncertainty that often arises from conflicting alternatives (Table 12).  
Answers to the open-ended question indicated that the most common conflicting 
alternatives were between a desire for good skiing and the avoidance of a severely 
negative outcome.  The open-ended questions have been analysed in detail in the 
next chapter.   
Table	  12	  Sources	  of	  challenge	  and	  uncertainty	  
 Near-misses  Good Days 
What made the day 
challenging? 
  
Snowpack stability 75.2% (SD=0.40) 81.9% (SD=0.31) 
Terrain variability 42.7% (SD=0.45) 56.5% (SD=0.44) 
Flying weather 31.7% (SD=0.45) 22.2% (SD=0.36) 
Changes through the day 28.6% (SD=0.42) 19.6% (SD=0.29) 
Skiing conditions 24.1% (SD=0.40) 38.1% (SD=0.36) 
Group dynamics-guests 24.1% (SD=0.37) 24.0% (SD=0.33) 
Source of uncertainty?   
Conflicting alternatives 38.1% (SD=0.42) 53.8% (SD=0.43) 
Not fully aware 32.8% (SD=0.41) 22.2% (SD=0.38) 
Incomplete information 25.9% (SD=0.41) 20.8% (SD=0.34) 
Other  19.1% (SD=0.34) 8.5% (SD=0.16) 
 
 Not surprisingly given the feedback inherent in a near-miss event, decision 
difficulty was perceived as being higher and decision quality perceived as lower, in 
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Table	  13	  Decision	  difficulty	  and	  quality	  
 Near-misses  Good Days  
Decision Difficulty  
(1=Very Easy, 
7= Very Difficult) 
M = 4.14 
SD = 1.24 
M = 3.65 
SD = 1.17 
Decision Quality  
(1=Not good enough,  
4 = Excellent)  
M = 2.28 
SD = 0.97 
M = 3.64 
SD = 0.37 
5.3.2.1.1	  Snowpack	  Stability	  
 According to the participants, completing the snow stability forecast was the 
greatest challenge of the day; for both seasons of data collection and regardless of 
whether the event was a near-miss or a good day.  The stability evaluation process 
was a task that the participants completed at the end of every day based on their field 
observations gathered throughout the day.  The evening evaluation formed the 
starting point for the stability forecasting process the following morning.   
 I was able to access the stability assessments generated by the participants 
and submitted to the InfoEx.  These site-specific assessments were used to generate 
context for the event reports.  An analysis of the outcome of the snow stability 
assessments showed that the average stability rating was in the ‘Fair’ range, or a 
three on a scale of 1-5, for both good days and near-misses (Table 15).  This made 
for an easier comparison between good day events and near-miss events, as the 
snowpack stability is a major variable in the decision process.  If the participants had 
contributed good day event reports on days when the stability had been good to very 
good and near-miss event reports when the stability had been poor to very poor, a 
comparison of the decision process would have been much more complicated.  The 
participants had been asked to provide good day reports on days that they felt 
provided some level of challenge.  The fact that the stability ratings were consistent 
between good days and near-miss events shows that this happened.  
 The Canadian stability rating scale was used with ratings for three elevation 
bands: Alpine, Treeline and Below Treeline (where 1 = Very Good and 5 = Very 
Poor).  As the participants did not provide information as to the specific elevation 
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range where they had been for a particular event report, it was necessary to 
convert the three elevation band ratings to a single rating.  (Appendix 8 – Calculation 
of Stability Number Based on Three Elevation Bands).  Additional information that 
was available in most of the InfoEx reports, which provided further insight into the 
decision process, was the indication of whether a persistent weak layer (PWL) was a 
factor in the snowpack analysis and whether there had been any skier triggering of 
avalanches.  The information in Table 14 came from the InfoEx and has been 
grouped based on the two data collection seasons and sub-divided based on good day 
and near-miss reports.  It shows the average stability rating for each of the sub-
groups.  In addition, it shows how often persistent weak layers, skier accidental 
triggered avalanches and skier-controlled avalanches were reported in the InfoEx on 
days when participants reported good days or near-misses. 
Table	  14	  InfoEx	  -­‐	  stability,	  snowpack	  and	  skier	  triggerability	  
Season Stability Number of 
Reports 
Reports w/ a PWL Reports w/ Sa Sc 
0809 GD 2.8 29 11 9 
0809 NM 2.9 23 15 11 
0910 GD 3.0 31 24 20 
0910 NM 3.1 9 4 4 
Totals  92 54 44 
Note: PWL = persistent weak layer, Sa = avalanche triggered accidentally by a skier, Sc = avalanche 
triggered deliberately by a skier. 
 The presence of these two factors in the InfoEx reports was useful, because 
participants subjectively described them in the interviews (presented in the next two 
chapters).  The presence of a persistent weak layer emerged as one of the qualitative 
data codes and contributed to the central theme – ‘Impact of the environment’.  Skier 
triggering of an avalanche factored into the likelihood and consequence aspect of the 
decision and was discussed as part of a number of the qualitative data codes 
including ‘Terrain Selection’ and ‘Surprised by Events’.  'Skier triggering' was 
central to the two themes, Environment and Future Decisions, which provided the 
bookends, or the beginning and end of the decision process, for the qualitative 
analysis as described in the next chapter. 
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5.3.2.2	  Intuitive	  Analytical	  Continuum	  
 Participants rated their decisions on a continuum, with intuition at one end 
and analysis at the other.  The scale midpoint (3) was labelled as representing an 
even mix of intuition and analysis.  This allowed the participants to indicate a blend 
of decision response processes.  The analysis showed that no decisions were rated as 
being fully analytical (5).  The primary decisions involved some level of intuition, 
with four of the 89 rated as fully intuitive (1).  The intuitive-analytical ratings for 
near-misses and for good days were slightly intuitive (Table 15).  The participants 
rated their intuitive responses on a 7-point continuum in terms strength and direction, 
with strongly positive at one end (1) and strongly negative (7) at the other.  The 
middle ground (4) was neutral.  The mean for both good days and near-miss days 
was slightly positive.  Taking this one step further, the strength of the intuitive 
response was isolated.  The mean for both categories was about ‘2’, or moderately 
strong.  
Table	  15	  Near-­‐miss	  and	  Good	  Day	  -­‐	  Use	  of	  intuition	  
 Near-misses  Good Days  
Decision Intuitive-Analytical mix  
(1 = Intuitive,  
5 = Analytical) 
M = 2.82 
SD = 0.52 
M = 2.85 
SD = 0.66 
Strength & direction of intuition  
(1 = Strong Positive,  
7 = Strong Negative) 
M = 3.77 
SD = 1.99 
M = 3.82 
SD = 1.93 
Strength of Intuition  
(1 = Weak,  
3 = Strong) 
M = 1.97 
SD = 0.61 
M = 2.03 
SD = 0.51 
If intuition-analysis conflict, how easy 
to choose which one?  
(1 = Very easy, 
5 = Very hard) 
M = 2.67 
SD = 0.75 
M = 2.43 
SD = 0.67 
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5.3.2.3	  Direction	  of	  Intuitive	  Response	  	  
 The intuitive response was analysed with regard to whether it promoted 
feelings to do something (positive or good feeling), or to avoid doing something 
(negative or bad feeling).  I did not use the averaged individual results in this 
situation.  I treated every report as a data point, as the use of the averaged individual 
scores for this variable would mask the implications of the degree to which intuition 
was used.  For example, Participant 103 provided 14 good day reports.  He had an 
almost even balance of positive and negative responses.  When comparing his reports 
of negative intuitive responses to his positive intuitive responses, he had two more 
negative responses than positive ones.  His net score was -2. 
 Overall, participants reported more positive intuitive responses than negative 
responses by a 1.7:1 ratio on good days and a 1.6:1 ratio on near-miss days (Table 
16).  A positive intuitive response was given a weighting of +1 and a negative 
intuitive response was given a weighting of -1.  The open-ended responses to this 
question have been analysed in detail in Chapter Seven.  There was a noticeable 
difference between the pattern of results from the event reports and those obtained 
from the interviews (to anticipate: the interview participants described how the 
negative intuitive response was far more significant to them, yet in their quantitative 
ratings, they indicated that the positive intuitive responses occur more frequently).  
Table	  16	  Good	  Day	  and	  Near-­‐miss	  -­‐	  positive	  and	  negative	  feelings	  
 Positive Neutral Negative Ratio 
Weighting 1 0 -1  
Number of Good 
Day Reports 32 2 19 1.7:1 
Number of Near-
miss Reports 16 3 10 1.6:1 
5.3.2.4	  Use	  of	  intuition	  on	  Good	  days	  compared	  to	  Near-­‐miss	  Days	  
 Thirteen participants provided both good days and near-miss reports and 
completed the experience questionnaire.  There was a weak positive correlation 
between their use of intuition on good days and on near-miss days (r = 0.32).  This 
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shows some degree of consistency in the use of intuition, regardless of the 
outcome of the decision. 
5.3.2.5	  Decision	  Confidence	  
 The participants rated their decision confidence both pre and post-event.  The 
average self-rated pre-event confidence for both near-miss and good day reports was 
in the 80-89% bracket (very confident) (Table 17).  This appeared to conflict with 
the subjective comments from the questionnaires and the interviews where the 
participants described a decision environment fraught with variables that did not 
match previous patterns.  As the reports were done retrospectively, the rating of pre-
event confidence was likely influence by the decision outcome.  Confidence has been 
discussed further in relation to consequence and likelihood in Chapters Six and 
Eight. 
Table	  17	  Decision	  confidence	  
 Near-misses  Good Days  
Decision Confidence prior to 
decision  
1 = 100% - Completely Sure 
2 = 90-99% - Highly Confident 
3 = 80-89% - Very Confident 
4 = 65-79% - Moderately Confident 
5 = 50-64% - Educated Guess 
6 = 50/50 – Just Guessing 
M = 3.29 
SD = 0.93 
M = 3.00 
SD = 0.78 
Decision Confidence at end of day  
(1 = 100% confident, 
6 = 50/50 guess) 
M = 3.97 
SD = 1.40 
M = 2.06 
SD = 0.76 
 Not surprisingly, post-event confidence went up after a good day and down 
after a near-miss.  Post-event confidence may have been influenced by the feedback 
inherent within the outcome.  That is, the most obvious feedback was whether the 
participants perceived the event as a near-miss.  The perception of the occurrence of 
a near-miss had an immediate effect on decision confidence.  Confidence went down 
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when a decision event was perceived as a near-miss and went up when it was not 
perceived as a near-miss.  A second level of feedback came from fellow guides.  The 
average feedback received from others at the end of the day was ‘some moderate 
quality feedback’.  The feedback quality was perceived to be slightly higher on good 
days (Table 18). 
Table	  18	  Decision	  feedback	  
 Near-misses  Good Days  
Quantity of feedback  
(1 = None, 
3 = Some, 
5 = Extensive) 
M = 2.96 
SD = 0.89 
M = 3.19 
SD = 0.69 
Quality of feedback  
(1 = Low, 
3 = Moderate, 
5 = High) 
M = 2.95 
SD = 1.36 
M = 3.42 
SD = 0.81 
5.3.3	  The	  Relationship	  between	  Expertise	  and	  Decision-­‐making	  
 In this section I examined the relationship between expertise and decision 
responses in order to analyse the impact of five aspects of the participants’ decision 
strategies.  Expertise was represented by 'hours of expertise' and the event reports 
provided the decision data.  The primary focus was the impact that expertise had on 
the use of dual process decision-making, particularly the intuitive-analytical 
continuum.  This was followed by an investigation of how expertise related to the 
strength and direction of the intuitive response expressed as feelings or somatic 
markers.  I also examined how pre- and post-event confidence changed, based on the 
level of expertise.  Lastly I analysed the role of expertise in perceptions of how 
consequence and luck influenced the decision process.   
5.3.3.1	  Correlation	  between	  Expertise	  and	  the	  Intuitive	  -­‐	  Analytical	  Mix	  
 Participants rated their relative use of intuition and analysis using Hammond 
and Summers’ cognitive continuum (1972).  I used the Pearson correlation to 
measure the association between expertise and the intuitive-analytical continuum.  
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On good days, as expertise increased, so did the use of intuition (r = - 0.26), 
albeit somewhat weakly.  When near-misses were reported the correlation was 
slightly stronger (r = - 0.39). 
5.3.3.2	  Correlation	  between	  Expertise	  and	  Strength	  and	  Direction	  of	  Intuition	  
 A similar pattern was noted when the strength and direction of intuitive 
response was correlated to expertise.  With increasing expertise, self-reported use of 
intuition became stronger and more positive (the feeling to do something).  This 
correlation between expertise and strength/direction was somewhat stronger for near-
miss days (r = 0.38) than good days (r = 0.30). 
5.3.3.3	  Correlation	  between	  Expertise	  and	  Confidence	  
 Confidence was expressed on a scale from 100% (given a ranking of 1) to 
50/50 (given a ranking of 6).  There appeared to be a weak relationship between 
expertise and confidence prior to a good day and after a near-miss.  Levels of 
confidence prior to a good day decision had a weak positive correlation to the 
measures of expertise (Table 19).  After a near-miss there was a slightly stronger 
negative correlation.   
 Participants with lower levels of expertise had a greater drop in their 
confidence.  The occurrence of a near-miss appeared to have less of an effect on the 
more experienced participants, perhaps because they have had a greater history of 
near-misses and subsequent opportunity to learn from those near-misses.  This is 
consistent with Shanteau’s findings (1992). 
Table	  19	  Hours	  of	  expertise	  correlations	  with	  decision	  confidence	  
r Hours of Expertise 
Good Day Confidence – prior to event  0.252 
Good Day Confidence – post event  -0.033 
Near-miss Confidence – prior to event  0.117 
Near-miss Confidence – post event  -0.321 
5.3.3.4	  Correlation	  between	  Expertise	  and	  Consequence	  
 Participants typically viewed their decision environment as having the 
potential for serious and occasionally fatal consequences.  On both good days and 
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near-miss days, the most likely consequence of a poor decision was an injury to a 
guest or guide (Table 20).  The most likely consequence scale does not have equal 
severity increments between options.  It reflects the reality of the possible 
consequences.  There is no equal distance between dead and alive.  
Table	  20	  Decision	  consequence	  and	  luck	  
 Near-misses  Good Days 
Most likely consequence  
1 = Loss of time 
2 = Increased cost to the operation 
3 = Loss or damage to equipment 
4 = Injury 
5 = Fatality 
M = 4.20 
SD = 0.48 
M = 3.89 
SD = 0.73 
How lucky were you today?  
1 = Not at all, 
2 = A little, 
3 = Some, 
4 = Very, 
5 = Incredibly 
M = 3.41 
SD = 0.98 
M = 1.93 
SD = 0.55 
 
 In contrast to the previous three correlations, multiple measures of expertise 
were used in the exploration of the measure of association between consequence and 
expertise.  I found that the correlation between consequence and expertise was 
different when I used objective, as opposed to subjective measures of expertise.  The 
objective (hours of expertise) measure showed a weak positive correlation with the 
perceived consequences on both good days and near-miss days (Table 21).  
However, subjective (self-rated) expertise, particularly self-perceived risk 
optimization skills, showed a negative correlation. Specifically on good days, 
participants who rated themselves as having had better risk optimization skills 
perceived lesser consequences. 
 
     
 
163 
Table	  21	  Good	  Day	  and	  Near-­‐miss	  consequence	  correlations	  with	  expertise	  
r Near-miss Consequence Good Day Consequence 







Self-rated Proficiency -0.236 -0.198 
5.3.3.5	  Correlation	  between	  Expertise	  and	  Luck	  
 On good days, more experienced participants were less inclined to attribute 
the outcome of the day to luck (Table 22).  Level of expertise did not correlate 
however, with the degree to which luck was considered a factor when a near-miss 
occurred. 
Table	  22	  Hours	  of	  expertise	  correlations	  with	  Good	  Day	  and	  Near-­‐miss	  luck	  
r Hours of Expertise 
Good Day Luck and Hours of Expertise -0.393 
Near-miss Luck and Hours of Expertise -0.066 
5.4	  Summary	  
 In this chapter, I presented the quantitative data from the Background 
Experience Profile and the Event Report Questionnaires.  I used the information 
provided in the Background Experience Profile to generate expertise profiles for the 
participants.  I analysed the event reports with regard to differences between good 
days and near-miss days.  In the final stage of my analysis, I examined how expertise 
related to the decisions made on both good and near-miss days.  Expertise played a 
role in some, but not all of the decision parameters.  Intuition was used to some 
extent in most decisions and was increasingly used by participants with higher levels 
of expertise.  This relationship is analysed and discussed further in the next three 
chapters.  
 The quantitative analysis of my data provided clues for me to investigate 
though a more detailed qualitative investigation.  The quantitative expertise data 
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merely suggests that the participants in my sample population have high levels of 
expertise.  This was used as a starting point for the process of coding and the 
generation of themes.  Drinkwater (2008) concludes that equating statistical 
significance with value or worth is not necessarily the only way that research can 
contribute to the development of knowledge.  
 The primary result of interest was how and when ski guides used their 
intuition.  Avalanche professionals have been trained in the use of an analytical 
process in the forecasting of avalanche hazard.  This process has been well defined 
and is widely used.  Less well understood in the industry is the role that intuition 
plays.  It was clear from the results that the participants usually used some element of 
intuition in their decision process.  Based on the question format in the event report 
questionnaire, participants reported regular use of a 50/50 mix of intuition and 
analysis.  The intuitive – analytical interaction is discussed further in the next three 
chapters.  In Chapter Seven, it is analysed in relation to dual-process models rather 
than as a continuum.  The analysis of how intuition was used prompted a question for 
future research, as the method of how intuition is fostered and developed has not 
clearly been addressed in the avalanche or mountain guide training programs. 
 Across a wide range of judgement and decision-making literature, there has 
been support for the notion that as expertise develops there is a corresponding 
increase in the ability to generate a more sophisticated and nuanced intuitive 
response (Benner, 1984; Dreyfus, 2004; Easen & Wilcockson, 1996; Hogarth, 2008; 
King, 2002).  The pattern of self-reported, increased intuition use by the participants 
in this study had a weak positive correlation with an increased level of expertise.  
Minor variations were observed, which were likely due to the challenge of 
calculating expertise.    
 The general parameter that has been widely used in the calculation of 
expertise is a simple calculation of the number of years of experience.  However 
Klein (1993) suggested the use of a more sophisticated analysis, so for this study on 
ski guides I used a more nuanced measurement to contribute to the explanation, 
which included a combination of years of experience, number of locations worked at, 
and engagement in continued professional development.  I attempted to strike a 
balance between simplistic and complex methods of expertise calculation.  
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 With 32 near-miss reports and 57 good day reports there were sufficient 
data to make a comparison between days when near-misses occurred and days when 
they did not.  The evidence was strong enough to suggest differences between good 
days and near-misses and to provoke further questions of the qualitative data.  
 Three key results that emerged in this chapter related to the intuitive 
analytical mix, decision confidence and feedback.  These issues have been addressed 
in the next three chapters, which focused on the analysis of the qualitative data and a 
discussion of the research question in relation to the literature.  In other words, the 
event reports provided a springboard for further analysis and subsequent discussion 
with participants.  It was an iterative process as the event reports triggered questions 
for the interviews: “what you mean by that and how does that actually play out”. 
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Chapter	  6	  Findings	  and	  Discussion	  -­‐	  Qualitative	  analysis	  of	  decision-­‐
making	  filters	  using	  event	  report	  questionnaires	  	  
6.1	  Introduction	  
 A significant ontological shift occurred in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, as I 
became the instrument of analysis.  In Chapter Six and Seven, I used the lens of 
expertise to expand on the analysis of the decision process through a qualitative 
analysis of the questionnaires’ open-ended responses and the first of two rounds of 
interviews.  The critical theme in Chapter Six was the influence of a variety of filters 
on the decision process.  The critical theme in Chapter Seven was the interaction 
between intuition and analysis, as described through actual decision events (good 
days and near-misses).  I used the results from Chapter Five to provoke questions in 
Chapters Six and Seven, in which I used a qualitative data analysis process (Seidel, 
1998) to generate a set of codes and themes based on the descriptive prose contained 
within the event reports and the first round of participant interviews.  The interview 
protocol can be found in Section 4.3.2.4.3 on pages 120-124. 
 I used HyperRESEARCH software to aid me in the task of analysing the 
qualitative data from the interviews and prose embedded within the participants’ 
event reports.  As explained in Chapter Four - Methodology, this research used both 
an inductive and deductive approach to coding.  Some of the codes were anticipated 
prior to the analysis while other codes emerged as data were analysed.  The data 
codes are introduced as they fit within the thematic discussion.   
 One of my primary goals was to gain more information on the extent to 
which intuition played a role in the decision process, so I asked related questions 
both in the event questionnaire and the interviews.  Generally the participants 
responded to this line of questioning, which allowed me to generate thick 
descriptions of the ski guide decision process (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003).  My 
interpretation off what the participants said about their intuitive responses formed the 
basis for an in-depth understanding.  
 An example of the interaction between the inductive and deductive approach 
to coding was that I had expected the codes of Environment and Impact of 
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Environment to have a relatively high frequency, however during the analysis of 
the reports and interviews, it became apparent that the data codes Terrain Selection 
and Wicked Environment were more appropriate.  
6.2	  Discussion	  of	  Codes	  
 I generated 41 codes.  They are listed in Table 23 as per their frequency of 
use.  The frequency of use was just one way to list the data codes and does not 
necessarily indicate their relative significance to the discussion.  The significance of 
each code is discussed as it appears within the explanation of the themes.  
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Table	  23	  Code	  frequencies	  
Code Name 
Frequency 
Number of Uses 
Terrain selection 60 
Expectations (Guests, self, peer, company) 53 
Feedback (Environment, peers) 51 
Intuitive response 41 
Surprised by events 33 
Near-miss 30 
Analytical response 27 
Wicked environment  24 
Guests following directions (or not) 19 
Margin for error 19 




Different winter (abnormal conditions) 13 
Teamwork 13 
Terrain Choices 12 
Intuitive confidence 11 
Snow stability 11 
Good Day 10 
Persistent Weak Layer 8 
Exploring new terrain 7 
Reflection on the events 7 
Analysis of data not enough 5 
Experience (as a mitigating factor) 5 
Avoid making hard decisions 4 
Development of intuition 4 
End of the day 4 
Guest complaints 4 
Age factor difference 3 
Calibration of decisions 3 
Committed to the line 3 
Communication 3 
False intuition 3 
Human factors 2 
Kind environment 2 
Feedback on intuition 2 
Familiarity 1 
Open to new ideas 1 
Environment 0 
Impact of environment 0 
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 Direct quotations from the qualitative data are used to illustrate the 
meaning of the codes.  The codes are a distilled description of the participants’ 
words.  Collectively, these descriptions were interpreted to form meaning for the 
code.  For example, ‘Expectations’ was one of the key codes that played into the 
participants’ decision-making.  Within this code, guest expectations figured 
prominently.  The guests’ expectations to ski more aggressive terrain were described 
by participants as difficult to deal with.  Participants expressed their perception of the 
guests’ aspirations for steep terrain in the following way.  “We had a great day even 
though I was under pressure to give the people more challenging terrain” (Participant 
305).  The pressure from the guests to ski steeper terrain was so strong that one 
participant described how he went against his intuitive feeling.  “My intuition was 
telling me to pick a mellower run, but due to the ability and keenness of the group I 
thought I would try to please them with a steeper, more extreme ski run” (Participant 
106). 
6.3	  Themes	  
 In the creation a narrative explanation of the ski guide’s decision process, I 
formed the coded passages into six themes.  The inter-rater provided feedback on the 
generation of the themes.  These themes were: Environment, Complexities, 
Uncertainty, Process, Outcomes and Future Decisions.  Table 24 displays the 
arrangement and interaction of the themes, codes and sub-codes.  The Theme Map 
(Figure 13) provides a graphic representation of how the codes fit and link within the 
themes and how the themes link together within the decision-making process.  
Themes have been initially discussed in isolation.  However each of these themes has 
a key connection with at least one of the other themes and this connection has been 
discussed.  The initial three themes, Environment, Complexities and Uncertainty are 
grouped together as they represent filters through which the participants approached 
the decision process.  They are discussed in this chapter and form the basis for the 
following chapter in which the decision process is analysed. 
 The three themes in the filter group represent the pre-conditions or modifying 
factors that influenced the decision process for the participants.  The Environment 
theme created the context and formed the basis for a set of underlying principles that 
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the participants typically followed.  The second theme included all the 
complexities that exacerbated the decision environment.  The final filtering theme 
explored the degree to which uncertainty increased the degree of challenge.  
Incomplete knowledge within the decision environment forced participants to 
continually adapt.  
 Teamwork (present/absent) and Guests (cooperative/uncooperative) are 
expressed as dichotomies as they are an ever-present aspect of the decision 
environment.  For example some guests may be cooperative while at the same time 
others may not. 
 Although a conservative decision alternative should likely be the first choice, 
it is not necessarily always selected.  Both guests and guides seek the thrill of 
adventure.  It is an integral part of the heli and snowcat experience.  With the higher 
than usual levels of uncertainty present during the 2008-2010 seasons, participants 
regularly expressed the desire to reduce exposure to avalanche hazard through 
conservative route selection. 
 




Table	  24	  Themes,	  codes	  and	  sub-­‐codes	  
Theme Code Code Code Code Code 









Complexities Teamwork Terrain 
Choices 








 Expectations Confidence Margin 
for Error 







     
Process Knowledge 
of snowpack 
Intuitive Analytical Terrain Margin 
for Error 















Outcome Expertise Near-miss Surprise Good Day Feed 
back 













    
 




Figure	  13	  Theme	  map	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6.3.1	  Environment	  Theme	  
 
 I used the environment theme as a starting point for analysis, as it was 
foundational to all subsequent themes.  It provided the context for both the decisions 
enacted and the analysis of those decisions.  Five codes contributed to the 
environment theme.  They included: the idea that the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 
winters were different from normal winters, the forecasting of snow stability, the 
existence of persistent weak layers, the potential consequences if caught in an 
avalanche, and the margin for error, or safety factor needed to maintain a prescribed 
risk envelope.  
6.3.1.1	  Different	  Winter	  
 The winter prior to the start of this study (2007/2008) was described as a very 
difficult winter for commercial ski guiding operations in British Columbia.  
Persistent instabilities forced guides into rethinking the decision processes as to how 
this challenge was managed (Piché, 2008).  However it paled in comparison to the 
following two winters, the winters of this study.  The acknowledgement that all three 
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of these winters were ‘different’ was an ever-present component of the 
participants’ decision processes.  The winters of 08-09 and 09-10 were different from 
‘normal’ winters and yet similar to each other in that they were both plagued by 
persistence deep weak layers.  However they were also different in that persistent 
weak layers formed by facet/crust combinations characterized the 08/09 season, 
whereas persistent weak layers formed by buried surface hoar characterized the 
09/10 season.  These two snowpack weaknesses are both notoriously hard to predict, 
but perform differently. 
 The forecasting team at the Canadian Avalanche Centre used the term “the 
new normal” (Klassen, 2010, p. 176) and summed up a mid-season warning with the 
suggestion that the avalanches that were occurring only happened once every 100 
years.  As such, no current avalanche practitioner had experienced the combination 
of snowpack and weather factors that were causing these events.   
 The number of skier triggered and the number of observed, naturally 
triggered avalanches from 2006 to 2010 within the InfoEx database provided an 
indicator of the challenge (Figure 14).  During the 2009-2010 season, skier-triggered 
avalanches (Sa – accidental, and Sc – controlled) were more than one standard 
deviation higher than the four-year average; whereas the number of observed natural 
avalanches (Na) during that season were almost one standard deviation below the 
four-year average (N=3680, Ave=4066, SD=433).  This is an indicator of the 
difficulty of the decision environment in 2009-2010.  InfoEx subscribers tended to 
get less environmental feedback in the form of natural avalanche activity and while 
at the same time more were caught in accidentally triggered avalanches (N=807, 
Ave=540, SD=161).  
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Figure	  14	  Number	  of	  avalanches	  reported	  in	  the	  InfoEx	  2006-­‐2010	  
 
(Sa - skier accidental, SC - skier controlled, Sr - skier remote, Na – natural) 
6.3.1.2	  Snow	  Stability	  
 The assessment and forecasting of snow stability is central to the occupation 
of ski guiding (Bruns, 1996).  Participants, as professional ski guides, had developed 
these skills over their careers, becoming highly proficient.  This competence is 
demonstrated through the relatively few avalanche fatalities experienced in the heli-
ski and snowcat-ski guiding industry as compared to recreational skiers and 
snowmobilers (Grissom, 2011).  
 Participant 311 described a typical guiding challenge as “To bring day skiing 
groups out in poor stability with limited terrain available after big storm”.  Research 
indicates that ski guides are highly skilled when it come to forecasting storm snow 
instabilities, but have greater troubles when it comes to forecasting the stability of 
persistent weak layers (Jamieson & Geldsetzer, 1999).  The challenge as described 
by Participant 103, came from trying to determine whether “…a deep instability was 
ripe for triggering”.  Atkins (2004), found that given the same stability rating, ski 
guides selected more conservative terrain when a PWL was present, compared to 
when a PWL was not present.   
 Research in other areas provides possible answers as to why.  In a study of 
optimal decision choice (Schul & Mayo, 2003), it was found that study participants 
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they knew that the decision rule worked, they thought they could do better by 
combining the access to more information and a greater use of intuitive thinking.  
Even though intuition might have been less trustworthy in an environment filled with 
uncertainty, copious amounts of information could be used to augment the analytical 
process. 
 Participant 104 stated, “The most important decision of the day was to open 
up a number of ski runs for guiding which had been closed to guiding for some time 
due to persistent instabilities”.  The difficulty in forecasting these instabilities over 
these two seasons was illustrated by the frequency that participants who were 
surprised by the extent of propagation of avalanches on persistent weak layers 
(PWL).  
6.3.1.3	  Consequences	  
 Consequences were directly related to the depth of a potential failure plane 
and the terrain into which the avalanche could run, with potential fatalities attributed 
to both asphyxiation and trauma (Boyd, Hägeli, Abu-Laban, Shuster, & Butt, 2009). 
Grímsdóttir and McClung (2004) found that ski guides considered potential 
consequences as the primary factor when selecting terrain.  The vulnerability of the 
element at risk also played a role.  For example a skier standing above a large cliff 
can be swept off the cliff by a relatively small avalanche, whereas a group of guests 
riding uphill in a snow cat may be unaffected by a larger avalanche.  Participant 103 
described being hit by a small avalanche that might not have caught him had he been 
moving.  “It was a small slope and a small slide.  If I were carrying speed instead of 
standing sideways when the avalanche triggered, I likely would have skied off it with 
no consequence.” 
 The most likely consequence reported in most of the near-miss events and 
many of the good day reports was injury to a guest or the guide.  Consequences with 
this level of severity were regularly accepted as a trade-off in the quest for better 
skiing.  “[I] chose to ski the untracked snow with my group, which is the line, 
exposed to the most overhead hazard” (Participant 404).  This was likely motivated 
by the risk – reward conundrum.  Participants had to decide whether the likelihood of 
a negative consequence was balanced by the possibility of better skiing.  
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One member of guiding team wanted to ski a particular run with unlikely, 
but potential overhead consequence (rated yellow).  Other group experienced 
a skier remote release on a different slope.  My role (decision) was to argue 
against the choice to ski under the potential risk (remote triggering).  We 
skied a different option.  Participant 103 
6.3.1.4	  Margin	  for	  Error	  
 The consequences of a release on a deep PWL were much more severe and 
played a direct role in the determination of how large a buffer was needed to avoid 
catastrophe.  In practice, participants anticipated that if they made a poor decision, it 
had a high likelihood of a severe injury, a fatality, or even multiple fatalities.  
Elements of the environment theme, specifically the snow stability and the presence 
of a PWL provided the initial indicators of how large the margin, or safety factor 
might need to be when terrain was chosen.  However this was modified by four 
codes contained within other themes.  Two codes within the Uncertainty theme, 
Expectations and Confidence, were consistently linked to the concept of the need to 
maintain an adequate safety margin.  Two codes within the Future Decisions theme, 
Reflection and Feedback, were also connected to the Margin for Error code.  
 The difficulty experienced by participants in the forecasting of the 
triggerability of persistent weak layers may have been exacerbated by a number of 
issues.  Participants might have been reluctant to acknowledge that their apparent 
command of large volumes of data did not provide a complete answer to the PWL 
question.  There were also questions as to the reliability of their intuitive response in 
this wicked environment.  The decision process is the focus of a theme in the next 
chapter and explores the intuitive – analytical interaction in the terrain selection 
process. 
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6.3.2	  Complexities	  Theme	  
 
 The complexities theme is a collection of codes that describe the need for a 
subtle and nuanced response to decision-making.  These complexities are partially to 
blame for reasons why expert decision-making in avalanche terrain has not been 
managed by rule-based protocols (Hägeli et al., 2006).  It also helps to explain why 
principle-based decision-making can accommodate this large range of contingencies.  
These complexities come from interactions with fellow guides, guests and the 
environment.  
 Teamwork was an important support structure that helped the participants to 
make better decisions and learn from those decisions.  Poor teamwork, or the 
absence of teamwork reduced feedback opportunities.  The implications of this are 
explored in the Future Decisions theme in the next chapter.   
 The guest interactions posed a complex human dynamic.  The participants 
expended considerable energy in the management of these dynamics.  Guests had 
expectations that may or may not have been realistic given the conditions.  
Participants described how they were careful in their communication strategies to 
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ensure that safety was not compromised.  Piché (2008) described how during the 
2007-2008 season guides gave up on trying to find fresh snow and ensured that they 
communicated the difficulty of finding safe terrain, let alone safe untracked terrain. 
 The final code within the complexities theme was linked to terrain choices.  
Participants described how they avoided some difficult decisions by choosing 
simpler terrain.  They recognized that they just did not need to go there.  At the other 
end of the terrain scale, some participants were working in terrain new to them and 
took on an exploratory approach to terrain decisions. 
6.3.2.1	  Teamwork	  
 The participants worked in a team environment for most if not all of the time.  
Virtually all mechanized ski companies operate with a minimum of two guides and 
can have up to twenty-five guides working together.  As described in Chapter Two, 
these guiding teams typically use a consensus style of group decision-making.  
Participants described events that were affected by both good teamwork and poor, or 
absence teamwork.  Good communication and shared common values amongst team 
members created a supportive group decision-making environment.  
Correspondingly, a lack of these characteristics has the potential to add considerable 
complexity to the decision process (Surowiecki, 2004).  
6.3.2.1.1	  Good	  Teamwork	  
 The synergy of effort in good teamwork contributed to a safe, efficient 
operation.  Participant 404 described her comfort level with a particular ski run 
because of the “confidence from the guide’s team about stability and little potential 
for remote triggering”.  Within the team setting, the participants’ abilities to give and 
receive feedback were highly valued.  “[I have] excellent trust in the human side of 
the boys I work with” (Participant 502). 
 Open discussions amongst the guiding team during the day provided the basis 
for collaborative decision-making efforts.  “Discussed run with junior guides at lunch 
and thought I'd go ahead and take a look, but decided to leave it alone today” 
(Participant 708).  “We did discuss it at our lunch guide meeting, seems a reasonable 
choice” (Participant 708). 
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6.3.2.1.2	  Poor	  or	  Missing	  Teamwork	  
 At times, teamwork was low quality or missing completely.  Participant 708 
described the team culture as playing a role.  “No implication to safety for the day so 
who really cares, implication only relates to the work place culture that may have 
long-term cultural implications” (Participant 708).  Participant 104 described in a 
near-miss report, how the absence of teamwork was a contributing factor.  “Lack of 
organization the day of [the event].  Lack of control over public/off duty staff on the 
mountain”.  
 Participant 106 described a near-miss event that occurred when a group of 
independent guides were working at a popular backcountry ski touring destination.  
These guides were not working together per se.  They had their own groups of guests 
and did not have a common company that they were all working for. 
Complete "brainfart" regarding working as a guiding team while working as 
an independent guide among them.  One group was triggering avalanches 
below Bow Hut.  Myself and a Mountain Guide thought, "wow" look at the 
natural activity going on across the valley near the moraines.  In actual fact, 
the group leaving the hut was triggering the slides at/or near the group.  If we 
were more on it, we would have raced down below the hut to see if the 
guide/group were OK, rather than dismissing it as "natural" activity and 
continuing on with our routes and plans.  
 The operational context was missing.  Had they been working together for the 
same company, they would have likely benefited from increased communication and 
expectations of teamwork. 
6.3.2.2	  Guests	  following	  directions	  
 The degree to which guests followed the directions, which the participating 
guides thought they had given, played a significant role in the complexity of the 
decision scenario.  A guest’s failure to follow the guide’s directions can be caused by 
poor communication or wilful disobedience. Grímsdóttir and McClung (2004) 
reported three possible explanations for guests not doing what the guide expected 
them to do: intentional disobedience, a lack of ability, and an inappropriate response 
to a warning.   Participant 103 described how a group of guests forgot or were unable 
to maintain the spacing that he had asked of them, with a near fatal consequence.  “It 
was decided to ski a run at wide spacing.  Group control was lost and skiers were 
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close together and on top of each other.  There were 2 simultaneous Sa 
[Accidental, skier triggered avalanche] 1.5 and 2.0 with one ride and partial burial”.  
6.3.2.2.1	  Cooperative	  Guests	  
 The importance of the guests being given clear directions, understanding 
those directions and following the directions was a critical element that linked to 
terrain choices.  This was particularly important when the safe terrain option was a 
narrow strip that threaded between potential trigger spots.  Participant 101 described 
the need for good “group management, and how they skied through tricky pieces of 
terrain”.  These guide – guest interactions were categorized as positive, promoting 
good cooperation, or negative, promoting a lack of cooperation.  The efficiency of 
the day was affected by the quality of communication between the guide and guests.  
Good communication led to cooperative guests and more skiing.  
I stopped early to tell them to stay on the ridge and not in the gully (gully 
feature is small and insignificant looking until it releases).  We skied the 
ridge and coming down to the bottom I looked over and saw 2m of debris 
beside me spilling out of the gully. Participant 702 
6.3.2.2.2	  Un-­‐cooperative	  Guests	  
 When the participants did not trust the guests to follow their directions, a 
more conservative line of descent was often the only recourse.  “In hindsight [I] 
remember questioning the ability of my group to maintain ‘the line’ as they were a 
weak group.  Don’t take it for granted that the group will do what I expect them to” 
(Participant 404). 
 A more conservative line often only served to make the situation worse when 
dealing with a guest who wanted to ski more aggressively.  “[There were a] few 
aggressive individuals who liked to push the limits of any restrictive instructions on 
how we planned to ski a run” (Participant 103).  Wilful disobedience can often be 
blamed on a lack of trust between the guide and guest.  A guest who sees a 
potentially enjoyable ski line outside of the guide’s safety parameter, may choose to 
ski that line if he feels that the guide is being too conservative.   
The guests were not completely cooperative in heading the warnings to ski 
cautiously in shallow snow areas.  I was not fully certain that the message to 
ski slowly and under control in an area with near surface hazards was fully 
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comprehended by all.  There was some reckless, fast skiing and several 
crashes. Participant 103 
 Miscommunication can be attributed to either the guide issuing poorly 
worded directions, or the guest failing to understand the directions.  Although none 
of the participants in my study expressed a concern with language skills, many guests 
do not speak English as their primary language and many guides do not speak a 
second language, so the interpretation of body language may be an important method 
of communication.  Participant 103 summed up his methods of managing guest 
behaviour, suggesting that “if there are difficult skiers to control, address the issue 
early by talking privately with the individual(s) or the group as a whole.  I will deal 
with skier behaviour issues early and as they are presented”. 
6.3.2.3	  Terrain	  Choices	  
 Many companies are fortunate to have tenures with a large enough variety of 
terrain to provide a high quality experience, even when the avalanche hazard is high 
or there has been a lack of new snow for an extended period.  “I try to make guiding 
as easy as possible.  Do I really have to go there when I have all these other options 
that are easier and simpler?” (Participant 106).  Many of the participants expressed 
relief in not having to make difficult stability decisions by having the option to move 
to less hazardous terrain.  They choose to avoid difficult decisions when faced with 
high levels of uncertainty.  “We have so much terrain.  We are only running one 
group.  It’s pretty easy we can just avoid terrain…  It will be there tomorrow.  There 
is nothing that so important that we need to ski it today” (Participant 201).   
 When the number of untracked, high quality, safe ski runs became limited 
due to extensive skier traffic, participants were tempted to explore terrain that was 
steeper or more hazardous.  “[I chose] to ski a short pitch in a cutblock where snow 
pack was shallow and near surface hazards existed; as opposed to skiing on the 
snowcat road where those hazards would be avoided” (Participant 103).  Participant 
503 summed up the Terrain Avoidance code by saying “a lot of it is having that self-
composure to say we don’t need to be here.  Let’s just go somewhere else, where it is 
unicorns and rainbows”. 
 From my personal experience, exploring new terrain can be an exciting part 
of the ski-guiding job.  Known as on-sight guiding, it is a significant component of 
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the ACMG examination process.  Aspirant guides are assessed as to their 
competence in selecting safe options when in terrain they have not seen before.  This 
ability to apply previous knowledge and pattern recognition to new terrain is a key 
guiding skill (Association of Canadian Mountain Guides, 1999) and is likely 
influenced by the concepts of adaptive expertise (Tozer et al., 2007).  
 Participants who worked for new companies, or companies that added new 
terrain to their commercial tenures had the opportunity to evaluate terrain in terms of 
its potential for new runs.  New guides to a company are in a similar scenario as they 
generally lack familiarity with the company’s existing terrain.  Some of the 
necessary exploration and terrain familiarization will happen during training and 
operational set-up weeks, however guides will end up entering terrain that they have 
not skied before, accompanied by guests.  In the Process Theme described in the next 
chapter, the participants explain how an intimate knowledge of the snowpack and 
how that snowpack varies across the terrain is important.  A lack of intimate terrain 
knowledge can be a limiting factor.  Entering unknown terrain with guests typically 
required an adjustment to the desired margin for error. 
Knowing this place so well, we have a better historical overview and feel for 
how the snow lays on there and how you ski it.  When we go out into the new 
terrain that hasn’t been skied so much and we don’t know the history, we just 
need to pull in the reins and dig a lot more profiles and get some data.  Just 
not knowing the terrain so well, you just have to take it conservatively.  We 
are still exploring terrain.  New runs every time we go out. Participant 101 
6.3.2.4	  Summary	  
 The primary sources that made decision-making more complex were: the 
fellow guides, the guests, and the terrain.  These fluctuating elements forced the 
participants to continually adapt and modify their decision process.  Strategies that 
provided successful resolutions included: beginning with a strong sense of team 
effort, moving into a recognition of when terrain can and cannot be avoided and 
finishing with clear and on-going communication with the guests. 
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6.3.3	  Uncertainty	  Theme	  
 
 The uncertainty theme formed the core of what generated stress and made 
decision-making hard for ski guides.  Uncertainty may have had a cumulative effect 
for the participants, as it was attributed to a variety of sources.  In this study, as part 
of the event questionnaire, participants were asked to ascribe the source of the 
uncertainty to three categories: conflicting alternatives, low situational awareness, or 
incomplete information (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  These initial conditions of 
uncertainty were modified by the decision makers’ initial level of confidence 
prompted by the immediate intuitive response and then further modified by the 
conditions or the expectations placed on the decision maker.  Levels of confidence 
were expressed both before the decision event and afterwards.  
6.3.3.1	  Sources	  of	  Uncertainty	  
 The physical environment was dynamic, as the snowpack stability was 
constantly being modified by the weather.  The distribution of the snowpack across 
the terrain, the changes occurring within the snowpack and changing weather 
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conditions served to create an environment plagued with uncertainty.  The most 
significant source of uncertainty expressed in the questionnaire was dealing with 
conflicting alternatives.  This revolved around expectations placed on the 
participants by guests, other guides and the company.   
 The challenge for the participants was to provide a high quality experience 
that met the preconceived expectations of the guests within a context of weather and 
snowpack characteristics that were not necessarily conducive to achieving that goal.  
The most common conflicting alternative was that the guests want to ski steeper 
terrain, but the guiding team’s assessment of the stability suggested a more cautious 
approach.  During times of poor stability, participants described the struggle to find 
good quality skiing and avoid avalanches.  “We had seen very poor stability.  Na 
[natural] avalanches and skier triggered avalanches in low angle and surprising 
places.  Snow conditions were poor. [We were] trying to find the best snow but 
"safe" terrain” (Participant 708). 
 Poor weather conditions also served to add uncertainty and significantly 
constrain terrain options but were likely more easily understood by the guests.  “[I 
was] not certain of the terrain due to limited visibility” (Participant 310).  “We were 
a ‘heli-assisted’ ski touring group, so because we had only had one lift in the 
morning we did not have a good sense of what the winds were doing and how bad 
they were” (Participant 404).  Both heli-ski and snowcat groups were negatively 
affected by poor visibility on the ground.  However, heli-ski guides were further 
constrained by poor flying weather.  “Due to weather we were only able to ski the 
same 2 short runs all day” (Participant 608).  Heli-ski research participants 
recognized that pushing the pilots to get to places was counterproductive, as it 
increased the likelihood of a crash.  
The weather was threatening mid-day and even though the guests were 
anxious for more skiing after a difficult wx [weather] week, I flew closer to 
base to assess the approaching storm.  Skied two more runs close to home 
and then the weather pushed us home for the afternoon. . . Potential for a 
helicopter incident if the decision was to "push" for skiing by flying in poor 
wx.  Participant 703 
 The most prevalent factors that led to a reduced situational awareness, or 
provided incomplete information, were knowledge of what was happening in the 
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snowpack and how that snowpack varied over the terrain.  “There was some 
uncertainty with the reaction to the four layers of SH [surface hoar].  The temps were 
playing a roll with ski penetration and reactivity” (Participant 101). 
[I] wasn't comfortable with skiing more aggressive terrain, with limited 
knowledge of the terrain and poor confidence in the snowpack, too [sic] 
much SH [surface hoar]!  A bit uncertain on my decision not to ski the 
headwall because of my lack of knowledge of the terrain, accept that there 
was a skier accidental size 2 the week before. Participant 202 
6.3.3.2	  Intuitive	  confidence	  
 The literature suggests that confidence based on an immediate or growing 
intuitive response has a strong influence on the decision process (Simmons & 
Nelson, 2006b).  It was not unusual for the participants to have an increased feeling 
of confidence based on an absence of class one stability factors (McClung & 
Schaerer, 2006).  These class one factors of natural and skier-triggered avalanches 
provided immediate and tangible feedback to the on-going decision process during 
the day.  A lack of analytical data related to the probability and consequence of 
avalanches supported a greater reliance on intuitive responses.  In the absence of 
direct environmental feedback, intuitive confidence may have increased, prompting 
the participants to seek out more aggressive terrain, even though the hazard still 
existed.  
I was kind of wondering at the time if we would get that awful surprise.  We 
weren’t seeing anything…. For a long time we were worried about remotely 
triggering things.  We were avoiding that kind of terrain for so long.  We kept 
saying “caution shallow areas”, but we were not seeing it.  We were building 
confidence on that.  Maybe it’s not as bad as we think.  I was wondering are 
we going to get caught with our pants down. Participant 404 
 At times, the perception of improved stability grew based on a lack of direct 
evidence; there were no avalanches occurring.  This perception of reduced avalanche 
hazard permitted an adaptation to the use of terrain.  Guides began to venture into 
terrain, which was capable of producing avalanches, or bigger avalanches.  “It really 
settled things out.  You start to build up your confidence.  You start going bigger, 
bigger, bolder” (Participant 503). 
Obviously as we’re watching that facet layer develop in December, 
everybody was thinking…  we thought we had trickiest winter over with last 
year.  And now all of a sudden we are starting the same pattern.  Then in 
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January we didn’t have that much snow, and so all of a sudden, the 
stability [got better].  We were getting pretty confident. Participant 404 
 Participants had to constantly remind themselves that the absence of negative 
feedback was not the same as the presence of positive feedback.  
Just because it’s good doesn’t mean it’s good.  Just because that was good 
today doesn’t mean it will be good tomorrow…. It’s been good for three 
weeks.  Doesn’t mean it’s not going to get enough weight and finally crack 
the eggshell tomorrow. Participant 201 
A lot of it is having that self-composure to say we don’t need to be here.  
Let’s just go somewhere else, where it is unicorns and rainbows.  I know it is 
going to be good.  Lets go with the sure thing instead of the maybe.  Maybe is 
not good enough in this business.  Last year it felt like maybe was not a good 
idea. Participant 503 
6.3.3.3	  Expectations	  
 There were many expectations placed on the participants.  The primary 
source of these expectations was the guests, but participants described additional 
pressure from other sources including, fellow guides and company management.  
Due to the high profile and high cost of mechanized skiing, the participants 
considered guest satisfaction a high priority.  Heli-ski and snowcat skiing not only 
attracts an affluent clientele, but also one that is highly skilled in downhill skiing or 
snowboarding (Harley, 2002).  The expectations and pressure expressed by the 
guests, typically to ski more technically challenging terrain, had the potential to exert 
an influence on the decision process.    
 However, the degree to which guest expectations exerted an influence on the 
decision process was determined by the decision maker’s adaptation to these 
perceived and perhaps self-generated expectations.  “My intuition was telling me to 
pick a mellower run, but due to the ability and keenness of the group I thought I 
would try to please them with a steeper, more extreme ski run” (Participant 106).  “[I 
was] feeling pushed to ski a yellow run but decided not to get pushed” (Participant 
311). 
 When an incident occurred, it was easy to place blame on the negative effects 
generated by the guests’ expectations.  However it was the guide’s perception and 
response to these expectations that had placed people at risk. 
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[I] felt very confident in the snow stability and the fairly confident in the 
families ability, good skiers, but my decision to ski it as the 1st main run of 
the day, with an easier option to warm up on that I passed by, was a poor 
guiding decision on my behalf.  I think my motivation to impress the youth 
(considering it was the owners family) and challenge them affected my 
guiding program. Participant 202 
 When the ski program was limited by avalanche hazard or poor weather 
conditions to conservative and or tracked out terrain, the participants felt pressure 
through guest comments to deliver a better product.  “[The] decision was to continue 
with skiing mellow, skied terrain and not being tempted to venture out of our skied, 
lower angle terrain.  The terrain was very much skied out” (Participant 104). 
6.3.3.3.1	  Guests	  
 Guest expectations were divided into two categories based on the skiing 
ability of the guests.  Advanced skiers wanted advanced terrain to match their skills.  
“[I had] aggressive guests who want to ski steep” (Participant 404).  A question that 
this research has not addressed, but is likely a factor, is the origin of the expectations, 
as the promotional material of most if not all operators have candid explanations of 
the need to balance ‘steep and deep’ with safety (Canadian Mountain Holidays, 
2007).  Yet over the two years of the study, guides expressed their feelings of 
regularly being pushed by the guests to take them into more aggressive terrain.  With 
technical skills honed by the steep terrain available at many ski hills, many guests 
had the ability to ski steep (in excess of 38 degrees) terrain.  As the likelihood of 
triggering an avalanche increases as the slope angle approaches 45 degrees, the 
desire to ski steep was not always a good match with the desire to stay alive.  
 However, not all guests were expert skiers.  Some companies cater to first-
time heli-skiers.  These skiers did not have the technical skills or fitness to exceed 
the safety-related terrain limitations, but created other decision-making challenges. 
6.3.3.3.1.1	  Aggressive	  –	  high	  ability	  guests	  
 Participants described being caught between the guests’ expectations of 
skiing aggressive steep terrain and the need to manage the avalanche hazard.  “It was 
a fine line between providing them with exciting runs and scaring them in a near-
miss avalanche” (Participant 106).  “Based on slope history and current snow pack 
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decisions, [I] avoided a very tempting ski line much to the dismay of [the] 
guests” (Participant 715).  Guests frequently expressed their desire for steeper skiing.  
“They had a specific idea of what they wanted and were critical of every element 
from small to big” (Participant 501).  Even when guests did not explicitly express 
their concerns, participants were aware of the issue.  “German guests were not happy 
with the skiing.  They were only talking in German.  I felt pressure to give them 
more” (Participant 304). 
 The pressure to ski was compounded by poor weather.  Both daily operations 
and weekly operations had times when they were challenged by poor weather and 
had difficulty providing a quality experience.  “The guests were anxious for more 
skiing after a difficult wx [weather] week” (Participant 703).   
 Less experienced guides might have felt the pressure more than the seasoned 
veterans, as the coded responses included fewer responses from the most experienced 
guides.  Solutions to the issue were described in the following ways.  “I have re-
emphasized good dialogue with clients” (Participant 501).  “Focus less on providing 
quality over safe skiing” (Participant 404). 
6.3.3.3.1.2	  Low	  ability	  guests	  
 Occasionally, participants were dealing with guest abilities at the other end of 
the spectrum.  Participant 103 described the need to select easier ski conditions for 
one of his guests, however it necessitated accepting an elevated level of risk.  “We 
decided to ski the most dry and soft snow especially to suit the needs of one special 
guest skier (quite lame in the legs), which meant northerly slopes (and PWL's)”. 
 When there are three or four groups sharing one helicopter, it is possible for 
fast groups to pass slow groups.  “[We stopped] intentionally to let [an] other group 
lap us while I was giving one guest in my group a chance to catch her breath” 
(Participant 304).  A group with one or two weaker skiers can be more difficult to 
manage than a group, in which all the skiers have weaker ski skills, as a ski group 








 Perhaps the greatest pressure came from within the guide, in his or her desire 
to do well and provide high quality service.  “[I was] feeling pressure to "turn it up" 
from the guests and from myself” (Participant 311).  Participants expressed a desire 
to please the guests by providing them with an exceptional experience.  “Part of me 
wanted to send them home with a great and exciting last run, when they probably 
would have been happy with another, less committing line” (Participant 106).  Often 
what was perceived, as pressure from the guests was just an inaccurate reading of 
their needs or desires.  “[I] felt pressure from the guests.  In retrospect, there was 
absolutely no pressure from the guests” (Participant 304).  “I think my motivation to 
impress the youth (considering it was the owners family) and challenge them, 
affected my guiding program” (Participant 202). 
 At times, a competitive element may have played a role.  If one guide skis a 
bigger, bolder line, another guide’s group may express the desire to do the same.  
“The challenge was that the group sees the other line, why aren’t we skiing there etc., 
Personal feelings of not giving my group the same level, but good feeling that for me 
it was the right thing to do come home!” (Participant 708). 
 Personal motivation also played into the decision.  Guides are skiers too, so 
when the skiing was good they wanted to push it a little.  “The snow pack was bomb 
proof and I wanted to ski the line.  The lead guide already skied a great run that we 
could see” (Participant 202).  “I decided to ski a run that I am not very familiar with 
in the quest for good skiing” (Participant 508). 
 Participants recognized the pressure to go against their better judgement and 
made conscious decisions not to give in to it.  “Yes, I want to follow the program 
more and not step out of it to please guests.  Quite often, I think I pressure myself 
more than they actually pressure me into doing certain things” (Participant 304).  
Participant 304 summed it up with: “The guests get what they get.  I should never 
pressure myself in skiing certain slopes just to please them”. 
 As a service industry, the ability to provide high quality service is often 
rewarded financially through tips.  The effect of tipping was not included as part of 
this research primarily because participants were reluctant to talk about it, even 
though an argument could be generated that tipping has a potential influence on 
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terrain selection.  This would be a significant research project in its own right, so 
it is outside the scope of this research. 
6.3.3.3.3	  Employer	  and	  Peers	  
 Employers and peers had expectations of performance.  Participants 
recognized that the logistics of running a heli-skiing program are considerable, as 
they are heavily dependent on equipment for transportation.  The breakdown or 
inefficient use of this equipment had the potential to turn a profitable day into a 
significant loss.  Participants expressed feelings of stress when they used excessive 
flight time, as at $0.50 to $1.00 per second, it did not take long for indecision to 
become a financial burden.  “[I] had to pick a run to ski after twelve minutes in the 
air flying around and not going anywhere” (Participant 304).  This was $720 worth 
of indecision.  “[I] felt guilty flying around and not able to find a landing with good 
snow” (Participant 602). 
6.3.3.4	  Confidence	  and	  the	  Link	  to	  Margin	  for	  Error	  
 Within a theme of uncertainty, confidence went up or down depending on the 
above described factors.  As explained in Chapter 5, the feedback implicit within an 
outcome had a moderating effect on confidence.  Confidence went up at the end of a 
good day and went down after a near-miss.  The uncertainty within the decision 
challenge was likely magnified by the pressure exerted through expectations, be they 
guest, peer, or self-generated.  The final level of decision confidence prior to the 
enactment of a decision created the desired margin for error.  
 Strong-willed guides were able to resist the perceived demands placed on 
them and focus on the challenge of selecting appropriate terrain, with the goal of 
optimizing the quality of skiing in relation to the level of risk.  One participant 
described how he had the confidence to resist both a personal and guest expressed 
expectation to ski a particular run.  He and another guide were fortunate enough to 
get direct feedback on the sensitivity of triggering an avalanche big enough to kill 
someone, but with no negative consequence, as their margin for error was just big 
enough. 
Based on slope history and current snow pack decisions, [I] avoid very 
tempting ski line much to the dismay of guest. Two runs later, a group skiing 
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within 10m of the slope remotely triggered the slope resulting in a size 
2.5 avalanche. Participant 715 
6.3.4	  Summary	  
 The Environment, Uncertainty and Complexities themes formed the 
fundamental challenges for the participants.  It was incumbent upon the participants 
to view the decision environment through the lens of these challenges.  They needed 
to interpret the baseline environment, accommodate the various complexities and 
assess the degree of uncertainty.  The nature of the environment during the winters of 
2008 to 2010 was so complex that it forced the participants to adapt.  Some 
participants may not have had sufficiently rich repertoires of pattern memories to 
accommodate the full breath of challenges.  These three themes form the basis for 
the following chapter, in which the decision process is analysed.  The sequential and 
iterative process of decision – outcome – decision forms the framework for Chapter 
Seven. 
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Chapter	  7	  Findings	  and	  Discussion	  -­‐	  Qualitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  
decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  outcome	  using	  event	  report	  
questionnaires	  	  
7.1	  Introduction	  
 The cyclical nature of the decision process, as displayed in Figure 15, was 
central to the three themes presented in this chapter: Process, Outcome and Future 
Decisions.  The filters presented in the previous chapter framed the challenges within 
the decision environment and formed the basis for a discussion of the findings 
presented in this chapter.  The primary theme presented in this chapter is the 
interaction between intuition and analysis within the decision process.  This 
interaction between the intuitive and analytical responses was bracketed by the 
participants’ depth of knowledge of both the snowpack and the terrain.  Although 
there were rarely precursors to indicate whether a day would end up poorly, 
reflection on the day’s outcome helped the participants to anticipate future decision 
challenges.  The participants’ reflection on the feedback that they received was 
instrumental in shaping future decisions. 
 












7.2.1	  Process	  Theme	  
 
 The analysis of the process theme centred on a blending of possible decision 
responses generated through intuition and analysis as described by Evans (2010, 
2011).  An intimate knowledge of the qualities of the snowpack and the intricacies of 
the terrain were intertwined throughout the participants’ application of intuitive and 
analytical responses.  Safe skiing terrain was chosen based not only on the shape of 
the terrain, but also the participants’ understanding of how the snowpack had 
developed on the terrain over the season.  Numerous localized variables within the 
snowpack had to be interpreted by the participants.  
I felt that I was on a safe terrain feature and there was little risk for me to 
investigate the ski line.  I miss-judged the spatial variability of the SH 
[surface hoar] layer thinking it was not in this wind exposed location, and in 
any case did not think the bench I was on was steep enough to slide. 
Participant 608 
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7.2.1.1	  Intimate	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  Snowpack	  	  
 The guide’s knowledge of the snowpack as it evolves over the winter is one 
of the cornerstones of commercial ski guiding risk management (Association of 
Canadian Mountain Guides, 1999).  Watching weak layers develop and change over 
time is key in the interpretation of snowpack stability.  Atkins (2004) created an 
avalanche characterization checklist to aid in the assessment of potential avalanche 
character.  The intent was to strengthen the connection between stability assessments 
based on knowledge of the snowpack and risk management choices in the selection 
of terrain. 
 Participants made it their job to be familiar with what was going on within 
the snowpack.  “[I] got in and made an assessment that we were not affecting the 
layer of concern.  And surface instabilities were not yet a problem” (Participant 101).  
They maintained an awareness of the history of the season.  During times of 
changing conditions this was a challenge.  “We did not have a good sense of what 
the winds were doing and how bad they were” (Participant 404).  
 The participants’ knowledge of the terrain and the history of the season’s 
snowpack on the terrain aided the decision process.  “Based on slope history and 
current snow pack decisions, avoid very tempting ski line much to the dismay of 
guest [sic]” (Participant 715).  The knowledge that certain layers were weak or 
poorly bonded provided a starting point, or anchor and allowed the participants to 
seek out information, which would fill any potential gaps in their knowledge.  “[We 
were concerned about] 2 buried SH layers and a weak FC CR [facet crust] basal 
layer, [and the] critical threshold load on these layers after large storm with wind 
[sic]” (Participant 605).  Although the on-going familiarity with the intricacies of the 
snowpack provided an anchor from which to generate a stability forecast, it was a 
self-generated anchor and thus susceptible to insufficient adjustment (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2001).  To avoid this trap, participants had to be cognizant of the 
uncertainty in their original forecast.  “There was some uncertainty with the reaction 
to the four layers of SH.  The temps were playing a role with ski pen and reactivity” 
(Participant 101).  In this way they were able to make adequate adjustments to their 
stability assessment when conditions changed. 
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7.2.1.2	  Intuitive	  Response	  and	  Analytical	  Response	  	  
 In my initial analysis and coding process, I created separate codes for the 
intuitive responses and the analytical responses.  I have grouped them together to 
facilitate analysis in terms of Dual Process theories (Evans, 2008).  Within these 
responses there are specific intuitive references, specific analytical responses and 
dual process responses.  One additional aspect that stood out within the intuitive 
responses was a large number of conservative choices. 
 The way in which the intuitive and analytical processes interacted was central 
to the decision process used by the participants.  Rule-based decision-making, such 
as that advocated for novice avalanche decision makers is not widely used within the 
professional guiding community (Hägeli et al., 2006).  An overriding trend from the 
data was the intermingling of the intuition and analysis.  Occasionally a decision was 
attributed to a fully intuitive process and more rarely, a decision was attributed solely 
to a fully analytical process.  The majority of the time the two processes were used 
together.  
 Participants described a give and take between intuitive and analytical modes.  
“[I] listen to my intuitive sense more, and weigh it against my analytical decision-
making” (Participant 202).  There was regular discussion of the interaction between 
the two processes.  “My intuition was saying, ‘maybe this could slide’ but logic said, 
it is a planar 25-degree slope, it's OK” (Participant 708).  This is in harmony with the 
quantitative data as described in Chapter Five, suggesting that both processes are 
used in most decisions.  “My intuition said the bench was safe terrain, and upon 
investigation my analytical decision was not to ski the line but return to the group 
and ski on the ridge” (Participant 608). 
7.2.1.2.1	  Intuitive	  Response	  
 Participants had a variety of ways of describing the intuitive response, but 
generally it came down to a feeling.  This feeling was expressed both positively and 
negatively, either as good feelings or bad feelings and was generally related to risk 
management.  The good feelings promoted an inclination toward entering more 
aggressive terrain, while bad feelings inhibited that tendency.  
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 Participant 305 described an intuitive feeling that avalanche conditions 
were better than the analytical decision that had been formed earlier, during the 
morning guide’s meeting.  “The group wanted steeper terrain but I stayed on my 
program even though things felt better than they really were”.  The analytical process 
engaged in during the morning guide’s meeting would have formed a self-generated 
‘plan’ or initial decision.  The initial anchoring heuristic was challenged by an 
intuitive desire for adjustment.  Previous research suggests that these adjustments 
from self-generated initial anchors may be insufficient (Epley & Gilovich, 2001).   
 The negative feelings were oriented toward moving away from steeper 
terrain, or the realization that the terrain the group was in, was already too 
aggressive.  “As I ski down I feel increasingly uncomfortable” (Participant 708).  
These conservative or negative intuitive feelings often clashed with one of the other 
codes, that of guest expectations.  This link was explored further in the previous 
chapter through the Uncertainty theme.  “My intuition was telling me to pick a 
mellower run, but due to the ability and keenness of the group I thought I would try 
to please them with a steeper, more extreme ski run” (Participant 106). 
 The intuitive feeling of caution was also challenged when operational 
considerations pushed risk management thresholds.  This happened when weather 
restricted access to good ski terrain.  “Skiing in poor weather, confined to one very 
mellow and short run, we finally get a slight break to move to a new run, and as we 
ski the last pitch, intuition says to me, we should not be skiing this line” (Participant 
708). 
 Reflection on the use of an intuitive response was a common practice.  “In 
hindsight [I] remember questioning the ability of my group to maintain "the line" as 
they were a weak group.  Should have stopped and listened to my intuition which 
was suggesting I give them more ‘direction’” (Participant 404).  When combined 
with feedback from peers, this reflection had the potential to change how future 
decisions were made.  “In the current environment seeing avalanche events occurring 
in unexpected places, these events have made me more attuned to my intuition” 
(Participant 708).  Reflection is explored further as its own code, later in the chapter 
as part of the Future Decisions theme. 
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 One of the by-products of asking the participants to reflect on their 
decision process was that they reflected on their intuitive responses.  There is very 
little in the JDM literature specific to the role that reflection on intuitive responses 
can play in the development of decision-making.  Hogarth et al (1991) argued for the 
‘learning of intuition’ but did not expand on the learning that could occur through the 
reflective process.  Their focus was on the environment in which the intuitive 
responses took place, with descriptions of the attributes of kind and wicked learning 
environments.  There is some support for the use of a reflective practice in the 
development of intuitive responses in a therapeutic relationship (Bove & Rizzi, 
2009), but this does not necessarily transfer over to the ski guide’s reflection on the 
use of intuition in avalanche terrain.  
7.2.1.2.2	  Analytical	  Response	   	  
 Based on the emphasis placed on the analytical decision-making process 
delivered in the CAA and ACMG certification programs (Association of Canadian 
Mountain Guides, 1999; Canadian Avalanche Association, 2011), it would be 
reasonable to assume that these models form a core element of professional practice.  
An analytical response might be expected to be the mainstay of the participants’ 
decision response process (Bruns, 1996).  However, one of the challenges expressed 
by participants over the two seasons of the study was a frustration with the results of 
their analytical efforts in avalanche hazard forecasting, as the reality of where 
avalanches were occurring was frequently not consistent with their forecast.  The 
participants’ analysis of the current snowpack conditions, grounded in the theories of 
where and when avalanches should occur, did not match up with what was actually 
happening.  
 Participants had been trained to gather and analyse information as an integral 
part of the avalanche forecasting process.  Participant 602 described this data 
gathering process.  “[I] found SH [surface hoar] down 45cm, I had heard about it but 
not seen it all week.”  Some level of uncertainty was a common thread through the 
participants’ event reports and typically prompted further data gathering and 
analysis.  “I went in with the intention of skiing the line but held the group back so as 
to do some of my own analysis” (Participant 508).  Slope angle was the most 
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commonly used indicator of safe terrain.  “Analysis said this is too low an angle 
to slide. . . I measured the slope angle, it was 24 degrees, in a "normal" winter we 
would ski this slope in poor stability” (Participant 708). 
 Gathering additional information was not always easily achieved, as even the 
decision of where to dig a snow profile was compromised by the shortcomings of the 
analytical process.  Participant 104 described his challenge as “needing more 
snowpack information, but [I was] very hesitant and had very low confidence in the 
snowpack.  Biggest decision was where to dig (snow safety) to obtain pertinent 
information, with out endangering the snow safety team”.  
 In a similar study of avalanche professionals, Adams (2005) found that only 
17% of her participants used analysis as their primary mode of cognitive function 
within their field-based decision-making.  However analysis was used largely when 
decisions were made in the office.  This is consistent with my participants’ 
description of their use of analysis in the morning guide’s meeting.  This is also 
consistent with findings in the Naturalistic Decision-making literature, that in high 
stress time-limited scenarios, intuition prevailed as the predominant decision process 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Klein, 1993; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001; 
Zsambok & Klein, 1997).  
 Participants had lost confidence in their ability to analyse snowpack and 
weather data in the application of the avalanche forecasting process.  They struggled 
with an analytical process that did not provide the level of accuracy that they were 
accustomed to.  After repeatedly seeing avalanches on terrain features that they had 
deemed ‘safe’, they questioned their ability and began to build in larger safety 
margins by making more conservative terrain choices.  
7.2.1.2.3	  Conservative	  Choice	  
 When faced with a conflict between an analytical response and an intuitive 
one, participants regularly expressed the desire to go with the more conservative 
choice.  Although this may be viewed as the more correct response from a risk 
manager’s perspective, the nature of the environment that these decisions were 
taking place in, would be considered ‘wicked’ (Hogarth, Plessner,  Betsch, &  
Betsch, 2008).  With massive consequences and intermittent feedback, participants 
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were feeling pushed to act more conservatively.  “[I] discussed [the] run with 
junior guides at lunch and thought I'd go ahead and take a look, but decided to leave 
it alone today. As I flew over the run, the "little guy" said this is too hard and "has 
potential, so I flew back to the short, mellow lines” (Participant 708).  The impact of 
a wicked environment is discussed further as an element within the Outcome theme. 
 When faced with the cumulative results of low confidence in their analytical 
process and an intuitive response that was often a ‘bad feeling’, participants were 
defaulting to the conservative intuitive choice.  
In the current environment seeing avalanche events occurring in unexpected 
places, these events have made me more attuned to my intuition.  If I have 
any slight reservation or "little voice" telling me not to go to a run ski a line 
or similar I'm pretty much listening to that completely and going with that.  
Participant 708 
 Participant 708 described the lesson learned from working in this wicked 
environment as “Listen to intuition, [and] question "seniority/experience" especially 
in times of uncertainty and unusual events”. 
7.2.1.2.4	  Summary	  
 Participants described how they used both intuition and analysis in their daily 
decision-making process, which is consistent with Adams’ findings (2005).  She 
described how her participants used either intuition or analysis, as their primary 
decision mode, and the other as a quality control check.  This does not fit well with 
the Cognitive Continuum (Hammond & Klein, 1993), which suggests that as the use 
of intuition increases there is a corresponding decrease in analytical processing, and 
vice versa.  Participants described times when they used large amounts of both 
processes for the same decision and other times when they used neither.  More 
recently Hammond (2010) has argued for the use of ‘quasirationality’, which he 
defines as a dynamic balance between analysis and intuition.  He suggests that very 
few decisions can be fully analytical because information is incomplete and yet the 
temptation to surrender to intuition should be avoided.  
 My participants’ inability to find and assimilate snowpack data that was 
representative of the terrain and conditions that they would like to ski, compromised 
the analytical process and resulted in surprises; avalanches occurring in unexpected 
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times and places.  The resultant loss of confidence combined with the massive, 
negative, potential consequences promoted a more conservative theme to the 
decision process.  Participants used an analytical process of stability evaluation as a 
starting point, and then mapped out a plan onto the terrain using intuition.  This 
intuitive process drove the terrain selection procedure and formed the basis for the 
terrain selection code. 
7.2.1.3	  Terrain	  Selection	  Code	  
 Terrain selection was the most frequent code in the participants’ responses.  
This was entirely understandable and expected as the choice of location is generally 
agreed to be the most important aspect of managing risk exposure for ski guides 
(Cardon, 2004).  It is consistent with the findings of Grímsdóttir and McClung 
(2004) who found that the general shape of the terrain was the prime consideration in 
the selection of safe skiing terrain.  Atkins (2004) suggested that guides are also 
much more capable of communicating terrain choices than they are capable of 
communicating stability evaluations.  The guides use careful terrain selection to 
manage the amount of danger that the group is exposed to and for how long the party 
is exposed to it (Bruns, 1996).  The terrain code was divided up into six sub-codes: 
Decision Timing, Stability, Consequences, New Terrain, Guest Behaviour, and Guest 
Expectations, with the latter five linked to other codes.  
7.2.1.3.1	  Decision	  Timing	  
 The primary sub-code within terrain selection was the timing of the choices 
made by guides in their quest for challenging, yet safe ski routes.  Decisions were 
made prior to skiing during the morning guides meeting, and during the ski 
programme.  The structure for the morning guides meeting decision process was 
described in Chapter Two.  Key decisions made during the morning meetings centred 
on the selection of ski terrain; “It is a reasonable choice for the first run” (Participant 
601), and the designation of terrain to be avoided;  “[The] decision [was made] to not 
ski steeper slopes” (Participant 311).  
 Although the determination of snowpack stability and the associated 
avalanche risk was largely an analytical process, the application of this knowledge to 
the terrain became much more intuitive at times.  “The most important decision of 
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today was terrain avoidance.  Convex lee loaded features @ tree-line looked fat 
and we knew the surface hoar was in there” (Participant 703).  Slope angle is 
considered one of the best objective measures of avalanche likelihood, with few slab 
avalanches triggered on slopes with an incline of less than 25 degrees and 38 degrees 
being the average angle at which slab avalanches occur (Jamieson & Geldsetzer, 
1996).  However, avalanche triggering during the period of the study did not 
correlate well with previously observed norms. 
 Hogarth (2010) suggests that analysis can work well when the task is simple, 
but can falter as task complexity rises.  Intuition has the potential to be more accurate 
in this complex environment, but only if the ‘cultural capital of patterns’ has been 
generated under ideal ‘kind’ conditions.  Participant 708 described this interaction 
between the analytical and intuitive process the following way. 
Intuition (the little guy inside your head) was making some thought about 
"given what we are seeing today and with the anomalies of the season, is this 
the best choice, but [the analytical process of] terrain selection said a mid 20 
degree slope with no steep associated slope it should be OK.  
This fits with earlier findings (Jamieson & Geldsetzer, 1999), which suggest 
that 70% of unexpected skier-triggered avalanches occurred on slopes which were 
less than 35 degrees.   
 Typically the participants left the morning meeting with certain terrain 
management principles to govern their decision-making during the day, such as: 
“Keep to moderate angle, higher elevation” (Participant 201), and “stay on fully 
supported ridges instead of [in] the gullies where the snow was better” (Participant 
714).  
 Once the participants got out into the terrain, those governing principles were 
typically modified by current observations.  This process may have been 
compromised by the heuristic biases of anchoring and adjustment (Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1999).  Although the initial anchor of stability assessment was 
self-generated and thus potentially susceptible to insufficient adjustments during the 
day’s ski operations (Epley & Gilovich, 2001), the on-going process of stability 
forecasting and evaluation was modified each evening by access to other operations’ 
interpretations of stability through the daily information exchange (InfoEx).   
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 The initial stability forecast anchor generated in the morning meeting by 
the previous day’s observations, the overnight changes and the forecasted weather 
for the day was not necessarily well reflected in the current conditions, thus requiring 
some level of adjustment during the day.  Additional insight may be contributed by 
examining the role that another heuristic might play, that of a confirmation bias.   
 Mercier and Sperber (2011) argued that the function of an analytical 
reasoning process was fundamentally argumentative.  Reasoning through human 
communication has the potential to be side-tracked by personal agendas and 
deliberate misinformation.  I observed debates during the participants’ morning 
meetings as evidence of the argumentative nature of analysis and reasoning.  The 
interpretation of hard data, such as wind, precipitation amounts and temperature, 
from remote sensing stations can be compromised by a confirmation bias.  There can 
be a tendency to see what one wants to see, and to seek out data that confirms a 
hypothesis (Lehner et al., 2009). 
 Once out in the field, participants described both aggressive and conservative 
adjustments based on observed conditions.  “But my decision to ski it as the first 
main run of the day, with an easier option to warm up on that I passed by, was a poor 
guiding decision on my behalf” (Participant 202).   
 The weather was an additional complicating factor, which regularly dictated 
changes to the terrain selection.  There were two types of weather-related 
circumstances that mandated a modification of the ski plan: weather that was 
significantly different from the forecast, “[We had to pick] up high on [the] last run 
as the pick up is threatened by steep west facing slopes and [the] sun was out in [the] 
PM” (Participant 304), and poor visibility which reduced the participants’ abilities to 
assess conditions.  “The decision was made to stay on conservative terrain and avoid 
wide-open areas due to poor light” (Participant 103).   
 Good visibility allowed the guides to continue to monitor changing 
conditions, while poor visibility created a higher level of uncertainty.  “[I was] not 
certain of the terrain due to limited visibility” (Participant 310).  With higher levels 
of uncertainty linked to a lack of environmental feedback, there was a tendency to be 
more conservative, which is congruent with research conducted on gamblers and the 
disjunction effect (Bagassi & Macchi, 2006).    




 The participants’ selection of ski terrain varied tremendously depending on 
the assessment and forecasting of the snowpack stability (Cardon, 2004) and the 
potential avalanche characteristics (Atkins, 2004).  The difficulty in accurately 
forecasting the sensitivity and reactivity of the persistent weak layers (PWL) during 
the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 seasons led some participants to be more reliant on 
their ability to pick safe terrain than their ability to forecast the snow stability.  
Participant 605 described how he choose more conservative terrain based on the 
presence of a persistent weak layer.  “We have a current stability rating of G-G-G 
[Good-Good-Good], caution windslab & PWL's (persistent weak layers).  Some runs 
that we typically ski during G stability are being avoided, and some runs skied very 
conservatively”.  For example, Participant 101 provided a more simplified 
description of his most important decision on one of his Good day reports as, 
“Terrain selection: choosing the terrain vs. [having to assess] the snow/stability”. 
 Participants were challenged to rationalize the incongruence between the 
results of their decision process, including both analytical and intuitive responses, 
with the reality of when and where they were seeing or triggering avalanches.  Their 
comments included: “[I] was aware of [the] layer but was on 25 deg terrain which [I] 
thought was safe” (Participant 311), “[I decided] to stick with the terrain choice even 
though I have never seen avalanches on this run” (Participant 714), and “it changes 
my view on what avalanche terrain is” (Participant 311). 
 On the other end of the scale, when weather and snowpack conditions 
became more stable, participants were able to choose more aggressive terrain.  “[We] 
skied fairly aggressively today.  Big open slopes in ALP [alpine] to 38 degrees” 
(Participant 304). For example, the best decision on one good day report was “skiing 
a bigger slope on a run we had greened that morning, but with caution on certain 
features, including loaded ridge top features, such as that slope” (Participant 304). 
7.2.1.3.3	  Consequences	  
 One of the challenges in the selection of terrain was the need to find a 
balance between risk and reward.  The key elements of this balance were: the quality 
of the skiing, the likelihood of triggering an avalanche and the consequence if an 
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avalanche were to be released.  Most often this was expressed as a choice 
between steeper and more challenging skiing with higher consequences, and lower 
angled, less challenging skiing with lower consequences, but it was also expressed as 
a choice between a high consequence event with a low likelihood of occurrence 
compared to a low consequence event with a higher likelihood of occurrence.  
Making a decision between skiing a line that was likely more stable but had 
higher consequences if anything released, or skiing a steeper more 
challenging line that offered more options of safety while exposing ourselves 
to a higher likelihood of releasing something smaller with likely smaller 
consequences.  Participant 605 
 Generalized utility theories (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; Camerer, 1989) 
suggest that there would be an optimum balance between ski quality and the 
possibility of a negative event, however the balance would likely be different 
between the guides and the guests depending on the level of risk aversion.  The 
participants tended to be more risk averse than their guests.  This is consistent with 
research conducted on medical decision-making.  Garcia-Retamero and Galesic 
(2011) found that doctors chose more conservative options than their patients.  There 
is a significant difference with ski guiding as the ski guides were committed to the 
same level of risk exposure as their guests, whereas in medical decision-making it 
was only the patient that was at risk.  Participant 311 “decided not to ski a more 
committing slope and limited exposure to a smaller feature”, whereas Participant 404 
“chose to ski the untracked snow with my group, which is the line, exposed to the 
most overhead hazard”.  One participant described the lessons learned as: “to never 
underestimate terrain and what can occur on what kind of terrain” (Participant 604). 
7.2.1.3.4	  Guest	  Behaviour	  
 In addition to being a sub-code within the terrain selection code, guest 
behaviour was a code all to itself and will be discussed further later in this section.  I 
have defined guest behaviour as the guests’ ability and willingness to follow the 
guide’s directions (Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson, 1996).  There was a critical link 
between guest behaviour and terrain selection.  There were times when the 
participants chose terrain close to places where avalanches could have been 
triggered.  The guides needed to carefully conduct the guests through these narrow 
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strips of safe terrain.  If the guests were unable or unwilling to follow the guide’s 
directions, it would only take a few turns in the wrong direction to trigger an 
avalanche.  The standard strategy used by guides is to create a defining boundary 
with their ski tracks.  The guests are managed with words like “Stay in my tracks”, or 
“Ski to the right/left of my tracks”.  Participant 103 described an event with guests 
who failed to heed his directions.  
[I] located the controlling left ski line too close to a steep unsupported 
feature.  [I] stopped on a bench to move right (30 metres) and keep skiers off 
the slope.  Two aggressive skiers came in fast and the slope triggered below.  
 The following is an example from my own guiding to illustrate this point.  In 
the photo below (Figure 16), I put in a defining track and told my guests to ski to the 
right of my tracks, one at a time.  This particular slope is considered an indicator 
slope as it frequently avalanches naturally, or can be deliberately triggered.  I wanted 
to test the stability of the slope so I jumped on the convex rollover at the entrance to 
the slope in an attempt to ski trigger the slope, but was unsuccessful.  The first guest 
(seen just left of the avalanche, in the red circle) crossed his ski tips at the convex 
rollover and fell head first into the snow.  He was two meters to skier’s-right of my 
track, but the additional weight that he was able to generate in his fall was sufficient 
to cause an avalanche. 
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Figure	  16	  Avalanche	  on	  indicator	  slope	  
 
 The influence of guest behaviour on the selection of terrain is likely grounded 
in the nature of the relationship between the guide and the guests.  Guides who know 
their guests well may be able to conduct them through more complex terrain that 
requires the guests to follow a precise ski line.  This level of familiarity could come 
from time spent together in challenging terrain.  
7.2.1.3.5	  Guest	  Expectations	  
 This sub-code is also linked to its own code and represented a significant 
contributing factor to terrain selection.  Although participants were frequently able to 
select terrain that exceeded their guests’ expectations, the challenging avalanche 
conditions of 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 made this much more difficult to achieve.  
The difficulty in predicting the reactivity of the persistent weak layers forced 
participants to choose more low-angled terrain.  Often this did not meet their guests’ 
expectations. 
[My] decision was to continue with skiing mellow, skied terrain and not 
being tempted to venture out of our skied, lower angle terrain.  The terrain 
was very much skied out and the guests were only marginally 
challenged/satisfied.  (Participant 104) 
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 The participants were also affected by the desire to increase the level of 
challenge and ski more challenging terrain.  However, the participants’ desires, 
whether internally or externally generated was modified by the reality of the 
snowpack.  “Based on slope history and current snow pack decisions, [I made the 
decision to] avoid a very tempting ski line, much to the dismay of the guests” 
(Participant 715).  This did not mean that participants were always disappointing 
their guests or that guests stopped exerting pressure to ski steeper terrain.  “We had a 
great day even though I was under pressure to give the people more challenging 
terrain” (Participant 305). 
7.2.1.3.6	  Summary	  
 Terrain selection is at the core of the decision process for ski guides.  The 
intuitive-analytical discourse within the stability/consequence evaluation process 
may be the means by which terrain is selected, however there are many mitigating 
factors.  The key factor is the role that guest satisfaction plays.  Ski guiding is a 
service industry, thus guest expectations of the product must be accounted for in its 
delivery.  Guest expectations and subsequent guest behaviours combined with 
corporate, peer and self-expectations modified, and in many ways exacerbated, the 
complexity of the decision environment.  
 The decision process matched knowledge of snowpack and terrain with the 
selection of safe skiing options.  These skiing options were constrained by a context 
specific margin for error.  The margin for error was modified by elements within the 
Filter themes, Environment and Uncertainty.  Participant 702 summed it up with a 
comment from a near-miss report; “This was so great because I actually got an 
answer to the safety margin / decision-making process we do everyday”.  The 
ultimate goal of the decision process was the selection of technically challenging, yet 
safe terrain.  Striving to achieve an optimal balance between maximum challenge 
and acceptable risk was a constant battle. 
 The likelihood and potential consequence of an occurrence played a huge role 
in the determination of margins.  A high likelihood of being caught in a small 
avalanche with minimal consequences may have been entirely acceptable, while the 
potential for dying in a low-likelihood, large avalanche event may not.  Somewhere 
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between the extremes of no hazard and probable death, was a place that divided 
acceptable loss from unacceptable loss.  The ability to forecast avalanche occurrence, 
let alone avalanche size is insufficiently developed to have a definitive line in the 
snow (Atkins, 2004; McClung & Schaerer, 2006).  This precipitates the need to 
gather as much information as possible without actually generating more risk for the 
data gatherer.  Participant 104 described the challenge of balancing information 
gathering with risk acceptance.  “[It] just wasn't worth putting everything on the line 
to gather a bit more information, knowing full well that the existing conditions were 
tricky”. 
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7.2.2	  Outcomes	  Theme	  
 
 Participants described how they used their expertise as a cornerstone on 
which to base their decision-making within this challenging environment.  An 
analysis of the decision environment provided clues as to whether implicit feedback 
was present and to its validity.  A wicked environment, with low quality feedback 
and severe potential consequences, had the potential to deceive the participants 
(Hogarth et al., 1991).  The likelihood of being surprised by events and having a 
near-miss went up when the environment provided imprecise feedback.  Having a 
good day was linked to the concept of not making snow stability decisions and 
instead choosing terrain that was less likely to produce an avalanche.  
7.2.2.1	  Expertise	  
 The ability to use and trust decisions based on expertise was linked to the 
environment in which the expertise was built (Camerer, Johnson, Goldstein, & 
Hogarth, 1997; Hogarth et al., 1991).  One of the most experienced participants 
recognized that even with all the good decisions that he had made over a 20-plus 
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year career as a heli-ski guide, the most powerful learning came from his poor 
decisions.  He recognized that misleading feedback could come from what was 
thought to be a good decision.  However, a bad decision with a negative outcome 
could not be ignored and a bad decision with a near-miss outcome should be 
embraced. 
I hate to say it, but its a good thing for a guide to experience having 
somebody in their group buried or caught in an avalanche because all of a 
sudden it changes your reality.  Now I know what its like to have one of my 
clients caught in an avalanche and be swept away and hopefully they’re just 
sitting there on the surface when you get over the edge and look. Participant 
714 
7.2.2.2	  Wicked	  environment	  
 The wicked environment has two components: quality of feedback and 
severity of consequences (Hogarth et al., 2008).  The two winters of the study had 
highly variable feedback in both quality and quantity, and were characterized by 
massive consequences.   
Just this year because of the anomalies and not having a good handle on it, 
things are surprising people all year…. A lot of the terrain we have a known 
history of, but its been showing us differently this year.  We’ve had 
avalanches go through roads that we didn’t expect. Participant 104 
 Participants received environmental feedback, however it was often outside 
of what they expected.  “Mother nature just defined the new run out zones for a few 
select locations.  Knowing the potential of the type of snowpack we have this year” 
(Participant 104).  Feedback was not missing in this wicked environment.  It was just 
unexpected in its timing, location and magnitude.  At times there was a lack of 
negative environmental feedback, which prompted the participants to be more 
aggressive in their terrain selection.  “The long dry spell may have lured many into 
skiing like it is a normal snowpack” (Participant 608).  “After 2-3 weeks of good 
stability, maybe we forgot that there were still weak layers buried deeply within the 
snowpack” (Participant 605). 
 It was hard for the participants to learn from the feedback, as it did not make 
for easy pattern recognition.  This could have produced a false context for future 
pattern recognition and subsequent faulty intuitive responses, however participants 
described how they learned to deal with the challenge.  
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Wow, how do I feel about this slope, with the facet layer compared to 
how do I feel about it with the surface hoar layer.  I think going into it, 
having been there last year in a weird year, really prepared me well for it.  If I 
hadn’t been there last year with a weird persistent weak layer, then I might 
have just gone into it being influenced by what I had been observing in the 
Bugaboos. Participant 404 
 Decision-making in this wicked environment, with significant and possible, 
negative consequences, was characterized by low confidence and conservative 
choices.  Participant 605 stated, “[my] risk tolerance has not changed, but guiding 
during times of prolonged PWL's has me choosing as conservative lines as needed”.  
“[The decision was] to stick with the terrain choice even though I have never seen 
avalanches on this run” (Participant 714).  This may be analogous to decision-
making when competing against a stronger opponent.  In a study of chess players, a 
slower, more conservative strategy was employed when facing opponents of greater 
skill (Slezak & Sigman, 2011). 
7.2.2.3	  Surprised	  by	  events	  
 Inherent within the nature of a near-miss event is an element of surprise.  The 
element of surprising environmental feedback, an avalanche occurrence, was 
associated with 24 of the 31 near-miss events that included feedback information.   
For example, last week we had a skier accidental and it was the snow safety 
guide while they were going to dig a pit.  They took off their skis then they 
had a size 3 ripped out under their feet, which sympathetically released six 
other avalanches all in the same zone.  Participant 404 
 The primary source of surprise was how low the slope angle was.  Additional 
factors were the depth of the failure plane and number of layers involved.  “I have 
never seen that slope avalanche like that before” (Participant 601).  All of the 
responses could be linked to the existence of persistent weak layers.  “It really 
surprised me.  Did we make a mistake when we decided in the morning guides 
meeting that the run should be green?” (Participant 604). 
7.2.2.3.1	  Slope	  angle	  
 Slope angle is one of the benchmark measurements used in avalanche 
forecasting.  On slopes of less than 25° the potential for slab avalanche failure is 
minimal (McClung & Schaerer, 2006), yet participants reported avalanches 
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occurring on terrain as low as 20°.  “I did not think I was in a spot that would 
slide” (Participant 608).  Participant 311 was not surprised by the release of a weak 
layer, just the angle of the location where it released.  “Was aware of layer but was 
on 25 deg terrain which thought was safe [sic].  Do not trust unskied terrain and [it] 
changes my view on what avalanche terrain is”.  An additional surprise was the 
distance that some avalanches travelled into what had been considered safe terrain.  
It’s south facing.  I land on top and see a huge (size 4) avalanche on a run 
across the valley, running to the valley floor, starting on steep terrain, but 
propagating into shallow angle what we have historically called "safe" i.e. 20 
degree terrain.  Participant 708 
7.2.2.3.2	  Layering,	  depth	  and	  extent	  of	  propagation	  
 The number of reactive layers, the depth of those layers and the extent to 
which they propagated over large distances took some participants by surprise.  To 
have numerous reactive layers all producing anomalous avalanches was outside the 
pattern recognition of many participants.  “Experienced practitioners with 30+ years 
of experience have never seen anything like the layering in this year's snowpack and 
many of us are waiting for the other (next?) shoe to drop” (Participant 810).  
Avalanches released on weak layers much deeper in the pack than were thought 
possible.  “The slide released on SH [surface hoar] and went deeper than I would 
have expected with only 10 cm HN [height of new snow]” (Participant 608).  Larger 
avalanches were produced by this combination of deep weak layers and extensive 
propagation.  “[I was] surprised with the extent of propagation and fracture depth” 
(Participant 601).  “We were all surprised by the magnitude and depth of the release” 
(Participant 604). 
7.2.2.4	  Outcomes	  -­‐	  link	  to	  feedback	  and	  reflection	  
 The outcomes from the event reports produced feedback and a stimulus for 
reflection, which had the potential to alter future decisions.  The nature and 
variability of this feedback produced uncertainty even for the participants with very 
high levels of expertise.  Avalanches were surprising everyone.  Numerous incidents 
were attributed to the difficulty of dealing with a wicked environment, as both 
analytical and intuitive responses had failed to predict these events.  This failure 
promoted deeper reflection and a default to more conservative choices.  
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I have gone over that so many times in my head.  Could we have seen 
this?  Could we have forecasted this?  Could we have seen that coming?  If 
you look at just the data, no, in a sense.  Are things touchy after a cycle?  
Yeah but that big, it was amazing.  Participant 104 
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7.2.3	  Future	  Decisions	  Theme	  
 
 Decision-making in this environment occurred in a context of repeated 
opportunity.  The opportunity to improve decision-making came from feedback and 
reflection.  Some of the feedback came from the environment, but many of the 
participants reported high levels of peer feedback.  Hammond and Summers (1972) 
suggest that learning in a complex environment with high levels of uncertainty is 
best accomplished by incorporating feedback which addresses the why question and 
not just the what question.  Feedback that helps the recipient understand not just that 
their decision solution was right or wrong, but also the reasons why, will help to 
accelerate the learning process. 
 The most potent opportunity for learning came from reflection on peer 
feedback.  The reflection likely increased the acquisition of potential patterns that 
could be used as the basis for future intuitive responses.  This rapid pattern 
recognition has also been credited with generating an increase in decision confidence 
(Simmons & Nelson, 2006b).  A higher level of confidence allowed the participants 
to adjust the margin for error.  




 Feedback came from three sources and played a role in the on-going, iterative 
decision process of the participants.  The mountain environment contributed some of 
the feedback; unfortunately it was often incomplete or misleading.  Additional 
feedback came from the actions of the ski group as they travelled through the terrain 
and from other guides in the field.  Participant 101 described the challenge of 
working independently.  “I’m pretty hard on myself when it comes to my own 
business….Its pretty hard to bounce things off yourself.  Its easier to talk to someone 
about it and sort of calibrate or figure out how it went when you have some other 
people”. 
7.2.3.1.1	  Environmental	  feedback	  
 Natural and skier triggered avalanche activity observed by the participants 
was taken as a strong and reliable indicator of weaknesses within the snowpack 
(McClung & Schaerer, 2006).  “Whenever the mountain ‘talks’ like that it gives 
strong feedback” (Participant 608).  As described in Chapter Two, someone from 
within the ski group triggers the majority of avalanches that catch skiers.  Far fewer 
skiers are involved in natural avalanches.  The environmental feedback most 
frequently discussed by the participants centred on their ability to directly impact the 
snowpack through skier or explosive initiation. 
7.2.3.1.2	  Skier	  initiated	  feedback	  
 Skier triggered avalanches were one the best sources of information and 
feedback for the participants, as they were a direct measure of a skier’s potential to 
trigger an avalanche.  Participants or their guests triggered slopes in a number of 
ways: deliberately by choosing a potential weak area, accidentally by skiing through 
that weak area inadvertently, and remotely from a distance (either deliberately or 
accidentally).   Some of the participants also attempted to trigger avalanches with 
explosives.  Participant 708 described the dilemma of wanting feedback on the 
sensitivity to triggering, but not the potential negative consequence.  “Feedback on 
terrain choices, if you make a decision not to go somewhere there is little feedback, 
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but if you go and something happens, then it's easier but tough because of 
consequence”. 
7.2.3.1.2.1	  Deliberately	  triggered	  or	  controlled	  while	  skiing	  
 Ski cutting was routinely used to test the stability of the snowpack.  Small 
slopes with minimal consequence that were similar in nature to the intended ski lines 
were tested.  “Ski cutting produced 10 cm loose sluffing.  Guide cut most starts” 
(Participant 103).  Although it was an excellent source of feedback, the lack of a 
result was less definitive.  “I suspected a windslab and ski cut the slope with no 
results, I was still suspicious of the slope and therefore had the group ski a less steep 
line” (Participant 404). 
7.2.3.1.2.2	  Accidentally	  triggered	  
 Accidentally triggered avalanches were an excellent source of direct feedback 
on the decision process.  “As soon as the guest entered the chute, the slope released 
(30 cm crown) and zippered around into a steep rocky area next to the chute” 
(Participant 106).  Testing the slope through ski cutting may not always be possible 
and can result in accidental avalanches.  “Skied a lower TL [treeline] NE aspect in 
previously skied area without ski cutting, resulting in 2 Sa's [skier triggered 
accidental avalanches] to size 1.5 and scaring one guest” (Participant 103).  Non-
fatal and non-injurious skier involvements in avalanches may be a regular and 
acceptable risk within a commercial ski operation, however great effort is put into 
avoiding them, as there can be a very small margin between a fatal and a non-fatal 
outcome. 
See it and feel it be part of it for it to actually sink in and be part of you from 
then on.  And particularly if you've been part of the decision.  It’s that 
negative feedback, I made a decision and it was wrong, way wrong because 
somebody got caught.  Those are the decisions that sink in.  Participant 714 
7.2.3.1.2.3	  Remotely	  triggered	  
 Remotely triggered avalanches that do not entrain a skier are arguably a 
better form of feedback, as they give a good indicator of the sensitivity of the 
snowpack while providing a larger safety margin.  “[I] went to the fracture line of the 
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skier remote to get a feeling of the avalanche size and consequence” (Participant 
714). 
 Participant 608 described feedback he received just after he made the 
decision not to ski a slope.  The slope released remotely and the avalanche was big 
enough to bury and kill someone.  “I decided it was not viable to ski the group down 
this line and was sidestepping back up when the flank of the ridge release Sr size 2 
[skier remote size 2]”.  Participant 702 welcomed the feedback when the group 
triggered an avalanche large enough to fully bury the entire group. 
[An] expert group on mellow terrain - wanted to ski non stop [I] but was 
concerned with Jan 30 SH triggering on gully walls, so I stopped early to tell 
them to stay on the ridge and not in the gully (gully feature is small and 
insignificant looking until it releases).  We skied the ridge and coming down 
to the bottom, I looked over and saw 2m of debris beside me spilling out of 
the gully.  It has triggered remotely from less than 10m away and fractured 
the whole gully wall!  This was so great because I actually got an answer to 
the "safety margin / decision-making process" we do everyday.  Participant 
702 
7.2.3.1.3	  Explosive	  triggered	  
 Some participants used explosives to test slopes without placing a skier in 
potential harm.  This provided feedback from a larger trigger than a skier.  “[We 
decided] to ski a supported feature adjacent to a size 2 Xe [explosive triggered 
avalanche] from a week ago” (Participant 103).  However the lack of result did not 
necessarily mean that the slope or similar slopes were safe to ski.  Participant 810 
described a near-miss event that occurred after explosive testing.  “[An] explosive 
charge [was] placed in [the] slope and [the] run was skied prior to the [near-miss]”.   
 Avalanches resulting from explosive testing helped with decision-making, 
however non-results were less definitive and needed to be interpreted within the 
context of the terrain and snowpack.  “[We decided] to have explosive testing done 
on a main ski line.  A size 2 avalanche resulted and we skied an alternate route in 
white out conditions, mostly along a cat road” (Participant 103). 
7.2.3.1.4	  Peer	  feedback	  
 Participants faced a dilemma in that conservative terrain choices typically 
resulted in a lack of environmental feedback, whereas aggressive choices potentially 
     
 
222 
led to accidents or near-misses.  Participants were dependent on peer feedback to 
calibrate their confidence and margin for error.  “Guide team agreed I made a good 
decision not to ski the slope, and the clients were in a safe spot.  Discussed the 
variability of SH [surface hoar] and the SSL [soft slab] which was deeper than 
expected and triggered remotely” (Participant 608).  Peer feedback was a powerful 
tool available to guiding teams, but appeared to be under reported and perhaps under 
utilized.  This area has great potential for the development of decision-making 
expertise and is further discussed later in this chapter and in the next chapter.   
If I have had what I feel is a challenging day, irrespective of what those 
challenges have been, I bring it up with the rest of the guiding team and say 
how did it go for you because I need to get some more tangible feedback.  I 
felt like the day sucked and I want to know how it went for you.  And then 
you can have some learning out of that.  Participant 508 
7.2.3.2	  Reflection	  
 The ability to reflect on decisions and the feedback generated either from the 
environment or from peers was key to the development of more sophisticated 
decision responses.  Participants described how reflection modified their future 
decisions.  
I decided to ski it but at the end of the day was disappointed with myself that 
I let myself be exposed like that when it wasn't necessary at all - lots of good 
snow around.  I hadn't switched my mind from Good stability yet even 
though we had a couple of warning days leading up to today that the layers 
were waking up.  Nothing happened but I feel stupid for letting myself be 
exposed like that - I had a contingency plan but the guilt of skiing it 
afterwards leads me to believe I really shouldn't have been there. Participant 
702 
7.3	  Summary	  
 I used the Background Experience Profile to form the foundation for the 
analysis of the event reports.  It was from within this view of expertise that I was 
able to put the event reports into perspective.  Although not all the participants were 
‘experts’ as per the strictest definitions from the literature (Ericsson, 1996; Ericsson 
& Charness, 1994), the ‘average’ participant could be considered an expert.  This 
allowed me to move the analysis forward on the basis of expert performance and 
delve into the role of recognition-primed decision-making (Klein, 1998).  
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 The codes that were assigned to the descriptive responses from the event 
reports and the first round of interviews had both inductive and deductive origins.  
The participant responses spoke strongly about the processes that were used to make 
decisions.  I analysed the participant responses and allocated them into coded groups 
to generate a number of themes.  These themes described the decision process used 
by this group of expert ski guides.  The most frequently mentioned and eloquently 
described codes were terrain, expectations and feedback.  These three codes were 
central my discussion of the decision process of the participants.  
 Although the twenty-four primary codes were grouped into six themes, there 
was considerable overlap that tied the themes together.  Each theme was connected 
to its neighbour by at least one code, while the confidence and margin for error codes 
straddled all six themes.  These six themes described the decision processes used by 
ski guides to navigate the challenges of conducting guests through potentially 
hazardous terrain.  Both intuition and analysis were embraced as integral components 
of the decision process.  
 Although the word ‘terrain’ was used as a code, the meaning of this code 
included the snowpack as it lay on that terrain.  Thus the code can be taken to include 
the concept of environment.  The terrain and snowpack environment provided the 
initial challenge for the participants, but also proved to be a source of feedback, 
although the frequency was sometimes lacking and the meaning masked.  The 
sombre undertone of the feedback included the potential for fatal or exacting 
consequences as per Hogarth et al. (1991).  Fortunately my research participants 
experienced no fatalities, however there were injuries to both guests and guides.  
 Exacting feedback from the terrain was powerful on a visceral level and had 
the potential to degrade decision performance (Hogarth et al., 1991), however peer 
feedback provided the opportunity for cognitive learning when it included an 
analysis of the why question (Hammond & Summers, 1972).   
 The participants clearly described the difficulties that they faced and the ways 
in which they used both intuition and analysis to solve problems.  Hammond (2010) 
argued that intuition should not be used in isolation and should be paired with 
analytical strategies.  A concern expressed by participants was that intuitive 
responses generated through pattern recognition were not able to account for the 
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current conditions.  Uncertainty was high and confidence low as intuitive 
responses did not easily come to mind as the literature suggests (Simmons & Nelson, 
2006b).  In addition to this, analytical strategies were also unable to account for the 
anomalies.  Participants felt abandoned by intuitive and analytical strategies that had 
worked in the past.  Koole and Jostmann (2004) suggest that action-oriented 
individuals, like these participants should be able to control intuitive emotions and 
not let their emotions hijack their decision process. 
 The primary strategy used by the participants to manage uncertainty was a 
prudent risk management process.  This was due to the anomalous events observed 
during the winters of the study.  Guides described how they were reluctant to ‘step it 
up’ and take their guests into more complex and potentially hazardous terrain.  
Although there was considerable pressure from guests to use more aggressive terrain, 
the decision process was tempered by the possibility of a low frequency, high 
consequence event.  The nature of the deeply buried, persistent weak layers was that 
it was difficult to forecast the likelihood of triggering.  Yet the information exchange 
within the industry, facilitated primarily by the InfoEx, produced a steady flow of 
reports of large catastrophic, yet anomalous events.  A majority of the fatal 
avalanches that occurred during this time frame were attributed to persistent weak 
layers (Klassen, 2008, 2010b).  The fact that there were very few avalanche fatalities 
within professionally guided groups is testament to the effectiveness of this cautious 
strategy.  
 Despite the expertise within the participant group, many were surprised when 
anomalous events occurred that did not fall within previously recognizable patterns.  
This is not surprising as Canadian Avalanche Centre forecasters described these as 
one-in-thirty year patterns (Klassen, 2010a).  Some participants felt that they had 
learned how to make better decision in spite of the wicked, unfavourable learning 
environment.  The literature suggests that wicked and exacting environments will 
produce minimal learning and that any learning that occurs may be compromised and 
lead to future poor performances (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Hogarth et al., 1991; 
Simandan, 2011).    
 One outcome, measured by the number of commercial fatalities, suggests that 
this is not true.  After three increasingly difficult winters the fatality rate was 
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unchanged.  Decision performances did not get worse.  There is no doubt that the 
environment was exacting; poor decisions had the potential to be punished with 
severe consequences.  These conditions increased the likelihood of numerous 
commercial fatalities.  Yet that did not happen.  I suggest that this was due to 
increasingly conservative decision-making.  The only other possible answer is that 
the entire mechanized ski industry was incredibly lucky for two years.  Given the 
roughly 90,000 commercial skier days each season, it would be hard to attribute the 
success to just blind luck.  I suggest that this was highly unlikely.  The analysis of 
the second round of interviews has been used in the next chapter to connect the 
results from this chapter to a broader discussion of the topic.  
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Chapter	  8	  Findings	  and	  Discussion:	  Study	  Three	  –	  A	  holistic	  
interpretation	  of	  dual	  process	  	  
8.1	  Introduction	  
 In Chapter Eight, I used the participants’ words and descriptions generated 
through the final round of interviews to develop a more holistic perspective of dual 
process decision-making.  This chapter provided my findings and analysis of how 
intuition fits into the broader context of the Dual Process Theories (Evans, 2010; 
Glöckner & Witteman, 2010).  I used the final interview responses to look at 
intuition as a parallel partner to analysis rather than an either/or comparison.  It is a 
more global perspective compared to the findings and results in chapters five to 
seven.  Chapter Nine, the conclusions and recommendations, is used to draw the 
findings and results together from all four chapters and to clarify the contribution to 
the literature.  
 Chapter Eight provides the findings and discussion from the third and final 
study.  As discussed in the methods chapter, the intent of this third study was to distil 
a richer understanding of the decision process.  Findings from the first two studies 
used expertise and event reports as the data source.  The third study was narrower in 
scope, using nine participants; however these nine participants provided great depth 
of perspective for analysis.   
 The interviews were conducted in October and December just prior to the 
start of the 2010-2011 ski season.  As the participants were not actively guiding at 
the time of the interviews, a scenario or a vignette based on the Critical Decision 
Method (Klein et al., 1989) was used to get the participants thinking about ski guide 
decision-making again.  These vignettes consisted of a photograph of a ski run and a 
set of facts about the snowpack.  See Appendix 9 for the vignettes and the interview 
questions.  Once I felt that the participants were sufficiently primed to make guiding 
decisions, I moved to the primary questions as listed below.  This took longer for the 
interviews conducted in October, likely because the December interviews were 
conducted during the pre-season training week and the participants had spent one or 
more days back in the wilderness skiing environment.  The interviews took from 45 
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minutes to two hours.  I did not limit my questions or the participants’ answers to 
the impact of the 2008-2010 seasons and opened up the interview to be inclusive of 
all previous experiences.  As with Study 2, the interviews were initially coded as 
digital audio files using HyperResearch.  The coded sections were then transcribed 
using MacSpeech Dictate and inserted back into HyperResearch for the thematic 
analysis.  
8.2	  Study	  3	  -­‐	  Final	  Interviews	  
 The central premise that emerged from the final interview data was that 
guiding decisions were co-generated by both intuitive responses and analytical 
results.  This fits within the dual process theories as supported by a growing body of 
literature (Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011).  I asked the participants 
three key questions in this third study.   
1. What is an intuitive response?   
2. What is an analytical response?   
3. How do they relate? 
 In Study 2, using the Event Report Questionnaire and follow-up interview, 
participants were asked the extent to which their decision was based on an intuitive 
response, an analytical response, or a mix.  In this final interview, participants were 
asked a broader series of questions focused on the nature of the intuitive-analytical 
relationship.  Within this broader context, it became apparent that participants were 
using intuition and analysis at the same time.  Rather than being an either-or answer, 
participants described a more nuanced approach that integrated the two systems.  
This fits with the dual process models of decision-making described by Evans (2007, 
2008), as opposed to the dual system theories described by Kruglanski and 
Gigerenzer (2011). 
8.3	  Themes	  
 I developed the coded responses into four central themes: the challenge, the 
response, mitigating factors and outcomes.  Although this Study 3 has fewer themes, 
there is consistency between it and Study 2.  Study 3 has a more streamlined set of 
themes compared to Study 2, but they follow a similar progression.  
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8.3.1	  The	  Challenge	  
 As described in previous chapters the winters of 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 
presented a number of cumulative long-term challenges for ski guides in British 
Columbia.  For long periods, guides had difficulty providing consistent, high quality 
ski days for their guests.  The complexity of the environment had a direct impact on 
the decision process.  Both intuitive responses and analytical processes were 
negatively affected by what was termed by the participants as different winters.  
Participants described elevated levels of stress, because both their intuitive responses 
and their analyses were failing them.  Participants described their stress in the 
following way:  
Difficult, very difficult.  Because I saw terrain avalanche that I hadn’t seen 
avalanche in twelve seasons of being here.  I had a guest with a small 
involvement… in terrain that I’d never seen avalanche before, [terrain] that I 
didn’t think anything about. Participant 106 
We had two winters before last.  They had their issues.  They were a piece of 
cake compared last winter.  The difference was last year took what was 
normally a safe piece of terrain and totally threw it out the window. 
Participant 702 
 The timing of the interviews generated distance from the day-to-day stress of 
ski guiding, with six to eight months of separation from the enactment of guiding 
decisions.  During this time, the participants had the opportunity to reflect.  This 
reflection likely formed an integral part of the learning process for the participants 
(Boud & Walker, 1991; Dewey, 1938; Korthagen, 2005; Schön, 1990).  After three 
difficult winters in a row, the accumulated level of stress surprised me.  
We have a lot of safe terrain.  It should not have been that hard.  But to be out 
there day in and day out and have to deal with that….It really upset me.  I 
think because it seemed like I couldn’t get away from avalanches.  They were 
everywhere.  No matter how hard you tried to ski as mellow as possible and 
they were still there…  I was just mad.  I had a lot of anger.  Participant 702 
8.3.2	  The	  Response	  
 Participants were asked to describe in detail how they used intuition and 
analysis.  They described what each process meant to them and how they thought the 
two processes interacted for them.  Participants rarely described using intuition or 
analysis in isolation.  More frequently, the two decision processes were described as 
complementary elements of the final decision.  This confirmed what might have been 
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expected and is consistent with Kruglanski and Gigerenzer’s (2011) unified 
theory of judgement.  They suggest that intuition and analysis share a common set of 
rules or inferential processes.  The use of heuristics provides a possible clue as to 
how intuition and analysis can be linked.  Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011, p. 100) 
defined a heuristic as “a rule that ignored part of the information and did not attempt 
to calculate the maximum or minimum of a function”.  
 My participants termed the decision process easy when the two processes 
suggested the same course of action, and difficult when different courses of action 
were indicated.  
So I think its always subtly going back and forth between the two.  I think as 
time goes on, as I skied this terrain here, I probably rely a bit more on 
intuition and when I ski terrain where I’m less familiar with pieces of the 
puzzle, I rely on data a lot more.  Participant 101 
 The dynamic interaction between intuition and analysis also caused stress.  
This occurred when the two response processes were at odds.  This interaction of 
intuition and analysis described by the participants fits what is described in the 
literature as a Dual Process Theory (Evans, 2008; Hogarth, 2005; Pretz, 2008). In 
this chapter, as I analysed the participant responses, I used the context of intuition 
and analysis as separate entities operating concurrently.  
8.3.2.1	  Analysis	  
 Participants learned through their guide training and avalanche training 
programs to use an analytical process in their determination of safe travel choices 
(Association of Canadian Mountain Guides, 1999; McClung & Schaerer, 2006).  
This analytical process is sophisticated and well defined.  Considerable global 
expertise has continually improved snow science as evidenced by the preponderance 
of hard science or engineering-based research presentations at the biennial 
International Snow Science Workshop.  The analytical process anchored the decision 
process for the participants.  
It is definitely there.  Absolutely, because it’s part of our job.  It’s part of 
learning what’s going on in the snowpack and following it through the 
winter.  It’s what gives you your foundation to know what’s there in the snow 
and what to watch for, where things will move and if they step down.  It’s 
like your baseline vitals. Participant 604 
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 Participants acknowledge that this analytical process did not occur in 
isolation, that most often it was the basis for a group decision process during the 
morning guides meeting.  “An analytical response is often a group response; all of 
the information that we gather, the formal process that we operate under as guides, 
the training system that we have, [and] the decision-making process that we’ve been 
taught” (Participant 608).  For many of the participants the analytical process was 
anchored by the physical act of digging into the snow to see what was there.  
The actual studying of what’s going on.  So digging.  Most of the digging that 
I might do would be surface or what we might call hasty pits, but there is 
always weekly full profiles done.  We look at, as a group and discuss.  That 
to me is analytical.  Participant 103 
 However, participants described how their use of the well-defined analytical 
path changed as they gained expertise.  “Earlier in my career, I would put more 
confidence in the information that was gathered.  More trust in that.  I do that less 
now” (Participant 608). 
 Extensive use of the analytical, data-intensive process exposed deficiencies or 
shortcomings, resulting in the feeling that at times, data analysis was not enough. 
What makes me not trust it is I think an analytical response can’t, just by the 
very nature of its limited ability to assess everything.  It’s not possible to do 
that.  If we had superpowers to see into the snow and see everything there, 
and way faster brains to process more information, maybe I would trust it a 
lot more. Participant 608 
 Participants felt most reluctant to trust the data when they were dealing with 
persistent weak layers.  Participant 714 described the problem.  “But on the 
persistent weak layers, I don’t think were getting nearly the quality of result to base a 
decision ‘to ski or not to ski’, a based on a profile”.  They had good reason to feel 
this way, as many unexpected skier triggered avalanches have been linked to the 
presence of persistent weak layers (Jamieson & Geldsetzer, 1999).  As a result, this 
area has been the target of extensive research since 2005, with new diagnostic tools 
developed such as the Propagation Saw Test and the Extended Column Test (Gautier 
2007).  These new tools may allow participants (guides) to change from their current 
default strategy of using extra caution when they know that there is a persistent weak 
layer. 
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Dial it back a step when you’ve got a persistent weak layer in the 
snowpack.  Even when it’s not performing, dial it back a step.  Don’t worry 
about your test results.  You can throw most of your test results out.  
Participant 714 
 Avalanche forecasting has not been skipped by the current age of technology.  
With increased access to information about snowpack and weather conditions, 
participants described how it has become more challenging to make efficient use of 
the wealth of data.  “When I’m in the zone, [I] can’t process this information because 
I’ve got enough coming in already.  But at the same time… it just starts to become 
overwhelming at times” (Participant 106).  There is a growing perception that 
although abundant information is good, less, but enhanced or more targeted 
information is better. 
In the early days I was trying to look at it all and try to analyse it.  And just 
finding it was too overwhelming to take in that much information.  In the last 
couple of years… okay let’s bring it closer to home and look at these 
operations that are close to me and see if they’re seen similar things in the 
snowpack or not and why or why not.  Participant 106 
8.3.2.2	  Intuition	  
 I separated the role that intuition played in the dual process into three parts 
for analysis.  The first step was to use the participants’ words to simply describe an 
intuitive response.  The second step was to analyse the different ways in which 
participants used intuition.  The final stage was to analyse possible differences 
between positive and negative intuitive responses.  
8.3.2.2.1	  Description	  
 Intuition is a concept that is difficult to describe.  As described in the 
literature review chapter, there are many, varied descriptions ranging from: “heuristic 
and error prone” (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011 p. 97), to “contrastive of 
reasoning” (Evans, 2010, p. 313) and simply, pattern recognition (Kahneman &  
Klein, 2009; Klein, 1998).  Not surprisingly, participants also explained it in a 
variety of ways.  The predominant description included a sense of feeling.  These 
feelings were described as either positive, the need to do something, or negative, the 
need to avoid something. 
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 For Participant 702, it was associated with sound and feel.  “Intuition 
comes in when you’re standing there and you can feel the snow and listen to the 
sounds it makes and how it feels when your skis are going through it.”  The feeling 
of the snow likely elicits a somatic response (Brown & Reid, 2006; Damasio, 1996).  
There is emotion associated with the feeling of the skis cutting through the snow.  It 
may be a good feeling associated with memories of high quality skiing.  Alternately, 
it could be a bad feeling associated with a negative event, anything from poor skiing 
quality to an avalanche involvement.  “It is the feeling that you get based on your 
senses, your observations visually and sensory-wise, feeling the snow and knowing 
the history of what happened in the days leading up to it” (Participant 604).  These 
somatic markers are thought to exert a powerful influence on the decision process 
(Brown & Reid, 2006).  
 Participants linked intuition with pattern recognition; the sense that they had 
seen it before and recognized what had worked, or not, in the past.  “Intuition, in my 
mind, comes from something that just wasn’t conscious: pattern recognition.  I use 
intuition in my guiding all the time, not necessarily just for go or no go decisions, but 
where to ski a line” (Participant 714). 
 Participant 702 described intuition as starting with a feeling, but then 
becoming a voice to listen to.  This inner dialogue may be a form of constructive 
intuition that begins to link retrieved patterns with mental representations of possible 
solutions (Glöckner & Witteman, 2010). 
To me it’s a feeling that I get.  I get butterflies in my stomach.  I get that 
voice in my head that starts talking about the “what ifs”, or “what about this” 
or “are you sure about this”.  The voice that starts talking to me, asking me, 
it’s like a checklist in my head.  Have you really considered all this, or are 
you just pushing it aside because you really want to ski that? Participant 702 
 Participant 106 summarized his description of intuition by linking his feelings 
with his experience base, acknowledging that his cumulative cultural capital was a 
source of information that could be linked with his analytical reasoning.  Hogarth 
(2010) supports this notion, but cautions that the cultural capital of previous patterns 
has the potential to lead the decision maker astray, if the patterns were learned in 
wicked environments. 
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Intuition is like a sixth sense when I’m out there… the ability to make 
good decisions based on experience with decisions and bad decision-making 
and using that collective knowledge to reinforce the ideas or thoughts that 
I’m having going through my head along with factual evidence as well. 
Participant 106 
8.3.2.2.2	  Use	  of	  Intuition	  
 Intuition was used in a variety of ways.  For many of the participants, the use 
of intuition did not just happen.  There was a conscious use of intuition.  Morsella 
and Bargh (2010) suggest that an initial intuitive response promotes action; however 
conscious processing of that intuitive response serves to constrain action.  
Participants recognized that the presence of an intuitive response often triggered an 
element of deliberation, which in turn led to an analysis of that response.  This 
process is supported by the notion of constructive intuition (Glöckner & Witteman, 
2010).  Participant 106 described the process when he recognized that his intuitive 
pattern recognition was flawed.  His conscious processing or deliberations may not 
only have changed the output of his decision, but also impacted future intuitive 
responses. 
So the pattern has changed.  So when it comes back to intuition, is intuition 
correct here or not?  It wasn’t in that situation.  So then I start to guess the 
intuition.  How much should I be basing my decision off intuition?  It starts to 
get all messy when I start to break it down and try to figure it out.  Participant 
106 
 This integration of intuition into a deliberate process was described as being 
integral to the task of terrain selection.  The task began during the morning guides 
meeting and extended out into the field.  Participants felt that intuition helped them 
select terrain on both a macro and micro scale.  In the morning meeting, Participant 
101 suggested that the integration of intuition and analysis occurred when the run list 
was generated.  “Certainly during the run list.  You’re talking about different runs, 
the characteristics of the runs, you have the feeling of how the snow, how the 
stability has laid up.  What you can get away with?” 
 Hogarth (2010) suggests that the question should not be whether intuition or 
analysis is superior, but how to use both process in a synergistic effort, with intuitive 
responses treated as data and analytical responses passed through the intuitive filter 
of “How does it feel?”. 
     
 
235 
8.3.2.2.3	  Positive	  and	  Negative	  Intuitive	  Responses	  
 Intuitive responses played a greater role for participants when they evoked 
stronger feelings.  This included both positive and negative feelings.  “Intuition tends 
to be more site-specific.  I feel good here.  I don’t feel good over there.  And often if 
you move to the next site, it’s not there any more” (Participant 714).  These somatic 
markers functioned as alarm bells, alerting the participants to existence of previously 
experienced positive or negative events (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Damasio, 1996). 
“It’s like a thing within your body that is just sort of an alert.  It’s almost like a siren 
goes off on in your body” (Participant 604). 
 Many participants reported experiencing negative intuitive responses.  These 
negative intuitive responses had a strong influence on the decision process and 
triggered further analytical processing.  “I learned that it was good to listen to all the 
time was the [sic] nagging voice that was saying: ‘No don’t do that.  This might 
happen.  Remember this’” (Participant 702).  
It just means that there is [sic] enough factors in the back of my mind that are 
telling me that there is something that’s not right.  It’s a warning bell that 
you’ve got to weigh against other things, but it is a warning bell, that over the 
years I’ve been involved in skiing in the winter, it has been a warning bell 
that has been good for me. Participant 601 
 The negative intuitive response seemed to speak more strongly to the 
participants.  “I try not to make go decisions based on intuition but I do make lots of 
no-go decisions based on intuition” (Participant 714).  Although the negative 
intuitive responses were valued as alerts to possible dangers, participants described a 
preference to operating in the absence of these bad feelings.  
To me the best way is to not let it get to the point where you have a bad 
feeling about something.  If it’s gotten to that point it’s almost like I haven’t 
been using the intuitive process early enough.  I’ve already gotten to the point 
where it’s a critical enough decision or situations that I’m actually getting a 
bad feeling about something.  I would rather be operating where I having a 
good feeling about what’s going on.  I found listening to intuition early; I’m 
much more in that place of feeling good about what is going on in the process 
and the decisions that are being made.  Participant 608 
 The positive intuitive response was only mentioned twice in total by the nine 
participants, but may represent the tip of the iceberg.   
     
 
236 
Sometimes you definitely do go for it… it’s not a standstill think about it, 
think about it.  You just go. If you have that feeling you just go.  It’s a split 
[second] decision....I’ve had situations where I went for it and I’ve been 
lucky. Participant 604 
 It is possible that this type of response occurs more frequently during winters 
when persistent weak layers are less of a concern.  
8.3.2.3	  Dual	  Process	  
 The dual process models suggest that intuition and analysis are 
complementary and parallel processes (Sloman, 1996; Stanovich et al., 2011), 
however given the immediacy of the intuitive response to a sudden stimulus; it may 
frequently occur prior to the development of an analytical response.  The default-
interventionist theory suggests that decisions could be made solely based on the 
intuitive response, if it were strong enough (Gillard et al., 2009).  Hausmann and 
Läge (2008) described this as the process of accumulating enough evidence to attain 
a desired level of confidence.  It would likely take a conscious decision to extend 
beyond the stop conditions, if the threshold for certainty was reached within the 
intuitive response.  Feduzi (2010) argued that the issue of the ‘stopping problem’ 
hinged on the degree of completeness within the weighted evidence.  Taken one step 
further, there were times when the strength of the intuitive response provided 
adequate stop conditions for my research participants.  However, participants 
described that this was not a frequent occurrence and that more often, they relied on 
both intuitive and analytical responses as a series of checks and balances.  This may 
be due to some of the elements of analytical pre-planning that occurred on a daily 
basis.  The morning guides meeting set the stage for an intuitive – analytical 
dialogue. 
The initial framework decisions are based on analytical [analysis].  That’s in 
the office before you’re on your skis.  If you made an analytical decision to 
ski slope “A” and you get there and things are not exactly as you discussed 
them, that’s when intuition kicks in. Participant 103  
I use my intuition a lot.  It’s a dual process for me.  I don’t go hundred 
percent analytical.  You always have a feeling about something as well.  You 
get out of the machine and step into the snow; right away you get a feeling.  
Participant 604 
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 Participants displayed reluctance to be entirely dependent on either 
process, preferring instead a blend of processes.  “Make sure you have data and 
intuition every single time.  Not just intuition” (Participant 101).  “Gut feeling?  I 
don’t think I solely use intuition.  I also use our team’s analysis our discussions in 
the morning” (Participant 103).  However when intuition and analysis clashed, 
participants indicated a preference for intuition. 
Intuition plays a big role for me.  I can look at statistics or facts on a piece of 
paper and it plays a role, but intuition for me over the years, you can’t 
quantify it, but it has played a reasonably high role.  If something doesn’t feel 
right, if the paperwork is indicating it is right, I may not do it… The final 
decision comes out of an intuitive process.  Participant 601 
 Defaulting to intuition did not always work well for the participants, as their 
intuitive responses could have been swayed by the use of a representative heuristic 
that failed to account for base rate neglect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
Participants described how their decision confidence suffered and stress increased 
when they had to choose between intuitive and analytical conflicting alternatives. 
If I’ve overridden the analytical, I would probably have very low confidence 
in it.  I know that that happens to me.  So I do it much less.  When I was a 
younger guide I made that decision more and more and you skied the whole 
run with your hair standing up.  At your regroup spot, yelling, “come on, 
come on, come on, oh man, I can’t believe he fell there” by the end of the run 
you feel shitty and stressed.  Participant 714 
 This is consistent with studies conducted using an fMRI to detect areas of 
brain activation.  De Neys, Vartanian and Goel (2008) monitored frontal brain areas 
thought to be responsible for conflict detection and response inhibition.  They found 
that the conflict detection area was activated in most cases.  They suggest that 
although the intuitive process may provide a rapid solution; as long as it is not 
immediately acted upon, the analytical process has the opportunity to provide an 
alternate and potentially conflicting alternative.  They suggest that heuristic biases 
may occur, not from a failure to detect a conflict, but from a failure to inhibit the 
intuitive response.   
 My participants showed that they were able to detect conflicts between 
intuition and analysis and regularly used both processes in a series of checks and 
balances. 
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It [intuition] plays a huge role for sure.  I think of it as 50/50, when I am 
feeling comfortable on the slope.  When I have less history, less analytics, I 
kind of lean towards more data, but there’s always that touching base with 
how you’re feeling.  Participant 101 
 As the human brain has finite cognitive capacity, and in the environment of 
my research participants, limited time, the primary task of the participants was to 
decide when to trust an intuitive response and when to apply more in-depth 
processing.  Evans (2010) argues for the use of intuition as the basis for analysis  and 
this was the strategy used by many of my participants.  
8.3.3	  Mitigating	  Factors	  
 The participants described how the duality of the decision process was 
dependent on, or varied, based on two key factors; the range of possible 
consequences of a particular action and the feeling of confidence generated by the 
decision process.  Participant 101 described how he used two questions.  “Does it 
feel good? and Is it worth it? Not only the consequence, but touching base with the 
risk and reward.” 
 Consequence also played into the conflicting outcome scenario when 
intuition suggested one course of action and analysis another.  Galloway (2005) 
stressed the importance of assessing the potential outcomes of a decision.  If the 
decision was wrong, and the worst possible outcome were to occur, would this be 
acceptable? 
You know what I think it boils down to for me is consequence.  If analysis 
says don’t go and intuition says go, then I take the next step. If I go what’s to 
happen? Am I going to get wrenched through trees for 500 vertical feet? Well 
no I probably won’t go. Participant 103 
 Even when nothing went wrong, there were times when participants felt that 
they had made poor decisions.  These were taken as opportunities to modify future 
decisions.  
When I feel that something really could’ve gone wrong, and it didn’t, that 
really hits home hard.  And I can’t really explain it.  It’s pucker factor.  It is 
gut feeling.  Something was wrong there.  And you just know.  At least you 
think you know.  Participant 103 




 Participants described confidence as a feeling that permeated the entire 
decision process, but was most acutely felt at a few key points.  Their initial level of 
intuitive confidence would likely have been generated as the result of previously 
enacted decisions and resulting feedback.  Whether or not participant confidence was 
tainted by an illusion of validity would have depended on how the participant had 
learned from those previous experiences (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). “I try to relate 
it to past events, past history, past build-up of snowpack, past types of terrain, what 
has and hasn’t happened on things.  My level of confidence is pretty high in my 
decision-making” (Participant 601).  However the assumption that confidence is 
increased through additional time spent in the environment may be flawed.  The 
absence of reflection on non-event days may lull the unsuspecting decision maker 
into a state of overconfidence (Fischhoff et al., 1977). 
I think the more time you’re at it, experience longevity.  You can’t help but to 
build your confidence in your decision-making skills, the more time you put 
into it, and the more that you’re exposed to and the more that you see. 
Participant 604 
 The environment experienced by the participants during the winters of 2008-
2010 was not conducive to the development of confidence.  Some participants 
described having a low level of confidence due to the presence of persistent weak 
layers.  They could not use their level of confidence as a stopping rule as suggested 
by Hausmann and Läge (2008). 
For me personally it is harder to feel confident about what is going on with 
that [PWL] when it is that deep in the snow pack.  And you know that it’s 
lingering and you know that it’s going to be variable. Participant 608 
 Other participants described a process to reduce the level of uncertainty, by 
being less dependent on the analysis of snowpack stability.  They created larger 
margins for error through conservative terrain choices.  “I make those kinds of 
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8.3.3.1.1	  Increased	  confidence	  and	  subsequent	  terrain	  use	  	  
 One of the challenges expressed by participants was the scenario when 
snowpack stability was improving.  Typical indicators of improving stability are a 
reduction in negative indicators, such as natural avalanche activity and the likelihood 
of skier triggering an avalanche (McClung & Schaerer, 2006). The validity of these 
two indicators is dependent on sample size.  The amount of terrain observed and the 
volume and type of terrain skied are necessary components of the decision process.  
Along with other stability factors, if no avalanches are observed or triggered, the 
guides may decide that snowpack stability is improving and that it may be possible to 
begin to use more aggressive terrain.  Participants described using small incremental 
steps as they began to use more aggressive terrain. 
I think you build confidence and don’t know if you build any knowledge.  
But you do build confidence as you step a little further.  As we step out, we 
do continue to analyse and if we’re not seeing a reaction on a layer or an 
interface of concern and we’re not getting it in our analysis and we’re not 
getting it in our skiing, then it tends to get stepped up a little further.  As you 
step out further you may need to choose terrain that has more support or low 
consequence.  Participant 103 
8.3.3.2	  Feedback	  
 Participants perceived feedback on their decisions coming through human 
interaction and from the physical environment.  This equates to behavioural and 
outcome feedback as described by Brown (2006).  The limitation on peer feedback 
received by the participants within a small circle of influence was that the peer group 
might have also misperceived the environmental context, due to a similar set of 
misleading factors.  The group decision process may have been distracted.  However, 
it was the environmental feedback during the 2008 / 2009 and 2009/10 seasons that 
forced participants to step back and re-evaluate their decision process; in particular 
the faith that they put in both the intuitive and the analytical processes.  
It was a progression and a learning to listen to that voice last year.  Because 
in so many other years I might have had the voice and I might have listened 
and probably other times I didn’t listen to it and I didn’t have that direct 
feedback and what was so neat about last year was I had that direct feedback 
a lot of times.  Participant 702 
 Participant 106 described the importance of receiving environmental 
feedback on the use of well-known terrain.  “I think being complacent, skiing the 
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terrain for the last 12 years and never seeing anything happen on it.  Thinking 
‘ahh’ it will be fine.  And then something pulling out and getting slapped”. 
 Finding the balance between caution and recklessness was a constant battle 
for the participants.  Direct environmental feedback provided a calibration 
opportunity.  The repeated negative feedback from the environment could be 
summed up with; no you cannot go there.  This contributed to the participants’ 
penchant for conservative decision-making and is consistent with other research 
findings (Brown, 2006). 
I was really lucky to get that direct feedback that is what I needed.  You can 
talk about avalanches until you’re blue in the face, but if you never see one 
and you never see one happen where you don’t expect it.  Or you think it 
might happen, but then it doesn’t.  You start to question am I being overly 
cautious?  Am I just getting away with stuff?  Participant 702 
8.3.3.3	  Reflections	  
 Reflection was different from feedback, but served a similar role.  
Participants described how they reflected on their performances, particularly in the 
absence of direct feedback.  The trigger of the reflective process was attributed to a 
direct evidence event such as a near-miss, or to forward thinking of the “what if…” 
scenario building process. Much of the reflection centred on a self-critique of 
possible negative outcomes that could have occurred, but did not.  Harteis, Bauer and 
Gruber (2008) found that there were constraints on near-miss reflections if at the 
organizational level, there was a culture of blaming.  Participants in my study 
reported corporate cultures that supported near-miss reporting.  
 Participants described that reflective episodes within their practice surfaced 
after both good days and on days when near-misses occurred. Near-misses frequently 
triggered extensive reflection.  Some of these near-misses were avalanche events that 
occurred either just before or just after the participants were exposed to the hazard.  
For the past nine years it has worked.  I’ve had no issues.  The last three 
seasons it’s kind of slapped me around.  It’s made me re-evaluate the 
situation with intuition and my own perception off collecting data and 
analysing data. Participant 106 
 Reflection was also triggered in the absence of a near-miss.  This raises the 
question of why participants felt that they had made a poor decision, even though an 
analysis of the decision provided no concrete evidence to support that.  There 
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appeared to be post-event, reflective episodes that pointed to an error in the 
decision response.  “I’ve never had the same gut wrenching feeling as when I made a 
mistake and nothing happened.  Never….I get to the bottom and everybody’s happy, 
but I’m pissed off because I think I’ve killed everyone” (Participant 103). 
 The need to justify one’s actions to the guests and the company hierarchy 
provided additional impetus for reflection.  Knowing that others would judge the 
quality of decision outcomes contributed to a more conservative range of risk 
acceptance. 
There have been a lot of times when I felt like an idiot, for skiing what I skied 
and taking people down it, because of the potential strictly for avalanches.  I 
get to the bottom of a run and my group is behind me.  Nothing happened and 
I felt like an idiot. Participant 103 
 Participant 714 described the self-questioning process that he used.  “How 
would I justify this decision, and if I can’t justify it then I don’t do it.  That’s my acid 
test, how would I explain this and how I explain that if something went wrong?”  
8.3.4	  Outcomes	  
 As described above, the conservative choice became a theme in the 
participants’ decision processes.  This pattern of behaviour was influenced by the 
nature of the environment.  The environment experienced during the winters of 
2008-2009 and 2009-2010 was not a fully wicked environment as described by 
Hogarth, et al (1991) and Pretz (2008). The consequences were severe, however the 
quantity and quality of feedback were mixed.  The challenge for the participants was 
a conflict that emerged between perceived feedback and previously observed 
patterns.  The feedback provided by observed natural and skier triggered avalanches 
did not match with expectations.  This created a sense of doubt, which mandated 
larger margins for error.  A kinder environment, one with less severe consequences, 
might have allowed for more aggressive decision choices.  However, the more 
wicked environment experienced over the two seasons and in particular the 2009-
1010 season, emphasized the need for a conservative approach. 
 The long term effect of this somewhat wicked environment was a trend 
toward more conservative decision choices.  “That’s what the last three years have 
done is added doubt to my ability to predict avalanches, persistent weak layer 
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avalanches and how long that they can stick around” (Participant 714).  “I tend to 
err on the safer side, regardless of whether it’s an intuitive feeling or an analytical 
situation. Today I will go with the conservative decision” (Participant 604). 
 When balancing their intuitive feelings with the results of analytical 
processing, participants described a conservative, hedging process as they adopted a 
wait and see attitude. 
I would rather wait an extra day or two even though all of the analytical 
information is pointing in that direction.  And even intuitively you feel that 
the stability is pretty good, but I still would rather be a bit more conservative.  
There’s no hurry.  Participant 608 
 The existence of a persistent weak layer in the snowpack, regardless of 
whether it was performing, was enough to question analytical test results and to 
embrace conservative intuitive responses.  
8.3.4.1	  Changes	  over	  time	  
 Participants described how their decision-making had changed over time as 
they gained expertise in dealing with the challenges of snowpacks with persistent 
weak layers.  
Five years ago I might have given you a different answer.  Five years ago I 
don’t think I was so defined in my decision processors.  But the last three 
years of persistent weak layers causing all kinds of issues, to me has 
solidified that thought that: no, “if it is there its there” and don’t try to 
second-guess if it’s there. Participant 714 
8.3.4.2	  All	  the	  answers	  
 The complexity of the ski guiding decision environment has led some 
participants to question their understanding of the avalanche phenomenon.  Although 
they had built expertise through years of deliberate practice, they felt that their ability 
to make good decisions was compromised. 
It’s interesting, I find the more and more I get into this, the less and less I feel 
like I know what’s going on.  The last couple of seasons it feels like my 
confidence has dropped.  It feels like I keep asking bigger and bigger 
questions about what’s going on there…. I don’t have any answers yet.  It 
seems like there will be a pattern growing where I will start to build 
confidence and then it just seems like I get slapped down and then it’s right 
back to the bottom again…. I’m just getting more confused.  Participant 106 




 There has been considerable discussion as to the nature of, and even the 
existence of dual processing in decision-making (Barrouillet, 2011a).  Single process 
theories have been argued by Keren and Schul (2009) and Kruglanski and 
Gigerenzer (2011), however they do not address the evidence provided by the 
research that has used fMRIs to demonstrate a link between brain activation and dual 
process (Lieberman et al., 2004).  
 The common ground between the single and dual process camps is the 
acknowledgement there are two components or parts at work.  Researchers have used 
a variety of names for these components from System 1 and System 2 (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973; Simon, 1987), Type 1 and Type 2 (Evans, 2011),  and more simply 
intuition and analysis (Hammond & Summers, 1972).  The argument as to how these 
two components integrate, ranges from the Cognitive Continuum Theory (Hammond 
& Summers, 1972; Hammond, 2010), to the fMRI studies conducted by De Neys et 
al. (2008), and Fuzzy Trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). 
 Within this matrix of conflicting and often overlapping research, the data 
from Study 3 suggest that participants used both intuition and analysis, but not as a 
cognitive continuum as explored in Study 2.  Participants described using intuition 
and analysis as distinct and separate continuums.  They used these two continuums in 
a series of comparisons, one to the other.  At times, they experienced high levels of 
both intuition and analysis, while at other times they experienced low levels of each.  
There were times when intuition and analysis were congruent and times when they 
suggested different courses of action.  The greatest challenges were experienced 
during these moments of cognitive discord, well thought out analysis suggesting one 
course of action and the intuitive response the opposite.  There is very little in the 
literature that explores the nature of intuitive feelings, be they good feelings or bad 
feelings.  Participants described how they were more motivated to action by bad 
feelings than good ones.  Participants responded to this challenge by defaulting to the 
conservative choice, perhaps exacerbated by the exacting and ‘wicked’ nature of the 
operational environment experienced during the two research seasons.  The 
avoidance of low likelihood, yet extreme negative consequence was the overriding 
theme expressed by the participants.  
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 Participants indicated that they were conscious of their processing of 
intuitive responses (Morsella & Bargh, 2010).  Rather than letting an immediate 
action prompted by an intuitive response that seemed to satisfice the decision 
environment become action, participants described how they often used analytical 
processing to constrain action.  Although there were likely times when Recognition-
primed decisions that satisficed the operational environment occurred as per Klein’s 
(1993) and Simon’s (1979) descriptions, participants reported regular use of intuition 
as a check, or constraint on analytical responses and vice versa.  
 Participants used feedback and reflection to learn from their experiences.  
This learning was likely powerful enough to impact their future intuitive responses.  
Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox and Sadler-Smith (2008) summarize that intuition is 
typically slow to change.  I suggest that three winters in a row of dealing with the 
possibility of low probability, high consequence events may have been enough to 
modify the participants’ intuitive processes.  Hogarth (1980) suggests that learning in 
this type of environment is difficult.  However, given the strength of the potential 
negative consequence and the occasional near-miss occurrence, ski guides who 
participated in the study were able to integrate learning into their practices, 
facilitated by reflection and peer feedback.  
Last winter I felt like hanging up my skis and walking away.  Because it 
didn’t seem worth it.  I was trying so hard to be out there in a beautiful 
environment, that is supposed to be fun, but it seemed like I was working so 
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Chapter	  9	  Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations	  
 Standing at the top of the first run of the day, everything seems to be coming 
together.  The storm is over.  There is plenty of fresh powder snow.  The sun is 
poking through the clouds.  The guiding team has selected a range of conservative 
terrain for the run list, with a low angle north-facing slope chosen for the first run.  It 
is the first week of March and the only avalanche concern is an instability with the 
recent storm snow; temperatures are relatively mild and the snow is settling and 
bonding rapidly.  The guiding team feels confident with their terrain selection in 
relation to the snow stability and their forecast of considerable avalanche hazard.  
Figure 17 shows the slope and the ski line in red (Google Earth, 2010). 
Figure	  17	  Buster's	  Run	  -­‐	  ski	  line	  
 
 The first guide and his group enter the slope and ski to the pick-up point. The 
second group is flown up from the valley and skis the slope.  The third group is 
flown up and enters the slope.  By this time, the helicopter has picked up the first 
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group and the second group has made it to the pick-up and taken their skis off.  
One of the guests in the third group skis slightly away from the line designated by 
the guide and stops on a convex roll.  A fracture occurs and an avalanche initiates in 
the storm snow five metres away from the guest.  The avalanche, more than big 
enough to bury and kill a person, rumbles down the slope below the group.  Nobody 
is caught in the slide.   
 Midway down the slope, the avalanche triggers two more avalanches, one 
from each side of the valley (Figure 18).  As the three avalanches gather momentum 
and race down the slope, the guide thinks of the second group, still at the bottom of 
the slope and waiting for a pick-up.  He radios a warning, but there is nothing they 
can do.  Their skis are off.  There is nowhere to run, nowhere to hide.   
Figure	  18	  Buster's	  Run	  -­‐	  Three	  avalanches	  
 
 I was a participant-observer for this event.  I participated in the morning 
guide’s meeting and contributed to the stability assessment, hazard forecast and run 
selection.  I did not observe the event occur, but I interviewed the guides at the end 
of the day.  How did this happen?  How did we get it so wrong?  Six guides with 
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over 100 years of combined guiding experience made the decision to ski the 
slope.  The knowledge of the snowpack development over the season, the analysis of 
the weather and snowpack observations over the previous few days, the comparison 
with the nearest neighbours’ observations and stability assessments, the knowledge 
of the terrain, and intuitive confidence generated through pattern recognition 
contributed to the decision. 
 The first avalanche failed at the interface between the recent storm snow and 
the older snow.  The second avalanche also failed at the storm snow interface.  It was 
the third avalanche that was anomalous.  Although it initially failed at the storm 
snow interface, it stepped down to a depth of 265 centimetres and an old weak layer 
that had formed and been buried in early December (Figure 19).  This was highly 
unusual for the area.  Weak layers in the upper snowpack are typically the major 
concern in a coastal snowpack.  It was rare for a weak layer formed in the early 
season to remain weak right through until March.  However, this event was not the 
only deep avalanche reported that day as two other deep avalanches with skier 
involvements were reported in the region.    
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Figure	  19	  Fracture	  Line	  –	  maximum	  depth	  265	  cm	  
 
 So what happened?  The analytical and intuitive processes were in harmony 
and indicated the same action.  The weather and snowpack data seemed to match up 
with previous patterns.  The answer may be that this winter was different.  This 
early-March event was the first indicator that the environment was not providing 
consistent high quality feedback and that the negative consequences of making a 
poor decision could be catastrophic.  The Mountain Conditions Report produced by 
the Association of Canadian Mountain Guides posted an analysis the following day.   
If anything, this year is weirder and more complex than last.… Usually, 
avalanches in the Coast Ranges or the Rockies have little or no relevance to 
the interior ranges. This year, however, I think the recent incidents reported 
on the Coast and in the Rockies are directly relevant to what we might expect 
here in the interior…. In my opinion, in a winter like this, it's wise to keep an 
eye on conditions farther afield than you might normally--my nearest 
neighbour in a PWL winter may not be geographically close by--it could be a 
place hundreds of kilometres away where the snowpack is similar (Klassen, 
2009). 
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 This near-miss event was similar to many other near-miss events reported 
by participants over the two years of the study.  Nobody was hurt, but the 
consequences were potentially catastrophic.   
9.1	  Introduction	  
 Results and finding from chapters Five through Eight have been interpreted 
in light of the previous literature.  The discussions of expertise, and dual process 
decision-making as it occurred in the wilderness ski-guiding environment of Western 
Canada have been made clear and have the potential to contribute to the literature.  I 
have also discussed the study’s limitations, the implications for ski guide practice 
and training, and implications for future research. 
 This chapter connects discussions of the findings from three studies together 
and places my research within the broader discussions that have taken place in the 
literature.  As there have been a variety of discussions or arguments within the 
decision-making literature, I needed to be selective in choosing which discussions to 
join and how to contribute to them.  My research has the most direct connection with 
the snow sciences discussion, so the contribution to this domain is most germane.  
Connections have also been made to the context of the adventure literature and the 
judgement and decision-making literature. 
 Although the methods included both qualitative and quantitative components, 
the research questions were framed in a qualitative perspective of the role that 
intuition played in the decision process of ski guides.  The quantitative results were 
used as a springboard for further exploration of the qualitative data.   
 Within the JDM literature, the heuristics and biases research studies have 
investigated the negative side of intuition (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  While the 
recognition-primed research (RPD) studies have investigated the positive side of 
intuition (Klein, 1993; Zsambok & Klein, 1997).  Although Kahneman and Klein 
(2009) acknowledged the value of each other’s work, there was still much to be done 
to assimilate the results from each area into some common language.  A fragmented 
discussion of the decision-making process also exists within the dual process 
research (Evans, 2007, 2008).   
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 The snow science literature lacked clarity and depth in the discussion of 
expert decision-making.  It is important to understand how ski guides actually make 
decisions, in particular how they blend analytical and intuitive responses together.  
The ability to dissect the decision process has led to a maturation of understanding 
within the JDM literature, so these JDM theories have been applied in the snow 
science context.  This has led to the development of strategies for decision success, 
which are explored later in the chapter (Hogarth, 2010).  
9.2	  The	  Research	  Questions	  
 The primary question queried why guides relied on their intuition when they 
had been taught to use analysis.  My investigation sought to clarify the degree and 
the method in which ski guides with a range of expertise, used intuition to solve 
decision challenges within a culture that favoured analytical decision-making.  An 
additional question examined why somatic markers, or good and bad feelings had 
such an impact on ski guides’ decision processes.  The final question assessed the 
influence of feedback.  The literature suggests that the development of intuition is 
dependent on the presence of high quality environmental and peer-based feedback.  
The following questions were prompted.  What did ski guides do to integrate variable 
quality feedback into the formation of patterns for future recognition?  How did the 
uncertainty presented by the mere existence of persistent weak layers affect the 
decision response?  How was decision confidence influenced by the strength of 
intuitive response? 
9.3	  The	  Problem	  -­‐	  Expertise	  and	  Intuition	  
 The challenge experienced by the research participants was the need to digest 
a wealth of data.  Sort them.  Sift them.  Arrange them.  Use them to generate a 
logical risk assessment.  This was no easy task, as along with other sources of 
information, the InfoEx alone provided over 10,000 data points per day (Tomm, 
2008, personal communication).  The potential for information overload was 
significant, even for these expert ski guides.  Davis (2011) described information 
overload as the result of having an overabundance of information and faulty or 
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inefficient filters.  Participants needed some way to filter, or reduce the amount 
of data that they needed to process.    
 One method of filtering that has been regularly used in the industry is the idea 
of only using information from the nearest neighbours.  Nearest neighbours have 
typically been considered to range from the same valley to the same mountain range.  
Under conditions of increased uncertainty, such as dealing with a persistent weak 
layer Klassen (2010) proposed that the nearest neighbour concept might need to be 
geographically expanded.  The conditions experienced hundreds of kilometres away 
in the next mountain range, rather than just five to ten kilometres away in the next 
valley, might provide valuable indicators of changing conditions.  This was the case 
with the vignette presented at the beginning of the chapter.   
 However, expanding the range of the nearest neighbour network does not 
ease the challenge of data filtering.  On the contrary, it makes it worse.  Computer-
based filtering using nearest neighbour models was proposed and tested, but has not 
received wide acceptance (Cordy, McClung, Hawkins, Tweedy, & Weick, 2009; 
Purves, Morrison, Moss, & Wright, 2003).  This may be an area for future research.   
 Over the two winters of the study, participants regularly described a lack of 
faith in the standard analytical process that they had learned in their training courses.  
Many decisions produced through this process were found to be inadequate for the 
complexity of the challenges presented during the winters of 2008-2010.  
Participants described how they began to rely more on their intuitive feelings.  Many 
of these intuitive feelings were negative in that they promoted feelings of caution.  
Terrain was avoided based on these conservative thoughts.  They felt the need to rely 
on their intuitive feelings to fill the void left by the inaccuracies of their analytical 
decision process. 
 However I question the accuracy of the participants’ intuitive responses, as 
they were potentially the result of a wicked and exacting environment.  Hogarth 
(2005) cautioned against relying on intuition when the initial patterns were learned in 
an environment which gave contradictory feedback.  Although participants may not 
have been able to overcome all the challenges of the wicked environment, they 
generally choose a conservative line of reasoning which blended their intuitive 
feelings and their analytical assessments.   
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9.4	  Primary	  Research	  Findings	  	  
 The key variables that were examined in this study included expertise and 
how it could be estimated, or calculated, the interaction between intuitive and 
analytical responses in the decision process, and the influence of somatic markers 
both positive and negative.  These variables were examined in relation to how they 
influenced the development and use of intuition 
 The primary findings centred on how intuition and analysis should be viewed 
as concurrent and separate processes rather than sequential and mutually exclusive 
and thus rejecting the cognitive continuum concept (Hammond & Summers, 1972; 
Hammond, 2010).  In the development of a decision response, intuition and analysis 
were not weighted relative to each other.  The weight of the intuitive response did 
not need to change based on the weigh of the analytical response.  Decisions were 
made across a spectrum of possibilities, with some decisions involving high levels of 
both intuition and analysis and others involving low levels of each.  These findings 
support Evans’ (2010) definition of dual process, but conflict with the argument 
proposed by Hammond (2010), who suggests that intuition is over-valued and should 
not be trusted.  The challenge for my participants occurred when the weight of the 
two responses were equal, but indicated opposite actions.  In this situation, the 
strength of each response was then factored into the decision, with conservative 
intuitive responses the dominant force.   
 The environment, or setting in which these variables were examined was 
unique, both professionally and physically, each providing opportunities for decision 
feedback and subsequent learning.  The physical environment was at times wicked in 
that it provided variable quality and quantity of feedback in the face of exacting 
consequences (Hogarth et al., 1991).  The professional environment had the ability to 
generate high quality feedback, but was dependent on the quality of interactions 
within the guiding group.  Feedback and reflection that occurred within these peer 
groups created opportunities to build strong intuitive responses through the 
establishment of peer-validated patterns. 
 Faced with an environment over the winters of 2008-2010 that hindered both 
analytical and intuitive processes, how were guiding teams able to produce high 
quality and safe experiences for their guests?  An exploration of how and when 
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intuition was used, particularly the importance of somatic markers expressed as 
bad feelings has provided a possible explanation.  The quantitative data suggested 
that participants used positive or good feelings as the basis for many decisions.  
However the interview data suggested that participants defaulted to the conservative 
option when intuition and analysis clashed, with generally the intuitive response 
indicating the need for additional caution.   
9.4.1	  Study	  1	  –	  The	  Calculation	  of	  Expertise	  
 Relationships were explored between expertise and the use of intuition, and 
expertise and confidence.  These relationships were analysed based on good day and 
near-miss reports.  The intuitive-analytical continuum (Hammond & Summers, 
1972) was used to examine the relative use of intuition within the good day and near-
miss reports.  Although the ratings indicated that the participants typically blended 
their use of both intuition and analysis, there was a trend toward the use of intuition.  
Further examination indicated that when intuition was used, there were slightly more 
positive intuitive responses than negative ones.  The intuitive response was rated as 
positive more often than negative.  This conflicted with the findings in study 2. 
 As expertise cannot be directly measured, it must be calculated based on a 
variety of measurements.  The accuracy of the calculation is dependent on the 
selection of the variables and the accuracy in the measurement of those variables.  
Galloway (2002, 2003, 2005, 2007) used multiple measures of experience in the 
Outdoor Leader Experience Use History Instrument (OLEUH) to generate an 
expertise profile.  The OLEUH is a sophisticated tool that has the potential to 
generate a precise portrayal of expertise, but is dependent on accurate recordkeeping 
for a wide range of activities.  Ollis, MacPherson and Collins (2006) suggested using 
a longitudinal research design and the inclusion of a field study component to 
generate greater accuracy.  Although this was not a ski-guiding context, they used an 
18-month period in a study of rugby officiating.  I was able to interact with my 
participants over an extended period (two seasons). 
 The selection of appropriate measures for calculating ski guide expertise was 
one of the challenges that I faced.  I used a more limited range of measures than were 
used in the OLEUH, as my participants did not have accurate records for all of the 
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measures.  I was concerned with the accuracy of the individual elements, so I 
used the most accurate measurements available.  The participants had recorded some 
of these measures as part of the Canadian Avalanche Association’s template for the 
documentation of continued professional development (CPD).   
 A simple summation of each participant’s years of experience was not 
rigorous enough, as it did not accommodate the range of experiences captured within 
a year, or give any indication of what might have been learned during that year.  So 
in addition to an hours of professional, field-based experience calculation, I 
generated an hours of experience calculation for continued professional 
development.  I took these CPD markers as being indicative of reflective learning, as 
many of the CPD days were training events, which connected new learning to field 
experiences.  The opportunity to question what could be learned from previous 
events potentially prompted new learning.  The integration of CPD events helped me 
to distil the participants’ expertise out from their experiences.  The ability to learn 
from experiences was considered indicative of the development of expertise.   
 A subjective assessment of expertise was also conducted.  Participants were 
asked to reflect on their expertise and rank themselves relative to their peers.  
Although the literature suggested that there could be major inaccuracies in the self-
assessment of expertise (Dunning et al., 2004), the three subjective measures were 
only slightly higher than the objective measures.  It is likely that the regular feedback 
received by the participants from the environment and their peer group helped them 
retain a balanced perspective.   
The acceleration of expertise 
 Endsley (1997, 2006) concludes that experts generally have more refined 
situational awareness.  Fadde (2007) adds the suggestion that situational awareness 
could be trained through dedicated practice with an increase in repetitions.  These 
repetitions could be attained directly, or by watching others.  A less experienced ski 
guide could build situational awareness by anticipating the lead guide’s decisions.  
Personal reflection in conjunction with a feedback session facilitated by the lead 
guide would complete the process.  Whether through direct or indirect repetitions, 
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timely feedback is likely best when focussed on the decision process rather than 
the outcome.   
 The standard method of developing expertise consists of performance 
preparation, performance and debriefing (Fadde, 2007).  The preparation and 
debriefing phases are the key to the eventual development of expertise.  However to 
accelerate the development of expertise, targeted instructional settings can be 
constructed that focus on the development of the recognition component of the 
decision process.  For ski guides, the ten years or 10,000 hours of dedicated practice 
is achieved through three somewhat discreet segments of development: preparation 
for certification, formal training and certification, and professional practice.  
 The training of recognition skills has a potential benefit in the acceleration of 
decision expertise, as it is the first step in the RPD process.  Quicker recognition 
provides a more rapid priming of the decision process.  Fadde (2007) identifies three 
critical issues: why train recognition, how can recognition best be trained, and will 
improved recognition lead to better decision-making?  Fadde (2007) suggests that it 
is possible to use instructional design to hasten the development of expertise through 
the improvement of training that targets pattern recognition.  This combination of 
prescriptive instructional design with descriptive expertise research may offer a way 
to accelerate the transition from competent practitioner to expert and as such is not 
appropriate for teaching novices.   
 The ski guide needs well-defined reaction skills; these abilities are based on 
recognition, decision and action.  For example: the ski guide needs to correctly 
identify the reaction component of the feel of the skis in the snow.  When a pattern of 
skier-triggerable windslab is felt and recognized, there is a priming of the diagnostic 
action.  The appropriate response is to traverse off to the side around the windslab.  
Delayed recognition may result in the guide travelling further onto the windslab, 
triggering an avalanche.   
 As the ski guiding decision context varies considerably, multiple 
opportunities exist to explore new techniques.  Developing experts can choose to 
make the task progressively more difficult.  The recognition training approach is 
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anchored in direct instruction, which has been largely remiss in addressing the 
developmental needs of RPD.  The instructional elements are immediate feedback 
and incremental difficulty.   
9.4.2	  Study	  2	  –	  Intuition	  
 A qualitative analysis of the event reports and interviews produced insight 
into the filters that were present in the decision environment.  In Chapter 7, the 
cyclical nature of the decision process was analysed.  The filters formed the 
groundwork for the enactment of decisions.  The participants were able to improve 
the quality their decisions through reflection on their decisions and feedback from 
both the environment and their peers.   
 The greatest challenge in the use of intuitive responses has been identified as 
knowing whether the response is valid and correct, or the product of an imperfect 
heuristic bias (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  They suggested that an intuitive response 
would come to mind whether the decision maker had underlying expertise and skill 
or not.  Although intuitive responses may generate strong feelings of confidence, 
confidence alone has not been found to be a quality indicator of a correct intuitive 
response (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978).  
 Over the two years of the study, the general theme expressed by participants 
was a lack of trust in their analytical process and a questioning of their intuitive 
responses.  They described a wicked decision environment that did not match 
previous patterns.  Kahneman and Klein (2009) suggested that intuitive responses 
should be evaluated through effortful analysis, but that this regularly did not happen, 
either through inability, or lack of effort.  Even though the participants described 
how they reflected upon their intuitive responses, it did not generate a sense of 
confidence as the results of their analytical decision processes were also suspect. 
 Although the consequences were exacting, often the feedback timing allowed 
participants the opportunity to make decisions that were subsequently proven wrong.  
Fortunately the catastrophic consequences occurred prior to participants exposing 
themselves and their groups to the suspect slopes.  After experiencing events such as 
this, participants described how they began to trust their negative intuitive responses 
more than their positive ones.  A tendency to rely more on negative intuitive 
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responses developed.  Participants turned to more conservative choices when 
they experienced general feelings of uncertainty and low levels of confidence.  
9.4.3	  Study	  3	  –	  Dual	  Process	  Interpretation	  
 The findings from Study 3 were presented in Chapter 8.  They resulted from a 
qualitative analysis of interviews conducted with nine of the participants.  These 
interviews asked the participants to describe their global perspective of decision-
making and reflect on their practices based on an analysis of critical decisions.  
9.4.3.1	  Dual	  Process	  
 Data suggest that participants used a dual process in their decision strategies 
as opposed to using intuition and analysis on a continuum.  Participants described 
how they varied their use of intuition and analysis.  At times the two decision 
processes were used in isolation from each other and at other times, used together as 
a series of checks and balances.  This is particularly interesting, as they had received 
considerable training in their use of the analytical process, but little to no training in 
the use of intuition.  The striking imbalance in training was perhaps offset by the 
depth of the expertise that had developed over their careers. 
What is running through the mind of the ski-guide at different stages of 
guiding? 
 The default-interventionist theories suggest that the decision-making default 
response is based on intuition or heuristics and requires the decision maker to 
consciously make an intervention to change the initial response (Alter et al., 2007; 
Evans, 2011; Sinclair, 2010).  Hogarth (2005) suggests that conscious processing is a 
limited resource.  As such, it must be conserved whenever possible, allowing the 
unconscious, or intuitive process to solve as many challenges as possible.  Thus the 
intuitive response, or heuristic processing happens first.  Pattern matching may 
provide an answer that appears to satisfice the problem.  An adequate solution that 
satisfices the decision challenge can provide a stop condition, negating the need for 
further searching.  This becomes the default.  Although analytical reasoning may 
provide an opportunity for a solution check, previous experience might suggest that 
the time and effort needed to go down the analytic route is not worth it, as the 
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intuitive response has usually been correct.  This makes for a faster, but more 
error prone decision strategy (Gillard, Van Dooren, & Verschaffel, 2009).  In 
addition, any departure from the default may produce regret (Kahneman, 2011).  
 The prescribed ski-guiding industry decision process followed in the morning 
Guides Meeting is anchored in analysis.  Most operations use some iteration of the 
Canadian Avalanche Association A.M. Avalanche Hazard and Risk Analysis 
Worksheet (Appendix 1).  It is a largely analytical process, however there is a 
significant turning point when the data analysis demands an intuitive response.  The 
form begins with an analysis of the weather observations and forecast.  This is 
followed by an analysis of the impact of the weather changes on what has been 
observed in the snowpack.  Class One stability factors (McClung & Schaerer, 2006) 
provide the evidence considered to hold the greatest strength and weight, as 
avalanche activity and snowpack tests are the best indicators of the likelihood and 
severity of the avalanche hazard.  In an effort to gain greater weight of evidence, 
reports of avalanches from nearest neighbours are a vital part of the analysis.  This 
helps the guiding team to create a detailed description of the avalanche problem.  
Weak layers and interfaces are named and dated along with the character and 
destructive potential when avalanches occur.  The sensitivity to triggering is 
described as: unreactive, stubborn, touchy, or very touchy.  Finally, the potential 
locations where these avalanches could be triggered are described.  This includes 
both the spatial distribution and the specific terrain features.  
 The weather, snowpack and description of the avalanche problem contribute 
to a hazard forecast rating of both the stability of the snowpack and danger posed by 
a potential avalanche.  Hazard ratings are made for three elevation zones: Alpine, 
Treeline and Below Treeline.  A confidence bracket is also included.  
 The transition to an operational plan demands a combination of both 
analytical and intuitive processes.  Although based in an analytical framework, the 
questions of “Where should we go?” and “How will we manage our exposure to the 
hazards?” benefit from intuitive responses based on pattern recognition.  
Interpretation and extrapolation from the data analysis is aided by intuitive 
responses.  “Have we seen this before?  If so, what did we do?”  The analytical plan 
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formed during the guide’s meeting likely forms an anchor for the field decisions.  
Adjustments to this anchor will depend on the strength of intuitive responses to field 
conditions (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). 
9.4.3.2	  The	  Training	  of	  Intuition	  
 The enhancement of existing reflective components and peer feedback 
elements had the potential to further increase the quality of the intuitive responses.  
Participants expanded their pattern recognition with the inclusion of reflective 
learning over the two wicked winters of the study.  Hogarth et al. (1991) suggested 
that positive feedback, which reinforced the strategies that were used, occurred more 
often in lenient environments.  While exacting environments were more likely to 
produce negative feedback and thus a motivation to search for a better strategy.  
 Groups of guides working together and using guide’s meetings, such as the 
ones that are an integral part of the heli-ski and snowcat-ski guiding landscape in 
Western Canada, are only just beginning to occur outside of the Canada.  Although 
guide’s meetings have been the industry norm for many years in Canada, a culture of 
decision support within the meetings could accelerate the development of intuition, 
but it is currently under utilized (Piché, personal communication, 2008).  Piché 
reported that guiding teams at Canadian Mountain Holidays’ Bugaboo Lodge had 
initiated a peer feedback process for the end of each day.  This template has 
tremendous potential given the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical results 
from my research.  The ability of a guiding team to make a collective decision, enact 
that decision individually, and then reflect on the decision outcomes as a group has 
the potential to accelerate the development of decision expertise.  
Four-step recognition training  
 The training of intuition is likely dependent on the development of 
recognition skills.  Fadde (2007, pp. 369-370) recommends using a four-step process 
to build recognition skills that is regular and progressive (incrementally challenging), 
rather than stand alone discreet sessions.  
• Identify the key recognition component of a reaction-generated skill 
• Create a task that will train the recognition skill 
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• Conduct a training program 
• Assess the transfer of training through performance-oriented tasks 
 The ability to recognize evolving patterns and anticipate future events is a 
benchmark of highly defined situational awareness.  It has been referred to as ‘flying 
in front of the plane’.  This early recognition can be trained.  Truck drivers are 
trained to maintain a 7 second following distance, but to look 15 seconds down the 
road.  Typical tasks that are used to assess recognition skills have been identified as 
recall, detection, categorization and prediction (Ericsson et al., 1993). 
 Scenarios or vignettes have been proposed as a method of enhancing 
deliberate practice (Ross et al., 2006).  A deliberate practice session would ideally 
include a learning objective and timely, focussed feedback.  Scenarios need to be 
constructed with the intent of accelerating the recognition phase, which in turn 
primes the decision process.  Is this typical and or similar?  Is this atypical and or 
dissimilar?  These scenarios can be based on real events and may use a cognitive task 
analysis to ensure authenticity.  Decisions are made and a mentor provides feedback.  
The vignettes may lack the physical integrity of the decision environment, but they 
should encompass a high degree of cognitive authenticity (Chauvin, Clostermann, & 
Hoc, 2009).   
 The transfer of training to the real world is a consideration.  Regular and 
frequent use of low cost and low fidelity training modules is likely more beneficial 
than infrequent use of high fidelity training (Fadde, 2007).  For example, in 
avalanche rescue, a transceiver basin (numerous pre-buried transceivers, with the 
potential to activate varying combinations of transmitting units) provides an 
excellent practice field.  Although real avalanche rescue is far more complex, a high 
fidelity simulation once per year is perhaps less effective than more regular low 
fidelity sessions.  A combination of regular training in low fidelity settings 
interspersed with less frequent high fidelity settings might hold promise.  As 
helicopter time is expensive, a low fidelity alternative is needed.  Trainings of this 
sort will benefit competent performers who are ready to transition to experts.  The 
transition can be accelerated through improvements in pattern recognition.  
     
 
263 
 Fadde and Klein (2010) propose five strategies to enhance and accelerate 
the development of intuitive decision-making: estimation, experimentation, 
extrapolation, explanation, and coaching.  Estimation requires the decision maker to 
make a prediction and then measure the outcome.  For example, an avalanche 
forecaster might estimate whether any avalanches will be seen in the forecast region 
over the next 24-hours.  This can be expanded to include both the number and 
destructive potential.  (Moores, personal communication, 2003). 
 Experimentation requires the decision maker to try something new.  This 
might include reflection-in-action experiments.  An estimation of a possible 
avalanche trigger location can be translated into a commitment to action to produce a 
change.  This could include ski cutting and explosive control.  
 Extrapolation pushes the decision maker to recycle prior events and extract 
significant lessons.  Failures, near misses and surprises provide potent learning 
opportunities.  The opportunity for learning often occurs in fleeting moments.  Weick 
(2001) describes these as ‘moments of the unexpected’.  Extrapolation requires an 
understanding of the causal relationship.  Imagine failure.  What would it look like?  
Where will we be most at risk today?  If our routine, standard operating procedure 
will lead to failure, how will we change our routine?  One of the more difficult 
aspects is learning to recognize when to break the rules in ambiguous, challenging 
environments (Chauvin et al., 2009).  Although not all decisions will result in good 
outcomes, decision makers need to be aware of and able to counteract the effects of 
bad outcomes when making future decisions (Ratner & Herbst, 2005).   
 Explanation creates opportunities for reflective explanation.  The desire for 
improvement and the quest for excellence is the key to the development of mastery 
through feedback, which can sometimes be hidden, or missing.  Allowing the 
vagaries of ambiguous feedback to limit the development of decision expertise is 
only an excuse for mediocrity. 
 An on-going dialogue between an emerging expert and an established one 
will benefit from coaching.  Predicting a senior lead guide’s decisions creates an 
opportunity for reflection and discussion at the end of the day.  Maximum benefit 
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can be attained through the development of specific questions prior to the PM 
guide’s meeting.  Macpherson and Collins (2009) stress the importance of learning 
from optimal performances and going beyond an analysis of the corrective actions 
generated by poor performances. 
 Fadde and Klein’s five strategies have many similarities to the four processes 
of Kolb’s (1973) experiential learning model.  These processes: concrete experience, 
reflective observation, abstract conceptualization and active experimentation form 
the building blocks, which can accelerate development of expertise.  Deliberate 
performances integrating all four of Kolb’s processes can quicken the development 
of decision expertise and can be accomplished during regular work activities.  
9.5	  Conclusions	  
9.5.1	  Role	  of	  Feedback	  
9.5.1.1	  Near-­‐miss	  Reflections	  
 Accuracy in decision-making is thought to benefit from the feedback received 
through making errors and recognizing that these errors have occurred (Cure, Zayas-
Castro, & Fabri, 2011).  Near-miss events have been considered excellent 
opportunities to learn from the decision environment, as they are believed to share a 
pattern of causal factors that would be seen in an accident.  Weick (2001) suggested 
that when the number of perceived errors was low, there was minimal opportunity to 
learn.  It was only once the errors had been detected that feedback could be elicited.  
Errors, which were not perceived or recognized as such, could actually lead to a 
‘false positive’.  For example, the decision to ski a particular slope could be 
considered appropriate when the result has not included a negative result such as an 
avalanche (Gonzales, 2008).  The adjustment to detected errors could potentially 
increase the quality of the decision-making.  Participants described the benefits of 
learning from mistakes.  This implies that although making mistakes should not be 
encouraged, they will happen and should be embraced for their learning potential 
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001).  Working towards an error-free 
performance in a highly complex unstable environment may in the end be 
detrimental to the learning process.  
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 Near-miss experiences can have two very different effects on future 
decision strategies.  Bird and Germain’s (1966) landmark research on industrial 
accident rates suggested that the collection of near-miss reports and their subsequent 
analysis might help the avoidance of future accidents.  Learning can occur through 
an understanding of the near-miss event sequence.  However this is contradicted by 
Dillon, Tinsley and Cronin’s (2011) suggestion that people who experience a near-
miss may perceive a future similar scenario as being less risky and subsequently 
reduce their risk mitigation efforts.  With the potential fatal consequences of being 
wrong, ski guide participants made the most out of the learning available through the 
near-miss events.  They described becoming more risk averse following a near-miss.  
 Reflections on near-miss events by my research participants indicated that 
they recognized how lucky they had been and made conservative adjustments to their 
subsequent decisions, so as not to be dependent on what Cure et al. (2011, p. 738) 
termed “a convenient evolution of the circumstances”.  This supports Weick’s (2001) 
premise that high reliability organizations should take advantage of near-miss 
occurrances with the intent of reducing future accident rates.   
9.5.2	  Feelings	  of	  Confidence	  
9.5.2.1	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Analytical	  Process	  
 Moxley, Ericsson, Charness and Krampe (2012) found that additional time 
spent on the analytical process was beneficial for experts when they were dealing 
with complex problems.  This conflicts with Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s (1996) 
assertion that in environments with high levels of uncertainty, the analysis of too 
much information may lead to less accurate predictions than a Take-the-Best (TTB) 
approach that focuses on two or three key indicators.  Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
argued that small errors in multiple cues could generate an inflated error in the final 
decision and that small levels of uncertainty in only two or three cues could be more 
accurate.  The experiences of my research participants suggests that even with an 
extensive analytical morning guide’s meetings, they were not always successful in 
their selection of safe skiing terrain.  There was a resulting reduction of confidence 
when the decision outcomes were wrong even though they had been generated 
through an extensive analytical process.  This suggests that there may be benefit in 
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the development of decision filters that would reduce the available information to 
some select indicators. 
9.5.2.2	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Intuitive	  Process	  
 The participants described a change over the two years of the study in the 
confidence that they had in their intuitive responses.  Early in the study they had a 
mix of positive and negative intuitive responses, with slightly more positive feelings 
generating motivation to choose certain travel routes.  This changed over the two 
seasons, as often the terrain selection proved more hazardous than expected.  The 
participants learned despite the limitations of the wicked environment.  They became 
more cautious and developed a growing confidence in their negative intuitive 
responses.  Their feelings of ‘do not go there’ were strong and immediate and 
generated confidence in their decisions.  
I had this feeling that wasn’t so good, I overrode that for various reasons, and 
then it didn’t turn out well.  So after going through that experience a number 
of times, I’ve really realized that it’s incredibly important to listen to that.  
That intuitive feeling is generally the better way to go.  It seems to me in 
almost every situation that I’ve been in; it’s been a more reliable gauge of the 
best decision to make. Participant 608 
9.5.2.2.1	  Persistent	  Weak	  Layers	  and	  Decision	  Confidence	  
 Comments from the participants included statements about the surprise they 
experienced when avalanches occurred on low angle terrain and or initiated deeper in 
the snowpack than they had expected.  This fits with Hogarth’s (2008) description of 
the ‘wicked’ environment.  The initial effect of the existence of a persistent weak 
layer in the snowpack was a reduction of decision confidence.  The level of 
uncertainty and the consequence of releasing a deep avalanche contributed to a 
reduction in decision confidence.  As the difficulty of predicting the sensitivity of a 
persistent weak layer may have caused higher levels of anxiety and stress, what is 
remarkable is the safety record of the mechanized ski industry.  One of the reasons 
that decision confidence dropped was likely that their intuitive responses were 
unable to account for the variables in the environment.  They did not experience 
what Thompson, Prowse Turner and Pennycook (2011) termed the ‘feeling of 
rightness’. 
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 Dillon et al. (2011) suggested that experts placed more emphasis on the 
probability of an event as opposed to the consequence of the event.  This contradicts 
my results, which suggest that expert participants were greatly influenced by the 
series of low probability, high consequence potential failure layers within the 
snowpack.  Even though very few ski guides were caught in persistent weak layer 
avalanches, near-misses were common.  The participants displayed a reluctance to 
expose their guests and themselves to these hazards.   
9.5.2.2.2	  Somatic	  Markers	  
 Experience-based affective cues generated by previous similar situations may 
trigger a pattern recognition that can be used as the basis for a decision (Glöckner & 
Hochman, 2011).  The power of these positive or negative feelings can be very 
convincing (Damasio, 1996).  Participants described the importance of following 
their feelings, particularly when the feelings promoted a conservative action.   
9.6	  Summary	  
 The expertise literature crosses many fields and areas of study.  It is well 
developed, with studies ranging from doctors (Patel et al., 1996), to sports (Ollis et 
al., 2006; Starkes & Ericsson, 2003), to nursing (Benner, 1984; Rolfe, 1997), and 
even fire-fighters and guided missile ship commanders (Klein, 1993).  Data from the 
ski guide participants were analysed in light of the suggestions from Galloway’s 
Outdoor Leader Experience Use History Inventory (OLEUH).  The results produced 
a more definitive definition of ski guide expertise than was used by Grímsdóttir 
(2004), or Adams (2005).  The greatest contribution was the use of continued 
professional development data as a measure of expertise.  I considered these data the 
most robust indicator of dedicated practice, as participants had documented their 
professional development activities, one of the requirements for professional 
membership in the Canadian Avalanche Association.  
 My findings support greater understanding of expert ski guide decision-
making and fill the gap between three previous studies (Adams, 2005; Grímsdóttir, 
2004; Hägeli & Atkins, 2010.  The two seasons of data collection (2008/2009 and 
2009/2010) were beset with snowpacks characterized by persistent weak layers.  This 
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presented more complex decision-making challenges than what might be 
considered in ‘normal’ winters.  Most of the participants would have experienced 
three seasons in a row of making decisions regarding persistent weak layers, as 
2007/2008 was of a similar nature.  Based on the evidence provided by the 
participants, they may have developed an increased level of pattern recognition 
regarding this phenomenon.  These findings provoke further research to investigate 
whether other practitioners within the Canadian ski guiding and avalanche industries 
have also learned to recognize these patterns. 
 Evans (2011) acknowledged that there was a wide ranging discussion within 
the dual process theories debate.  Evans’ (2011) dual process argument is supported 
by neuroscience research (De Neys et al., 2008; Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005; 
Lieberman et al., 2004), which shows that different parts of the brain are activated 
depending on whether intuitive or analytical processing has been stimulated.  There 
are no clear, easy answers.  Stanovich et al. (2011) cautioned that the transition from 
decision theory to empirical testing, to practical application will not easily be solved.  
The findings in my research lend support to Evans’ argument that two processes are 
actively used in the pursuit of decision excellence.   
 My research participants described how they were conscious of their intuitive 
feelings or somatic markers, even though they were unable to identify the source of 
their feelings.  This does not fit with Dijksterhuis’ (2004) argument that intuitive 
responses, which included periods of unconscious thought could be used to increase 
decision accuracy.  
 The findings from my research are not entirely in agreement with Kruglanski 
and Gigerenzer’s (2011) description of heuristics.  They considered heuristics to be 
rule-based strategies that ignored information and could form the basis for both 
analytical and intuitive judgements.  These heuristics could be used in a satisficing 
role and were not used as part of an optimizing strategy.  Although they suggested 
that both analytical and intuitive processes were rule-based, they had a very broad 
interpretation of what constituted a rule.  Rules needed to be based in an if-then 
relationship.  They suggested that rules could be consciously or unconsciously 
applied, with the implication that this replaced the analytical - intuitive dichotomy.  
The part of their argument that does fit with my findings is their descriptions of how 
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new skills become learned skills.  They suggested that tasks that initially required 
analytical thought, after extensive practice resulted in intuitive responses.  
 Hammond (2010) argued for the replacement of intuition with the notion of 
quasi-rationality.  He labelled intuition as unjustifiable.  He argued that all decisions 
should include some element of analytical thought.  Pure intuition, residing at one 
end of his cognitive continuum should not be depended on.  Findings from my 
research do not support this argument.  Participants described blending intuition and 
analysis, but certainly did not refrain from purely intuitive responses.  The opposite 
was true, with none of the participants describing their use of a purely analytical 
response.  This discussion warrants further study, as the implications are significant.  
Should intuition always be subjected to the scrutiny of analysis?  Are there times 
when intuition alone can be depended on? 
 My research fills a void in the Adventure literature.  It goes beyond the 
classic risk management behaviour and outdoor leadership decision-making 
paradigm described by Meyer and Williamson (1998).  It complements the 
theoretical contributions of Watters (2005) and Cook (1996) by adding empirical, 
field-based research to the discussion.  Boyes and O’Hare (2011) used computer 
simulations to study naturalistic decision-making in an outdoor context.  Their 
findings that experts spent more time and accessed more information for their 
analytical decision process was consistent with Hägeli and Atkins (2010) research on 
ski guides.  However the context of the computer simulation, as used by both Boyes 
and O’Hare, and Hägeli and Atkins, allowed participants to be more reflective and 
analytical.  This was counter to the expectation that experts would use rapid intuitive 
responses.  This demonstrates a critical difference between research that uses 
simulations or vignettes and research that observes or measures real decision 
situations.  My field-based research was situated in an environmental context that 
followed ski guides as they made real decisions.  This also adds a dimension to 
causal factor accident analysis, supporting the work of Davidson (2005). 
 The level of engagement of the participants can be seen in the degree of 
openness and honesty in the answers to both the questionnaires and the interviews.  
Participants expressed their thought processes with an openness that might concern 
corporate marketing managers.  Discussions of the level of confidence they had prior 
     
 
270 
to committing to a ski line and the potential role that luck played in the outcome 
revealed much about the professional ski guide decision process.  Participants 
accepted that they did not always have a good answer.  There was a willingness to 
say, “sometimes I just do not know”.  In their acknowledgement of this void, they 
were willing to be more prudent and simple avoid some terrain features. 
 A theme that emerged from the two sets of interviews focused on decision 
avoidance through the management of terrain and the avoidance of certain areas.  
Rather than feeling forced into making a decision about what was safe to ski, terrain 
was chosen to avoid the hazard.  The decision was avoided completely by choosing 
alternate terrain.  Participants made life easier for themselves in terms of the decision 
process by choosing to not use certain terrain.   
 Ski guides have been trained in an analytical decision process at each step in 
the certification process.  With three levels of avalanche training and four levels of 
guide training and certification representing a total of 50-60 days, there would appear 
to be many opportunities to foster the development of a quality decision process.  
However when approached from the perspective of dual process, intuitive-analytical 
decision-making, more emphasis has been placed on the development of analytical 
decision-making within the training courses curricula.  A possible reason for this is 
that the analytical process is easier to teach.  The results from this study suggest that 
intuition plays a role in most decisions, so it may be beneficial to expand the training 
opportunities in this area.  
 Participants described the important role that peer feedback played in the 
development of their decision process.  The classic mechanized guiding team 
approach has the opportunity to excel in this area.  A small group of guides can help 
each other become better decision makers by improving the quality and quantity of 
feedback, particularly when it comes to the role that intuition plays.  
9.7	  Limitations	  
 Limitations were discussed in the introductory chapter and the methods 
chapter.  Limitations discovered during the collection of the data have been 
summarized here.  As previously mentioned this was a study of ski guide decision-
making in a real world setting, while the participants were leading guests down 
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potentially hazardous slopes.  The risk of accidents was real, so confidentiality 
was of utmost importance, as it allowed the participants to engage freely with the 
researcher.    
 Guest interactions were not considered as part of this study.  Although the 
expressed desires of the guests had the potential to influence the participants’ 
decision-making, an assessment of guest motivation was not part of this study. 
 This was a self-selected participant group.  The limitations of this method of 
participant selection were discussed in the methods chapter.  There was a range in 
level of participation within the participant group.  Not all the participants completed 
all the aspects of the study.  Some participants were more highly engaged in the 
research process, while others needed frequent prompts from the researcher to 
complete event reports.  The number of event reports from each participant ranged 
from one to nineteen.   
 Perhaps the most significant limitations were the characteristics of the two 
study winters.  Participants described the winters of 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 as 
being novel and unique.  They were different from ‘average’ winters and demanded 
much more from the participants.  The decision-making was much more complex.   
 The final limitation was my bias as a researcher.  This was largely a 
qualitative analysis based on my interpretation of the data.  I used an inter-rater to 
help me overcome my inherent biases.  Other tools that I used to overcome my 
inherent biases were to discuss my interpretations with the participants and to engage 
in regular peer review of my progress.  During the course of the study, I presented 
twice to the International Snow Science Workshop.  Feedback from this group was 
instrumental in the on-going shaping of the study.  
9.8	  Recommendations	  
 So what would a model for the development of expert decision-making look 
like?  As described in Chapter 3, the literature supports the notion that the 
development of expertise is dependent on dedicated practice and the ability to learn 
from experiences.  Also foundational to the argument is the acknowledgement of two 
decision processes, intuition and analysis.  The development of expert decision-
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making thus needs to apply the concepts of dedicated practice to both intuitive 
and analytical processes. 
 The analytical decision framework for ski guides is largely in place, but is 
missing a process for data filtering based on context specific challenges.  The 
analytical process can easily be overwhelmed by access to data, if the decision maker 
is no longer able to make sense of it.  Research on information filters needs to be 
conducted.  These filters would likely need to be adapted to each operational context.  
An example of this would be to create a filter that would limit the runs discussed in 
the morning guide’s meeting, based on hazard forecast rating. 
 The training of the intuitive response needs to be grounded in reflective 
analysis and peer feedback.  Tools for both reflection and feedback need to be 
developed for the ski-guiding context.  A relatively simple set of questions could 
facilitate reflective analysis.  A process for peer feedback needs to take into 
consideration both the size of the operation and the existing communication 
pathways.  The culture within the team environment would need to be conducive to 
open and honest feedback.  This could be challenging based on the diverse cultural 
backgrounds of ski guides in Western Canada. 
 Key to the development of a decision-making model is an analysis and 
subsequent thorough understanding of the context.  Just looking at the possible 
diversity within the ski-guiding context, the analytical filters and the intuitive 
patterns will be different based on geographic differences.  However the underlying 
process for decision capacity building would remain the same.  The development of 
the intuitive context will be dependent on establishing filters that identify good and 
bad patterns.  The criteria for identifying the quality of the patterns are based on 
Hogarth e al.’s (2008) concept of wicked and kind environments.   
 Although there may be situations that are predisposed to resolution through 
one process or the other, decision-making for ski guides would appear to benefit 
from a strategy that combines the strengths of both intuition and analysis.  There is 
room for improvement in the development of both intuitive and analytical response 
training.  The following recommendations highlight the implications for both 
practical application and theoretical investigation.  
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  9.8.1	  Recommendations	  for	  Practice	  and	  Training	  
 There are two major implications for the ski guiding industry and the ski 
guide training and certification providers.  Intuition and analysis form two sides of 
the decision process and both should be used.  At this point, analysis is over-taxed 
and intuition is under-used.  However intuition may also be under-trained.  There 
needs to be complimentary development of an integrated decision matrix.  This 
would be a two-stage process for improvement.  A filtering process for analytical 
decision process and a training tool for intuition need to be designed.  Heuristics, 
using only information that addresses the most important aspect of the decision 
environment should be considered, as this may straddle the two problems.  Heuristics 
can be used as a filtering process for an excess of analytical data.  This would 
simplify the search for a solution that works (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).   
 When intuitive responses degenerate into lazy heuristic shortcutting, the 
decision process can be derailed, become less accurate and suffer from biases.  
However, intuitive responses that are grounded in pattern recognition and learning 
generated through experiences, the decision process can be remarkably accurate 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  The ability to differentiate between skill-based intuition 
and heuristic-based intuition is key.   
9.8.1.1	  Integration	  of	  newly	  available	  data	  sources	  into	  the	  decision	  process	  
 The first stage of information filtering is complicated by easier access to 
information.  New data sources have become increasingly accessible and available.  
Smartphone technology and Internet access have made it easier to access volumes of 
information.  More information has the potential to reduce uncertainty, but it also has 
the potential to overwhelm the decision maker.  It is important to avoid information 
overload, which occurs when information is plentiful and filters fail to reduce the 
flow (Davis, 2011).  New research by Hägeli and Atkins (2010) has the potential to 
help determine which decision filters are most appropriate.  
9.8.1.2	  Change	  within	  the	  intuitive	  response.	  	  
 The second stage is to improve the accuracy and consistency of the intuitive 
process through reflection and feedback.  Betsch and Glöckner (2010) suggested that 
intuition was capable of handling large volumes of complex information.  This 
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would necessitate an assessment of what an optimal level of information would 
be for a ski guide.  One participant described a method that resulted in an 
improvement in the intuitive response.  
It is good to get a client caught in an avalanche because it brings back the 
reality of the consequences.  A stronger intuitive response is built as a result.  
See it feel it and be part of it.  Particularly if you have been part of the 
decision involved in that happening.  It’s that negative feedback – I made a 
decision and it was wrong, way wrong because somebody got caught, those 
decisions really sink in.  Participant 714 
However, although burying a guest may be a powerful learning opportunity, there are 
obvious potential negative consequences.  
 Hogarth et al. (2008) suggested that intuition was slow to learn, but quick to 
react.  Learning or change does happen within the intuitive response, but it takes a 
while.  It is likely that over the two seasons of the study, the participants grew their 
intuitive ability.  The winters were hard on participants forcing them out of their 
comfort zones and into new learning situations.  The ability to learn from 
experiences was dependent on three elements: disconfirming evidence, awareness of 
environmental effect on the outcome and the use of memory aids to record events 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). 
Teaching intuition. Being able to have some kind of mentorship programme 
in the guiding operation.  To have debriefs.  You have your afternoon 
debriefs with a chance to talk with the guiding team.  And talk about the day 
and have the opportunity to ask questions and to have an open learning 
environment where it’s okay to ask questions.  I know it used to be the “shut 
up and listen”.  I hope, I think, that it has changed.  Participant 702 
9.8.2	  Recommendations	  for	  Future	  Research	  
 Numerous related research questions were not addressed in this study.  Some 
were anticipated prior to the commencement of this study, such as the culture of 
group decision-making in this environment and the influence of guest expectations 
on the decision process.  Other questions became clarified as the study progressed, 
such as the use of filters to screen information and whether certain decision 
challenges are more conducive toward being solved through intuition or analysis.  
 A logical next step beyond this study would be to examine what filters could 
be generated for use as decision support tools by expert decision makers.  The results 
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and findings of this thesis suggest that ski guides can become overwhelmed by 
conditions of uncertainty even though they have access to a wealth of information.  
More information does not necessarily make the decision process easier.  Some 
method of filtering and sorting information may produce greater efficiency and result 
in better decisions.  Filters have been produced for recreational decision makers in 
avalanche terrain.  Although the success of these filters has been challenged, 
consensus amongst users has been positive (McCammon & Hägeli, 2006).  
 Some tasks may be better solved through an intuitive process, while others 
are better solved through an analytical process.  Are there times when the conditions 
are more conducive to successful decision-making via intuitive methods and other 
conditions that favour analytical processing?  Can flags be generated to help guides 
know when to favour an intuitive or analytical response? 
 The organizational culture of the heli-ski and snowcat industry has evolved 
over the last 40 years.  Many cultural aspects warrant study.  They include a study of 
the multi-national aspect of the guiding culture.  Does a Canadian guide make 
decisions differently form an Austrian guide, or a French guide?  What role does 
corporate culture play in decision-making?  How are guest expectations manifested?  
Are they a result of marketing?  How do these expectations play out when the 
avalanche hazard precludes skiing steep slopes?  
 The area of group decision-making within the guide’s meeting has not been 
addressed.  Is there a difference in decision-making based on the size of the group or 
number of people in a guides meeting?  In the evolution of a group, is there an 
optimal point of maturity?  Is a long-standing group a good thing or a bad thing?   
 The measurement of expertise has been the subject of considerable research.  
However there is still some discussion over how to objectively rank expertise.  
Although many criteria have been proposed, the accuracy of each individual element 
may be questionable.  The assessment of what has been learned from experience is 
still highly subjective.   
9.10	  Final	  Words	  
 Kahneman and Klein (2009) suggested that the best way to evaluate the 
quality of a decision was to look at the underlying conditions of the environment and 
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the decision maker’s level of mastery within that environment.  Shanteau (1992) 
examined the development of expertise and related use of intuitive responses.  He 
suggested that the predictability of the environment and the degree to which an 
individual had learned from that environment were key considerations in the 
development of decision expertise.  He noted that some areas of expertise 
development produced higher reliability in decision outcomes.   
 Of particular significance to this discussion is the notion that expertise 
regularly becomes ‘fractionated’ (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  In this situation, an 
expert’s decision process works well for some circumstances, but not all.  Decision 
confidence generated under optimal conditions may spill over into non-optimal ones.  
The mark of true expert would be the ability to recognize when a situation poses 
novel challenges and is outside of the decision maker’s pattern recognition.  These 
anomalous conditions were an ever-present part of the decision environment for ski 
guides over the winters of 2008 to 2010. 
 The participants described how they used a combination of intuition and 
analysis to solve the decision challenges of managing guests in hazardous conditions.  
The analytical process that they used was well documented and supported through 
their previous training.  Their intuitive responses were the product of a more 
haphazard developmental process.  With no formal training in the use of intuition, 
research participants became more aware of their responses through participation in 
this study, which may have provoked an increased introspective analysis of what 
their intuition was telling them and what they should do about it.   
 There is a great opportunity for ski guides to learn how to develop their 
intuitive responses into a much more potent tool.  The optimal conditions, under 
which intuition will be more accurate, include an environment that provides 
relatively consistent indicators as to its true nature.  The second and perhaps more 
important aspect is whether the decision maker has had the opportunity to learn the 
meaning of these indicators.  The absence of quality environmental cues, or a 
decision maker that has not learned the meaning of the cues may lead to confidence 
in an intuitive response that lacks underpinning.  This confidence has been termed 
the ‘illusion of validity’ (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978).  A good outcome based on the 
illusion of validity can only be attributed to luck.  In the words of one participant, 
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“Intuition is based on a series of events.  Intuition has to be based on experience, 
if it is not it is luck.” 
 Klein (1993) suggested that overconfidence was typically reduced in 
environments, which placed the decision maker at risk.  Direct personal hazard had 
the modifying effect of reducing the likelihood of overconfidence.  It is incumbent 
on ski guides to have an acute sense of the limits of their expertise as overstepping 
their decision resources has the potential for catastrophic events and multiple 
fatalities. 
In the words of one of the participants reflecting on a near-miss… 
 The event occurred towards the end of the day and, in hindsight, I should 
have picked a mellower run.  It was a fine line between providing them with 
exciting runs and scaring them in a near-miss avalanche.  I think I'd rather 
ride the side of keeping it mellow and bringing everyone home, even if they 
feel that the runs were too mellow.  Most guest over estimate their abilities 
and energy levels (especially at the end of the day).  Part of me wanted to 
send them home with a great and exciting last run, when they probably would 
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Appendix	  1	  –	  Hazard	  and	  Risk	  Worksheet	  
Date:    Time:    Valid Until:     
Location:     Spatial Scale:     




Weather Systems & 500 mb flow  
(describe Highs, Lows, fronts, timing, duration, freezing level, cloud cover etc.) 
 
Freezing Level:     
Actuals at: Wind Direction Wind Speed Temperature Dew Point 
850 mb     
700 mb     
Local Weather Forecast Precipitation  Wind  Temperature 
 
Local Weather Observations 
Location    
Time    
Sky    
Precipitation Type/Rate    
Temperature Max    
Temperature Min    
Temperature Present    
Temperature (-10 cm)    
Relative Humidity    
Foot Penetration    
Surface Form    
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H2D    
HNW    
HN24    
HST    
HS    
Settlement    
Wind Low    
Wind Ridge/Blowing Snow    
Barometric Pressure Trend    
 
SNOWPACK FACTORS 
Significant Changes since last analysis: (precip, temps, wind, no change etc.) 
 
InfoEx Reports:(include relevant avalanche activity or test results of nearby operations) 
 
Avalanche Activity, Snowpack tests or important observations: (include your avalanche activity, 
snowpack tests or useful observations) 
   







Slab, loose, wet, 




































Avalanche Hazard Summary Chart 
	  








Alpine     
Treeline     
Below 
Treeline	  
    
 
Operational Plans 
Trip or destination: (where do you plan to go? Timing?) 
Risk Treatment: (describe the risk control to manage exposure to hazards) 
Field work objectives: (what knowledge gaps will you fill?) 
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Appendix	  2	  –	  InfoEx	  Sample	  














  Started in 20cm storm snow and quickly stepped down.    
Amazon 
13-




Triggered by guide regrouping on the edge of a wind-loaded gully in a 
cut block with the start zone being 10 degrees only! 
Armstrong 
13-




Windslab on steep roll Mar 10 
SH       
Dog Bone  
13-
Mar Iso 2.5 Na ~         
  
Steep non-skiable hanging 













In Southern Monashees terrain, esp Born Creek and south, in Alp & TL 













  Heli-bombing; 12.5 kg ANFO. Soft slab. No sign of SH at fracture lines. 
Monashees 
13-
Mar 1 2 Ni S 50 30     
            
Baldy Bowl 
13-
Mar 1 2 Sa S 
20-




9th skier on slope, partial burial head above, one ski released and 
found 




Mar 1 1.5 Sa S 30 25 30 
O: SH/SH 
(03-08) 









Convex rolls in 
glades             
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Appendix	  3	  –	  Event	  Report	  Questionnaire	  
Intuition in Decision-Making Survey 
Please use this form to report good days, or near misses once you have completed the 
Background Experience Profile.  
1. Please enter your User ID  
Definition of Terms  
1) Uncertainty – The decision maker may be faced with uncertainty due to:  
a) Ill structured problems. Example: Snowpack stability will vary 
considerably from place to place  
b) Uncertain dynamic environments. Example: Weather conditions 
can change rapidly.  
c) Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals. Example: Guest 
expectations may clash with safety parameters  
d) Action / feedback loops. Example: There may be minimal feedback 
on good decisions  
2) Intuition  
There are a variety of terms used interchangeably with intuition including: 
gut feeling, hunch, knowhow, and tacit knowledge  
3) Intuitive – analytical continuum  
The intuitive end of the continuum is characterized by easily accessible 
thoughts that do not require much in the way of reflection. Intuitive responses 
are: fast, effortless, can be impacted by emotions, governed by habit and can 
be difficult to control. Analytical responses use reasoning and are: slower, 
require effort, are potentially rule-based, and are consciously controlled.  
4) Confidence  
Confidence is easily affected by the feedback from recent events. In 
situations with minimal feedback, over or under-confidence may result from 
an inability or unwillingness to adjust one’s confidence far enough, as the 
task difficulty changes.  
5) Feedback  
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The type, quality and quantity of feedback will be dependent on the 
characteristics of the operational environment. The ski guide faces the 
challenge of interpreting numerous, possibly conflicting environmental 
feedback clues. High quality feedback can also come from other experts, so 
teams of guides such as those used by most mechanized ski operations will 
likely benefit from some form of decision analysis during the traditional 
evening guides meeting.  
6) Consequences  
There are two elements to the evaluation of potential consequences: the 
magnitude of the event and the potential or likelihood of it occurring.  The 
estimation of the magnitude may include a range of values but should focus 
on the most likely size.  
7) Luck  
This refers to a very qualitative interpretation of events. The tendency within 
the guiding community may be a preference to attribute outcomes to good 
decision making, rather than luck, however an open and honest appraisal of 
each situation may be warranted.  
2. This was a (n)  
Good Day - The decision-making was challenging and the outcome was good  
Near Miss or Incident - In a near miss there was the potential for serious 
consequences, but no first aid was required and no equipment was damaged 
or lost. OR an Incident, which is described as Minor first aid, was required or 
equipment lost, or damaged, or the program was delayed or interrupted.  
3. When did the event occur?  
4. Location - Mountain Range 
Southern Rockies  
Northern Rockies  
Purcells  
Selkirks  
Southern Monashees  
Northern Monashees  
Cariboos  
South Coast  
North Coast  
Other  
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5. What made today challenging (if anything)? (Check all that apply)  
Snowpack stability  
Forecast  
Variability over the terrain  
Changes through the day  
Skiing conditions (finding good snow)  
Flying Weather  
Weather on the ground  
Group dynamics within the guiding team  
Group dynamics with the guests  
Other (please specify)  
6. When making the day’s decisions, did you ever feel uncertain? If so, tick the 
boxes below (as many as apply) that represented the source(s) of this uncertainty.  
I was not fully aware of some significant events or components that were 
happening  
The available information was incomplete, ambiguous, or unreliable  
There were conflicting alternatives (e.g. the guests wanted to ski some 
steeper terrain, but your assessment of the stability suggested a more cautious 
approach.)  
Other (please specify)  
Good Day Report 
This questionnaire is for challenging days that ended well. Choose the days that are 
challenging for you and complete the questionnaire on those days. Ideally pick at 
least one day per week. The intent of the questionnaire is to capture the immediacy 
of your thoughts shortly after the completion of the day. There will be room to 
describe the three most important decisions of the day.  
7. Brief Description of the most important decision of the day (What happened?)  
8. Rate the difficulty of the most important decision of the day.  
Very easy  
Easy  
Moderately easy  
Moderate  
Moderately difficult  
Difficult  
Very Difficult  
Other (please specify)  
9. Rate the quality of the most important decision  
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After reflection and/or discussion with the rest of the team on each 
decision, how well did you do?  
Not good enough  
Just barely good enough to get home safely  
Good, but could have been better  
Excellent, could not have done much more  
Other (please specify)  
10. Brief Description of the second most important decision of the day (What 
happened?)  
11. Rate the difficulty of the second most important decision of the day.  
12. Rate the quality of the second most important decision  
After reflection and/or discussion with the rest of the team on each decision, 
how well did you do?  
13. Brief Description of the third most important decision of the day (What 
happened?)  
14. Rate the difficulty of the third most important decision of the day.  
15. Rate the quality of the third most important decision  
After reflection and/or discussion with the rest of the team on each decision, 
how well did you do?  
16. Intuitive Analytical  
Describe the role that intuition played in each of the three decisions you described 
above. Remember that intuitive responses are typically fast, effortless, can be 
emotionally charged, governed by habit and difficult to control, while analytical 
responses use reasoning and are: slower, serial, effortful, potentially rule-based, and 
are consciously controlled.  
Did you go with your initial intuitive response or were you more analytical?  
Fully intuitive  
Mostly intuitive  
Mix  
Mostly analytical  
Fully analytical  
17. If there was an element of intuition in the decision, rate the intuition in terms of 
strength and whether it promoted feelings to DO something (Positive or good 
feeling), or to AVOID doing something (Negative or bad feeling)  
Strong positive  
Moderate positive  
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Weak positive  
Neutral  
Weak negative  
Moderate negative  
Strong negative  
18. If intuition suggested one course of action and analysis another, was it easy to 
decide which one to go with? (if the question does not apply to a given decision, you 
may leave the item blank)  




Very hard  
19. Describe how confident you were in your decision(s) prior to committing to a 
course of action.  
100% Completely sure  
90-99% Highly confident  
80-89% Very confident  
65-79% Moderately confident  
50-64% Educated guess  
50/50 Just guessing  
20. Describe how confident you were in your decision(s) at the end of the day.  
100% Completely sure  
90-99% Highly confident  
80-89% Very confident  
65-79% Moderately confident  
50-64% Educated guess  
50/50 Just guessing  
21. At the end of the day, did you do anything to check whether you were over or 
under-confident in relation to the quality of your decisions such as talk it over with 
another guide?  
Yes  
No  
22. If "yes" what did you do?  
Discussions with my peer group  
A personal retrospective analysis (20/20 hindsight, second guess)  
Other (please specify)  
23. Reflect on the quantity of feedback you received about each of your 3 decisions 
by the end of the day. Feedback could be from the environment, fellow guides, or 
guests.  
None  





Large amount  
Extensive  
24. Reflect on the quality of feedback you received about each of your 3 decisions by 
the end of the day. Feedback could be from the environment, fellow guides, or 
guests.  
Low  
Low to moderate  
Moderate  
Moderate to high  
High  
25. Most likely consequence if the decision had resulted in a poor outcome  
Loss of time  
Loss of money  
Loss or damage to equipment  
Injury to guest or guide  
Fatality  
Other  
26. Reflecting on the day as a whole, in terms of outcomes as a result of your 
decisions, how lucky do you think you were today?  
Not at all  
A little  
Some  
Very  
Incredibly Lucky  
27. When did the event occur?  
28. Location  
Southern Rockies  
Northern Rockies  
Purcells  
Selkirks  
Southern Monashees  
Northern Monashees  
Cariboos  
South Coast  
North Coast  
Other  
29. What made today challenging (if anything)? (Check all that apply)  
Snowpack stability  
Forecast  
Variability over the terrain  
Changes through the day  
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Skiing conditions (finding good snow)  
Flying Weather  
Weather on the ground  
Group dynamics within the guiding team  
Group dynamics with the guests  
Other (please specify)  
30. When making the day’s decisions, did you ever feel uncertain? If so, tick the 
boxes  
I was not fully aware of some significant events or components that were 
happening  
The available information was incomplete, ambiguous, or unreliable  
There were conflicting alternatives (e.g. the guests wanted to ski some 
steeper terrain, but your assessment of the stability suggested a more cautious 
approach.)  
Other (please specify)  
31. Did you make a decision potentially relevant to managing the event before the 
near miss? (If no, please skip to question #27)  
32. Brief Description of the most important decision that contributed to the near miss 
or incident (What happened?)  
33. Rate the difficulty of the most important decision of the day.  
Very easy  
Easy  
Moderately easy  
Moderate  
Moderately difficult  
Difficult  
Very Difficult  
Other (please specify)  
34. Rate the quality of the most important decision  
After reflection and/or discussion with the rest of the team on each decision, 
how well did you do?  
Not good enough  
Just barely good enough to get home safely  
Good, but could have been better  
Excellent, could not have done much more  
Other (please specify)  
Describe the role that intuition played in the decision you described above. 
Remember that intuitive responses are typically fast, effortless, can be emotionally 
charged, governed by habit and difficult to control, while analytical responses use 
reasoning and are: slower, serial, effortful, potentially rule-based, and are 
consciously controlled.  
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35. Intuitive Analytical  
Did you go with your initial intuitive response or were you more analytical?  
Fully intuitive  
Mostly intuitive  
Mix  
Mostly analytical  
Fully analytical  
36. If there was an element of intuition in the decision, rate the intuition in terms of 
strength and whether it promoted feelings to DO something (Positive or good 
feeling), or to AVOID doing something (Negative or bad feeling)  
Strong positive  
Moderate positive  
Weak positive  
Neutral  
Weak negative  
Moderate negative  
Strong negative  
37. If intuition suggested one course of action and analysis another, was it easy to 
decide which one to go with? (if the question does not apply to a given decision, you 
may leave the item blank)  




Very hard  
38. Describe how confident you were in your decision(s) prior to committing to a 
course of action.  
100% Completely sure  
90-99% Highly confident  
80-89% Very confident  
65-79% Moderately confident  
50-64% Educated guess  
50/50 Just guessing  
39. Describe how confident you were in your decision(s) at the end of the day.  
100% Completely sure  
90-99% Highly confident  
80-89% Very confident  
65-79% Moderately confident  
50-64% Educated guess  
50/50 Just guessing  
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40. At the end of the day, did you do anything to check whether you were over or 
under-confident in relation to the quality of your decisions such as talk it over with 
another guide?  
Yes 
No 
41. If "yes" what did you do?  
Discussions with my peer group  
A personal retrospective analysis (20/20 hindsight, second guess)  
Other (please specify)  
42. Reflect on the quantity of feedback you received about your decision by the end 




Large amount  
Extensive  
43. Reflect on the quality of feedback you received about your decision by the end of 
the day. Feedback could be from the environment, fellow guides, or guests.  
Low  
Low to moderate  
Moderate  
Moderate to high  
High  
44. Most likely consequence if the decision had resulted in a poor outcome  
Loss of time  
Loss of money  
Loss or damage to equipment  
Injury to guest or guide  
Fatality  
Other  
45. What was the worst possible outcome for this incident? In other words, where 
does it sit on the potential severity scale?  
No injury  
Minor injury  
Major injury  
Death  
46. Reflecting on the day as a whole, in terms of outcomes as a result of your 
decisions, how lucky do you think you were today?  
Not at all  
A little  
Some  





47. Were there any additional factors that contributed to the occurrence of the event?  
48. What if anything, could be learned from the event?  
49. Any additional comments?  
 
Concluding Remarks  
If you have had a chance to reflect on this event, please complete the following 
questions.  
50. As a result, of this incident has your risk tolerance changed? Do you do things 
differently now?  
51. Has it influenced your work situation and changed how other people do things?  
52. Did the lessons learned have a short-term impact, long-term impact, or 
permanent impact?  
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Informed Consent by Subjects to Participate 




Note: The University of Edinburgh and those conducting this project subscribe to the 
ethical conduct of research and to the protection at all times of the interests, comfort, 
and safety of subjects.  This form and the information it contains are given to you for 
your own protection and full understanding of the procedures, risks and benefits. 
 
This consent form, a copy of which has been given to you, is only part of the process 
of informed consent.  It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about 
and what your participation will involve.  If you would like more details, feel free to 
ask at anytime.  Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand the 
accompanying information. 
 
I have been asked by Iain Stewart-Patterson of the Outdoor Education Department of The 
University of Edinburgh, telephone number (250) 828-5184, email: spatterson@tru.ca to 
participate in a research project entitled: Expertise, Intuition and Confidence in the Decision 
Process of Ski Guides.  
This encompasses the following:  
The purpose of this research is to create a structure for the strength-based analysis of good 
decisions and to analyse near miss data. Questions will be asked relating to previous 
experience, description of the setting, and the challenges of the decision making process 
• The procedure will involve: completing a questionnaire at the beginning of the guiding 
season related to their level of expertise, followed by the reporting of good decision days 
and near misses as they happen through the season by filling out two different 
questionnaires. The development of a strength based reporting scheme for good day 
reporting will occur through these questionnaires, field observations and participation in 
a short, interview once per month. During these field observations, the researcher will 
travel with a guide and a group of guests, taking the role of a guest. For each guide that 
is participating in a field observation day, there will be a short interview at the end of the 
day.  
 
• In an effort to be more proactive in the understanding of near misses, my intent is to 
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develop a ‘blameless reporting scheme’ that will allow the sharing and pooling of 
near miss and incident information in particular. Through the analysis of this data, it is 
hoped, that serious accidents can be further minimized, as a seemingly insignificant near 
miss or incident may be an indicator of a larger problem when put in the context of other 
near misses and incidents.  
• Avalanche workers including ski guides, instructors, ski patrollers and avalanche 
technicians are invited to participate in this study. Participation in this study is in no way 
linked, to professional performance, conduct, or employment reviews. This study is 
completely independent of all job related formative feedback and / or summative 
evaluation. 
• The research will be submitted for publication in a peer–reviewed journal, a consumer 
magazine and in IFMGA newsletters. Papers will be presented at the International Snow 
Science Workshop, The Association for Experiential Education Northwest Conference 
and others. 
• It is unlikely that there will be any discomfort or inconvenience associated with 
participation in the study. No individuals or companies will be named in any of the 
published results other than individuals or companies that wish to be credited with 
contributing to the research will be identified as such. Identifying information such as 
locations, run names and group size will not be included in the results. Information will 
be stored in a password protected electronic file. Raw data (questionnaires) will be kept 
in a locked file box, until such a time, as they will be shredded. Only the research team 
will have access to the data.   
• Confidentiality of participants will be protected. 
• Participants will receive updated information during the course of the research via e-mail 
through each agency’s program coordinator, or directly through a personal email 
account. 
• There will be no financial costs, or remuneration to the participants as a result of 
participation in the research. 
• Copies of the results of this study, upon its completion, may be obtained by sending an 
e-mail request to Iain Stewart-Patterson <spatterson@tru.ca> 
 
My signature on this form indicates that I understand the information regarding this research 
project including all procedures and the personal risks involved and that I voluntarily agree 
to participate in this project as a subject by type here 
 
I understand that my identity and any identifying information obtained will be kept 
confidential. 
 
I understand that I may refuse to participate or withdraw my participation in this project at 
any time without consequence.  My involvement or non-involvement in this project is in no 
way related to my current employment status. 
 
I understand that I may ask any questions or register any complaint I might have about the 
project with either the chief researcher named above, or with Dr. Peter Allison, Outdoor 
Education Department, The University of Edinburgh. Telephone number 44 (0)131 651 
6001. Email: Peter.Allison@education.ed.ac.uk 
 




I have received a copy of this consent form. 
 
Name: (Please Print)   
 




Participant’s signature ________________________________________   Date  _______________  
 
Investigator and/or Delegate’s signature  ________________________________________________   Date  _______________________  
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Appendix	  5	  –	  Background	  Experience	  Questionnaire	  
Background Experience 
You have been invited to participate in a research project investigating the role of 
intuition in the decision process of ski guides. Participation in this project is entirely 
voluntary, however the entire guiding community will benefit from the quality of 
your input. Ultimately the results from this project may influence the way guides 
make decisions and help generate a safer work environment for both guides and 
guests. 
Please read over the attached informed consent form. If you have any questions 
please be sure to direct them to me or to my supervisor Dr. Pete Allison.  
 
Adventure guides operate in a dynamic wilderness environment, and our activities 
have an element of risk. Through diligent risk optimization we do our best to 
maintain high quality programs with relatively few accidents. The majority of the 
time we experience high quality days with minimal disruptions. There is much to be 
learned from these "good" days.  
 
Despite these efforts however, we will all experience ‘near misses’, incidents and, 
perhaps, even accidents. In an effort to be more proactive in the understanding of 
such events, my intent is to make available a ‘blameless reporting scheme’ that will 
allow the sharing and pooling of near miss and incident information. A seemingly 
insignificant near miss or incident may be an indicator of a larger problem when put 
in the context of other near misses and incidents and so through the analysis of data, 
it is hoped that serious accidents can be further minimized.  
 
Because I am seeking to understand the role of intuition in these events regardless of 
their outcomes, all information will be treated with strict confidentiality. In other 
words, all names and references to operations will be edited out of the final 
documents. Only the anonymous pooled results will be shared, again, with the aim of 
being used as a risk management tool.  
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In addition to helping generate an understanding of how we make decisions and 
potentially preventing future accidents, participation in this research is an 
opportunity for personal reflection. Thus, when thinking about a series of good 
decisions, or a near miss, try to be analytical about your actions without being 
critical. In all likelihood, you did the best job possible at the time, given the 
information that you had. Think about what happened and whether or not the 
situation was resolved in the manner in which you had anticipated. By including a 
reflective element, the information that you provide can contribute to a greater 
understanding of how guiding decisions are made and help you learn to become a 
better decision maker. Participating in the study can also help others learn from your 
experiences, and you from the other respondents.  
 
This research is conducted by Iain Stewart-Patterson in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for a PhD at the University of Edinburgh. Dr. Pete Higgins, Dr Pete 
Allison and Dr. Alison Lenton supervise the work  
 
Contact Information  
Iain Stewart-Patterson BPE, MEd, UIAGM  
Outdoor Education Department, Edinburgh University  
email: spatterson_at_tru.ca, Phone: (250) 3749474, Cell: (250) 3188811  
 
Please complete this description of your background experience prior to contributing 
decision-making reports.  
 
1. Please enter your User ID. If you do not have a User ID, please contact 
spatterson_at_tru.ca  
2. Certification (Only mark the highest level attained)  
For example an ACMG Mountain Guide would only tick two boxes, 
mountain guide and CAA level 2  
Ski Guide  Assistant Ski Guide 
Alpine Guide  Assistant Alpine Guide 
Rock Guide  Assistant Rock Guide 
CSGA 1 CSGA 2  CSGA 3 
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Avalanche Level 1 
Avalanche Level 2 
3. Number of seasons of professional work, either full-time or part-time over the last 
15 years. If possible, indicate how many weeks you worked for each year in 
mechanized or ski touring operations. If you cannot recall the number of weeks, use 
fulltime or part-time.  
Consider full-time as 7 weeks or more and part-time as 6 weeks or less.  
Heli or Snowcat Skiing  
Ski Touring  
Avalanche Control  
Waterfall Ice Climbing  
Alpine Climbing  
Other  
4. Indicate the total number of seasons you have worked in each activity.  
Heli or Snowcat Skiing  
Ski Touring  
Avalanche Control  
Waterfall Ice Climbing  
Alpine Climbing  
Other  
5. Name of primary activity for the current (0809) season (over 50% of your time).  
6. Number of seasons of full-time paid work experience in this primary activity, at 
your current location.  
 3-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 26-30, >30  
7. Number of different locations or operations you have worked at during your career 
as a ski guide? Omit this question if you are responding solely as a climbing guide.  
8. Which Continued Professional Development (CPD) activities, if any, have you 
engaged in over the last three years as per the CAA descriptions? Tick all that apply.  
Professional Practice  
Formal Learning Activities  
Informal Learning Activities  
Participation in Committee  
Service  
Presentations  
Contributions to Knowledge  
How often do you engage in CPD activities in a given year?  
Weekly  Biweekly  
Monthly  Seasonally  Annually  
9. On average, how many days per year, over the last three years have you engaged 
in specific training towards the development of your professional guiding role?  
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Informal training in preparation for an exam  
Company organized formal training days  
Non-job related trips in terrain that challenges your abilities and focus on 
personal skill development in the winter environment  
10. Compared to other guides or instructors in your primary activity, how do you rate 
your overall abilities as a decision maker? Note: This does not refer to your technical 
skill expertise.  
Very Low, Low, Average, High, Very High  
11. Compared to other guides or instructors in your primary activity, how refined are 
your abilities to balance risk with reward (i.e. your risk optimization skills)?  
Very Low, Low, Average, High, Very High  
12. Categorize your guiding skill set in each of the following areas as to your level of 
expertise.  
Heli or Snowcat Skiing  
Ski Touring  
Avalanche Control  
Waterfall Ice Climbing 
Alpine Climbing  
Rock Climbing  
Other  
13. Gender  
Female, Male  
14. Age?  
< 25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, >65  
Thank you for completing the background experience profile. You only need to do 
this once. Please use the event reporting survey to enter the details of your good days 
and near misses.  
The Event Survey can be found at  
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=dYh1lw_2fF1_2bKqnAxOhjEwEw_3d 
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Appendix	  6	  -­‐	  First	  Interview	  Questions	  
Interview Script 
Participant:           
Date:    Location:       
 
The intent of the interview is to talk about the days when you completed 
questionnaires (both regular and near miss). 
1. How many times did you complete the questionnaire? 
i. Did you have any near misses?  (Description) 
2. Describe the days that you chose. What was significant about those days? 
• Tell me about your most challenging day.  (Description) 
3. Now lets talk about the decisions that you made, in particular the difficulty and 
quality. 
• Describe the toughest decision.     (Description) 
i. From your questionnaire, you called it (easy-moderate-hard) 
ii. What made it hard?    (Analysis) 
iii. Thinking back on it, how good was it? (Reflection) 
a. What could you have done to make it better? 
• Describe the next toughest decision.  
• Describe the third decision.  
 
4. You operate in a team environment. Describe your teams’ decision process. 
         (Description) 
i. How did your decisions fit in with the team’s decision-making?
      (Analysis) 
 
5. I want you to think about the role that intuition plays in your decisions. Let us 
look at all your report days.     (Description) 
i. How often were your decisions based more on intuition?  
ii. Is there a common theme to the days? (Reflection) 
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1. How strong was your intuitive response? 
iii. When your intuitive response conflicted with your analytical 
response, what did you do?   (Description) 
 
6. How did your confidence relate to the quality of your decisions? 
         (Description) 
7. Did you find that your confidence changed during the day (either up or down)? 
i. If so, what caused it to change?   (Analysis) 
ii. If not, what contributed to it staying the same?  (Analysis) 
8.  Reflect on the feedback you received during the day. 
i. Did you get much?    (Reflection)  
ii. Was it very useful?    (Reflection) 
9. How severe were potential consequences of a poor decision? (Description) 
i. Did this impact your decision process? If so how? (Analysis) 
10.  Lets finish up with the luck question. Were you lucky to get away with what you 
did?       (Reflection Analysis) 
11. Is there anything more you would like to add? 
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Appendix	  7	  –	  Hours	  of	  Experience	  












 714 12 20 2 264 1584 12672 21   
 3 18 4 66 396 3168 5   
  5 15 0 75 450 3600 26 4160 
Totals 20 53 6 405 2430 19440 520 23600 
                
703 18 18 0 324 1944 15552 8   
              144   
 Totals             1152 16704 
                
101 18 16 1 306 1836 14688 8   
              2   
              180   
 Totals             1440 16128 
                
402 11 14 0 154 924 7392 11   
  2 6 8 28 168 1344 165   
  2 0 14 28 168 1344 1320   
 Totals 15 20 22 210 1260 10080   11400 
         
         
         
         
 Seasons Weeks Weeks Weeks Days Hours Days Hours 
702 7 20 0 140 840 6720 21 288 
  2 18 0 36 216 1728 11 2304 
 Totals 9 38 0 176 1056 8448 32 10752 
         
605 1 10 1 11 66 528 18   
  1 12 0 12 72 576 5   
  1 12 1 13 78 624 11   
  1 11 0 11 66 528 34   
  1 12 0 12 72 576 544   
  1 11 0 11 66 528 4352   
  1 11 2 13 78 624     
  9 5 0 45 270 2160     
 Totals 16 84 4 128 768 6144   10496 
                  
311 1 8 0 8 48 384 2   
  4 8 2 40 240 1920 11   
  1 8 3 11 66 528 11   
  2 8 4 24 144 1152 24   
  1 8 5 13 78 624 312   
  2 8 6 28 168 1344 2496   
  1 4 10 14 84 672     
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  1 4 8 12 72 576     
 Totals 13         7200   9696 
         
         
 Seasons Weeks Weeks Weeks Days Hours Days Hours 
508 1 10 3 13 78 624 21   
  1 10 4 14 84 672 18   
  1 8 4 12 72 576 21   
  1 8 5 13 78 624 60   
  1 8 4 12 72 576 600   
  1 8 5 13 78 624 4800   
  1 8 2 10 60 480     
  1 2 6 8 48 384     
  1 0 1 1 6 48     
  1 0 1 1 6 48     
 Totals 10 62 35 97 582 4656   9456 
         
                  
503 3 8 4 36 216 1728 35   
  8 4 8 96 576 4608 385   
 Totals 11         6336 3080 9416 
         
708 2 15 1 32 192 1536 11   
  6 17 0 102 612 4896 121   
  1 16 0 16 96 768 968   
  2 0 1 2 12 96     
 Totals 11 48 2 152 912 7296   8264 
         
         
         
 Seasons Weeks Weeks Weeks Days Hours Days Hours 
404 1 9 5 14 84 672 21   
  1 7 6 13 78 624 14   
  1 7 6 13 78 624 11   
  1 6 6 12 72 576 46   
  1 6 6 12 72 576 368   
  1 8 4 12 72 576 2944   
  1 5 4 9 54 432     
  1 5 4 9 54 432     
 Totals 8 53 41 94 564 4512   7456 
         
                  
104 6 8 0 48 288 2304 11   
  1 8 4 12 72 576 8   
  2 8 2 20 120 960 8   
  1 8 1 9 54 432 27   
  1 4 0 4 24 192 297   
 Totals 11     93 558 4464 2376 6840 
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 Seasons Weeks Weeks Weeks Days Hours Days Hours 
608 1 4 1 5 30 240 5   
  1 8 1 9 54 432 11   
  2 8 2 20 120 960 16   
  2 8 6 28 168 1344 176   
  1 4 2 6 36 288 1408   
  1 2 0 2 12 96     
  3 4 0 12 72 576     
 Totals 11         3936   5344 
         
501 5 3 9 60 360 2880 8   
  2 3 3 12 72 576 18   
  1 0 3 3 18 144 208   
 Totals 8 6 15 75 450 3600 1664 5264 
         
                  
607 1 8 0 8 48 384 11   
  1 8 4 12 72 576 8   
  1 4 8 12 72 576 11   
  4 4 4 32 192 1536 30   
  1 4 0 4 24 192 240   
 Totals 8         3264 1920 5184 
         
         
         
         
 Seasons Weeks Weeks Weeks Days Hours Days Hours 
103 5 8 0 40 240 1920 8   
  5 4 0 20 120 960 160   
  2 4 3 14 84 672 1280   
  3 8 0 24 144 1152     
  2 3 0 6 36 288     
  3 2 0 6 36 288     
 Totals 20         5280   6560 
         
304 1 14 3 17 102 816 14   
  1 13 4 17 102 816 5   
  1 10 4 14 84 672 14   
  1 4 0 4 24 192 33   
 Totals 4         2496 264 2760 
         
810 1 10 1 11 66 528 5   
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  3 10 0 30 180 1440 140   
  1 6 0 6 36 288 1120   
  7 0 10 70 420 3360     
  1 0 9 9 54 432     
  2 4 3 14 84 672     
 15     140 840 6720     
 Totals 28         12544   13664 
         
         
         
 Seasons Weeks Weeks Weeks Days Hours Days Hours 
604 2 9 0 18 108 864 14   
  1 5 0 5 30 240 5   
  1 10 0 10 60 480 11   
  1 7 0 7 42 336 30   
  1 8 0 8 48 384 180   
 Totals 6 39 0 48 288 2304 1440 3744 
         
                  
306 1 0 1 1 6 48 22   
  1 0 3 3 18 144 2   
  1 5 0 5 30 240 22   
  2 2 0 4 24 192 46   
  5 7 4 13 78 624 230   
 Totals             1840 2464 
         
901 4 16 0 64 384 3072     
  1 20 0 20 120 960     
  1 8 0 8 48 384     
 Totals 6 44 0 92 552 4416   6880 
         
         
         
         
         
         
 Seasons Weeks Weeks Weeks Days Hours Days Hours 
201 2 15 1 32 192 1536 5   
  1 14 2 16 96 768 5   
  2 14 1 30 180 1440 5   
  2 12 1 26 156 1248 15   
  1 11 1 12 72 576 225   
  1 11 0 11 66 528 1800   
  2 9 0 18 108 864     
  2 5 0 10 60 480     
  1 4 0 4 24 192     
  1 3 0 3 18 144     
 Totals 15 98 6 162 972 7776   9576 
         
     
 
332 
106 1 6 6 12 72 576 22   
  1 20 3 23 138 1104 11   
  2 5 5 20 120 960 11   
  5 5 0 25 150 1200 44   
  9 36 14 80 480 3840 396   
 Totals             3168 7008 
405 3 10 1 33 198 1584 8   
  19 10 0 190 1140 9120 18   
  22 20 1 223 1338 10704 26   
              572   
 Totals             4576 15280 
         
         
 Seasons Weeks Weeks Weeks Days Hours Days Hours 
715 10 20 0 200 1200 9600 5   
  2 5 5 20 120 960 22   
  12 25 5 220 1320 10560 11   
              38   
              456   
 Totals             3648 14208 
         
602 5 10 5 75 450 3600 22   
  3 4 4 24 144 1152 2   
  1 4 0 4 24 192 24   
  9 18 9 103 618 4944 216   
 Totals             1728 6672 
         
305 1 9 0 9 54 432 18   
  2 12 1 26 156 1248 11   
  1 13 0 13 78 624 11   
  1 6 0 6 36 288 40   
  5 40 1 54 324 2592 200   
 Totals             1600 4192 
         
202 1 3 0 3 18 144 22   
              11   
              22   
              55   
 Totals             440 584 
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Appendix	  8	  –	  Calculation	  of	  the	  Stability	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Appendix	  9	  –	  CDM	  Vignette	  and	  Interview	  Two	  
Interview Scenarios 
Rationale: (from Horstmann et al 2010, Methods for inducing intuitive and 
deliberate processing modes) 
1. The	  intent	  of	  the	  second	  round	  of	  interviews	  is	  to	  clarify	  my	  
understanding	  of	  the	  participants’	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  intuitive	  and	  
analytical.	  Specifically…	  
a. When	  they	  say	  that	  a	  decision	  response	  was	  a	  mix	  of	  intuitive	  
and	  analytical,	  what	  does	  that	  really	  mean?	  Are	  they	  using	  
both	  strategies?	  If	  so	  are	  they	  using	  them	  sequentially	  or	  in	  
parallel?	  
b. Can	  I	  elicit	  an	  intuitive	  or	  analytical	  response	  by	  manipulating	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  scenario?	  	  
i. Will	  a	  familiar	  setting,	  with	  minimal	  objective	  
information,	  framed	  by	  directions	  to	  respond	  
intuitively,	  induce	  an	  intuitive	  process?	  
ii. Will	  an	  unfamiliar	  setting,	  with	  significant	  amounts	  of	  
objective	  information,	  framed	  by	  directions	  to	  respond	  
analytically,	  induce	  an	  analytical	  process?	  
c. I	  am	  not	  interested	  in	  whether	  they	  decide	  to	  ski	  the	  slope	  or	  
not.	  I	  want	  to	  challenge	  them	  with	  a	  scenario	  and	  then	  query	  
them	  on	  the	  process	  that	  they	  used	  to	  get	  there.	  	  
2. I	  will	  use	  decision	  scenarios	  to	  initiate	  a	  discussion	  and	  investigate	  
the	  intuitive-­‐analytical	  continuum.	  
a. The	  participants	  will	  describe	  what	  an	  intuitive	  response	  or	  an	  
analytical	  response	  means	  to	  them.	  
Methodology 
Participants will do two scenarios; one will have factors that will promote an 
intuitive response, while the other will have factors that will promote an 
analytical response 
• The	  Intuitive	  scenario	  will	  use	  a	  photo	  of	  familiar	  terrain	  
supplemented	  by	  limited	  snowpack	  and	  weather	  data,	  with	  the	  intent	  
of	  inducing	  some	  level	  of	  pattern	  recognition	  and	  thus	  an	  intuitive	  
decision	  response.	  
• The	  Analytical	  scenario	  will	  use	  a	  photo	  of	  unfamiliar	  terrain	  
supplemented	  by	  extensive	  snowpack	  and	  weather	  data,	  with	  the	  
intent	  of	  inducing	  an	  analytical	  decision	  response.	  
• The	  environmental	  conditions	  in	  both	  scenarios	  will	  promote	  a	  high	  
degree	  of	  uncertainty,	  with	  neither	  an	  obvious	  “go”	  response	  or	  “no	  
go”	  response.	  
• The	  key	  questions	  come	  right	  at	  the	  end.	  




1. Scenario	  1	  –	  Intuitive/Familiar	  Terrain	  -­‐	  Young’s	  Peak	  photo	  and	  video	  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zWKqyWiU0VI&feature=related 
Start at 2:13 
Here is a picture and a video of the slope you would like to ski with a group of 4 
guests. 
A. What	  is	  your	  initial	  impression?	  	  
B. What	  are	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  you	  would	  ski	  it?	  
C. This	  is	  what	  you	  know	  about	  the	  slope.	  
a. HS:	  350cm	  
b. HST:	  20cm	  
c. Air	  temperature:	  -­‐6	  deg	  C	  
d. Stability:	  F/F/G	  
D. Talk	  aloud	  your	  decision	  process.	  Would	  you	  ski	  it?	  	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  
E. If	  yes,	  where	  would	  you	  go	  and	  how	  confident	  would	  you	  be?	  
a. Would	  there	  be	  any	  stop	  conditions?	  
F. If	  no,	  what	  additional	  information	  would	  you	  want?	  
G. Would	  it	  change	  if	  you	  knew	  
a. The	  HST	  interface	  produced	  a	  CTM	  on	  facets	  size	  1	   Yes	  /	  No	  
H. Would	  it	  change	  if	  you	  knew	  
a. There	  was	  a	  persistent	  weak	  layer	  down	  120cm,	  facets	  on	  top	  of	  a	  
crust,	  which	  produced	  an	  RB	  5	   	   	   	   Yes	  /	  No	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2. Scenario	  1	  –	  Intuitive/Familiar	  Terrain	  -­‐	  Young’s	  Peak	  photo	  and	  
video	  
1. Describe	  your	  decision	  response.	  	  
a. How	  did	  you	  come	  to	  your	  decision?	  
b. Can	  you	  articulate	  the	  elements	  that	  most	  greatly	  influenced	  your	  
decision?	  
2. How	  difficult	  was	  this	  decision?	  
! Very easy ! Easy ! Mod easy ! Mod ! Mod difficult ! Difficult ! V 
Diff 
3. Was	  your	  response	  Intuitive	  or	  Analytical?	  
! Fully intuitive ! Mostly intuitive ! Mix ! Mostly analytical ! Fully 
analytical 
4. Rate	  the	  intuition	  
! Strong positive 
! Moderate positive 
! Weak positive 
! Neutral 
! Weak negative 
! Moderate negative 
! Strong negative 
5. Describe	  an	  intuitive	  response	  	  
a. What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  you?	  
 
6. Describe	  an	  analytical	  response	  
a. What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  you?	  
 
7. How	  confident	  are	  you? 	  
! 100% - Completely sure  
! 90-99% Highly confident  
! 80-89% Very confident 
! 65-79% Moderately confident 
! 50-64% Educated guess 
! 50/50 Just guessing 
 
8. What	  caused	  you	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  confident	  in	  your	  decision?	  
	  




3. Scenario	  2	  -­‐	  Analytical/	  Unfamiliar	  Terrain	  -­‐	  Line	  King	  photo	  
Here is a picture of the slope you would like to ski with a group of 4 guests. 
A. What	  is	  your	  initial	  impression?	  	  
B. What	  are	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  you	  would	  ski	  it?	  
C. If	  you	  knew	  these	  things	  about	  the	  slope,	  would	  you	  ski	  it?	   	  
a. HS	  –	  350cm	  
b. HST	  –	  20cm	  
c. Air	  temperature	  -­‐6	  deg	  C	  
d. The	  HST	  interface	  produced	  a	  CTM	  on	  DF	  size	  1.5	  
e. There	  is	  a	  persistent	  weak	  layer	  down	  120cm,	  facets	  on	  top	  of	  a	  
crust,	  which	  produced	  an	  RB	  5	  
f. There	  was	  an	  accidentally,	  skier-­‐triggered	  avalanche	  (size	  2.5)	  on	  
a	  slope	  nearby	  with	  similar	  aspect	  and	  elevation,	  3	  days	  ago,	  prior	  
to	  the	  storm	  snow.	  The	  depth	  (100	  cm)	  and	  propagation	  (300m)	  
surprised	  you.	  
g. There	  was	  minimal	  wind	  associated	  with	  the	  storm	  snow.	  
h. The	  slope	  has	  been	  skied	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  though	  the	  winter.	  
i. There	  has	  been	  no	  avalanche	  activity	  over	  the	  last	  48	  hours	  
j. Stability:	  F/F/G	  
D. Talk	  aloud	  your	  decision	  process.	  Would	  you	  ski	  it?	  	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  
E. If	  yes,	  where	  would	  you	  go	  and	  how	  confident	  would	  you	  be?	  
F. If	  no,	  is	  there	  any	  additional	  information	  that	  would	  prompt	  you	  to	  
change	  your	  mind?	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4. Scenario	  2	  -­‐	  Analytical/	  Unfamiliar	  Terrain	  -­‐	  Line	  King	  photo	  
1. Describe	  your	  decision	  response.	  	  
a. How	  did	  you	  come	  to	  your	  decision?	  
b. Can	  you	  articulate	  the	  elements	  that	  most	  greatly	  influenced	  your	  
decision?	  
2. How	  difficult	  was	  this	  decision?	  
! Very easy ! Easy ! Mod easy ! Mod ! Mod difficult ! Difficult ! V 
Diff 
3. Was	  your	  response	  Intuitive	  or	  Analytical?	  
! Fully intuitive ! Mostly intuitive ! Mix ! Mostly analytical ! Fully 
analytical 
4. Rate	  the	  intuition	  
! Strong positive 
! Moderate positive 
! Weak positive 
! Neutral 
! Weak negative 
! Moderate negative 
! Strong negative 
 
5. Describe	  an	  intuitive	  response	  
a. What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  you?	  
 
6. Describe	  an	  analytical	  response	  
a. What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  you?	  
 
7. How	  confident	  are	  you? 	  
! 100% - Completely sure  
! 90-99% Highly confident  
! 80-89% Very confident 
! 65-79% Moderately confident 
! 50-64% Educated guess 
! 50/50 Just guessing 
 
8. What	  caused	  you	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  confident	  in	  your	  decision?	  
	  




1. This	  is	  what	  you	  know	  about	  the	  slope.	  
a. HS:	  350cm	  
b. HST:	  20cm	  
c. Air	  temperature:	  -­‐6	  deg	  C	  
d. Stability:	  F/F/G	  
e. If	  you	  knew	  these	  things	  about	  the	  slope,	  would	  you	  ski	  it?	   	  
a. HS	  –	  350cm	  
b. HST	  –	  20cm	  
c. Air	  temperature	  -­‐6	  deg	  C	  
d. The	  HST	  interface	  produced	  a	  CTM	  on	  DF	  size	  1.5	  
e. There	  is	  a	  persistent	  weak	  layer	  down	  120cm,	  facets	  on	  top	  of	  a	  
crust,	  which	  produced	  an	  RB	  5	  
f. There	  was	  an	  accidentally,	  skier-­‐triggered	  avalanche	  (size	  2.5)	  on	  
a	  slope	  nearby	  with	  similar	  aspect	  and	  elevation,	  3	  days	  ago,	  prior	  
to	  the	  storm	  snow.	  The	  depth	  (100	  cm)	  and	  propagation	  (300m)	  
surprised	  you.	  
g. There	  was	  minimal	  wind	  associated	  with	  the	  storm	  snow.	  
h. The	  slope	  has	  been	  skied	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  though	  the	  winter.	  
i. There	  has	  been	  no	  avalanche	  activity	  over	  the	  last	  48	  hours	  
j. Stability:	  F/F/G	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Appendix	  10	  -­‐	  Reflective	  Practice	  -­‐	  What	  did	  I	  learn	  from	  
undertaking	  the	  thesis?	  
 Reflection is an important component of the learning process.  Schön (1983) 
describes it as a way of acquiring knowledge and a greater understanding based on 
previous actions and experiences.  It has also been considered a way of entrenching 
the learning from fleeting opportunities into one’s personal practical knowledge 
(Connelly & Clandinin, 1988).  Reflection facilitates the transition and transfer from 
theory to practice and back again (Walker, 1996) 
 Dewey (1938) suggests a number of important qualities that would increase the 
value of reflection.  These include: taking responsibility for what occurred, being 
open to all aspects of the situation, and taking responsibility for learning from the 
events that occurred.  Hubbs (2010) proposes using reflection as a means of 
assessing learning by reflecting on both the process and content.  The most potent 
learning comes from process oriented, analytical reflection, which generates self-
awarenes and insight.  The implementation of a quality reflection should include 
aspects of both “what” occurred and “why” it occurred the way it did (Martindale & 
Collins, 2012). 
 Reflecting on my journey of discovery and learning through the PhD process 
led me to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) concept of “loving wisdom”.  He suggets that 
by taking control of the direction of the learning process, learning becomes less 
effortful and more enjoyable.  Although I managed the primary direction of the 
research I was coached and supported in my quest by my supervisors.  Schön (1983, 
1990) stresses the importance of introspection as a necessary aspect of reflection, but 
balanced by the support from a coach.  I was fortunate to have three supportive and 
engaged supervisors.  The increased value of having three supervisors came from 
their different points of view and areas of expertise.  Feedback and debriefing 
generated frequent discussions.  Often my many questions were not directly 
answered, but instead I was pointed in the direction of the answers. Although this 
was sometimes frustrating at the time, it ultimately led to greater learning. 
 The literature review was the most immediate and tangible learning 
opportunity.  Exploring the depth and breadth of the literature, particularly the JDM 
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literature, was both rewarding and intimidating in its vastness.  Learning to 
discern good research from bad was a slow process.  Initially all the articles seemed 
irrefutable and convincing, but as I gained perspective, I began to be able to detect 
holes.  Methods were flawed.  Results and findings were overstated.  I became an 
educated consumer of research.  For example, I used Hammond’s Cognitive 
Continuum as a starting point for the collection of intuition and analysis data from 
the participants.  As my research progressed and as the literature evolved, it became 
apparent that the Dual-Process model was a better way of contextualizing the 
interaction between the two processes.  As such, I used the Dual-Process model as 
the basis for the qualitative data analysis.   
 The methodology was the source of my greatest challenges.  I felt fairly 
comfortable with the qualitative process.  As I learned more about qualitative data 
analysis, I relished the challenge of teasing out the subtlties of meaning from within 
the data.  I also wanted to become better at conducting quantitative research.  I 
quickly learned that statistical analysis was an incredibly powerful and complex tool.  
The more I learned, the more I realised how little I knew.  I truly appreciate the skills 
of researchers who have become masters at quantitative analysis.  My next challenge 
beyond the thesis will be to become a better quantitative researcher.  I need to 
become better friends with my quantitative data and learn to appreciate it like a fine 
wine (Wright, 2003). 
 Data collection, particularly conducting interviews was tremendously 
rewarding.  Not only did I learn to refine my interviewing strategies, but I was also 
able to increase my comprehension of the ski guiding mosaic.  The opportunity to 
engage with some of the finest ski guides in the world and to pick their brains was 
tremendous. 
 Making sense of the mountain of data required a structured and regimented 
work flow on my computer.  I used HyperResearch to conduct the qualitative data 
analysis.  It allowed me to code the digital audio files.  Once coded, I transcribed the 
sections using MacSpeech Dictate.  Taking the time to learn the computer programs 
was well worth the effort.  I utilized the software program Mendeley to keep track of 
my 853 references.  Although I did not use all the potential sources in the thesis, 
Mendeley made it easy to review, search, sort and cite them.  
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 The final synthesis of my data analysis back into the surrounding literature 
gave a sense of completion and contribution.  This final step was challenging and 
rewarding.  I have gained a voice in the discussion.  I have something to say. 
 While training for and being examined to become a full certified mountain 
guide, I often felt that once I achieved the certification, I would have arrived.  As I 
was finishing my last exam, I was consumed with the realization that the end of the 
certification process was only the start of a new beginning.  Now as a budding 
researcher, I am fully aware of how little I know and how much there still is to learn.  
 
Reflective Questions (ISW, 2006) 
 Did it go according to plan? No 
 What would I do differently next time? Do it full-time 
 What was the biggest surprise? How long it took 
 What are the implications for the future? Use the skills I have learnred to do 
more research 
 What do I do well? Persevere 
 What can I improve on? Everything 
Is this enough for a PhD? 
The research draws on JDM theories and applies them in a new context.  It is an 
important topic that has not been covered, with the potential to reduce fatalities. 
The research has been conducted effectively, with a clear pragmatic methodology 
using mixed methods and triangulation 
The research contributes to knowledge.  In Snow Science, it firmly establishes the 
legitimacy of using dual process theory to expand the understanding of ski guide 
decision-making.  In the JDM literature, it contributes to the implications of 
Hogarth’s work on the education of intuition in relation to decision consequences 
and feedback (Hogarth, 2001).  It clarifies the need for an increase in peer-based 
feedback to compensate for when there is a lack of environmental feedback. 
The research provides future direction, illuminating the need for research on peer-
based feedback on good day decisions, and on ski guide group decision-making. 
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Appendix	  11	  –	  CAA	  Continuing Professional Development 	  
Guidelines for Professional and Active Members 
Preamble  
Amendments to the Canadian Avalanche Association (CAA) bylaws in 2006 created 
a new type of membership, the Active Member. The 2006 bylaws state that CAA 
Professional and Active Members will undertake a program for Continuing 
Professional Development (CPD) as requirement of membership.  
The CAA’s Code of Ethics is amended to contain the following statement:  
Professional and Active Members accept responsibility to undertake continuing 
professional development to ensure the currency of their knowledge, skills and 
technical competencies within their areas of practice, to meet society and industry 
expectations.  
Intent Of The CPD Program  
The CAA’s CPD program is intended to encourage, support and assist Professional 
and Active Members to continuously upgrade their knowledge, training, 
qualifications and credentials and thereby maintain a high level of competence 
throughout their careers. This policy serves as guidance for documenting and 
administering CPD program compliance.  
Authority  
This document contains all current terms and conditions of the CAA’s CPD program 
in the attached Appendix 1, and serves as standing guidance for CAA Professional 
and Active Members, Directors and staff. The CAA’s Board of Directors (Board) 
authorizes and requires the Director, Membership Committee to randomly select a 
prescribed number of Professional and Active Members annually, and audit their 
documentation for CPD program compliance.  
Under the CAA’s bylaws a Professional or Active Member unable to demonstrate 
compliance with the terms and conditions for CPD as contained in this document, 
and upon written notification from the Director, Membership Committee, shall have 
their CAA membership changed to a type of membership that is commensurate with 
their CPD activities, as determined by the Membership Committee audit process 
findings.  
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CPD Audit Process  
Members deemed by the Membership Committee to be in compliance with the terms 
and conditions of the CPD program will have all documentation returned, 
accompanied by a letter from the Director, Membership Committee confirming CPD 
compliance.  
Members deemed by the Membership Committee to be not in compliance with the 
terms and conditions of the CPD program will have all documentation copied and 
kept on file with the Director, Membership Committee for a period of three (3) years. 
All original documentation will be returned to the Member, accompanied by a letter 
from the Director, Membership Committee stating the reasons for the determination 
that they are not in compliance with the terms and conditions of the CPD program.  
All documentation or other information collected by the CAA for a Member’s CPD 
compliance audit is confidential, and will not be released to any third party without 
the Member’s written consent.  
Appeal Process  
A Member may appeal the Membership Committee’s determination that they are not 
in compliance with the terms and conditions of the CPD program, to the Board. An 
appeal must be in writing, sent by registered mail to the Executive Director at the 
CAA’s head office, and be received within 90 days from the date of the Member’s 
written notification from the Director, Membership Committee.  
The Board may request or collect additional information, consult, deliberate or do 
any other thing they deem necessary, and will deliver a binding decision regarding 
the Member’s CPD compliance within 90 days from the date that the appeal was 
received at the CAA’s head office.  
Approved: June 10, 2006  
Reviewed: insert date  
Attachments: Appendix 1. Terms and Conditions for Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD).  




Terms and Conditions for Continuing Professional Development (CPD) 
These terms and conditions apply to all Practicing Professional, Non-practicing 
Professional and Active Members (Members) of the Canadian Avalanche 
Association. Members will maintain records of their CPD activities for the past three 
(3) calendar years, or since their acceptance as a Member, which ever period of time 
is the lesser.  
Required CPD Points  
Members must earn CPD points from at least three out of the six CPD point 
categories during any three year period.  
• Practicing Professional Members are encouraged to earn at least 80 points per year 
and must accumulate at least 240 CPD points over three years.  
• Non-practicing Professional Members are encouraged to earn at least 50 points per 
year and must accumulate at least 150 CPD points over three years.  
• Active Members are encouraged to earn at least 60 points per year and must 
accumulate at least 180 CPD points over three years.  
Members in the third or subsequent years of their CPD program must maintain a 
three year rolling average of at least the minimum number of CPD points required 
for their type of membership. CPD points earned above the maximum allowed per 
category per year may be carried forward for a maximum of two years from the date 
those points were earned.  
Eligible CPD Activities & Points  
The CAA has defined six general categories for earning CPD points (listed below) 
showing annual maximum eligible points per category per year, by membership type.  
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CPD point categories by membership type Maximum eligible CPD points per 
year  
      Practicing  Non-practicing  
      Professional  Profession  
 Active  
      Member  Member  
 Member  
1. Professional practice    50   30    30  
2. Formal learning activities    30   30    30  
3. Informal learning activities   20   20    20  
4. Participation     20   20    20  
• Committee service     20   20    20  
• Other activities (specify)    10   10    10  
5. Presentations     20   20    20  
6. Contributions to knowledge   30   30    30  
• Develop published codes, standards  10   10    10  
• Peer reviewed publications    15   15    15  
• Non-reviewed articles    10   10    10  
• Reviewing articles for publication   10   10    10  
Total CPD points recommended / year  80   50    60  
Total CPD points required over 3 years  240   150             180 
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Definitions For Determining CPD Points  
1. Professional Practice  
A CAA Member’s professional practice is deemed to be all “avalanche related 
activities” as defined in the CAA’s Bylaws, as may be amended from time to time. 
The professional practice year is January 1 to December 31  
One CPD point is earned for each day of professional practice, to a maximum of 50 
points per year for Practicing Professional Members and 30 points per year for Non-
practicing Professional and Active Members.  
2. Formal Learning Activities  
 Formal learning activities are avalanche related educational or training programs 
such as:  
• University, technical institute and college courses  
• Industry sponsored courses, programs and seminars  
• Structured employer-sponsored training programs  
• Short courses sponsored by technical societies, industry or educational institutions  
• CAATS courses and other CAA sponsored programs  
One CPD point is earned for every hour in attendance at the course or program.  
For courses offering Continuing Education Units (CEUs), each CEU will be worth 
10 CPD points. A maximum of 30 CPD points per year may be earned for formal 
learning activities.  
3. Informal Learning Activities  
 These are learning activities which expand avalanche knowledge, skills or judgment, 
but which are not normally offered as structured educational or training programs. 
Examples include:  
• Attendance at conferences, technical sessions, seminars, workshops and industry 
trade shows.  
• Attendance at meetings of technical, professional or managerial associations or 
societies.  
• Self directed study.  
One CPD point is earned for each hour of informal learning activity, to a maximum 
of 20 CPD points per year.  
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4. Participation  
These activities enhance professional development by promoting peer interaction and 
providing exposure to new ideas and technologies. Examples include:  
• Acting as a mentor to a less experienced member or to a member-in-training  
• Service on public bodies that draw on a member’s professional expertise (for 
example, planning boards, review panels, investigative commissions, coroners' 
inquiries, etc.)  
• Service on standing or ad hoc committees of technical, professional or managerial 
associations or societies  
One CPD point is earned for each hour of participation, to a maximum of 10 CPD 
points per year, except for committee service, where a maximum of 20 CPD points 
per year may be earned.  
5. Presentations  
Activities in this category include formal avalanche related presentations that 
members make, requiring preparation and presentation of original material. They 
may occur:  
• At a conference or meeting  
• At a course, workshop or seminar  
• Within an organization/company  
• At an event sponsored by a technical or professional organization  
One CPD point is earned for each hour for preparation and delivery of presentations, 
to a maximum of 20 CPD points per year.  
6. Contributions to Knowledge  
Activities in this category include expanding the knowledge base of science, 
technical knowledge or best practice relating to avalanche safety. Activities may 
include:  
• Development of published codes and standards.  
One CPD point is earned for each hour of committee work developing published 
codes and standards to a maximum of 10 points per year.  
• Publication of papers in a peer-reviewed scientific or technical journal.  
Fifteen CPD points are earned for each peer reviewed paper published.  
• Publication of articles in a non-reviewed journal  
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Ten CPD points are earned for each non-reviewed article published.  
• Reviewing articles for publication  
One CPD point is earned for each hour spent reviewing articles for publication. A 
maximum of 10 CPD points may be claimed for this activity per year.  
• Editing papers for publication  
One CPD point is earned for each hour spent editing papers for publication. A 
maximum of 10 CPD points may be claimed for this activity per year.  
 * A maximum of 30 CPD points per year may be claimed for contributions to 
knowledge.  
Practicing and Non-practicing Professional Members  
A Member that has been a Practising Professional Member in good standing for at 
least five (5) years, shall be eligible to be a Non-practising Professional Member if 
the Member’s occupation has altered so that he is no longer directly engaged in 
avalanche-related activities, or is not sufficiently engaged to be able to comply with 
the terms and conditions for Continuing Professional Development for Practising 
Professional Membership, provided that the Member is able to comply with the 
terms and conditions for Continuing Professional Development for Non-practising 
Professional Members as stated in this policy document.  
Members Declaration of CPD Category  
As part of their annual membership renewal, Practicing Professional, Non-practicing 
Professional and Active members will declare the membership category for which 
they are earning CPD points at the start of each calendar (membership) year.  
“Career Recess” Status  
A Professional or Active Member who is currently not engaged in avalanche related 
activities as defined in the bylaws, is registered as a full-time student, on extended 
jury duty, or on medical or parental leave may declare themselves to be in career 
recess.  
A Member who has declared themselves to be in career recess is not be required to 
comply with the terms and conditions for CPD, is exempt from Membership 
Committee audit for CPD compliance, and remains a Member in good standing of 
the Canadian Avalanche Association as long as they maintain all other requirements 
of membership.  
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When a Member declares to have resumed avalanche related activities the 
Member will be required to comply fully with the CPD program, and the time that 
they declared themselves to be in career recess will be exempted from consideration 
in any subsequent audit for CPD program compliance.  
A Member who has declared career recess status for a consecutive period of time 
greater than two years or has been in career recess status for more than two of the 
past six years is deemed to have failed to comply with the CAA’s CPD program, and 
may become a Member in good standing of the CAA at a reduced level of 
membership as defined in the bylaws.  
 
 
 
